EST OF PAMELA ANN PONTE V ROBERT FRANCIS PONTE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ESTATE OF PAMELA ANN PONTE,
UNPUBLISHED
October 12, 2010
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 292081
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 04-002966-DM
ROBERT FRANCIS PONTE,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: MURPHY, C.J., and HOEKSTRA and STEPHENS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, who is an attorney representing himself, appeals as of right two orders entered
by the trial court, each of which required defendant to pay sanctions in the amount of $500.
Defendant argues that there is no legal authority to impose the sanctions, that MCR 2.114 does
not support the sanction orders, and that the imposition of the sanctions violated his due process
rights. Defendant also argues on appeal that the trial court is biased against him and should be
disqualified from presiding over any further proceedings. We reject defendant’s arguments and
affirm.
Whether the trial court has the authority to impose a sanction is a question of law subject
to review de novo. Persichini v William Beaumont Hosp, 238 Mich App 626, 637; 607 NW2d
100 (1999). The exercise of a court’s inherent power to sanction “may be disturbed only upon a
finding that there has been a clear abuse of discretion.” Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich
372, 388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006). When a court makes a decision that falls within a range of
reasonable and principled outcomes, there is no abuse of discretion. Id.
Assuming that the trial court did not have the authority to impose the sanctions against
defendant pursuant to MCR 2.114, as cited in one of the court’s orders, we find that the trial
court had the inherent authority to sanction defendant as it did on the basis of his conduct and
filings. In Maldonado, 476 Mich at 375-376, our Supreme Court observed:
In this case we consider the essential authority of trial courts to control the
proceedings before them. The issue in this case pertains to the extent of a trial
court's authority to govern the conduct of counsel and their clients in court
proceedings. Where the Michigan Constitution authorizes us to make rules to
govern court proceedings, the authority to enforce those rules inescapably
follows. At the heart of preserving an organized polity, we must attend to relevant
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issues, including concerns over belligerent, antagonistic, or incompetent
lawyering. To this end, we affirm the authority of trial courts to impose sanctions
appropriate to contain and prevent abuses so as to ensure the orderly operation of
justice.
We reiterate that trial courts possess the inherent authority to sanction
litigants and their counsel . . . . This power is not governed so much by rule or
statute, but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs
so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. [Citations
omitted.]
The trial court has the inherent authority to impose a sanction on the basis of a party’s or
attorney’s misconduct. Farmers Ins Exch v Kurzmann, 257 Mich App 412, 424; 668 NW2d 199
(2003); Persichini, 238 Mich App at 639.
Here, the record shows that defendant repeatedly filed motions to disqualify the trial
court, which were rejected by both the presiding judge and chief judge, along with motions for
reconsideration following the denials, which were also rejected. The denial of a motion to
disqualify did not stop defendant from simply filing another motion to disqualify in which he
raised the same arguments previously presented. As indicated by the presiding judge and chief
judge, defendant’s complaints and demands for disqualification merely reflected dissatisfaction
with the court’s rulings.
The trial court indicated in its orders that it attempted to be patient with defendant and
refrained from imposing sanctions relative to the repeated motions to disqualify, but the court
concluded that its patience apparently only served to inspire greater efforts by defendant to seek
disqualification.
Throughout the lower court proceedings, defendant was repeatedly ordered to pay
plaintiff’s attorney fees associated with myriad motions filed by defendant, despite his claims
that opposing counsel was a habitual liar. Defendant’s conduct giving rise to the payment of
attorney fees was characterized as vexatious and wrongful by the trial court. The presiding judge
and chief judge found that defendant’s filings were often not in compliance with the court rules.
With respect to the numerous motions filed by defendant, the trial court found that they violated
the standards in MCR 2.114(D). The court also remarked that defendant filed multiple
objections, demands, notices, and statements that were not paid for as motions and did not serve
as motions, yet they managed to find their way to the court’s office. The court noted that
defendant was using every means possible, such as fax and personal delivery, to deliver
documents and letters to the court. The trial court commented that defendant’s filings consisted
of opinions and harangues and that his willful disregard of the court rules and professional
standards was unexcusable.
What is most alarming to us, and which supports the imposition of the sanctions under
the inherent-power doctrine and not MCR 2.114, is defendant’s unprofessional, disrespectful,
and uncivil attitude toward the trial court during the proceedings as reflected in various
documents filed with the court. Defendant repeatedly accused the court of living in a “fantasy
world,” of indulging in “fantasies” as to the proceedings and in making rulings, of having “a
defect in her mental process,” of inventing bizarre issues, of being “incompetent to judge this or
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any legal matter,” of failing to comprehend or understand simple concepts, issues, and directions,
and of being delusional and irrational. Defendant remarked that the trial court’s “persistent
delusional and irrational thought process show her persistent incompetence.” Defendant also
stated in a court filing that the judge’s “fantasy will make this remand a career case for her, as
fantasy issue breeds fantasy issue.”
Defendant’s belligerent and antagonistic behavior and remarks are simply unacceptable
and cannot be tolerated within our system of law, especially from a defendant who is an officer
of the court. MRPC 3.5(c) provides that a lawyer “shall not engage in undignified and
discourteous conduct toward the tribunal.” If defendant was unhappy with the trial court’s
rulings on various matters, and we take no position on those matters, there is an appellate process
that can be utilized, as opposed to a campaign of insults and derogatory remarks aimed at the
trial court. Additionally, we find no merit in defendant’s associated due process claim.
Finally, with respect to defendant’s request to disqualify the trial court in regard to
further proceedings, defendant has failed to overcome the heavy presumption of judicial
impartiality, Van Buren Charter Twp v Garter Belt, Inc, 258 Mich App 594, 598; 673 NW2d 111
(2003), and he has not established personal and extrajudicial bias or prejudice, Cain v Dep’t of
Corrections, 451 Mich 470, 495-496; 548 NW2d 210 (1996). Defendant alleges that the trial
court’s adverse decisions and failure to resolve the so-called simple remand issue are evidence of
bias against him. However, judicial rulings are almost never sufficient as a valid basis for
allegations of bias, unless the judicial opinion displays a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism
that would make fair judgment impossible. Gates v Gates, 256 Mich App 420, 440; 664 NW2d
231 (2003). Defendant has not established such a level of favoritism or antagonism. Indeed, we
find that the trial court exercised a great deal of restraint in dealing with defendant.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
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