IN RE THOMAS LAWRENCE
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In re THOMAS LAWRENCE.
THOMAS LAWRENCE,
UNPUBLISHED
September 21, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 292796
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2009-097068-AS
FIFTY-TWO FOUR DISTRICT COURT,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: FITZGERALD, P.J., and MARKEY and BECKERING, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from a circuit court order denying his motion for summary
disposition, granting summary disposition to defendant pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(1) and (2), and
dismissing his complaint for a writ of superintending control. We affirm. This appeal has been
decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Plaintiff was issued a traffic citation for failing to possess proof of insurance. He
appeared before a district court magistrate who determined that plaintiff admitted responsibility
for not possessing proof of insurance when it was requested by the officer. Because plaintiff had
submitted proof of insurance before his appearance date, the court did not assess any fine or
costs, but assessed a $25 fee as permitted by MCL 257.328(3). Plaintiff sought to appeal the $25
fee, but defendant refused to accept the appeal as of right. Plaintiff thereafter filed this action for
a writ of superintending control to compel defendant to accept his appeal as a matter of right.
Plaintiff thereafter moved for summary disposition. Defendant opposed the motion and
requested judgment in its favor. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion and granted judgment
in favor of defendant.
Summary disposition may be granted under MCR 2.116(I)(1) when “the pleadings show
that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or if the affidavits or other proofs show
that there is no genuine issue of material fact . . . .” Summary disposition may be granted under
MCR 2.116(I)(2) “[i]f it appears to the court that the opposing party, rather than the moving
party, is entitled to judgment . . . .” This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for
summary disposition de novo. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).
-1-
To the extent that plaintiff raises an issue of law, this Court’s review is de novo. Estes v Titus,
481 Mich 573, 578-579; 751 NW2d 493 (2008).
“For superintending control to lie, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant has
failed to perform a clear legal duty and that plaintiff is otherwise without an adequate legal
remedy.” In re Credit Acceptance Corp, 273 Mich App 594, 598; 733 NW2d 65 (2007), aff’d
481 Mich 883 (2008). Plaintiff alleged that defendant had a clear legal duty to process his appeal
as of right pursuant to MCR 4.101(H)(2). However, MCR 4.101(H)(3) specifies that “[t]here is
no appeal of right from an admission of responsibility.”
Although plaintiff argues that he did not intend to admit responsibility at the district court
proceeding, the district court magistrate’s determination that plaintiff admitted responsibility
with an explanation controls whether plaintiff was entitled to appeal as of right under MCR
4.101. The proper method for challenging that decision was to request withdrawal of the
admission that plaintiff claimed was improperly entered, see MCR 4.101(H)(3), not to file an
appeal as of right or a complaint for an order of superintending control to compel acceptance of
an appeal as of right. Indeed, at the suggestion of defendant’s clerk’s office, plaintiff filed a
request to withdraw his admission, which the district court denied. Plaintiff did not pursue
appellate relief from that order. Because the district court’s determination that plaintiff had
admitted responsibility with an explanation made him ineligible for an appeal as of right
pursuant to MCR 4.101(H)(3), defendant did not have a clear legal duty to process his appeal as
of right under MCR 4.101(H) as alleged in plaintiff’s complaint.
We disagree with plaintiff’s argument that the preclusion of an appeal by right from an
admission of responsibility as provided in MCR 4.101(H)(3) conflicts with the right to appeal
“an adverse judgment entered at an informal hearing” afforded by MCL 257.746(5). (Emphasis
added.) An admission of responsibility does not involve an informal hearing. MCL 257.745 sets
forth options for a person who has received a citation. The provisions in that statute that address
admissions of responsibility do not refer to a formal or informal hearing. The provisions that
concern formal and informal hearings apply when a person denies responsibility for a civil
infraction. MCL 257.745(5); MCL 257.746. Because MCL 257.746(5) does not afford the right
to appeal following an admission of responsibility with an explanation, MCL 257.746(5) does
not conflict with MCR 4.101(H)(3).1
Plaintiff also argues that the circuit court violated his due process rights by granting
summary disposition in favor of defendant and dismissing his complaint when defendant had not
filed a motion for summary disposition. We disagree.
“Whether a party has been afforded due process is a question of law.” Al-Maliki v
LaGrant, 286 Mich App 483, 485; 781 NW2d 853 (2009). “Due process is a flexible concept,
the essence of which requires fundamental fairness. The basic requirements of due process in a
1
We note that plaintiff also refers to the Troy city ordinances. But because Troy Ordinance
§§ 2.10e and 2.10f are similar to MCL 257.745 and MCL 257.746, our analysis of the statutes
applies equally to the ordinances.
-2-
civil case include notice of the proceeding and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Id.
Although a trial court has authority to grant summary disposition sua sponte under MCR
2.116(I)(1), the court may not do so in contravention of a party’s due process rights. Al-Maliki,
286 Mich App at 489.
The record does not support plaintiff’s argument that he did not have notice that his case
could potentially be dismissed where he was the only party who had filed a motion for summary
disposition, or that he did not have an opportunity to present reasons why his case should not be
dismissed. The court rules alert parties of the potential for a court to grant judgment in favor of a
party opposing a motion for summary disposition. MCR 2.116(I)(1) and (2). Further, when
defendant specifically requested this relief at the hearing on plaintiff’s motion, the circuit court
asked plaintiff if he wanted to reply. Plaintiff did so. Therefore, plaintiff was not denied his
right to due process.
We also disagree with plaintiff’s argument that it was inappropriate for the circuit court
to rely on plaintiff’s statements at the district court proceeding because those statements were
hearsay and were not admissible under MRE 801(d)(2). Contrary to what plaintiff argues, the
circuit court did not rely on plaintiff’s statements at the district court proceeding for a hearsay
purpose. Hearsay is “a statement, other than the one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” MRE 801.
The circuit court’s analysis did not involve the use of plaintiff’s statements for the truth of the
matters asserted. Plaintiff’s acknowledgement that he did not have proof of insurance when the
police officer stopped him was not considered for the purpose of proving whether plaintiff had
the proof of insurance, but rather for the purpose of proving that he told the district court that he
did not. Because the statements were not considered for a hearsay purpose, the applicability of
MRE 801(d)(2)(A) is immaterial.
Affirmed.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
