PEOPLE OF MI V MICHAEL POWELL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 23, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 293434
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 08-010799-FH
MICHAEL POWELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: WILDER, P.J., and CAVANAGH and M. J. KELLY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Michael Powell appeals as of right his jury conviction of deserting or
abandoning his minor children without providing necessary and proper support (child desertion).
See MCL 750.161(1). The trial court sentenced defendant to serve five years on probation and
ordered him to pay $67,968 in restitution. The primary issues on appeal are whether the trial
court erred when it permitted the prosecution to present evidence concerning Powell’s history of
child support payments and whether the trial court exceeded the scope of its authority to order
restitution by ordering Powell to pay back child support for periods outside the charging period.
Because we conclude that there were no errors warranting relief, we affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2006, the prosecution charged Powell with two counts of child desertion. The first
count alleged that Powell failed to provide necessary and proper support for his minor daughters,
Gabrielle and Elizabeth, from January 1, 1990 through July 4, 1991. The second count alleged
that Powell failed to provide necessary and proper support for Elizabeth, who was still a minor,
from January 1, 1992 through January 23, 1995.
Jessie Allen testified that she was Powell’s former wife and that they were married from
1967 through early 1980. Allen stated that she and Powell had two children: Gabrielle, who was
born in 1974, and Elizabeth, who was born in 1978.
Powell injured his back in late 1978 or early 1979 while at work. Allen said that Powell
left her in 1979, but that she would still see him on occasion. In 1979, Powell had surgery to
correct his back injury and Allen learned that Powell had a girlfriend when she ran into her at the
hospital. Allen filed for divorce in late 1979 and the court entered a judgment of divorce in
1980. As part of the judgment of divorce, the court ordered Powell to pay $54 per week in child
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support for Gabrielle and another $54 per week for Elizabeth. The court also ordered Powell to
purchase health insurance for the girls.
Allen testified that Powell did not visit the children from the time he left until he resumed
contact with the children on July 5, 1991. She also said that, during this period, Powell provided
no care in any fashion for his children: he provided no money, no shelter, no food, no clothing,
no medical care, and no health insurance. She also stated that, although Powell promised to pay
her a portion of his worker’s compensation settlement, he did not. Indeed, she stated that, after a
child support payment he told her that he “wouldn’t pay a penny.” She said he also never
contacted the girls on birthdays, Christmas, or other holidays during this period. Allen testified
that she was forced to obtain various forms of state provided welfare in order to provide for her
children throughout this period.
In July 1991, Powell reestablished contact with his daughters. Thereafter, Gabrielle and
Elizabeth would visit with their father about twice per year; they would visit once in the summer
and again around Christmas. Allen admitted that Powell began to send her weekly checks for
$108 in June of 1992 and that some of those checks had child support written in the memo line.
Starting in October 1992, which was after Gabrielle turned 18, Powell began sending checks for
$54, which continued through December 1992 or January 1993. Thereafter, she received some
child support payments from Powell through the Friend of the Court system.
Dean Garber testified that he was an investigator and record keeper with Wayne County
Friend of the Court. He stated that he was familiar with the child support records for this case
and that the records indicated that Powell did not make any child support payments in 1990.
Garber said that Powell made $826 in payments in 1991, but received credit for around $1100
after Powell’s tax refund was intercepted. He said that Powell made no payments to the Friend
of the Court in 1992, but was aware that Powell made $1944 in direct payments. Garber stated
that Powell should have paid $4400 in 1991 and another $4400 in 1992. As of the end of 1992,
Powell should have made $65,000 in payments, which did not include surcharges. Garber said
that Powell also paid $2496 in 1993, $2731 in 1994, and $2012 in 1995.
Elizabeth Becker testified that she was Powell’s daughter by Allen. Becker stated that
she had no contact with her father until she was 11. She said that her father and his newest wife
came to visit her in 1991 and that, thereafter, she would visit her father a couple of times per
week. When she visited her father, he would not take time off and she would end up spending
95% of the time with his wife. She said her father played no role in her life from the time he left
until she turned 18 and did not attend her graduation or wedding. She admitted that, after they
reconnected in 1991, she would occasionally call and ask him for money or clothing. She
explained that she wanted to wear the current styles that those worn by her friends, but that her
mother could not afford to buy such clothing. She stated that he would sometimes send the
requested money or clothing.
Lisa Powell testified that she was Powell’s third wife and that they were married from
1986 to 2006. She stated that, although she had no records, she did send checks for child support
to the Friend of the Court on her husband’s behalf. She said she made the payments from 1986
onward, but that the bank only kept checks for seven years. In 1991, she began to send the
checks directly to Allen, but discontinued this practice after her and her husband’s income tax
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refund was intercepted. She stated that they spent time with the girls after 1991 and that they
took the girls shopping and bought them clothing and things for school.
Powell testified that Gabrielle and Elizabeth were his daughters. He stated that for a time
after his injury he could not pay support, but that after 1986 he regularly paid child support to the
Friend of the Court except for a time where he paid Allen directly. He stated that, after he
reconnected with his daughters in 1991, he would spend time with them, which included
shopping and participating in activities.
At the close of proofs, the jury found Powell guilty of deserting Gabrielle and Elizabeth
from January 1, 1990 through July 4, 1991, but found him not guilty of deserting Elizabeth from
January 1, 1992 through January 23, 1995.
The trial court later sentenced Powell to serve five years on probation and to pay $65,968
in restitution.
Powell now appeals.
II. EVIDENTIARY ERRORS
A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Powell first argues that the trial court erred when it permitted the prosecution to present
evidence that Powell failed to pay the child support ordered by the court after his divorce from
Allen. Specifically, Powell argues that the failure to pay child support is actually a violation of
MCL 750.165 and, because the period of limitations for that offense had passed, the prosecution
could not present any evidence of that offense. This Court reviews a trial court’s evidentiary
decisions for an abuse of discretion. People v Yost, 278 Mich App 341, 352; 749 NW2d 753
(2008). However, because this claim of error was not properly preserved on the record, this
Court will review the claim for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Carines, 460
Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
B. ANALYSIS
The statutes setting out periods of limitation for criminal offenses do not govern the
admission of evidence at trial; rather, the rules of evidence govern the proper admission of
evidence. MRE 101; MRE 1101. Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible at trial. MRE
402; Yost, 278 Mich App at 355. Relevant evidence is evidence that has “any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” MRE 401.
In this case, the prosecution had to prove that Powell deserted and abandoned Gabrielle
and Elizabeth when they were under 17 years of age, that he did so “without providing necessary
and proper shelter, food, care, and clothing for them,” and that he had “sufficient ability” to
provide the necessary and proper shelter, food, care, and clothing. MCL 750.161(1). One way
that a parent can provide necessary and proper shelter, food, care, and clothing is by providing
financial support to the person or persons who have custody of the child. And a support order is
presumably for an amount that will cover the basic needs of the child on whose behalf the order
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is made. If Powell had been complying with the court’s order of support during the relevant
charging period, that compliance would have been substantial evidence that he was providing the
necessary and proper care. Thus, in order to meet its evidentiary burden, the prosecution had to
present evidence that, for the period at issue, Powell either did not make the child support
payments that had been ordered or made insufficient payments to provide his children with the
necessary and proper shelter, food, care, and clothing. Accordingly, the evidence concerning
Powell’s child support payment history was quite relevant and, for that reason, admissible. MRE
401; MRE 402.
We also do not share Powell’s belief that the prosecution’s decision to pursue charges
under MCL 750.161 was unjust because the prosecution was otherwise time-barred from
pursuing charges under MCL 750.165. With these two criminal statutes, the Legislature sought
to penalize related but distinct wrongs: with MCL 750.165, the Legislature criminalized the
failure to make full and timely child support payments as ordered by a court, whereas with MCL
750.161 the Legislature criminalized the failure to provide necessary and proper support for
one’s children without regard to whether the parent had been ordered to do so. Indeed, the
failure to make a single child support payment could give rise to a conviction under MCL
750.165 even though the person ordered to make child support payments otherwise provided the
necessary and proper support for his or her children. See MCL 750.161(1). Hence, there is
nothing manifestly unjust about charging a parent with child desertion premised in part on a
parent’s failure to pay child support over a period of time without charging the parent with the
failure to pay child support. Moreover, this Court has recognized that prosecutor’s have broad
discretion in determining what charges to bring where a defendant’s conduct could plausibly
support multiple charges. See People v Barksdale, 219 Mich App 484, 487; 556 NW2d 521
(1996). And, although this Court does have a limited ability to review such discretionary
decisions, Powell’s subjective belief that it was unfair for the prosecutor to bring charges under
MCL 750.161 after the passage of the applicable period of limitation for a charge under MCL
750.165 is not a sufficient basis for review. Id. at 489 (noting that the defendant’s argument that
it was “unfair” under the circumstances for the prosecutor to bring felony charges rather than
misdemeanor charges was not the type of unconstitutional, illegal, or ultra vires conduct that
would justify review of the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion).
The trial court did not err in permitting the admission of evidence concerning Powell’s
history of child support payments.
III. RESTITUTION
A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Powell next argues that the trial court erred when it ordered him to pay restitution in the
amount of $67,968. Specifically, Powell argues that the trial court could only order him to pay
restitution for unpaid support for the period of desertion actually found by the jury—that is, for
the desertion of Gabrielle and Elizabeth from January 1, 1990 through July 4, 1991. This Court
reviews de novo the proper interpretation of a statute. People v Martin, 271 Mich App 280, 286287; 721 NW2d 815 (2006). However, this Court reviews a trial court’s order for restitution for
an abuse of discretion. People v Bell, 276 Mich App 342, 345; 741 NW2d 57 (2007).
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B. ANALYSIS
Under MCL 769.1a(2), a trial court must order, “in addition to or in lieu of any other
penalty authorized by law or in addition to any other penalty required by law, that the defendant
make full restitution to any victim of the defendant’s course of conduct that gives rise to the
conviction or to the victim’s estate.” See also MCL 780.766(2). Because restitution is
mandatory, the trial court had to order Powell to pay restitution to any victim who suffered losses
as a result of the “course of conduct” that gave rise to Powell’s conviction. Bell, 276 Mich App
at 347 (noting that restitution is mandatory and, for that reason, not subject to negotiation or plea
bargaining). On appeal, Powell argues that the course of conduct must be limited to the specific
crime for which he was found guilty—namely, the desertion of his children from January 1, 1990
through July 4, 1991. However, our Supreme Court has already rejected this narrow
understanding of the phrase “course of conduct.”
In People v Gahan, 456 Mich 264, 270; 571 NW2d 503 (1997), our Supreme Court
addressed whether the trial court properly ordered restitution for all the victims of the
defendant’s criminal conduct, even though some of the “specific losses were not the factual
predicate for the conviction.” In that case, the defendant had been involved in a scheme whereby
he sold trailers or vehicles on consignment and then told the consignor that he had sold the item
for less than he actually sold it and kept the difference between the actual selling price and that
told to the consignor. Id. at 266-267. A jury later convicted the defendant of embezzlement with
regard to one victim. Id. at 267. At sentencing, a probation officer stated he had spoken to 16
victims and explained that there were originally thought to be as many as 48 victims. Id. at 268.
On the basis of this information, the trial court ordered the defendant to pay $25,000 in
restitution to the known victims and provided that the Parole Board “should determine what each
victim should receive” and “should seek additional restitution if warranted.” Id. at 269. On
appeal, this Court vacated the restitution award because it determined that the trial court could
only order restitution “with respect to a loss caused by the very offense for which [the] defendant
was tried and convicted . . . .” Id.
In analyzing the issue, our Supreme Court noted that resolution depended on the proper
construction of the phrase “course of conduct” under MCL 780.766(2). The Court stated that
this phrase had developed a unique meaning under the common law and that this meaning
carried over to the interpretation of subsequent statutes dealing with the same subject:
Because there was no indication from the Legislature that the common-law
meaning was not being incorporated, this phrase “course of conduct” should be
given the broad meaning the courts had earlier stated. Thus, the defendant should
compensate for all the losses attributable to the illegal scheme that culminated in
his conviction, even though some of the losses were not the factual foundation of
the charge that resulted in conviction. [Id. at 272.]
The Court then concluded that, because the defendant’s scheme “to defraud his customers in the
same or similar manner” fell “within the broad meaning of ‘course of conduct’ contained in the
statute,” the trial court did not err when it ordered the defendant to pay restitution to all his
victims. Id. at 273.
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In this case, there was evidence from which the trial court could conclude by a
preponderance that Powell engaged in a scheme to avoid his obligation to support his own
children and, in that way, forced others—the taxpayers of this state and his former wife—to bear
the burden of supporting his children through to adulthood. See id. at 275-276 (noting that the
proper standard of proof for restitution is a preponderance of the evidence). Accordingly, there
was sufficient evidence to support an order of restitution for the total losses incurred by the state
and Powell’s former wife.1 Further, because the losses were occasioned by his “course of
conduct” in committing the offense for which he was convicted, the trial court had the authority
to order restitution for all the losses notwithstanding that some of the losses occurred outside the
charging period for his specific conviction. See MCL 769.1a(2); MCL 780.766(2); Gahan, 456
Mich at 277.
We also reject Powell’s contention that this Court must follow the holding in People v
Becker, 349 Mich 476; 84 NW2d 833 (1957), and limit the restitution to the losses occasioned by
the very offense for which he was convicted. Our Supreme Court addressed a similar argument
in Gahan and determined that Becker did not control. Gahan, 456 Mich at 274. The Court first
noted that the holding in Becker was not authoritative because it was a plurality decision. Id.
The Court then went on to distinguish Becker on the basis that the facts in that case showed that
the losses were occasioned by negligent conduct rather than the course of conduct giving rise to
the criminal conviction. Id. at 274-275. As was the case in Gahan, the facts in this case
demonstrate that the losses at issue were caused by Powell’s scheme to desert his children—that
is, all the losses were occasioned by Powell’s course of conduct in deserting his children.
Therefore, the trial court had the authority to order restitution for all those losses.2
1
We note that there was evidence to support losses in excess of $120,000, but that the trial court
determined that the amount of restitution should be set at $67,968. On appeal, Powell argues
that the trial court erred to the extent that it ordered restitution in that amount on a variety of
grounds. However, the arguments concerning the amount were not properly raised in the
questions presented, see MCR 7.212(C)(5), and are deficient in both terms of the proffered
analysis and the factual and legal support. Therefore, to the extent that Powell argues that the
trial court erred in setting the amount, we conclude that that argument has been abandoned on
appeal. Martin, 271 Mich App at 315.
2
We also do not agree with Powell’s statement that the trial court lacked the authority to order
him to pay restitution for the charging period at issue with regard to the charge for which he was
found not guilty. The burden of proof for restitution is substantially lower than the burden of
proof necessary to convict a defendant of a crime. Thus, although the jury could reasonably find
that the prosecution failed to prove that Powell deserted Elizabeth from January 1, 1992 through
January 23, 1995, the trial court could just as reasonably find by a preponderance that Powell’s
criminal course of conduct led to losses in the same period. See Gahan, 456 Mich at 275-276.
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There were no errors warranting relief.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
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