PATRICIA A SCHUMACHER V CARL STEEN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICIA A. SCHUMACHER,
UNPUBLISHED
August 26, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 294593
Cass Circuit Court
LC No. 09-000444-DC
CARL STEEN and CATHY STEEN,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: MARKEY, P.J., and ZAHRA and GLEICHER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This case involves a child visitation dispute between plaintiff and defendants, the paternal
grandparent’s of plaintiff’s child. Plaintiff appeals as of right from a circuit court order in which
the court (1) declined to register a Minnesota divorce judgment and custody order in Michigan;
(2) denied plaintiff’s motion to suspend defendants’ grandparent visitation and granted
defendants’ motion for summary disposition on jurisdictional grounds; and (3) dismissed as moot
defendants’ motions for appointment of a guardian ad litem and request to compel plaintiff to
submit to a psychological evaluation. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff was formerly married to defendants’ son. They had one child together. In May
2008, the couple was divorced pursuant to a judgment entered by a court in Minnesota, where the
two were then living. The divorce judgment awarded plaintiff sole custody of the child, but also
recognized that defendants, who are residents of Michigan, had obtained an order for
grandparent visitation, which the Minnesota court allowed to continue. In September 2008, the
Minnesota court issued an order allowing plaintiff to leave that state and relocate to Illinois.
Defendants’ son subsequently died in October 2008. In approximately November 2008, plaintiff
moved from Illinois to Indiana. Plaintiff never registered the Minnesota custody orders in
Indiana or sought to invoke that state’s jurisdiction in a custody proceeding while she and the
child resided there. In April 2009, defendants obtained an order from the Minnesota court
expanding their grandparent visitation rights.
On June 9, 2009, the same day that plaintiff and her new husband moved into an
apartment in Edwardsburg, Michigan, plaintiff filed this action in Michigan to register the
Minnesota divorce judgment pursuant to the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), MCL 722.1101 et seq. Plaintiff later sought to also register the
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September 2008 Minnesota order that allowed her to leave Minnesota with her child. She also
filed a supplemental motion to suspend defendants’ grandparenting time. Despite moving into
an apartment in Michigan, plaintiff continued to work in Indiana and enrolled her son in school
in Indiana. Plaintiff later admitted that she relocated to Michigan on the advice of her attorney.
Defendants opposed plaintiff’s request to register the Minnesota orders and informed the
court that the orders that plaintiff was attempting to register had been modified. Defendants also
moved for summary disposition for lack of jurisdiction, but additionally filed motions to compel
plaintiff to submit to a psychological evaluation, and for the appointment of a guardian ad litem
to represent the child’s best interests. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and also
conferred with the assigned judge in the Minnesota case. The court thereafter declined to
exercise jurisdiction pursuant to the UCCJEA and, accordingly, denied plaintiff’s motion to
suspend defendants’ grandparent visitation and granted defendants’ motion for summary
disposition on jurisdictional grounds. The court also declined to register the Minnesota divorce
judgment and custody order offered by plaintiff, and dismissed as moot defendants’ motions for
appointment of a guardian ad litem and request for a psychological evaluation. This appeal
followed.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court ruled that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and that Minnesota had
jurisdiction to enter the orders relating to the child’s custody and defendants’ grandparent
visitation. This Court reviews a trial court’s summary disposition decision de novo. Spiek v
Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). Although defendants
moved for summary disposition under both MCR 2.116(C)(1) (lack of personal jurisdiction), and
MCR 2.116(C)(4) (lack of subject-matter jurisdiction), the trial court’s decision focused on the
latter. Further, there appears to be no dispute that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over
the parties, who were all living in Michigan at the time the action was filed. Thus, MCR
2.116(C)(4) is the appropriate subrule to apply. “Jurisdictional questions under MCR
2.116(C)(4) are questions of law that are also reviewed de novo.” Travelers Ins Co v Detroit
Edison Co, 465 Mich 185, 205; 631 NW2d 733 (2001). “When reviewing a motion under MCR
2.116(C)(4), this Court must determine whether the pleadings demonstrate that the defendant
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law or whether the affidavits and other proofs show there
was no genuine issue of material fact.” Bock v Gen Motors Corp, 247 Mich App 705, 710; 637
NW2d 825 (2001).
With respect to questions of jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, this Court has stated:
“Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction presents a question
of law that this Court reviews de novo.” Atchison v Atchison, 256 Mich App 531,
534; 664 NW2d 249 (2003). However, “the determination whether to exercise
jurisdiction under the UCCJEA [is] within the discretion of the trial court, and
would not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.” Young v Punturo (On
Reconsideration), 270 Mich App 553, 560; 718 NW2d 366 (2006). The
jurisdictional determination in this case involves the UCCJEA, codified in
Michigan as MCL 722.1101 et seq. We review issues of statutory construction de
novo as questions of law. Atchison, supra at 534-535. We also review
constitutional questions de novo. Blackburne & Brown Mortgage Co v Ziomek,
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264 Mich App 615, 620; 692 NW2d 388 (2004). [Nash v Salter, 280 Mich App
104, 108-109; 760 NW2d 612 (2008).]
In reviewing a trial court’s exercise of discretion,
an appellate court should defer to the trial court’s judgment, and if the trial court’s
decision results in an outcome within the range of principled outcomes, it has not
abused its discretion. Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388; 719
NW2d 809 (2006). The abuse of discretion standard acknowledges that there are
circumstances in which there is no one correct outcome. People v Babcock, 469
Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). [Jamil v Jahan, 280 Mich App 92, 100;
760 NW2d 266 (2008).]
II. APPLICABILITY OF THE UCCJEA
Plaintiff primarily argues that the trial court erred in applying the UCCJEA to this case.
Plaintiff contends that Michigan’s version of the UCCJEA does not apply to orders relating to
grandparent visitation and, accordingly, the trial court erred in recognizing those orders issued by
the Minnesota court. We disagree.
The trial court’s initial task in this case was to determine if another state had jurisdiction.
Before a court in this state may make an initial child-custody determination, it must determine
whether an out-of-state child-custody proceeding has already commenced. MCL 722.1206;
Fisher v Belcher, 269 Mich App 247, 253-254; 713 NW2d 6 (2005). MCL 722.1206 provides,
in relevant part:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in section 204 [MCL 722.1204], a court
of this state may not exercise its jurisdiction under this article if, at the time of the
commencement of the proceeding, a child-custody proceeding has been
commenced in a court of another state having jurisdiction substantially in
conformity with this act, unless the proceeding has been terminated or is stayed
by the court of the other state because a court of this state is a more convenient
forum under section 207 [MCL 722.1207].
(2) Except as otherwise provided in section 204 [MCL 722.1204], before
hearing a child-custody proceeding, a court of this state shall examine the court
documents and other information supplied by the parties as required by section
209 [MCL 722.1209]. If the court determines that, at the time of the
commencement of the proceeding, a child-custody proceeding has been
commenced in a court in another state having jurisdiction substantially in
accordance with this act, the court of this state shall stay its proceeding and
communicate with the court of the other state. If the court of the state having
jurisdiction substantially in accordance with this act does not determine that the
court of this state is a more appropriate forum, the court of this state shall dismiss
the child-custody proceeding.
In this case, it was undisputed that a child-custody proceeding had previously been
commenced in Minnesota. Thus, the trial court was required to determine if, pursuant to MCL
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722.1206(1), that court’s jurisdiction (1) was substantially in conformity with this state’s version
of the UCCJEA and, if so, (2) whether the Minnesota proceedings had been terminated or should
be stayed because this state is a more convenient forum. MCL 722.1206(2) also required the
trial court to confer with the Minnesota court to determine whether it should proceed with the
hearing or dismiss it in favor of the Minnesota court’s jurisdiction. Thus, under MCL 722.1206,
whether Michigan could exercise jurisdiction in this matter depended first on whether Minnesota
had exercised jurisdiction in a child-custody proceeding “substantially in conformity” with
Michigan’s act.
As plaintiff argues, Michigan’s version of the UCCJEA appears to be limited to custody
orders between parents and does not specifically extend to orders relating to visitation with
nonparents. The UCCJEA is intended to resolve jurisdictional disputes relating to “childcustody determinations” or “child-custody proceedings.” See MCL 722.1201, MCL 722.1202,
and MCL 722.1203. These terms are defined in MCL 722.1102 as follows:
(c) “Child-custody determination” means a judgment, decree, or other
court order providing for legal custody, physical custody, or parenting time with
respect to a child. Child-custody determination includes a permanent, temporary,
initial, and modification order. Child-custody determination does not include an
order relating to child support or other monetary obligation of an individual.
(d) “Child-custody proceeding” means a proceeding in which legal
custody, physical custody, or parenting time with respect to a child is an issue.
Child-custody proceeding includes a proceeding for divorce, separate
maintenance, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity,
termination of parental rights, and protection from domestic violence, in which
the issue may appear. Child-custody proceeding does not include a proceeding
involving juvenile delinquency, contractual emancipation, or enforcement under
article 3 [MCL 722.1301 et seq.]. [Emphasis added.]
Plaintiff argues that, under these definitions, Michigan does not recognize orders relating
to grandparent visitation as being subject to the UCCJEA. Thus, plaintiff appears to contend that
she could register the Minnesota divorce judgment and the September 22, 2008, order granting
her full custody of the child and allowing her to leave Minnesota, but that defendants could not
similarly assert their visitation rights under the Minnesota orders, or have standing to argue that
Minnesota has jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. We disagree.
We believe that Minnesota’s version of the UCCJEA is in substantial conformity with
this state’s version. Minn Stat Ann 518D.201(a) generally provides that Minnesota has
jurisdiction to make “an initial child custody determination” if Minnesota was the child’s home
state on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or it was the child’s home state six
months before then and at least one parent, or a person acting as a parent, continues to reside in
the state and no other state has exercised jurisdiction. Here, the parties do not dispute that
Minnesota was the child’s home state when the Minnesota divorce proceeding commenced.
The Minnesota act, like Michigan’s act, contains definitions of “child-custody
determination” and “child-custody proceeding.” Those terms are defined in Minn Stat Ann
518D.102(d) and (e) as follows:
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(d) “Child custody determination” means a judgment, decree, or other
order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, or visitation
with respect to a child. The term includes a permanent, temporary, initial, and
modification order. The term does not include an order relating to child support
or other monetary obligation of an individual.
(e) “Child custody proceeding” means a proceeding in which legal
custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child is an issue. The
term includes a proceeding for divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency,
guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights, and protection from
domestic violence, in which the issue may appear. The term does not include a
proceeding involving juvenile delinquency, contractual emancipation, or
enforcement under sections 518D.301 to 518D.317. [Emphasis added.]
Because the definitions of “child-custody determination” and “child-custody proceeding”
in the Minnesota statute encompass orders “providing for . . . visitation with respect to a child”
and proceedings in which “visitation with respect to a child is an issue,” we believe that
Minnesota’s version of the UCCJEA applies to orders or proceedings relating to grandparent
visitation. Thus, the Minnesota orders granting defendants visitation rights are subject to
Minnesota’s UCCJEA.
The commencement of an action under the UCCJEA is defined by the filing of the first
pleading in the proceeding, Fisher, 269 Mich App at 259-260; MCL 722.1102(e); see also Minn
Stat Ann 518D.102(f), which in this case was the Minnesota complaint for divorce that was filed
in 2007. Defendants’ grandparent visitation rights were recognized in that proceeding, which
clearly involved both a child-custody proceeding and a child-custody determination.
We disagree with plaintiff’s suggestion that the trial court should not have recognized
Minnesota’s jurisdiction because its definitions of “child-custody determination” and “childcustody proceeding” are not identical to Michigan’s definitions of those terms, given that the
former refers to “visitation” whereas the latter refers to “parenting time.” Under MCL 722.1206,
it is not necessary that each state’s act be identical. They need only be “substantially in
conformity,” or the other state must have exercised jurisdiction “substantially in accordance”
with Michigan’s version of the UCCJEA. Despite some differences in terminology in the two
acts, we believe that they are substantially in conformity with each other.
Plaintiff ’s reliance on this state’s definitions of “child-custody proceeding” or “childcustody determination” in MCL 722.1102 is misplaced, because those definitions are not
dispositive. Rather, what is important is that Minnesota’s version of the UCCJEA is in
substantial conformity with Michigan’s version, and that Minnesota, where the custody and
grandparent visitation orders were issued, recognizes requests for grandparent visitation as being
subject to that state’s version of the UCCJEA.1
1
Accordingly, we need not decide whether Michigan’s version of the UCCJEA may be
(continued…)
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Therefore, the trial court did not err in looking to the UCCJEA to determine whether it
should exercise jurisdiction in this case.
III. THE TRIAL COURT’S APPLICATION OF THE UCCJEA
By attempting to register the Minnesota divorce judgment and custody order, plaintiff
was seeking jurisdiction in Michigan to enforce those orders. See MCL 722.1304. However,
plaintiff also sought to modify those orders to the extent that they related to defendants’
grandparent visitation. Plaintiff argued that Minnesota no longer had jurisdiction in the matter,
given that she and the child no longer lived there and the child’s father was deceased, and
therefore the trial court could exercise jurisdiction to modify the Minnesota orders.
While this state can enforce a registered judgment of another state, it may not modify it,
except in accordance with article 2 of the UCCJEA. MCL 722.1305.
MCL 722.1203 provides:
Except as otherwise provided in section 204 [MCL 722.1204], a court of
this state shall not modify a child-custody determination made by a court of
another state unless a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial childcustody determination under section 201(1)(a) or (b) [MCL 722.1201(1)(a) or (b)]
and either of the following applies:
(a) The court of the other state determines it no longer has exclusive,
continuing jurisdiction under section 202 [MCL 722.1202] or that a court of this
state would be a more convenient forum under section 207 [MCL 722.1207].
(b) A court of this state or a court of the other state determines that neither
the child, nor a parent of the child, nor a person acting as a parent presently
resides in the other state.
Initially, plaintiff has shown that MCL 722.1203(b) is satisfied in this case. It was
undisputed that plaintiff and her son no longer resided in Minnesota, that defendants never lived
in Minnesota, and that the child’s father had died. However, the trial court still needed to find
that there was a basis for its jurisdiction under MCL 722.1201(1)(a) or (b).
MCL 722.1201 provides, in relevant part:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in section 204 [MCL 722.1204], a court
of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination only in
the following situations:
(a) This state is the home state of the child on the date of the
commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within 6
(…continued)
construed as encompassing orders for grandparental visitation.
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months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from
this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state.
(b) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under subdivision
(a), or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction
on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum under section 207 or
208 [MCL 722.1207 or 722.1208], and the court finds both of the following:
(i) The child and the child’s parents, or the child and at least 1 parent or a
person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this state other than
mere physical presence.
(ii) Substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child’s
care, protection, training, and personal relationships.
***
(3) Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child is
neither necessary nor sufficient to make a child-custody determination.
MCL 722.1102(g) provides:
“Home state” means the state in which a child lived with a parent or a
person acting as a parent for at least 6 consecutive months immediately before the
commencement of a child-custody proceeding. In the case of a child less than 6
months of age, the term means the state in which the child lived from birth with a
parent or person acting as a parent. A period of temporary absence of a parent or
person acting as a parent is included as part of the period.
Plaintiff asserts that the child’s home state is Indiana. Thus, plaintiff concedes that
Michigan was not the child’s home state when this proceeding was commenced. Further,
Indiana’s status as a home state would be relevant under § 1201(1)(b) only if an Indiana court
declined to exercise jurisdiction. Plaintiff does not assert that jurisdiction in Indiana was ever
sought. Instead, the only dispute here is whether Minnesota continued to have jurisdiction in this
matter.
Because the child had not resided with a parent in Michigan for at least six consecutive
months before the petition was filed, as required by MCL 722.1102(g), there was no basis for
jurisdiction under MCL 722.1201(1)(a). Under MCL 722.1201(1)(b), the trial court could have
exercised jurisdiction only if another state either did not have jurisdiction as the child’s home
state or another state had declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state’s forum
was more appropriate and (1) the child and at least one parent had a significant connection with
this state other than mere physical presence, and (2) substantial evidence was available in this
state regarding the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships.
The first part of MCL 722.1201(1)(b) provides that another court must not have
jurisdiction under subdivision (a), which means that another state must not have been the child’s
home state within the immediate preceding six months. Minnesota was not the child’s residence
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for the six months immediately preceding this action. Accordingly, to exercise jurisdiction, the
trial court was required to find that both conditions in subsections (b)(i) and (ii) were satisfied.
The trial court did not err in finding that subsection (b)(i) was not satisfied, because there
was no evidence that plaintiff and her son had a significant connection with this state, other than
their physical presence here. Plaintiff continued to work in Indiana and the child was attending
school there. Although plaintiff claimed that some relatives lived in Michigan, she admitted that
they were not “blood relatives.” Further, plaintiff conceded that she moved to an apartment in
Michigan based on the advice of her attorney. The record does not establish that plaintiff has a
significant connection to Michigan apart from her physical presence.2
Furthermore, the record shows that substantial evidence regarding “the child’s care,
protection, training, and personal relationships” was available in Minnesota, and not in
Michigan. As the trial court noted, the Minnesota court had already spent considerable time and
amassed extensive evidence concerning the child’s relationships with plaintiff and defendants,
and the child’s best interests. That court dealt with allegations that the child’s father had
sexually abused the child, and plaintiff was relying on the validity of those same allegations and
evidence of the child’s relationship with defendants to support her request to suspend
defendants’ visitation rights. Thus, if the trial court exercised jurisdiction, it would be necessary
to revisit and relitigate those issues. The trial court did not err in finding that substantial
evidence concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships was not
available in this state, but rather was available in Minnesota.
The trial court did not err in finding that a basis for its jurisdiction had not been
established, and that Minnesota had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction because no court had
specifically found that jurisdiction by Minnesota had been lost. Minn Stat Ann 518D.202(a).
The trial court alternatively ruled that even if it could exercise jurisdiction in this matter,
it would decline to exercise it based on forum non conveniens, MCL 722.1207, and because
plaintiff engaged in “unjustifiable conduct” within the meaning of MCL 722.1208, given that
her move to an apartment in Michigan on the advice of her attorney was motivated by forum
shopping. Given our conclusion that the trial court correctly determined that it did not have
jurisdiction under MCL 722.1203, we need not address these issues. However, the trial court
and the Minnesota court agreed that “if [plaintiff] had established herself in Michigan for a
period of time, you know, I could see jurisdiction switching here if she’s been here for six
months and developed some contact with out state. . .” Because the courts recognized the
2
Plaintiff ’s reliance on White v Harrison-White, 280 Mich App 383, 394; 760 NW2d 691
(2008), is misplaced. In that case, this Court determined that the “significant connection with
this state” requirement of MCL 722.1202(1)(a) could be satisfied where one parent lives in
Michigan and maintains a meaningful relationship with the child in this state. But unlike the
statute at issue in White, § 1201(1)(b)(i) additionally provides that mere physical presence is
insufficient to satisfy the “significant connection” requirement of the statute. Thus, plaintiff
cannot rely on her mere physical presence in Michigan with the child to establish a significant
connection with Michigan.
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possibility of future proceedings in Michigan and the possibility that Michigan could acquire
jurisdiction in the future, we conclude that the issues may continue to affect plaintiff in some
collateral way, and thus, we address them. In re Dodge Estate, 162 Mich App 573, 583-584; 413
NW2d 449 (1987).
Here, the trial court sua sponte addressed the issue of forum non conveniens in its oral
opinion. This is appropriate, as MCL 722.1207(a) provides that “[t]he issue of inconvenient
forum may be raised upon the motion of a party, the court’s own motion, or the request of
another court.” Problematically, however, MCL 722.1207(b) expressly states that [b]efore
determining whether it is an inconvenient forum . . . the court shall allow the parties to submit
information.” The trial court did not provide the parties an opportunity to submit information,
and thus, the finding of inconvenient forum was improper. We also agree with plaintiff that the
trial court erred in finding that plaintiff engaged in forum shopping:
The concern surrounding forum shopping stems from the fear that a plaintiff will
be able to determine the outcome of a case simply by choosing the forum in
which to bring the suit. Presumably, plaintiffs will bring suit in the forum whose
law is the most advantageous. In so doing, the plaintiff may be attempting to
obtain a favorable result simply by choosing the right forum . . . [Olmstead v
Anderson, 428 Mich 1, 26; 400 NW2d 292 (1987).
The stated concern is that,
“applying the law sought by a forum-shopping plaintiff will defeat the
expectations of the defendant or will upset the policies of the state in which the
defendant acted (or from which the defendant hails).” [Id. quoting Morrison,
Death of conflicts, 29 Vill L R 313, 362 (1983-84).]
Here, however, “[s]ince defendant is a citizen of Michigan, there can be no serious
argument that applying Michigan law will defeat his expectations.” Olmstead, 428 Mich at 27.
Indeed, “[p]laintiff’s choice of Michigan, being the state of defendant’s citizenship and thus
subjecting defendant to general jurisdiction, is perfectly legitimate.” Id. Accordingly, we
reverse the trial court’s finding that plaintiff engaged in unjustifiable conduct, i.e, forumshopping.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT REFUSAL TO REGISTER THE DIVORCE JUDGMENT
Plaintiff argues that even if the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the Minnesota
orders, it should have still registered the judgment and the September 2008 orders under MCL
722.1304. Given the facts presented, we conclude the trial court did not err by declining to
register the orders presented by plaintiff.
Plaintiff only sought to register the divorce judgment and the September 2008 order.
Plaintiff maintained that the additional orders entered by the Minnesota court in 2009 were void
because that court did not have jurisdiction to issue those orders. As discussed previously,
however, we agree with the trial court that the Minnesota court continued to have jurisdiction in
the matter. MCL 722.1304(1) requires that a party seeking to register a child-custody
determination provide the court with any modifications to the orders she is seeking to register.
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Because the orders that plaintiff was offering for registration had been modified in part by
subsequent orders that plaintiff did not offer for registration, the trial court did not err by
declining to register the orders offered by plaintiff.
V. PLAINTIFF ’S MOTION TO SUSPEND VISITATION
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred by denying her request for emergency relief
to suspend defendants’ grandparent visitation. We disagree.
MCL 722.1204 permits a court to temporarily assume jurisdiction in a child-custody
matter, even if another court has jurisdiction, where the child has been abandoned or is subjected
to or threatened with abuse or mistreatment. There was no claim that the child had been
abandoned, and we agree with the trial court that there was no factual support for a finding of
actual or threatened abuse or mistreatment. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by declining to exercise emergency jurisdiction.
Furthermore, because the trial court did not err in finding that Minnesota had continuing
jurisdiction in this matter, modification of defendants’ grandparent visitation was not warranted
under MCL 722.27b(11).
VI. THE TRIAL COURT’S REFUSAL TO CONSIDER OTHER MOTIONS
Plaintiff also challenges the propriety of defendants’ motions to compel plaintiff to
submit to a psychological evaluation, to have the child treat with a neutral psychologist, and for
appointment of a guardian ad litem. Because the trial court dismissed this matter on
jurisdictional grounds, it declined to address defendants’ motions. Thus, plaintiff did not receive
any adverse decision on those motions. Because we affirm the trial court’s decision, we likewise
conclude that it is unnecessary to consider this issue.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. No taxable costs pursuant to MCR 7.219, neither party
having prevailed in full.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
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