SHAHIN FAROKHRANY V MARLIN JACKSON
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SHAHIN FAROKHRANY,
UNPUBLISHED
July 29, 2010
Plaintiff/Counter-DefendantAppellant,
V
No. 291616
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 05-000570-NO
MARLIN JACKSON,
Defendant/Counter-PlaintiffAppellee.
Before: FORT HOOD, P.J., and BORRELLO and STEPHENS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff/counter-defendant (“plaintiff”) appeals as of right from a judgment in favor of
defendant/counter-plaintiff (“defendant”) following a jury trial. On appeal, plaintiff argues that
the trial court erred when it denied his motions for directed verdicts on his claim for assault and
battery and on defendant’s claims for defamation and malicious prosecution. We affirm the
jury’s verdict with respect to the plaintiff’s claim for assault and battery but reverse with respect
to defendant’s claims for defamation and malicious prosecution.
The parties were involved in an altercation in the early morning hours of June 1, 2003.
Plaintiff alleged that defendant hit him with a bottle. Defendant was charged with felonious
assault, MCL 750.82, but pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, MCL 750.81a(1). Defendant
maintains that he only punched plaintiff with his fist. Plaintiff suffered an aggravation of a
serious eye condition and complained that he has ongoing problems with his vision, plus
dizziness and blackouts. Plaintiff sued defendant for assault and battery and defendant
countersued for defamation and malicious prosecution.1
On appeal, plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a
directed verdict on his assault and battery claim. Plaintiff argues that because defendant testified
1
Defendant’s counter complaint also alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress, but that
claim was never presented to the jury.
-1-
that he punched plaintiff, there was no factual question regarding whether defendant committed a
battery against plaintiff. We disagree.
A trial court’s decision on a motion for a directed verdict is reviewed de novo and the
reviewing court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Roberts v Saffell, 280 Mich App 397, 401; 760 NW2d 715 (2008). “A directed verdict is
appropriate only when no factual question exists upon which reasonable minds could differ.” Id.
While defendant admitted punching the plaintiff he argued both self-defense and mutual
affray. The jury was instructed on both defenses. Model Civil Jury Instruction 115.05 provides:
“A person who is assaulted may use such reasonable force as may be, or reasonably appears at
the time to be, necessary to protect himself or herself from bodily harm in repelling the assault.”
Model Civil Jury Instruction 115.06 provides: “If plaintiff voluntarily engaged in a fight with
defendant for the sake of fighting and not as a means of self-defense, then plaintiff may not
recover for an assault or battery unless the defendant beat the plaintiff excessively or used
unreasonable force.”
There was testimony raising a factual question regarding whether defendant was acting in
self-defense, or whether defendant reasonably concluded that plaintiff was engaging in a fight
with him. Defendant testified that plaintiff was heckling him and swearing at him at the party.
He further testified that plaintiff approached him from behind in a way that made him feel
“uncomfortable.” Plaintiff then nudged defendant from behind. Defendant testified that plaintiff
“obviously want[ed] trouble” and made him feel that “something’s not right.” Defendant felt
threatened before he punched plaintiff. Defendant’s roommate testified that defendant told him
he felt uncomfortable at the party, and that plaintiff approached defendant outside the house.
Additionally, both attorneys argued the issues of self-defense and mutual affray during their
closing arguments. Therefore, plaintiff did not become entitled to a directed verdict when
defendant acknowledged striking him, as a reasonable jury was permitted to conclude that the
strike was a justified act of self-defense. Further, plaintiff’s argument that the trial court required
the jury to conclude that defendant hit plaintiff with a bottle in order to find defendant liable for
assault is baseless. The jury was asked both whether defendant battered plaintiff with his fist and
whether he battered plaintiff with a bottle. The issue of the bottle related to the defamation
claim.
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a directed
verdict with respect to defendant’s claim of defamation. As above, “[a] directed verdict is
appropriate only when no factual question exists upon which reasonable minds could differ.”
Roberts, 280 Mich App at 401.
Defendant’s defamation claim was based on plaintiff’s statements that defendant hit him
with a bottle. Defendant presented evidence that his prospects in the National Football League
draft fell as a result of this allegation. The elements of a defamation claim are: “(1) that the
defendant made a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) that the defendant
published the defamatory statement to a third party, (3) that the defendant was at least negligent
in publishing the statement, and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special
harm (defamation per se) or the existence of special harm caused by publication (defamation per
quod).” Colista v Thomas, 241 Mich App 529, 538; 616 NW2d 249 (2000). Further, the
statement to a third party must not have been a privileged communication. Oesterle v Wallace,
-2-
272 Mich App 260, 263-264; 725 NW2d 470 (2006). Plaintiff challenges whether there were
any actionable unprivileged communications. The applicability of a privilege is a question of
law this Court reviews de novo. Oesterle, 272 Mich App at 263.
Plaintiff first argues that his statements to the police were privileged. We agree. There
was evidence presented at trial that plaintiff stated to the police that he was hit with a bottle
during the incident. Defendant presented evidence that the allegation became widely known and
had been published in the media. Statements to law enforcement in the course of an
investigation are indeed absolutely privileged and may not support recovery for defamation.
Shinglemeyer v Wright, 124 Mich 230, 239; 82 NW 887 (1900); Hall v Pizza Hut of America,
Inc., 153 Mich App 609, 619; 396 NW2d 809 (1986). Therefore, the evidence of plaintiff's
statements to the police regarding the incident could not be considered in determining whether
plaintiff was liable for defamation.
Plaintiff also claims that his statements to physicians “are . . . subject to patient-physician
confidentiality.” Plaintiff himself testified that he told the physicians that he was hit with a
bottle. There was no question of whether the information he provided to the doctors was
“confidential.” The privilege in that instance is held by the patient and allows the patient the
right to sue the physician if that confidence is breached. However, the fact that the information
was confidential is not determinative of whether the statement was protected by a defamation
privilege. “[A]bsolute privilege against a defamation action is limited to narrowly defined
areas.” Oesterle, 272 Mich App at 264. There is no authority that affords a defamation privilege
to statements made to a physician. Consequently, the jury was permitted to consider whether
plaintiff's statements to his physician constituted defamation that proximately caused defendant
harm.
We observe that there was no evidence presented at trial that plaintiff’s actionable
defamatory statements—those to the physician only—actually caused defendant’s injury. There
was never any evidence or allegation that plaintiff’s physician disclosed plaintiff’s statement;
defendant merely relied on evidence that the statement was widely known. “[A] proximate cause
is a foreseeable, natural, and probable cause of the plaintiff's injury and damages.” Unibar
Maintenance Servs, Inc v Saigh, 283 Mich App 609, 625; 769 NW2d 911 (2009) (internal
quotation omitted). It is equally likely, however, that the source of the media reports was
plaintiff’s privileged communication to law enforcement. There was no direct evidence
regarding the source of the “widely known” reports. Certainly there was no evidence that the
physician shared the patient information with anyone. Thus, there is nothing more than
speculation regarding whether the statements to the physician were a proximate cause of
plaintiff’s injury. The trial court should have entered a directed verdict in plaintiff’s favor on
defendant’s defamation claim.
Because we conclude that there was inadequate evidence of proximate causation, it is
unnecessary to address plaintiff's argument regarding the statute of limitations. Furthermore, we
note that “[a]ffirmative defenses, such as a statute of limitations defense, must be raised in a
party’s first responsive pleading or by motion filed not later than this responsive pleading.”
Attorney Gen ex rel Dep’t of Environmental Quality v Bulk Petroleum Corp, 276 Mich App 654,
664-665; 741 NW2d 857 (2007); MCR 2.111(F)(2) and (3). Thus, it would be improper to
address plaintiff's argument because the defense was waived when plaintiff failed to raise it in a
timely manner. Attorney Gen, 276 Mich App at 665.
-3-
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for directed
verdict on defendant’s malicious prosecution claim because defendant's guilty plea was not a
favorable determination. We agree.
In an action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff has the burden of proving (1)
that the defendant has initiated a criminal prosecution against him, (2) that the
criminal proceedings terminated in his favor, (3) that the private person who
instituted or maintained the prosecution lacked probable cause for his action, and
(4) that the action was undertaken with malice or a purpose in instituting the
criminal claim other than bringing the offender to justice. [Cox v Williams, 233
Mich App 388, 391; 593 NW2d 173 (1999).]
Defendant alleged that because he pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor for punching plaintiff, rather
than a felony for hitting plaintiff with a bottle, the prosecution initiated by plaintiff was
terminated in his favor. Whether a guilty plea constitutes a favorable termination, for the
purposes of a malicious prosecution claim, is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.
Id.
The Court in Cox stated: “[D]ismissal of criminal charges at the instance of the
prosecutor or the complaining witness implies a lack of reasonable ground for prosecution and is
a favorable termination of the proceeding for purposes of a malicious prosecution cause of
action.” Cox, 233 Mich App at 393. The Court contrasted this with the situation where the
accused procures the dismissal “as a courtesy or favor” or “by some act that prevents the
litigation.” Id. at 393-394. In that situation, the Court opined there would be no favorable
termination for the purposes of a claim of malicious prosecution. Id.
In this case, there was no evidence presented that the felonious assault charges were
dropped by the prosecutor for a want of evidence or failure to procure testimony from plaintiff.
The only evidence in the record regarding why the felonious assault charge was dropped was
defendant’s testimony that he voluntarily pleaded guilty to aggravated assault. Thus, defendant’s
voluntary guilty plea does not evidence a “lack of reasonable ground for prosecution,” but
instead constitutes an act by defendant to “prevent the litigation.” Cox, 233 Mich App at 393394. We hold there was no favorable termination to support the elements of malicious
prosecution. The trial court erred when it denied plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict.2
Finally, plaintiff argues that the trial court injected the issue of whether defendant hit
plaintiff with a bottle by placing a question to this effect on the verdict form, which tainted the
jury’s consideration of the claims. The jury was instructed to answer, 1) whether defendant
committed “an assault and battery” against plaintiff, and 2) whether defendant assaulted plaintiff
with a bottle. Plaintiff has waived appellate review of the verdict form because he expressly
assented to the form at trial. Dedes v Asch, 233 Mich App 329, 334-335; 590 NW2d 605 (1998),
2
Because we conclude that the trial court should have entered a directed verdict in plaintiff’s
favor with respect to both of defendant’s claims, the damages awarded to defendant in the trial
court’s judgment are also vacated.
-4-
overruled on other grounds Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439 (2000) (holding party waived
issue of allocation of fault for failure to object to the verdict form); MCR 2.516(C). Moreover,
plaintiff testified repeatedly that defendant hit him with a bottle; there is no evidence that the trial
court introduced this issue at its own initiative.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.