PEOPLE OF MI V PARRISH LEMONTE ROBINSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 3, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 290391
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 08-000591-FH
PARRISH LEMONTE ROBINSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: TALBOT, P.J., and FITZGERALD and DAVIS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of first-degree home invasion,
MCL 750.110a(2), domestic assault (third offense), MCL 750.81(4), and interfering with an
electronic communication device, MCL 750.540(5)(a).1 Defendant was sentenced as a third
habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to ten to forty years’ imprisonment for the home invasion
conviction, and to time served for the domestic assault and interference with an electronic
communication device convictions. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further
proceedings.
The complainant was defendant’s former girlfriend. She had obtained a personal
protection order against defendant and was resisting his attempts to contact her. On the date of
the offense, defendant had his cousin’s daughter knock on the complainant’s door, then entered
when the latter opened the door for the girl. The child waited outside while defendant entered
the complainant’s house. The complainant testified that defendant forcibly grabbed her by the
neck, tried to penetrate her digitally, and destroyed her cell phone. The child testified that
defendant was inside the house for a short time period, after which both he and the complainant
left the house in a state of some agitation; with the complainant asserting that defendant should
pay for the phone he had destroyed. A responding police officer observed red marks on the
complainant’s stomach area and neck, and some blood on the latter.
The complainant had a prior conviction for falsely reporting a felony, MCL
750.411a(1)(b). She was convicted of that offense when she had her father cut the word “snitch”
1
Defendant was acquitted of an additional charge of assault with intent to commit criminal
sexual conduct involving penetration, MCL 750.520g.
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into her back and then falsely told the police her then-boyfriend inflicted the injury. Before trial,
the prosecutor acknowledged that the complainant’s earlier conviction was admissible for
purposes of impeachment under MRE 609, but asked that defendant not be permitted to elicit the
facts underlying that conviction. The trial court expressed its agreement with the prosecutor’s
position and defense counsel acquiesced in the court’s decision without further argument.
At a posttrial Ginther2 hearing, defense counsel testified that he knew from experience
with the judge in question that he would not be permitted to explore the facts underlying the
complainant’s prior conviction, under MRE 404(b) or otherwise, so he elected not to pursue the
matter.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erroneously precluded him from
presenting evidence of the facts underlying the complainant’s prior conviction. Defendant
alternatively argues that defense counsel was ineffective to the extent that he failed to
sufficiently preserve that issue below. We conclude that because the issue in question was raised
before and decided by the trial court on the record, the issue was preserved despite defense
counsel’s lack of argument. In actions tried before the court, “No exception need be taken to a
finding or decision.” MCR 2.517(A)(7). “The purpose of appellate preservation requirements is
to induce litigants to do everything they can in the trial court to prevent error, eliminate its
prejudice, or at least create a record of the error and its prejudice.” People v Taylor, 195 Mich
App 57, 60; 489 NW2d 99 (1992). In this case, the prosecutor moved to limit the use of the
complainant’s conviction, and the trial court firmly decided the matter in the prosecution’s favor.
Although defense counsel neither himself suggested that the use of the evidence should be so
limited, nor otherwise expressed agreement with the trial court’s decision in the matter, neither
did counsel argue the point, having seen the futility. But a decision was made, and a record of it
created. “Counsel is not obligated to make futile objections.” People v Meadows, 175 Mich
App 355, 362; 437 NW2d 405 (1989). Accordingly, the claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel predicated on counsel’s failure to preserve this issue must fail.
We next address the merits of the trial court’s decision. This Court reviews a trial court’s
decision whether to admit or exclude evidence of other bad acts for an abuse of discretion.
People v Kahley, 277 Mich App 182, 184; 744 NW2d 194 (2007). “A trial court abuses its
discretion when it fails to select a principled outcome from a range of reasonable and principled
outcomes.” Id.
Witness credibility is always at issue, and may be attacked on cross-examination. See
MRE 611(c). MRE 609 authorizes the introduction of evidence of a crime containing an element
of dishonesty or false statement for the purposes of impeaching a witness. That rule is the cited
exception to the prohibition of MRE 608(b) of introducing extrinsic evidence to prove specific
instances of conduct of a witness for purposes of attacking credibility. The latter otherwise
permits inquiry into specific instances of conduct that are probative of truthfulness on crossexamination. Construing those companion rules in harmony with each other3 means that a party
2
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
3
See People v Pfaffle, 246 Mich App 282, 296; 632 NW2d 162 (2001); Rafferty v Markovitz,
(continued…)
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may cross-examine a witness with specific instances of their conduct, but may not introduce
extrinsic evidence of that conduct other than conviction of a crime. Accordingly, in this case,
had the complainant denied that she had been convicted of falsely reporting a felony; the defense
would have been entitled to rebut that denial with extrinsic evidence of the conviction. Defense
counsel would also be free to cross-examine the complainant about the underlying facts of that
conviction, but counsel would have to accept her responses without resort to extrinsic evidence.
But also coming into play is MRE 404(b)(1), which provides that evidence of other bad
acts is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show behavior consistent with
those other wrongs, but that such conduct may be admissible for other purposes such as proof of
“scheme, plan or system in doing an act . . . .” Although the rule is most often invoked in
connection with criminal defendants, it also applies to witnesses. People v Rockwell, 188 Mich
App 405, 409-410; 470 NW2d 673 (1991).
In this case, the trial court concluded after the Ginther hearing “although there are some
similarities between the facts of that incident and the instant case, they are not enough to
articulate a ‘scheme, plan, or system in doing an act.’” We disagree. Our Supreme Court has
clarified that “evidence of similar misconduct is logically relevant to show that the charged act
occurred where the uncharged misconduct and the charged offense are sufficiently similar to
support an inference that they are manifestations of a common plan, scheme, or system.” People
v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 63; 614 NW2d 888 (2000). The present situation does not
concern earlier acts and a current charge, but rather earlier witness misconduct and a current
credibility challenge. Given that the complainant was the only witness to describe what occurred
between herself and defendant inside her house at the time in question, evidence that she had
previously inflicted physical injury on herself to bring police pressure to bear on an old
boyfriend or his family does relate to the defense theory of false accusations in this case. That
the earlier event involved the witness arranging for another to injure her, while the defense
implication in this case is that she hastily created injuries in order to exaggerate to the police the
extent of defendant’s aggression, does not prevent the earlier incident and current theory of
fabrication from having sufficient commonality to constitute a common plan, scheme, or system.
It is significant that the jury elected to find defendant not guilty of the only charge for
which there was no evidence to corroborate the complainant’s account—assault with intent to
commit criminal sexual conduct involving penetration. The testimony of defendant’s cousin’s
daughter corroborated the complainant’s account of defendant entering her house without
permission, and of destroying her cell phone while within, but the only corroboration of the
allegations of physical assault on that occasion was the redness the police discovered on the
complainant’s stomach area and neck, and some blood on the latter.
Although defendant frames this issue in terms of the constitutional right to present a
defense, the crux of the matter is a dispute over an evidentiary ruling relating to impeachment of
the complaining witness over a collateral matter. Error related to the admission of evidence that
does not implicate a specific constitutional guarantee or right is nonconstitutional in nature.
People v Whittaker, 465 Mich 422, 426; 635 NW2d 687 (2001). A defendant pressing a
(…continued)
461 Mich 265, 270; 602 NW2d 367 (1999).
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preserved claim of nonconstitutional error bears the burden of showing that it is more probable
than not that the error affected the outcome. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495; 596 NW2d
607 (1999).
In this case, especially considering that the jury apparently retained a reasonable doubt
about the only charge in connection with which there was no evidence but for the complainant’s
account, we conclude that the jury might also have retained a reasonable doubt regarding the
allegations of assault had it been made aware that the complainant previously manufactured an
injury in an effort to pursue a police complaint against an old boyfriend.
First-degree home invasion was presented to the jury on the theory that defendant entered
the complainant’s home without permission and assaulted her. The limitation on defendant’s
ability to rebut the evidence of an assault undermines that conviction, along with that of domestic
assault. The Felony Information listed the first-degree home invasion as premised solely on
“domestic violence,” which comprised count three of the charges under MCL 750.81. The
prosecutor indicated in opening statements that the home invasion was premised on the
occurrence of an assault. When instructing the jury the trial court did not reference, in
accordance with the statutory language of MCL 750.110a(2), that first-degree home invasion can
be found if the jury determines that after entering a dwelling without permission the defendant
committed either “a felony, larceny or assault.” Instead, the trial court specifically instructed the
jury that it need only find that defendant entered without permission, that another person was
present in the dwelling and that while in the home defendant “committed the crime of an
assault.” Given the narrow language and specificity of the jury’s instruction, it would not be
proper to permit the home invasion conviction to stand without the assault conviction.
But whether an assault occurred does not impinge on a determination of whether
defendant destroyed the complainant’s cell phone. Accordingly, we affirm defendant’s
conviction of interference with a communication device, but vacate his convictions and
sentences for first-degree home invasion and domestic assault. The prosecutor is at liberty to
retry the latter two charges, or alternatively, in the case of home invasion, to move the trial court
to replace the here-vacated conviction with the necessarily included lesser offense of entering
without permission, MCL 750.115(1), and resentence defendant accordingly.4
We additionally take this opportunity to correct an irregularity in the judgment of
sentence. The original judgment of sentence, dated January 15, 2009, incorrectly indicated that
defendant’s convictions resulted from a guilty plea, and incorrectly identified the sentencing date
as December 5, 2008. An amended judgment of sentence, dated February 5, 2009, corrected the
former error, but retained the latter irregularity. A second amended judgment of sentence, dated
March 17, 2009, showed that defendant was sentenced as a third habitual offender and correctly
identified the sentencing date as January 14, 2009, but reverted to indicating that defendant was
convicted by guilty plea. On remand, the trial court should issue a new judgment of sentence
that is accurate in all of these particulars.
4
See People v Silver, 466 Mich 386; 646 NW2d 150 (2002).
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Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings in accordance
with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Alton T. Davis
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