DAVID PAPPENHEIMER V VILLAGE OF NEW LOTHROP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DAVID PAPPENHEIMER,
UNPUBLISHED
August 12, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 292002
Shiawassee Circuit Court
LC No. 07-006219-CL
VILLAGE OF NEW LOTHROP,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
JULIE JENKINS, KAREN MAKSIMCHUK,
LAWRENCE COLLINS, EUGENE
BIRCHMEIER, JOHN MAKSIMCHUK, and
KEN BIRCHMEIER,
Defendants.
Before: MARKEY, P.J., and OWENS and BORRELLO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Village of New Lothrop (Village) appeals by leave granted the denial of its
motion for summary disposition. We reverse and remand.
I. Factual background.
Plaintiff was hired by Village as a police officer in 1978, and worked his way up within
the police department. In 1992, he was promoted to chief of police, a title he held until his
discharge in 2007. Near the end of plaintiff’s tenure as police chief, numerous disputes arose
between plaintiff and the members of the Village board. The specific dispute that gave rise to
plaintiff’s discharge and the present litigation arose after the appointment in February 2007 of
defendant Jenkins as the Village’s police commissioner. Jenkins was also a board member.
Shortly after becoming police commissioner, Jenkins asked plaintiff to provide her with copies
of all the Village police officers’ daily reports (dailies); with the names, addresses, and phone
numbers of all the Village police officers; and with an inventory of the police department.
Plaintiff refused to give Jenkins any of the requested information other than the names and
addresses of the police officers. He testified that he believed it would have violated Michigan’s
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Freedom of Information Act1 (FOIA) to do so. Jenkins testified that plaintiff never raised FOIA
as a reason not to comply with her requests.
On April 25th, 2007, the Village board voted to suspend plaintiff for one month without
pay. Several individual defendants who were Village board members claimed that they voted to
suspend plaintiff because of his refusal to comply with Jenkins’ requests for information, as well
as his behavior at board meetings.
On July 18th, 2007, the Village board sent plaintiff a letter informing him that it was
considering terminating him. At this point, plaintiff began investigating whether it would violate
FOIA to give Jenkins the information requested. Plaintiff spoke with Shiawassee County Sheriff
Jon Wilson, “somebody at the FBI,” the Owosso Post Commander of the Michigan State Police,
the police department’s insurance representative, and some other police chiefs. Plaintiff testified
that Wilson told him that he was not required by FOIA to give this information out, and that it
was not Wilson’s practice to give the information out. Plaintiff did not testify that Wilson told
him it would violate FOIA to give the information. The police chiefs with whom plaintiff spoke
also told plaintiff it was not their practice to give out this information, but did not tell plaintiff
that it would violate FOIA to do so. The FBI employee, MSP Post Commander, and insurance
representative did not give plaintiff any relevant information or advice.
On August 8th, 2007, the Village board met and voted to discharge plaintiff. Jenkins
testified that she voted to terminate him because of his refusal to give the information requested,
and because of his disrespectful behavior at council meetings. Other individual defendant board
members testified similarly.
Plaintiff brought this claim for age discrimination and for violation of the
Whistleblowers’ Protection Act2 (WPA). Defendants moved for summary disposition, pointing
out that plaintiff had set out no facts in his complaint to support his allegations of violation of the
WPA and age discrimination. The trial court held that plaintiff had failed to make a case with
respect to the age discrimination claim, and granted summary disposition to all defendants on
that count. The trial court further held that the individual defendants were entitled to summary
disposition on the WPA action. Plaintiff did not appeal either dismissal. The only remaining
claim, then, was the WPA claim against Village. Village sought and was granted leave to appeal
the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary disposition.
II. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Spiek v
Mich Dep’t of Transp, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). Village moved for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (C)(8) and (C)(10). The trial court denied Village’s motion
1
MCL 15.231 et seq.
2
MCL 15.361 et seq.
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under MCR 2.116(C)(10), and explicitly declined to address the issue under MCR 2.116(C)(8).
No argument was made or addressed regarding MCR 2.116(C)(7). A motion under MCR
2.116(C)(8) “tests the legal sufficiency of the claim on the pleadings alone to determine whether
the plaintiff has stated a claim on which relief may be granted[, and] must be granted if no
factual development could justify the plaintiff[’s] claim for relief.” Spiek, 456 Mich at 337. A
motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) challenges the factual support of a claim, and should be
granted if, after the court reviews the evidence submitted in support of the claim, it finds there is
no genuine issue of material fact. Id.
III. Discussion
“To establish a prima facie case under [the WPA], a plaintiff must show that (1) [he] was
engaged in protected activity as defined by the [WPA], (2) [he] was discharged or discriminated
against, and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the discharge or
adverse employment action.” West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183-184; 665 NW2d 468
(2003).
Here, the second element is not in question. The discussion of the first element may be
analyzed as a legal question, as there is no significant dispute about what plaintiff was doing,
only whether, as a matter of law, it qualifies as a protected activity under the WPA. The trial
court held that “[p]laintiff has come forward with plenty of . . . information . . . to indicate that
this is a protected activity.” Village, however, argues that plaintiff never reported any conduct
he believed to be illegal, but only refused to engage in what he believed to be illegal conduct.
Although, as plaintiff points out, at least one commentator has advanced a broad view of what
constitutes a whistleblower, including “employees who refuse to carry out illegal instructions”
and “employees who voice their concerns regarding their employers’ illegal behavior,”3 this
view is not consistent with our law of whistleblowing. Under the WPA, an employer is
forbidden to discharge an employee because that employee
reports or is about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected
violation of a law or regulation or rule . . . to a public body, . . . or because an
employee is requested by a public body to participate in an investigation, hearing,
or inquiry held by that public body, or a court action. [MCL 15.362.]
Plaintiff’s pleadings and testimony support a finding that he was asked to do something
he believed violated the law, that he refused to comply, and that he was fired for that reason.
This is not protected activity under the WPA.
Plaintiff claimed he was reporting what he believed to be illegal activity when he
contacted the various law enforcement agencies and the police department’s insurance
3
Westman, Whistleblowing: The Law of Retaliatory Discharge (BNA Books, 1991), quoted in
Dolan v Continental Airlines/Continental Express, 454 Mich 373, 379 n 10; 563 NW2d 23
(1997).
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representative. But he also testified that he did not talk to anyone on the board about these
conversations. Even accepting that these conversations were reports of what plaintiff believed to
be violations of the law, because there was no evidence that any board member had any
knowledge of these reports, there can have been no causal relationship between the reports and
plaintiff’s termination. See West, 469 Mich at 187-188.
IV. Conclusion
We agree with Village that the activity for which plaintiff was terminated was not
protected activity under the WPA, and that, even assuming plaintiff was reporting suspected
violations of the law, there was no evidence supporting a causal relationship between the
reporting and plaintiff’s termination. The trial court therefore erred in denying Village’s motion
for summary disposition. In so holding, we need not and do not reach the question of whether
Jenkins violated FOIA or any other law in requesting information from plaintiff, nor do we reach
the question of whether plaintiff would have violated FOIA or any other law by providing the
information. Nor do we hold that plaintiff is without a remedy for his termination, only that if he
has a remedy, it is not under the WPA.
The case is reversed and remanded to the trial court for the entry of an order granting
Village’s motion. Village, being the prevailing party, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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