IN RE A R HUDSON MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
September 23, 2010
In the Matter of A. R. HUDSON and T. J.
YOUNGER, JR., Minors.
No. 296685
Genesee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 07-122851-NA
In the Matter of A. R. HUDSON, Minor.
No. 296793
Genesee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 07-122851-NA
Before: WILDER, P.J., and CAVANAGH and M. J. KELLY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In Docket No. 296685, respondent Huddleston appeals as of right from a circuit court
order terminating her parental rights to the minor children, apparently pursuant to MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j). In Docket No. 296793, respondent Hudson appeals as of
right from the same circuit court order, which also terminated his parental rights to A.R.,
apparently pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), (h), and (j). We affirm the
termination of respondent Huddleston’s parental rights in Docket No. 296885, reverse the
termination of respondent Hudson’s parental rights in Docket No. 296793, and remand for
further proceedings with respect to respondent Hudson.
Both respondents argue that the trial court erred in finding that a statutory ground for
termination was established by clear and convincing evidence. Although the trial court did not
specify the statutory basis or bases for its order, contrary to MCR 3.977(I)(3), it appears that the
court relied on the grounds requested in the supplemental petition, which requested termination
of respondent Huddleston’s parental rights pursuant to §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j), and
requested termination of respondent Hudson’s parental rights pursuant to §§ 19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i),
(c)(ii), (g), (h), and (j).
We agree that clear and convincing evidence supported termination of respondent
Huddleston’s parental rights to A.R. Hudson under §§ 19b(3)(c)(ii), (g), and (j), and supported
termination of her parental rights to T.J. Younger under §§ 19b(c)(i) and (j). The evidence
showed that respondent Huddleston had a serious substance abuse problem that had been treated
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when A.R. first entered foster care in 2007. Respondent Huddleston thereafter relapsed and was
using cocaine when A.R. again entered foster care in July 2008, and when T.J. entered foster
care in September 2008. Respondent Huddleston was noncompliant with services that were
provided to treat her addiction and, at the February 2010 termination hearing, admitted that she
was not ready to resume custody of the children because “I’m not fully recovered of my cocaine
addiction yet.”
Respondent Huddleston’s unresolved substance abuse problem and
noncompliance with other services supports termination under the cited statutory grounds.
Therefore, any error in relying on the additional statutory grounds for termination that were cited
in the petition was harmless. In re Powers Minors, 244 Mich App 111, 118; 624 NW2d 472
(2000).
With respect to the children’s best interests, the trial court applied an incorrect legal
standard when it determined that termination of respondent Huddleston’s parental rights was
“clearly not contrary to th[e] children’s best interests.” MCL 712A.19b(5) formerly provided
that once a court found a statutory basis for termination, it “shall order termination of parental
rights . . . unless the court finds that termination of parental rights to the child is clearly not in the
child’s best interests.” However, the statute was amended by 2008 PA 199, effective July 11,
2008, to require the court to affirmatively find that termination of parental rights is in the child’s
best interests. Nonetheless, respondent Huddleston does not challenge the trial court’s reliance
on the pre-amendment version of § 19b(5), and the record clearly shows that termination of
respondent Huddleston’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. A.R. had been in
foster care for all but three months of his life and T.J. had been in foster care all of his life.
Respondent Huddleston had not made any progress in overcoming her substance abuse problem
and the children were no closer to being returned to her care than they had been when they were
originally removed approximately 18 months before the hearing. Under the circumstances, the
evidence clearly established that termination of respondent Huddleston’s parental rights was in
the children’s best interests and the trial court’s reliance on an erroneous legal standard was
harmless. MCR 2.613(A).
Turning to respondent Hudson, we conclude that the trial court clearly erred in finding
that termination was warranted under any of the statutory grounds alleged in the petition. The
main issues concerning respondent Hudson were his criminal history and the fact that he had
been continuously incarcerated since A.R. entered foster care in July 2008. Termination was not
warranted under § 19b(3)(a)(ii) because there was no evidence that respondent Hudson
intentionally or willfully absented himself from the child’s life. See In re B & J, 279 Mich App
12, 18-19 n 3; 756 NW2d 234 (2008).
Termination was not warranted under § 19b(3)(c)(ii) because petitioner did not present
any evidence of conditions apart from those leading to the adjudication relative to respondent
Hudson that would have caused A.R. to come within the court’s jurisdiction.
Termination was not warranted under § 19b(3)(j) because there was no evidence that
respondent had ever committed a crime against, or had otherwise harmed, A.R. or another child.
See In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 165; 782 NW2d 747 (2010).
Finally, termination was not warranted under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (g), or (h). Despite
petitioner’s failure to offer services to respondent after A.R. entered foster care in July 2008,
there was evidence that respondent completed parenting classes and anger management classes
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in prison and also participated in substance abuse classes. He had arranged for a job upon his
release from prison, which was due to occur in less than two weeks after the termination hearing.
Such evidence indicated that respondent’s incarceration would be rectified, and that respondent
would be available to plan for the child and provide custody within a reasonable time. See In re
Mason, 486 Mich at 164-165. See, also, In re Kleyla, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___
(Docket No. 294776, issued July 15, 2010), slip op at 5-6. Thus, the trial court clearly erred in
terminating respondent Hudson’s parental rights to A.R. Accordingly, we reverse the order
terminating respondent Hudson’s parental rights to A.R. and remand for further proceedings with
respect to respondent Hudson.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
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