PEOPLE OF MI V JAMES GREGORY DENT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 21, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 290832
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2007-216132-FH
JAMES GREGORY DENT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MURRAY, P.J., and DONOFRIO and GLEICHER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his convictions for possession with intent to deliver 50
grams or more, but less that 450 grams of a controlled substance (cocaine), MCL
333.7401(2)(a)(iii); possession of less than 25 grams of a controlled substance (heroin), MCL
333.7403(2)(a)(v); felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f; and possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the
evidence that was seized during the execution of the search warrant because the affidavit
supporting the warrant failed to establish probable cause. We review the trial court’s ultimate
decision regarding a motion to suppress and questions of law involved in that determination de
novo. People v Mullen, 282 Mich App 14, 21; 762 NW2d 170 (2008). The trial court’s findings
of fact are reviewed for clear error. Id.
The magistrate’s determination that the affidavit set out sufficient probable cause to issue
a search warrant is given great deference. People v Keller, 479 Mich 467, 474; 739 NW2d 505
(2007). This Court “ask[s] only whether a reasonably cautious person could have concluded that
there was a ‘substantial basis’ for the finding of probable cause.” People v Unger, 278 Mich
App 210, 243-244; 749 NW2d 272 (2008), quoting People v Russo, 439 Mich 584, 603; 487
NW2d 698 (1992). The magistrate, in determining whether to issue a warrant,
is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him including the ‘veracity’ and
‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place. [Keller, 479 Mich at 475, quoting Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213, 238-239;
103 S Ct 2317; 76 L Ed 2d 527 (1983).]
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“Probable cause does not require certainty. Rather, it requires only a probability or substantial
chance of criminal activity.” People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 111 n 11; 549 NW2d 849
(1996), citing Gates, 462 US at 243-244 n 13. “[T]he threshold inquiry looks at the life cycle of
the evidence sought, given a totality of circumstances, that includes the criminal, the thing
seized, the place to be searched, and, most significantly, the character of the criminal activities
under investigation.” People v McGhee, 255 Mich App 623, 635; 662 NW2d 777 (2003),
quoting Russo, 439 Mich at 603. “The affiant’s experience is relevant to the establishment of
probable cause. Police officers are presumptively reliable . . . .” People v Ulman, 244 Mich App
500, 509; 625 NW2d 429 (2001), citing People v Darwich, 226 Mich App 635, 639; 575 NW2d
44 (1997).
In order to accommodate the Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for searches
undertaken by warrant, both our Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court have
cautioned that (1) “‘courts should not invalidate warrants by interpreting affidavits in a
hypertechnical, rather than commonsense, manner[,]’” and (2) that a “grudging or negative
attitude by reviewing courts towards warrants’ is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment . . . .”
Russo, 439 Mich at 603-604, quoting Gates, 462 US at 236-237.
In the affidavit attached to the search warrant, the officer established his experience and
training in narcotics enforcement and the reliability of the confidential informant. The officer
also averred that he had probable cause to believe that the premises of 240 South Anderson
contained evidence of criminal conduct, i.e., controlled substances including heroin and other
drug-related paraphernalia, based upon the following:
*
*
*
(2) That Affiant has been conducting a continued investigation concerning illegal
drug trafficking at 240 South Anderson . . . . Confidential [sic] informant of
established reliability provided the affiant with true and accurate information
concerning criminal activity at 240 South Anderson.
(3) The affiant has controlled the purchase of heroin from the location once within
the past 48 hours. The controlled purchase was performed with the cooperation of
a confidential informant.
(A) The confidential informant contacted a black male and arranged to purchase
narcotics. Within five minutes after the phone call Ofc. Main observed a black
male exit 240 South Anderson, enter a 1997 Chevrolet Monte Carlo . . . and drive
to the pre-arranged meet location. Once at the pre-arranged meet location affiant
observed the black male conduct a hand-to-hand narcotics transaction with the
confidential informant.
(B) The substance alleged by the informant to be heroin was field-tested by
affiant using the Mecke’s Modified Reagent Tester and a positive reaction was
received for the presence of heroin.
(C) The informant was searched immediately before and after making the
purchase with negative results.
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(D) The affiant observed the confidential informant perform the hand-to-hand
transaction and return to the pre-arranged meet location without stopping at any
other location or having contact with any other persons.
(E) After the purchase had been made affiant identified the individual that sold
the heroin to the confidential informant as Howell James McCullum (DOB
03/18/52).
*
*
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(5) Affiant conducted a Computerized Criminal History search of Howell James
McCullum (DOB 03/18/52). [He] was convicted of felony controlled substancepossession (narc/cocaine) less than 25 grams CFN:. [sic]
We conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that the affidavit provided probable
cause to support the issuance of the search warrant. As detailed above, a highly trained and
qualified narcotics officer stated in the affidavit that he arranged for a drug buy through a reliable
confidential informant who had already provided the officer with “true and accurate information
concerning criminal activity” at the premises. The seller was then contacted, he immediately left
the premises at issue, and went directly to the pre-arranged location and engaged in the sale with
the confidential informant. Tests proved the substance involved in the sale was illegal narcotics,
and subsequent information (provided in the affidavit) revealed that the seller had a prior
conviction for the sale of narcotics. Thus, what was presented to the magistrate was that a
convicted drug dealer was in the house (a house where “criminal activity” was reported by a
reliable informant), that he left the house without stopping to pick up drugs, and sold the drugs to
the informant. Given this information, and affording the appropriate “great deference” entitled
to the magistrate’s decision, we conclude that sufficient probable cause existed to issue the
warrant.
The fact that nothing tied the seller to the house, other than his being present in it
immediately before engaging in the transaction, is of no moment. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that in determining the sufficiency of the affidavit the focus is “not that the
owner of the property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to believe that
specific ‘things’ to be searched for and seized are located on the property . . . .” Zurcher v
Stanford Daily, 436 US 547, 556; 98 S Ct 1970; 56 L Ed 2d 525 (1978). See, also, United States
v Pinson, 321 F3d 558, 564 (CA 6, 2003). Hence, the fact that someone who had just been in the
house had sold drugs to the informant, and had been previously convicted of selling drugs, was
enough to reasonably believe that drugs and associated paraphernalia could be located in the
premises.
Although defendant likens this case to People v David, 119 Mich App 289, 293-296; 326
NW2d 485 (1982), we find that case distinguishable. In that case, the affidavit supporting the
search warrant contained only hearsay statements from an informant and no information about
the reliability or credibility of the informant. Id. at 293-294. In contrast, in the present case the
informant’s credibility and reliability were set forth extensively in the affidavit, including the
fact that the informant had never provided false information in the past and had been confirmed
by other sources, and the informant had participated in over 40 controlled buys and 15 search
warrants had been obtained as a result. The informant was searched before and after the
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controlled buy. The police observed the drug source leave defendant’s residence shortly after the
informant called to arrange the controlled purchase and travel directly to the pre-arranged
location for the transaction. The police observed the “hand to hand” drug transaction between
the informant and the drug source. The affiant indicated that the residence had been under
continued surveillance, and the affiant set forth his lengthy experience in narcotics trafficking
investigation. Thus, the information provided “some indication of the reliability of the buyerinformant so that a conclusion that a purchase actually took place may be legitimately drawn.”
Id. at 295. As noted, we give great deference to the magistrate’s determination regarding
probable cause. Keller, 479 Mich at 474.1
Additionally, in People v Williams, 139 Mich App 104, 107; 360 NW2d 585 (1984),
overruled in part on other grounds in Russo, 439 Mich at 584, this Court distinguished David,
119 Mich App at 295, because the information was stale where the single controlled buy
occurred three days before police attempted to obtain a warrant. In Williams, the affiant used a
confidential informant he had used on seven prior occasions to arrange a controlled purchase of
narcotics from a particular location; the affiant searched the informant before and after the
transaction; the affiant provided the informant with funds for the purchase and observed the
informant enter the location and exit a short time later; and the informant then handed the affiant
the heroin he purchased inside the location. Id. at 105-106. Thus, “the police officer-affiant’s
information regarding the single controlled buy formed a sufficiently substantial basis for the
magistrate’s finding of probable cause to search” the designated location for heroin because there
was probable cause to believe that heroin was located in the house and the information was not
stale when the controlled buy occurred one day before the request for the warrant. Id. at 107108.2
We also hold that, considering the totality of the circumstances, the affidavit was not stale
because the controlled purchase occurred within 48 hours of the warrant request; there was an
indication of continued drug activity and the residence had been under continued surveillance for
such activity; the drug source left the residence shortly after the informant’s call and traveled to
the pre-arranged location for the hand-to-hand drug transaction; the drug source had been
1
We agree with the prosecution that this case is analogous to Keller. In Keller, 479 Mich at 476,
the Michigan Supreme Court held that the presence of marijuana and correspondence in the trash
that was uncovered by police in a trash pull provided a substantial basis to find probable cause to
search the defendants’ home for contraband, regardless of the veracity of an anonymous tip
about illegal activity, because the trash pull provided direct evidence of illegal activity inside the
home and the correspondence linked the trash to the defendants. Id. at 477. The present
circumstances are similar in that the police observed McCullum exit 240 South Anderson almost
immediately after the informant’s call, observed McCullum travel to the pre-arranged location,
and observed him sell narcotics to the informant, which supports that there were narcotics inside
the residence from which McCullum had emerged shortly before.
2
People v McCullum, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued September
17, 2009 (Docket No. 284634), directly on point and is consistent with our conclusion. Although
unpublished opinions of this Court are not binding precedent, they may be considered instructive
or persuasive. MCR 7.215(C)(1); In re Application of Indiana Michigan Power Co, 275 Mich
App 369, 380; 738 NW2d 289 (2007), lv den 480 Mich 1032 (2008).
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convicted of a prior drug-related offense; and the informant had proven reliable on numerous
prior occasions. People v Brown, 279 Mich App 116, 128; 755 NW2d 664 (2008).
The differences between our opinion and that of the dissent are vast. In our view, the
dissent engages in a de novo review critically picking apart what it finds as deficiencies in the
search warrant affidavit. Such a hypertechnical review, however, the law does not allow. See
Russo, 439 Mich at 604 (courts are not to employ hypertechnical review of affidavits, but should
apply commonsense). Additionally, the dissent criticizes the affidavit because it “did not
identify the homeowner or substantiate that someone who lived in the home possessed a criminal
record or a history of drug dealing.” However, as we have already noted, the focus of a search
warrant is not on the people who may or may not reside in the residence; instead, the focus is on
the specific things to be searched or seized that are located on the property. Zurcher, 436 US at
556. Additionally, there does not need to be direct evidence connecting drug trafficking or
transactions to the house being searched, United States v Feliz, 182 F3d 82, 88 (CA 1, 1999);
United States v Sleet, 54 F3d 303, 306 (CA 7, 1995), and our Court as well as the federal courts
have held that a police officer or magistrate is entitled to infer that someone engaged in illicit
drug activity would keep items evidencing such illegal activity in the house. People v Nunez,
242 Mich App 610, 614-615; 619 NW2d 550 (2000); Feliz, 182 F3d at 88; United States v
McClellan, 165 F3d 535, 546 (CA 7, 1999); United States v Brito, 677 F Supp 2d 339, 342-344
(D Mass, 2009). In this case, the issuing court could reasonably infer that 240 Anderson
contained evidence of illegal narcotics since (1) the house being searched was where a convicted
drug felon was located immediately prior to engaging in an undercover drug transaction, and (2)
according to the reliable informant, the home had been the location of “criminal activity.”
Finally, we note that the dissent indicates that “it is at least equally plausible” that the
individual engaging in the narcotics sale obtained the stash of heroin on his person or inside the
vehicle that he drove to the sale. That much is true. However, if it is “equally plausible” that the
officer’s version of the facts could be true, the warrant can be issued. See State v Forker, 214 Or
App 627, 628-629; 168 P3d 279 (2007); People v Altman, 960 P2d 1164, 1171-1172 (Colo,
1998).
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the
difference between expert and factual witness testimony. Defendant waived his objection to the
instructions on appeal because he affirmatively approved them as given at trial and did not
request such an instruction. People v Lueth, 253 Mich App 670, 688; 660 NW2d 322 (2002).
Any error is therefore extinguished.
In any event, even if this issue were not waived, we would find no plain error requiring
reversal. The trial court instructed the jury that, in assessing Officer Daniel Main’s expert
testimony in the area of narcotics trafficking, it did not have to believe his testimony, and that it
should assess its importance, the reasons he gave for his opinions, his qualifications, and whether
his opinions made sense in light of all of the other evidence. The trial court also instructed the
jury that police officers’ testimony should be judged according to the same standards used to
evaluate the testimony of any other witness. In addition, when defense counsel objected to a
particular opinion expressed by Main, the trial court cautioned the jury that a witness who was
qualified as an expert was permitted to give his opinion, but the jury did not have to accept the
opinion, and it could reject the opinion in whole or in part. Unlike in United States v LopezMedina, 461 F3d 724, 743-744 (CA 6, 2006), the trial court here twice provided a general
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cautionary instruction regarding how to weigh expert testimony, which the Lopez-Medina Court
indicated would have been sufficient to avoid reversal. See, also, United States v Vasquez, 560
F3d 461, 470 (CA 6, 2009). The trial court also issued an instruction regarding assessing police
officers’ testimony in general. Additionally, no evidentiary errors occurred, unlike in LopezMedina. Thus, there was no plain, outcome determinative error in this case.
Defendant next argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for
felony-firearm. We review the evidence de novo, in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
to determine whether any rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime
were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Werner, 254 Mich App 528, 530; 659 NW2d
688 (2002). All reasonable inferences and credibility choices are made in support of the jury’s
verdict. People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000).
The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the
commission of or attempt to commit a felony. People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597
NW2d 864 (1999). Possession of a firearm may be actual or constructive, joint or exclusive, and
it may be proven using circumstantial evidence. People v Burgenmeyer, 461 Mich 431, 437-438;
606 NW2d 645 (2000); People v Hill, 433 Mich 464, 469-470; 446 NW2d 140 (1989). A
defendant constructively possesses a firearm if he knows the location of the firearm and it is
reasonably accessible to him. Burgenmeyer, 461 Mich at 438. Possession is determined at the
time of the offense, not at the time of the arrest or search. Id. at 439.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient
evidence for a rational trier of fact to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant had
constructive possession of the firearms in the residence and was therefore guilty of felonyfirearm. Werner, 254 Mich App at 530. Defendant admitted he was aware of the firearms’
locations in the house. Additionally, the evidence supports an inference that the firearms were
readily accessible. The door to defendant’s mother’s bedroom was open and her closet did not
have a door; the firearms were behind some clothes, but not otherwise locked up. The third
bedroom was unoccupied and the gun was found in the closet. Defendant and his mother
admitted that he stayed at her house, and there were documents bearing his name, clothing in his
size, and drug-related items located in the east bedroom, which was just down the hall from the
two bedrooms containing the weapons. Defendant stated that he knew the police would come to
the house. There was evidence presented that the presence of firearms was common in drug
trafficking operations, and a press, grinder, drugs, and packaging materials were found in the
vehicles parked in front of the house, and defendant was linked to those vehicles. Importantly,
defendant volunteered to police during the search that there were firearms in the closet that
belonged to his father, and he knew he was not allowed to “be around those guns” because he
was a convicted felon. Hence, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant possessed the firearms.
In defendant’s final claim of error, he alleges that the trial court erroneously scored 35
points for prior record variable (PRV) 2, MCL 777.52. Defendant properly preserved this issue
for appeal by his objection at sentencing. MCL 769.34(10); People v Kimble, 470 Mich 305,
310-311; 684 NW2d 669 (2004). The proper construction of the sentencing guidelines, and the
legal questions involved in their applicability, present issues of law reviewed de novo. People v
Underwood, 278 Mich App 334, 337; 750 NW2d 612 (2008). The sentencing guidelines are
interpreted according to the rules of statutory construction. People v Lyons (After Remand), 222
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Mich App 319, 322; 564 NW2d 114 (1997). We enforce the plain, unambiguous language of the
statute. People v Libbett, 251 Mich App 353, 365-366; 650 NW2d 407 (2002).
PRV 2 provides:
(1) Prior record variable 2 is prior low severity felony convictions. Score prior
record variable 2 by determining which of the following apply and by assigning
the number of points attributable to the one that has the highest number of points:
(a) The offender has 4 or more prior low severity felony convictions
30 points
(b) The offender has 3 prior low severity felony convictions
20 points
(c) The offender has 2 prior low severity felony convictions
10 points
(d) The offender has 1 prior low severity felony conviction
5 points
(e) The offender has no prior low severity felony convictions
0 points
(2) As used in this section, “prior low severity felony conviction” means a
conviction for any of the following, if the conviction was entered before the
sentencing offense was committed:
(a) A crime listed in offense class E, F, G, or H.
(b) A felony under a law of the United States or another state that corresponds to
a crime listed in offense class E, F, G, or H.
(c) A felony that is not listed in offense class M2, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, or H and
that is punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of less than 10 years.
(d) A felony under a law of the United States or another state that does not
correspond to a crime listed in offense class M2, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, or H and
that is punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of less than 10 years.
[MCL 777.52.]3
The trial court scored PRV 2 at 35 points. This was error where a maximum score under
MCL 777.52 is 30 points. However, the trial court properly scored four prior low severity
felonies. Defendant’s presentence investigation report reflects prior convictions for felonious
3
On January, 9, 2007, MCL 777.52 was amended by 2006 PA 655, immediately effective, to
rewrite subsection (2), which previously read: “As used in this section, ‘prior low severity
felony conviction’ means a conviction for a crime listed in offense class E, F, G, or H or for a
felony under a law of the United States or another state that corresponds to a crime listed in
offense class E, F, G, or H, if the conviction was entered before the sentencing offense was
committed.”
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assault, felon in possession of a firearm, two felony-firearm convictions, and possession with
intent to deliver 50 to 449 grams of a controlled substance. Felonious assault, MCL 750.82, is a
class F offense. MCL 777.16d. Felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, is a class E
offense. MCL 777.16m. These two offenses therefore qualify as prior low severity felony
convictions that may be counted in PRV 2. MCL 777.52(2)(a). The two felony-firearm
convictions, contrary to defendant’s claims, also constitute prior low severity convictions under
the amended language of MCL 777.52(2)(c).4
Moreover, although defendant argues that felony-firearm should not be counted because
it carries a determinate sentence, this assertion is inconsistent with the purpose of PRV 2, which
is to provide for longer sentences where a defendant has a prior criminal history. People v
Maben, 208 Mich App 652, 655; 528 NW2d 850 (1995). Further, in PRV 7, MCL 777.57, the
language of the statute specifically excludes consideration of felony-firearm in scoring
subsequent and concurrent felony convictions. MCL 777.57(2)(b) provides: “[d]o not score a
felony firearm conviction in this variable.” This language is noticeably absent from PRV 2.
Where a provision is omitted in one part of a statute and is included in another part, we construe
the omission as intentional. People v Monaco, 474 Mich 48, 58; 710 NW2d 46 (2006). We also
read the two statutes together because they are both part of the Legislature’s sentencing
guidelines. People v Buehler, 477 Mich 18, 26; 727 NW2d 127 (2007).
Defendant should have been scored 30 points for PRV 2. MCL 777.52(1)(a). This
results in a total PRV score of 75, level F. MCL 777.63. With correction of the score,
defendant’s total offense variable score is 55 points, level V; the legislative sentencing
guidelines’ recommended minimum range remains the same at 99 to 240 months’ imprisonment,
with the habitual offender enhancement, and therefore resentencing is not required. People v
Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 89-91; 711 NW2d 44 (2006).
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
4
Defendant’s reliance on People v Martin, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of
Appeals, issued May 11, 2006 (Docket No. 259716), is misplaced where that case was decided
before the amendment, when a prior low severity offense was limited to crimes specifically listed
in offense classes E, F, G, or H. The amended language, however, now specifically incorporates
felonies that are not listed in the offense classes. MCL 777.52(2)(c). Felony-firearm is not a
class M2, A, B, C, D, E, F, or H offense. MCL 777.52(2)(c); MCL 777.16m. MCL 777.52(2)(c)
also requires that the conviction’s maximum punishment be less than ten years. MCL
750.227b(1) provides that first and second felony-firearm convictions carry sentences of two and
five years, respectively.
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