IN RE J J CORBIN MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
September 30, 2010
In the Matter of J. J. CORBIN, Minor.
No. 296397
St. Clair Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 04-000586-NA
Before: GLEICHER, P.J., and ZAHRA and K. F. KELLY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from a circuit court order terminating his
parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper
care or custody) and (j) (the child is likely to be harmed if returned to the parent’s home). We
affirm.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that § 19b(3)(j) was established by clear and
convincing legally admissible evidence. MCR 3.977(E)(3) and (K); In re Utrera, 281 Mich App
1, 16-17; 761 NW2d 253 (2008). The child had been in and out of foster care since his birth in
2004, in part because of the mother’s mental health and substance abuse problems. Respondent
was the child’s appointed physical custodian. Despite knowing the risk of harm the mother
posed to the child because of her history of prior terminations, her history of unstable housing,
and her mental health and substance abuse issues, respondent abandoned his obligations to the
child and allowed the mother to assume physical custody and did so at a time when she had just
been released from a psychiatric facility and was in the early stages of substance abuse treatment.
Even after respondent became aware that the mother had left Sacred Heart, which meant that she
was no longer actively involved in substance abuse treatment, the record reflects that respondent
only made a half-hearted effort to locate the child and did not seek police assistance until the
police were already investigating the mother for a home invasion. Such evidence clearly showed
that respondent was too willing to risk the child’s welfare when it suited him to do so. Further,
this was not a one-time lapse of judgment. The evidence also showed that respondent had
resumed cohabitation with the mother sometime after the guardianship ended and allowed her to
resume the role of the child’s primary caretaker. Therefore, we conclude that based on
respondent’s conduct, it was reasonably likely that the child would be harmed if returned to
respondent’s custody. Because termination was proper under § 19b(3)(j), any error regarding §
19b(3)(g) was harmless. In re Powers, 244 Mich App 111, 118; 624 NW2d 472 (2000).
Respondent’s claim that termination requires proof of child neglect for the long-term
future is without merit. At one time, MCL 712A.19a(e) authorized termination of parental rights
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if the parent was “unable to provide a fit home for the child by reason of neglect.” In Fritts v
Krugh, 354 Mich 97, 114; 92 NW2d 604 (1958), overruled on other grounds by In re Hatcher,
443 Mich 426, 444; 505 NW2d 834 (1993), the Court stated that while evidence of temporary
neglect was sufficient to allow a court to take jurisdiction over a child, “the entry of an order for
permanent custody due to neglect must be based upon testimony of such a nature as to establish
or seriously threaten neglect of the child for the long-run future.” That holding was followed in
In re Riffe, 147 Mich App 658, 671-672; 382 NW2d 842 (1985), the case cited by respondent.
However, § 19b(3), enacted 30 years after Fritts was decided, now governs termination. The
various subsections do not specifically refer to “neglect” but identify parental conduct and
circumstances that justify termination of parental rights. For example, § 19b(3)(g) permits
termination upon proof of circumstances consistent with neglect that will not be remedied
“within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.” Subsection 19b(3)(j) has nothing to do
with neglect of the child’s needs but permits termination because the child’s safety is at risk.
Therefore, petitioner was not required to prove that respondent would neglect his child for the
long-term future.
Further, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondent’s
parental rights was in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341,
354, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Although there was evidence that respondent loved his
son and that they were bonded, the evidence demonstrated that respondent was unwilling to
make the commitment to assume the role as the child’s primary caregiver. The child had
repeatedly been in and out of foster care since his birth and was in need of stability, which
respondent was unwilling to provide. Therefore, the trial court did not err in terminating
respondent’s parental rights to the child.
Affirmed.
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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