AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSN V FRANCINE SCOTT
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION,
UNPUBLISHED
September 30, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 291911
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 07-713613-NF
FRANCINE SCOTT,
Defendant,
and
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: WILDER, P.J., and CAVANAGH and M. J. KELLY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
At issue in this appeal is whether defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange (“Farmers”) is
liable for no-fault personal injury protection (“PIP”) benefits for two individuals who were
injured while occupying a vehicle owned by defendant Francine Scott. Farmers insured the
vehicle under a no-fault policy issued to Willie Sims. The trial court granted Farmers’ motion
for summary disposition and dismissed plaintiff Auto Club Insurance Association’s claim for
reimbursement of PIP benefits from Farmers on the ground that Farmers’ policy did not provide
coverage for the injured individuals. Plaintiff appeals as of right. We reverse the order of
summary disposition in favor of Farmers and remand for entry of an order of partial summary
disposition in favor of plaintiff and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
The underlying facts are not in dispute. Farmers issued a no-fault insurance policy for a
2000 Dodge Caravan. The named insured was Willie Sims, but the vehicle was actually owned
by Sims’ daughter, Francine Scott, who resided with her son, Vernest Scott, and his wife, Kim
Scott. Sims did not reside with Francine. According to Francine, the vehicle was insured in
Sims’ name in order to take advantage of a discounted rate. In May 2006, the vehicle was
involved in an accident while being used by Vernest and Kim Scott, with Francine’s permission.
Vernest and Kim filed claims for no-fault PIP benefits with the Michigan Assigned Claims
Facility (MACF) and their claims were assigned to plaintiff. Plaintiff thereafter filed this action
against Francine and Farmers, seeking reimbursement of the PIP benefits it had paid to Vernest
and Kim. In its answer to the complaint, Farmers admitted that the vehicle was covered by a no-1-
fault policy on the date of the accident. Farmers later moved for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(10) on the ground that the injured claimants did not qualify for PIP benefits
under MCL 500.3114. Plaintiff opposed the motion and sought summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(I)(2) on the ground that the insurance policy issued to Sims established the injured
claimants’ entitlement to PIP benefits from Farmers. The trial court determined that the policy
did not provide coverage for the injured claimants and granted Farmers’ motion.
We review de novo a trial court’s decision regarding a motion for summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). Auto-Owners Ins Co v Martin, 284 Mich App 427, 433; 773
NW2d 29 (2009). “Summary disposition should be granted only where the evidence fails to
establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact.” Id. We also review de novo whether an
insurance policy is ambiguous. Id. at 434. Although an insurance policy is governed by
principles of contract interpretation, mandatory statutory provisions must be read into the policy.
Id. at 433-435. Contractual language is ambiguous only where two provisions irreconcilably
conflict, or a term is equally susceptible to more than one meaning. Coates v Bastian Bros, Inc,
276 Mich App 498, 503; 741 NW2d 539 (2007).
We conclude that the trial court erred in finding that Farmers’ insurance policy did not
provide coverage for the injured claimants. The insurance policy provides coverage for PIP
benefits for an “insured person,” which is defined, in pertinent part, as “any other person
occupying your insured car.” Because the parties do not dispute that the injured claimants
qualify as “any other person occupying,” we turn to the policy’s definition of “your insured car.”
The policy provides:
Your Insured Car means the vehicle described in the declarations for
which the Liability Insurance of this policy applies, and which security under the
provisions of the Code is required; or a motor vehicle to which the Liability
Insurance of this policy applies, if it does not have the security required by the
Code, and is operated but not owned by you or a family member. [Emphasis
added.]
We agree with plaintiff that the Dodge Caravan that the injured claimants were using at
the time of the accident qualifies as “your insured car” under the first part of this definition.
There is no dispute that the Dodge Caravan is described in the declarations and that the liability
insurance applies to it. The material question is whether the phrase “and which security under
the provisions of the Code is required” is linked to the Dodge Caravan, as argued by plaintiff, or
to any owners or registrants of the vehicle, as argued by Farmers based on the security
requirements of MCL 500.3101(1). We agree with plaintiff’s argument.
Although we agree that the word “Code,” as defined in the general definitions section of
the insurance policy, refers to the no-fault act, the requirements of the no-fault act are not
dispositive of the meaning of the disputed phrase, inasmuch as policy provisions that do not
directly conflict with the no-fault act are permitted. See Doss v Citizens Ins Co of America, 146
Mich App 510, 512-514; 381 NW2d 409 (1985). Here, Farmers has not established any conflict.
The disputed phrase commences with the word “and,” which is defined as “with; as well
as; in addition to” when “used to connect grammatically coordinate, words, phrases, or clauses.”
Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997), p 49; see, also, Karaczewski v Farbman
-2-
Stein & Co, 478 Mich 28, 33; 732 NW2d 56 (2007) (word “and” generally reflects that both
requirements must be satisfied), and Singer v American States Ins, 245 Mich App 370, 377; 631
NW2d 34 (2001) (absent a clearly defined definition in an insurance policy, a policy term is
given its commonly understood meaning). Examined in its grammatical context, the phrase “and
which security under the Code is required” unambiguously links the required security to the
vehicle, regardless of who provides it. Cf. Iqbal v Bristol West Ins Group, 278 Mich App 31, 39;
748 NW2d 574 (2008) (MCL 500.3113(b), as construed in its grammatical context, linked the
required security for a person to avoid being disqualified from PIP benefits to the vehicle).
Indeed, while not dispositive of our construction of the policy, this result is consistent with the
facts of this case, which involve the issuance of an insurance policy to an individual, Sims, who
was not required to insure the Dodge Caravan under MCL 500.3101(1).
We conclude that the well-established rule that PIP coverage applies to the insured
person, Amerisure Ins Co v Coleman, 274 Mich App 432, 438; 733 NW2d 93 (2007), is
immaterial to how the disputed provision of the insurance policy should be construed. To the
extent that Farmers views its dispute with plaintiff as one involving a priority dispute, and not
merely whether the insurance policy provides coverage for the injured claimants, we conclude
that this case does not present any priority issue because plaintiff, as an MACF assignee, would
be an insurer of last priority. MCL 500.3172(1); Bronson Methodist Hosp v Allstate Ins Co, 286
Mich App 219, 225; 779 NW2d 304 (2009), lv pending. Although MCL 500.3114 also contains
priority provisions in the sense that it defines when a particular insurer is liable for PIP benefits,
Dobbelaere v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 275 Mich App 527, 531-532, n 1; 740 NW2d 503 (2007),
where, as in this case, there is evidence that an injured claimant operated the motor vehicle, the
language of the insurance policy is appropriately considered to determine the insurer’s liability.
MCL 500.3114(4)(b); Amerisure Ins Co, 274 Mich App at 436-437. Therefore, Farmers has not
established any basis for avoiding liability for PIP benefits based on the no-fault act’s priority
provisions for insurers.
In sum, we conclude that the meaning of “insured person” in Farmers’ insurance policy
unambiguously includes the injured claimants because they both qualify as “any other person
occupying your insured car.” Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order of summary
disposition in favor of Farmers and remand for entry of an order of partial summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(I)(2) in favor of plaintiff with respect to this contractual issue.
Reversed and remanded for entry of an order of partial summary disposition in favor of
plaintiff and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.