BUFFY LYNN WHITSON V JAMES MICHAEL GRADY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
BUFFY LYNN WHITSON,
UNPUBLISHED
September 7, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 295657
Genesee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 01-234212-DM
JAMES MICHAEL GRADY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before:
WILDER,
P.J., and CAVANAGH and SAAD, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this custody matter, plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s custody order
granting defendant primary physical custody of the parties’ three minor children. We affirm.
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether to modify the custody order because defendant failed to show, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that proper cause or a change in circumstances existed. We
disagree because defendant made an initial showing that proper cause existed.
In a custody matter, we review the trial court’s findings of fact under the great weight of
the evidence standard and will affirm factual findings unless the evidence clearly preponderates
in the opposite direction. Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 705; 747 NW2d 336 (2008).
Discretionary rulings, including custody decisions, are reviewed for an abuse of discretion,
which occurs only “when the trial court’s decision is so palpably and grossly violative of fact and
logic that it evidences a perversity of will, a defiance of judgment, or the exercise of passion or
bias.” Id. Legal questions are reviewed for clear legal error, which occurs “when a trial court
incorrectly chooses, interprets, or applies the law.” Id. at 706.
To demonstrate that a change in a custody order is warranted, the moving party must
make an initial showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, either that proper cause exists for a
change, or that circumstances have changed since the entry of the most recent custody order.
Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 508-509; 675 NW2d 847 (2003); MCL
722.27(1)(c). The trial court need not hold an evidentiary hearing on this threshold
determination. Corporan v Henton, 282 Mich App 599, 609; 766 NW2d 903 (2009).
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In the context of the Child Custody Act, “proper cause” to revisit a custody order means
“an appropriate ground for legal action to be taken.” Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 510. The party
seeking the change in custody must demonstrate circumstances that “have or could have a
significant effect on the child’s life.” Id. at 511. The inquiry into proper cause is fact sensitive,
and the trial court may use for guidance the 12 best interest factors designated in the Child
Custody Act. Id. at 511-512. A change of circumstances is established by proving that “since
the entry of the last custody order, the conditions surrounding custody of the child, which have or
could have a significant effect on the child’s well-being, have materially changed.” Id. at 513
(emphasis in original). Something more than normal life changes that occurs during a child’s life
must be shown. Id. If proper cause or a change of circumstances is not established, the court is
precluded from holding a child custody hearing to determine the child’s best interests. Id. at 508.
In its order for an evidentiary hearing, the trial court stated in its order setting an
evidentiary hearing that “[i]ssues are raised by both parties causing the Court sufficient concern
that an evidentiary hearing will be scheduled in this matter.” In ruling on plaintiff’s motion for a
new trial, the trial court clarified that its order for an evidentiary hearing implied that the
Vodvarka standard was met based on its review of the detailed pleadings and the Child
Protective Services (CPS) reports. Although the trial court did not make detailed findings on
why it ordered an evidentiary hearing to consider modifying the custody order, we conclude that
ordering the evidentiary hearing was not an abuse of discretion. When considering the facts that
are not in dispute, defendant established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there was
proper cause to revisit the custody order.
The pleadings and CPS reports showed that there had been dramatic confrontations
between the parties’ eldest daughter and plaintiff, including an instance where plaintiff had
essentially kicked her 12-year-old daughter out of the house for a night, as a way to teach her a
lesson. Further, contents of one of the CPS reports at trial established that there was a lot of
yelling and arguing in plaintiff’s home and that the children wanted to live with defendant.
Moreover, there is no dispute that the parties’ eldest daughter was regularly babysitting for her
siblings and plaintiff was having some mental health issues. Thus, the trial court was within its
discretion to reconsider the custody order because defendant showed, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that there were questions of fact as to whether there were material changes in the
ability of plaintiff to provide guidance and discipline, the stability of plaintiff’s home, the
possibility of a mental health condition affecting plaintiff’s ability to parent, and the children’s
custody preferences, such that the conditions existing could have had a significant effect on the
children’s well being.
Next, plaintiff argues that defendant did not show, by clear and convincing evidence, that
a change in custody was in the best interest of the children. We disagree.
If the court finds that an established custodial environment exists, it may not change that
environment unless it finds clear and convincing evidence that a change in custody is in the
child’s best interests. MCL 722.27(1)(c); Powery v Wells, 278 Mich App 526; 752 NW2d 47
(2008). In this case, the parties do not dispute the trial court’s finding that there was an
established custodial environment with plaintiff only. Therefore, defendant was obligated to
show, by clear and convincing evidence, that a change in custody was in the children’s best
interests. The best interests are to be evaluated in light of the statutory best interest factors set
forth in MCL 722.23(a)-(l).
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The trial court must weigh the statutory best interest factors found in MCL 722.23 and
make a factual finding regarding each of the factors. Grew v Knox, 265 Mich App 333, 337; 694
NW2d 772 (2005); Schlender v Schlender, 235 Mich App 230, 233; 596 NW2d 643 (1999);
MCL 722.23; MCL 722.27. While the trial court must state its factual findings and conclusions
on each best interest factor, the court need not include consideration of every piece of evidence
entered and argument raised at trial. MacIntyre v MacIntyre (On Remand), 267 Mich App 449,
451-452; 705 NW2d 144 (2005). Also, MCR 3.210(D), which governs factual findings in child
custody hearings and trials, incorporates by reference MCR 2.517, which provides, in part, that
“[b]rief, definite, and pertinent findings and conclusions on the contested matters are sufficient,
without overelaboration of detail or particularization of facts.” See Foskett v Foskett, 247 Mich
App 1, 12-13; 634 NW2d 363 (2001).
When considering the statutory best interest factors, the trial court considered the
aforementioned factors and concluded that five of the factors favored defendant, none of the
factors favored plaintiff, and the remaining seven factors were either equal or not relevant to the
inquiry. Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in its evaluation of the statutory best interest
factors. MCL 722.23. Specifically, plaintiff challenges the trial court’s findings with respect to
factors (b), (d), (g), (i), and (k), which are the factors that favored defendant.
Regarding factor (b), MCL 722.23(b), “[t]he capacity and disposition of the parties
involved to give the child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising
of the child in his or her religion or creed, if any,” the trial court found that there had been
dramatic confrontations between the parties’ eldest daughter and plaintiff, which established a
troubling and potentially dangerous dynamic between the two of them. The trial court also found
that the incidents involving plaintiff breaking the parties’ eldest daughter’s cell phone during an
argument, interacting in a hostile fashion when denying to a teacher, that a paper, which plaintiff
helped her eldest daughter write, was partially plagiarized, not allowing the parties’ son to play
football because of plaintiff’s personal dispute with the coach, and confronting Carolyn Thomas
regarding counseling of the parties’ eldest daughter, all showed plaintiff’s propensity to fight
personal battles using her children as pawns under the guise that she is acting in their best
interests. The trial court concluded from this evidence that plaintiff has a problem providing
guidance and discipline to the children. The trial court also found that, although defendant is
untested in day-to-day guidance, the children act appropriately when with him, and that the
structure of his house and expectations regarding academics showed that he would be more
effective in providing guidance and discipline.
The trial court’s findings are fully supported by the record. Plaintiff argues that the trial
court’s findings essentially empower the parties’ eldest daughter to continue her teenage
rebellion. However, as the trial court found, plaintiff’s behavior went beyond addressing typical
teenage rebellion, and plaintiff’s actions fostered an environment where she was not able to
provide adequate guidance and discipline. There were repeated instances of inappropriate
confrontations between plaintiff and her eldest daughter, which included plaintiff kicking her
daughter out of her house for a night and smashing her daughter’s cell phone during an
argument. Further, as the trial court found, plaintiff showed a pattern of angry and hostile
behavior toward people in her children’s lives under the guise of working for her children’s best
interests. Thus, because the evidence does not clearly preponderate in the opposite direction, the
trial court did not err in favoring defendant on this factor.
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Regarding factor (d), MCL 722.23(d), “[t]he length of time the child has lived in a stable,
satisfactory environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity,” the trial court found
that both parties have stable environments for the children, but that this factor favored defendant
because there are concerns regarding plaintiff’s home that have manifested in stress for the
children, and, when comparing the parties, defendant’s home is more stable and satisfactory.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred because there will always be stress in a home and
mere stress does not support the conclusion that a home is not stable and satisfactory. However,
the testimony showed that the stress in plaintiff’s home goes beyond routine stress as the
aforementioned confrontations and testimony regarding excessive yelling showed. Further, these
elements are not a part of defendant’s household. Thus, because the evidence does not clearly
preponderate in the opposite direction, the trial court did not err in favoring defendant on this
factor.
Regarding factor (g), MCL 722.23(g), “[t]he mental and physical health of the parties
involved,” the trial court noted that neither party has any physical issues that would interfere
with their parenting and defendant does not have any mental health concerns. However, the trial
court noted a concern about plaintiff’s testimony that she suffers from mild bi-polar disorder,
anxiety, and panic attacks, and these conditions, which she treats with medication, nevertheless,
caused her to be unable to maintain employment. The trial court was further concerned by
evidence that plaintiff engaged in several inappropriate confrontations and is unable to separate
her wants from what is best for her children.
Plaintiff argues that there was no testimony regarding how her mental health affects the
parties’ children and there is nothing to suggest that her mental health is not under control.
However, as the trial court found, plaintiff’s general behavior is concerning because she is
unable to separate her needs from what is best for her children. Moreover, her inability to
maintain employment due to her mental health conditions raises a valid concern in how her
conditions affect the children. Therefore, because the evidence does not clearly preponderate in
the opposite direction, the trial court did not err in favoring defendant on this factor.
Regarding factor (i), MCL 722.23(i), “[t]he reasonable preference of the child, if the
court considers the child to be of sufficient age to express preference,” the trial court interviewed
the children with regard to their preference. The parties eldest daughter indicated a strong
preference to live with defendant, while the other two children indicated they wanted to split
time equally with both parents.
Plaintiff argues that favoring defendant on this factor empowers the eldest daughter to get
what she wants even though she is motivated by teenage rebellion. Plaintiff’s attack on the
eldest daughter’s motivation does nothing to dispute that the trial court interviewed the children
and each expressed their reasonable preference. In each case, the children expressed a desire to
spend more time than they had been spending with defendant. Therefore, because the evidence
does not clearly preponderate in the opposite direction, the trial court did not err in favoring
defendant on this factor.
Regarding factor (k), MCL 722.23(k), “[d]omestic violence, regardless of whether the
violence was directed against or witnessed by the child,” the trial court found that this factor
favors defendant because, at a minimum, there are dramatic conflicts with inappropriate yelling
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between plaintiff, plaintiff’s husband, Brian Whitson, and the parties’ eldest daughter, and that
on at least one occasion, there was inappropriate physical contact resulting in marks on the eldest
daughter’s neck. The trial court also found that Brian acknowledged putting his hands on the
parties’ eldest daughter’s neck when she attempted to walk away from him.
The trial court’s findings are fully supported by the record. Plaintiff argues that the trial
court abused its discretion in finding that this factor favored defendant because the two CPS
reports did not substantiate instances of physical abuse against the eldest daughter. However, the
trial court based its findings on the testimony of Thomas and Brian, and we defer to the trial
court’s determination of credibility. Mogle v Scriver, 241 Mich App 192, 201; 614 NW2d 696
(2000). Moreover, the trial court discredited any allegations of physical abuse by defendant
against the parties’ son because a smack to his head occurred in the context of playing football
when the parties’ son had a helmet on. Thus, because the evidence does not clearly preponderate
in the opposite direction, the trial court did not err in favoring defendant on this factor.
Therefore, based on all of the above, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding defendant primary physical custody because there was clear and convincing evidence
that a change in custody was in the children’s best interests.
Lastly, plaintiff argues that remand is necessary in order for the trial court to provide a
more detailed parenting time schedule. Plaintiff contends that the current schedule leaves open
for interpretation days in which there is not school and parenting time options when one parent
relies on a third party to watch the children when the other parent is available during that time.
Regarding parenting time, the trial court ordered as follows:
The parenting schedule is reasonable as agreed between the parties. If the parties
cannot agree, then the following will apply:
•
First week: Plaintiff shall have Thursday after school until Monday school
drop off
•
Second week: Plaintiff shall have Friday after school until Saturday at 10
am
•
Third week: Plaintiff shall have Thursday after school until Monday
school drop off
•
Fourth week: Plaintiff shall have Wednesday after school until 7:30
•
In summer, the parties shall alternate weeks
•
Holidays are pursuant to the Genesee County Friend of the Court
guidelines.
Pursuant to the parenting time schedule, parenting time on holidays is set up according to
the friend of the court guidelines. In an instance during the school year where there is no school
on a day that the guidelines do not delineate as a holiday, the current schedule does not explicitly
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state what should occur. Nevertheless, the parenting time schedule, in effect, states that the
parenting time switch occurs when the school day would begin or end, regardless of whether
school is actually held. Further, because the parenting time schedule does not provide a right to
first refusal regarding watching the children, there are no parenting time options when one parent
relies on a third party to watch the children even though the other parent is available during that
time. Therefore, remand for clarification of the parenting time schedule is not necessary.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Henry William Saad
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