ENGENIUS INC V FORD MOTOR CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ENGENIUS, INC., and ENGENIUS-EU,
LIMITED,
UNPUBLISHED
July 29, 2010
Plaintiffs/CounterdefendantsAppellees,
v
No. 290682
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 03-331133-CK
FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
Defendant/CounterplaintiffAppellant.
Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and JANSEN and DONOFRIO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Ford Motor Company (Ford) appeals by right the trial court’s order
confirming an arbitration award in favor of plaintiffs EnGenius, Inc. (EnGenius) and EnGeniusEU, Ltd. (EEU) in the amount of $22,689,898.43. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we
affirm.
I
EnGenius supplied Ford with engineering services for approximately 20 years. From
1992 through 1994, EnGenius worked to develop a comprehensive test system for Ford’s
assembly plants, which was referred to as the “FACTS” system. On June 30, 2000, Ford and
EnGenius entered into a technical support agreement, by which EnGenius agreed to provide
technical support for the FACTS system for the life of Ford’s use of the system, and Ford agreed
to compensate EnGenius at the rate of $127,636.67 per month. This agreement, known as the
“FACTS Contract,” was found by the arbitration panel to be the sole and complete agreement
between the parties with respect to the FACTS system. The panel further found that the FACTS
Contract did not contain the Global Terms and Conditions (GTC), which were found to be mere
proposals for additional terms, or Ford’s Purchase Order form, which was simply a vehicle for
payment.
Meanwhile, in 1999, Ford decided to replace the FACTS system with a system known as
the “eCATS” system. On February 18, 2000, Ford and EnGenius entered into a written
agreement known as the “eCATS Contract,” which the panel found to be comprised of the
Software Terms and Conditions, the GTC, and Ford’s Purchase Order form. EnGenius alleges
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that through the eCATS Contract, Ford agreed to pay EnGenius a yearly sum during the eCATS
project, since funding the project was beyond EnGenius’s financial resources. However, Ford
argues that the eCATS Contract was a fixed-price contract, subject to periodic purchase orders,
rather than an agreement guaranteeing fixed annual payments.
At Ford’s request, EnGenius created a European affiliate known as EEU. The purpose of
EEU was to support the eCATS system in Ford’s European plants.
On January 2, 2001, EnGenius, with Ford’s approval, successfully implemented and
launched the eCATS system for the first time at Ford’s Wayne Plant. Despite the success of
eCATS, Ford fell behind on its yearly payments under the eCATS Contract. EnGenius argues
that Ford’s failure to make payments brought it to the brink of insolvency. Indeed, Ford’s own
representative stated in an e-mail that EnGenius had expended more than $12 million during the
development of the eCATS project, with little, if any, return from Ford. In August 2001, Ford
personnel reviewed the eCATS system so as to potentially provide final approval, which would
have resulted in full payment to EnGenius. But EnGenius alleges that Ford refused to approve
the system without reason, and that when EnGenius asked for a written explanation of Ford’s
refusal, Ford ignored the requests and provided no explanation of its refusal to approve the
system.
EnGenius further alleges that Ford purposely induced all EEU employees to leave EEU
and work for a different company supported by Ford. This new company allegedly took all of
EEU’s business, and continued to provide services for Ford through the former EEU employees,
who were working in the same roles as they had for EEU.
On September 17, 2003, plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Wayne Circuit Court asserting
various breach-of-contract, tort, and quasi-contract claims against Ford. Thereafter, Ford filed a
motion for summary disposition on the ground that all claims asserted in this matter must be
resolved via arbitration, pursuant to a clause in the GTC document that gave Ford the right to
initiate binding arbitration if plaintiffs initiated litigation. The trial court granted Ford’s motion
for summary disposition, ruling that the arbitration clause in the GTC document applied to all
claims included in plaintiffs’ complaint, and that the matter therefore had to be resolved via
binding arbitration. Subsequently, the trial court entered a stipulated corrected order, reserving
jurisdiction over any arbitration award pursuant to MCR 3.602.
After an unsuccessful mediation attempt, plaintiffs served Ford with their notice of
arbitration. Arbitration proceedings took place from May 2004 through April 2008. EnGenius
appointed attorney Sheldon Miller as its arbitrator, Ford appointed former Judge Norman Lippitt,
and former Judge Barry Howard was chosen as the neutral arbitrator.
On November 20, 2008, the arbitration panel majority (composed of Arbitrators Howard
and Miller) issued an interim opinion and award, awarding $17,611,970 in favor of plaintiffs.
This award was final in all respects except that it reserved ruling on plaintiffs’ requests for
attorney fees, arbitration fees, and costs and interest. Arbitrator Lippitt issued a dissenting
opinion. The majority arbitrators’ specific awards to EnGenius were: (1) $1,239,885 in lost
profits for Ford’s breach of the FACTS contract, (2) $14,425,954 for Ford’s breach of the
eCATS contract, and (3) $1,946,131 for tortious interference.
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At some point before the final arbitration award was issued, Howard, the neutral
arbitrator, apparently requested that Lippitt, Ford’s arbitrator, approach Ford and recommend a
settlement offer of between $10 and $12 million. Lippitt relayed the settlement offer to Ford,
which Ford rejected. Lippitt then informed Howard of Ford’s rejection. Ford now argues that
this series of settlement discussions constituted an improper ex parte communication.
On December 12, 2008, the arbitration panel issued its final opinion and award, which reconfirmed the interim award, denied the requests for attorney fees, arbitration fees, and costs,
and referred the issue of statutory interest to the trial court. Plaintiffs filed a motion to confirm
the award in the trial court.
On January 9, 2009, the trial court confirmed the final arbitration award and further
awarded $5,077,928.43 in statutory pre-judgment interest through January 9, 2009. Ford then
moved to vacate the award. The trial court denied Ford’s motion to vacate.
II
The existence of a contract to arbitrate and its enforceability are judicial questions that
this Court considers de novo on appeal. Watts v Polaczyk, 242 Mich App 600, 603; 619 NW2d
714 (2000). This Court also reviews de novo a trial court’s decision to enforce, vacate, or
modify an arbitration award. Tokar v Albery, 258 Mich App 350, 352; 671 NW2d 139 (2003).
This Court “review[s] the legal issues presented without extending any deference to the trial
court.” Washington v Washington, 283 Mich App 667, 671; 770 NW2d 908 (2009).
However, with respect to the facts and the arbitrators’ findings on the merits, this Court’s
review is much more limited. Id. Indeed, the standard of review for such matters is among the
narrowest standards known to American law. Id. at 671 n 4. An arbitration panel’s findings of
fact and decisions on the merits are not judicially reviewable. Id. at 672; Byron Ctr Pub Schools
Bd of Ed v Kent Co Ed Ass’n, 186 Mich App 29, 31; 463 NW2d 112 (1990). This Court’s
authority to vacate an arbitration award is generally limited to the four circumstances enumerated
in MCR 3.602(J)(2), which provides that a court may vacate an arbitration award only if (1) “the
award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means,” (2) “there was evident
partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, corruption of an arbitrator, or misconduct
prejudicing a party’s rights,” (3) “the arbitrator exceeded his or her powers,” or (4) “the
arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing on a showing of sufficient cause, refused to hear
evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing to prejudice
substantially a party’s rights.” Whether an arbitrator has exceeded his or her authority is
reviewed de novo by this Court. Washington, 283 Mich App at 672.
A court may also vacate an arbitration award when the panel has committed an error of
law that is evident on the face of the award itself. Id. But not all errors of law will warrant
reversal of an arbitration award. Id. Instead, it must be affirmatively shown that, but for the
arbitrators’ error of law, the arbitration award would have been substantially different. Id. at
672-673; Saveski v Tiseo Architects Inc, 261 Mich App 553, 555; 682 NW2d 542 (2004). This
Court will not review the arbitrators’ thoughts or mental processes that have led to an award.
Washington, 283 Mich App at 672.
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III
A
Ford first argues that the trial court erred by confirming the arbitration award and denying
its motion to vacate because the majority arbitrators exceeded their jurisdiction and powers by
holding that the arbitration clause giving them jurisdiction was not part of the FACTS Contract.
However, when Ford filed its motion for summary disposition in the trial court, it actively sought
to have all of plaintiffs’ claims resolved via binding arbitration. Accordingly, Ford implicitly
agreed to allow the arbitrators to decide the makeup of the FACTS Contract and adjudicate
plaintiffs’ claims arising thereunder.
The United States Supreme Court has recently held that, at least in the context of matters
governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 USC 1 et seq., “courts must treat the arbitration
clause as severable from the contract in which it appears, and thus apply the clause to all disputes
within its scope ‘[u]nless the [validity] challenge is to the arbitration clause itself’ or the party
‘disputes the formation of [the] contract.’” Granite Rock Co v Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters,
___ US ___; ___ S Ct ___; ___ L Ed 2d ___ (2010) (citations omitted). Similarly, Arbitration
Rule 8.2 states that the
[t]ribunal shall have the power to determine the existence, validity or scope of the
contract of which an arbitration clause forms a part. For the purposes of
challenges to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the arbitration clause shall be
considered as separable from any contract of which it forms a part.
We conclude that the arbitrators acted within their power in determining that the GTC and
Purchase Order were not part of the FACTS Contract. In the present case, neither party
challenges the validity of the GTC’s arbitration clause itself; nor does either party dispute the
actual formation of the FACTS Contract. See Granite Rock Co, ___ US at ___. Therefore, the
arbitration panel did not err by treating the GTC’s arbitration clause as separable from the
remainder of the FACTS Contract, itself. See id.; see also Arbitration Rule 8.2.
Further, even if the arbitrators had somehow erred by determining that the GTC’s
arbitration clause was not part of the FACTS Contract, we find that Ford has waived its
argument in this regard. We reiterate that Ford actively sought to submit this entire dispute to
binding arbitration in accordance with the arbitration clause contained in the GTC. An appellant
may not claim as error on appeal something to which it specifically consented in the trial court.
Hilgendorf v St John Hosp & Med Ctr Corp, 245 Mich App 670, 696; 630 NW2d 356 (2001);
see also Joba Constr Co, Inc v Burns & Roe Inc, 121 Mich App 615, 629; 329 NW2d 760
(1982). It is well settled an appellant may not harbor error as an appellate parachute. In re
Gazella, 264 Mich App 668, 679; 692 NW2d 708 (2005). We conclude that Ford has waived
this argument by affirmatively agreeing to submit the entire dispute to arbitration. See
Hilgendorf, 245 Mich App at 696.
Lastly, we conclude that Ford’s argument lacks merit for two other reasons as well. First,
the arbitrators made a factual finding that Ford’s Purchase Order and GTC were not part of the
FACTS Contract. Such findings of fact and decisions on the merits are not judicially reviewable.
Washington, 283 Mich App at 672; see also Byron Ctr Pub Schools, 186 Mich App at 31. This
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Court cannot now substitute its own judgment for that of the arbitrators concerning which
documents did, or did not, make up the FACTS contract. See Saginaw v Mich Law Enforcement
Union, Teamsters Local 129, 136 Mich App 542, 556-557; 358 NW2d 356 (1984). Second, once
the trial court determined that there was a valid agreement to arbitrate, granted Ford’s motion for
summary disposition, and sent the entire dispute to arbitration, the arbitrators lacked the power to
divest themselves of jurisdiction over the matter. See Arrow Overall Supply Co v Peloquin
Enterprises, 414 Mich 95, 99; 323 NW2d 1 (1982) (holding that the existence of a contract to
arbitrate and the enforceability of its terms must be determined by the court, and cannot be
decided by the arbitrator). Accordingly, although the arbitrators ultimately concluded that the
Purchase Order and GTC were not part of the FACTS Contract, this determination could not
divest them of their authority to decide plaintiffs’ claims arising under the FACTS agreement in
the first instance. The trial court had already determined that a valid agreement to arbitrate
existed with respect to the entire dispute,1 and the arbitrators, themselves, could not later undo
the court’s earlier ruling on this issue. See id.
B
Ford also argues that the trial court erred by confirming the arbitration award because the
unambiguous terms of the eCATS Contract did not provide for “guaranteed annual payments,”
but the arbitrators awarded such payments anyway. However, contrary to Ford’s argument, the
arbitrators’ award was not based upon a determination that the eCATS Contract called for
guaranteed annual payments. Instead, it was based upon the arbitrators’ determination that
plaintiffs were entitled to compensation under the eCATS Contract for work that had already
been completed. This determination by the arbitrators constituted a finding of fact, and is
therefore not reviewable by this Court. Washington, 283 Mich App at 672; see also Byron Ctr
Pub Schools, 186 Mich App at 31.
C
Ford next argues that the trial court erred by confirming the arbitration award because the
arbitrators exceeded their jurisdiction and powers by awarding damages for tortious interference.
As Ford accurately argues, Michigan law states that a party cannot be liable for tortiously
interfering with its own contractual or advantageous business relationships. Reed v Michigan
Metro Girl Scout Council, 201 Mich App 10, 13; 506 NW2d 231 (1993) (stating that “[t]o
maintain a cause of action for tortious interference, [a plaintiff] must establish that the defendant
was a ‘third party’ to the contract or business relationship”); see also Dzierwa v Mich Oil Co,
152 Mich App 281, 287; 39 NW2d 610 (1986). However, in this situation, Ford did not interfere
with its own contractual or business relationship with EEU. Instead, as the arbitrators found,
Ford interfered with the existing contractual and business relationships between EEU and EEU’s
employees. There is nothing in Michigan law to suggest that a defendant like Ford may not be
held liable for tortiously interfering with the existing contractual or business relationships
1
We note that Ford does not specifically challenge the trial court’s determination that there was
an enforceable agreement to arbitrate. Instead, Ford merely challenges the subsequent findings
of the arbitrators.
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between another company and that other company’s employees. Nor does Ford attempt to argue
that there was not a recognized and established contractual or business relationship between EEU
and EEU’s employees. This Court has specifically held that a defendant may tortiously interfere
with the contractual and business relations between another company and that company’s
employees. See, e.g., Prysak v R L Polk Co, 193 Mich App 1, 12; 483 NW2d 629 (1992);
Feaheny v Caldwell, 175 Mich App 291, 302-304; 437 NW2d 358 (1989). In short, contrary to
Ford’s arguments on appeal, a defendant in the position of Ford may be held liable in tort under
Michigan law for its wrongful interference with such an employment relationship.
Moreover, the arbitrators made a factual determination that Ford’s conduct satisfied all
the elements of tortious interference with a contract or tortious interference with a business
relationship. See Health Call of Detroit v Atrium Home & Health Care Services, Inc, 268 Mich
App 83, 89-90; 706 NW2d 843 (2005) (describing the elements of the two torts). This finding of
fact by the arbitrators must remain undisturbed. Washington, 283 Mich App at 672; see also
Byron Ctr Pub Schools, 186 Mich App at 31.
D
Lastly, Ford argues that the trial court erred by confirming the arbitration award because
the arbitrators engaged in misconduct in the form of ex parte settlement discussions with Ford.
Ford argues that Arbitrator Howard initiated these improper ex parte communications by
requesting that Arbitrator Lippitt approach Ford and recommend a settlement offer of between
$10 and $12 million. We disagree.
Although Howard apparently suggested that Lippitt should relay a potential settlement
offer to Ford, it was Lippitt (Ford’s own party-appointed arbitrator) who relayed the offer to Ford
and therefore actually engaged in an ex parte communication. Ford did not raise any objections
to the arbitrators’ decision until January 29, 2009, approximately two months after receiving the
interim award on November 20, 2008. Former Arbitration Rule 202 states that “[a] party
knowing of a failure to comply with any provision of these Rules, or any requirement of the
arbitration agreement or any direction of the Tribunal, and neglecting to state its objections
promptly, waives any objection thereto.” By waiting nearly three months to raise this issue in
the trial court, Ford has effectively waived any objection regarding the alleged ex parte
communications. If the allegedly improper settlement offer was truly as detrimental to the
arbitration process as Ford claims, Ford should have objected to the communication as soon as
Lippitt first approached Ford with the offer.
It is well settled that a party cannot adopt a “wait and see” approach during arbitration by
raising an issue for the first time only after receiving an unfavorable ruling. Arrow Overall
Supply Co, 414 Mich at 99-100. By arguing that it is entitled to relief on the basis of its own
allegedly improper discussion with its own party-appointed arbitrator, which took place between
the issuance of the interim award and the unaffected, substantially similar final award, Ford is
2
Rule 20 has now been renumbered as Rule 21, but the text has remained substantially
unchanged.
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effectively manufacturing its own error for the purpose of creating a ground for appeal. As noted
earlier, an appellant may not harbor error as an appellate parachute. In re Gazella, 264 Mich
App at 679. The trial court properly rejected Ford’s argument that there were impermissible ex
parte communications in this case. We perceive no error requiring reversal.
Affirmed. As the prevailing party, plaintiffs may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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