RICHARD LEVINE V MONROE CO EMERGENCY MEDICAL AUTHORITY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RICHARD LEVINE and MELISSA LEVINE,
d/b/a HART EMS MONROE,
UNPUBLISHED
July 29, 2010
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
MONROE COUNTY EMERGENCY MEDICAL
AUTHORITY and COUNTY OF MONROE,
No. 288844
Monroe Circuit Court
LC No. 06-021923-CK
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: GLEICHER, P.J., and O’CONNELL and WILDER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs Richard and Melissa Levine appeal as of right from an order granting summary
disposition in favor of defendants County of Monroe (Monroe County) and Monroe County
Emergency Medical Authority (MCEMA). Because we determine that defendants have no
liability under tort or contract law, we do not reach the issue of governmental immunity.1 We
affirm the trial court’s learned opinion.
Plaintiffs ran Hart EMS Monroe (Hart EMS), a business that provided emergency
medical services (EMS) in Monroe County.2 The predecessor in interest to Hart EMS, Hart
1
Were we to address the issue of governmental immunity, we would agree with Judge Gleicher’s
analysis of this issue in her concurring opinion. We note that the issue of governmental
immunity as it relates to public contracts presents a unique issue. Although private entities can
employ bad faith, misrepresentation, and fraud in the inducement as shields to a contract action,
they are prohibited from employing the same concepts as a sword. In our opinion, this leads to
an interesting exchange of ideas concerning these cases, especially when the public entity
negotiated the contract in bad faith or misrepresented the essential terms and conditions of the
contract, or as the cases cited in this opinion clearly indicate, intentionally failed to disclose
pertinent information to the private entity. Although we find these concepts interesting and
unique to public contracts, such a discussion is best left for another day.
2
Richard and Melissa Levine are married. Although both had ownership of Hart EMS, Richard
Levine was actively involved in the events described herein. Accordingly, we refer to Richard
and Melissa Levine together as “plaintiffs” and to Richard Levine individually as “Levine.”
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Medical, Inc., (Hart Medical) entered into a contract to provide EMS services in Monroe County
in November 2003. The MCEMA oversaw all emergency medical services in Monroe County
except in the city of Monroe, which had its own EMS operation, and the organization had the
authority to accept bids and enter contracts for the provision of EMS on behalf of Monroe
County and its municipalities.
In 2001, defendants commissioned a study by the Ludwig Group, a consulting firm, to
address the development of a comprehensive strategic plan to improve the provision of
emergency services in Monroe County.3 The study, known as the Ludwig Report, constituted an
“audit” with respect to the delivery of emergency medical services in Monroe County and
provided recommendations for “developing a comprehensive emergency services strategic plan
and design for an emergency medical service delivery system for medical services, emergency
services responses, training, and an effective communications system.” As part of this study, the
Ludwig Group compared the benefits of keeping American Medical Response (AMR) as the
current EMS provider in Monroe County with developing a county-operated system.
The Ludwig Group acknowledged that the conclusions in its report were
“recommendations” to ensure “that the Monroe County EMS system delivers the right level of
care in the right amount of time” and noted that changes were “constantly occurring to the
delivery of emergency services.” It also noted that some of the factors it considered, especially
available resources and population demographics, were constantly changing, requiring any EMS
system to “constantly look inward and make corrections and modifications to constantly enhance
the system.”
The Ludwig Report highlighted several structural and organizational concerns with AMR
related to its ability to provide cost-effective EMS services within the county. In particular, the
report detailed serious financial problems that AMR and its parent company had faced in the
years immediately preceding the compilation of the report. The Ludwig Group also explained
that because AMR was privately owned, it could not access much of the company’s financial
data. However, it reported that one AMR manager, “[w]hen questioned about the financial
solvency of the Monroe operation, . . . indicated they operated on about a four percent profit
margin in the community.” The Ludwig Group assumed that this four-percent profit margin
exclusively concerned AMR’s profit margin from the Monroe County contract. The report also
indicated that new Medicare regulations and changing reimbursement rates between 2002 and
3
At the time, the emergency services system in Monroe County consisted of a public/private
partnership between American Medical Response (AMR), a for-profit commercial ambulance
provider, and career, volunteer, and combination career/volunteer firefighters throughout the
county. AMR was contractually obligated to provide four ambulances, while 21 other
ambulances were housed in various fire departments within the county. Firefighters often
provided first responder services during medical emergencies, while AMR would provide more
advanced paramedic services and hospital transport during medical emergencies. The county did
not fund the system; instead, funding came from the fire departments, Mercy Memorial Hospital
(the hospital serving Monroe County), and AMR.
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2006 would likely impact AMR’s financial solvency in the county, although the report did not
detail whether the impact would be positive or negative.
The report also noted that each AMR vehicle received 4.6 calls per day and explained
that this low call ratio “would generally indicate that AMR has vehicles available at all times for
calls.”4 The report mentioned that AMR’s four ambulances were primarily based in the center
part of the county, not in more rapidly growing areas in the northern and southern parts of the
county. Further, AMR had a 60 percent transport rate, which it considered high for a rural
county and at a level typically seen in urban areas with lower social-economic individuals. The
report repeated concerns from firefighters and first responders that at times, AMR would not
arrive at an emergency scene in a timely manner and the first responders would be forced to
transport a patient to the hospital in a first-responder vehicle. This was particularly common at
emergency scenes in the northern and southern parts of the county. The report discussed
possible reasons for these reports of long response times, mentioning the placement of base
station locations, the comparative lack of major east-west highways in the county, personnel
discouraging individuals from going to the hospital, a significantly high number of false alarms
in the community, or the fact that patients had already been transported by the fire department
because of AMR’s prolonged response time. However, because of limitations on the type of data
collected by Monroe County, the Ludwig Group admitted that it could not draw firm conclusions
regarding the reasons for AMR’s slow response times.
The Ludwig Group relied on data from 1997 through 2000 and used a linear regression
model to determine future EMS demand, predicted an average annual increase in the future call
load of approximately 800 calls, and estimated that the EMS system would “possibly reach
10,000 EMS runs by 2004.” The report noted that this prediction was based on the assumption
that the rate of growth in demand would remain consistent, and emphasized that “EMS demand
is most correlated with the population and median income of the community served.” The report
stated,
In general, EMS demand is directly proportional to population (the more people,
the more calls) and inversely proportional to median income (low income
households tend to be higher users of EMS for a variety of reasons). There are
4
The Ludwig Group explained that AMR has four ambulances available for Monroe County at
all times. Between July 1, 2000, and June 30, 2001, AMR responded to 6,771 calls, each taking
an average of one hour to complete. Using this data, it then calculated the unit-hour utilization
for each ambulance by dividing the number of EMS runs (6,771) by the product of the number of
ambulances in the county (4) multiplied by the number of hours in a year (8,760). The unit-hour
utilization number that it calculated, 0.19, represents “the ratio of the number of unit-hours spent
delivering EMS to the total number of unit-hours that the system could possibly deliver.”
Although the Ludwig Group admitted that the standard for effective use of EMS resources varied
from community to community, it also noted that the unit-hour utilization ratio was low, and
possibly indicated an inefficient use of resources. The report stated, “By some standards, an
UH:U less than 0.30 means that transport resources are not being used efficiently, while UH:U in
excess of 0.40 is over-utilization.”
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many other factors that influence demand, too, such as the self-reliance of the
population (i.e. take care of themselves or taking themselves to the hospital).
EMS demand is also subject to external occurrences (exogenous factors) that
cannot be anticipated or controlled, such as heat waves, snow emergencies, etc.
The Ludwig Group concluded with a series of recommendations. In particular, it
recommended revising the centralized radio communication system that AMR used to dispatch
its units, opining that having Monroe County Central Dispatch dispatch the AMR ambulances
directly and at the same time as the fire department, would decrease response times. The report
also recommended increasing the number of ambulances operated by the county EMS provider
to at least seven advanced life support (ALS) ambulances during peak periods and five ALS
ambulances during non-peak periods. Finally, the report outlined the benefits and costs of
keeping AMR as an ambulance provider as opposed to having the county or local fire
departments provide ALS service. It opined that if the county chose to renew its contract with
AMR, it would probably need to provide a subsidy to AMR in order to increase AMR resources.
Alternatively, the county could open the contract to competitive bids from both AMR and other
licensed private ambulance services. Although the report anticipated that “based upon like
communities and recommended deployment of seven ambulances, it is anticipated the additional
subsidy . . . will range from $150,000 - $375,000,” it also noted that the competitive bidding
process would possibly lower the amount of any subsidy that might need to be paid. Further, the
report noted,
well-managed, efficiently run systems can survive with minimal subsidization.
Subsidy, when it occurs, is most often required by political and practical
considerations such as the need to serve remote locations or locations with poor
payer mixes. Specifically, experience has shown that a minimum population base
of 250,000 is necessary in order for an ambulance service to be self-sufficient.
Systems serving populations less than that will be required to provide some sort
of external funding in addition to the amount recouped through reimbursement.
The Monroe County Board of Commissioners (the board) received the Ludwig Report in
May 2002. The deputy clerk for the board kept the original report and would provide a copy free
of charge to anyone who requested it. The report initiated a fair amount of debate among
members of the board and the MCEMA, as local officials studied the report and discussed points
of agreement and disagreement.
By 2003, the MCEMA had decided to solicit bids for the provision of ambulance services
in the county.5 In the spring of 2003, the MCEMA released a request for proposed bids (RFP)
5
The EMS contract in question was not a traditional bid in the sense that the county was seeking
a provider who would provide ambulance service in exchange for a fee. Instead, the county was
requesting proposals from private ambulance companies to be given an exclusive right to provide
ambulance service for the county. Instead of being paid by the county for providing this service,
the ambulance service would profit by collecting fees for the ambulance runs it provided in the
county. Regardless, Monroe County’s process for selecting a service provider is similar to a
(continued…)
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for the county EMS contract. AMR and another EMS provider submitted bids.6 However,
neither bid was consistent with the criteria set forth in the RFP, so the MCEMA decided to reject
both bids for nonconformance and reopen the bidding process. During the meeting at which this
was decided, a MCEMA committee member recommended amending the RFP to only require
the provision of six ALS units instead of seven, while also requiring that an equal number of
units be placed north and south of the River Raisin. The MCEMA agreed and amended the RFP
to only require that a provider have six fully staffed ambulance units available around the clock,
with an additional two units available on a backup basis. After this meeting, the MCEMA again
invited bids and proposals from private-sector vendors.
At this time, Adam Gottlieb, the CEO and only shareholder of Hart Medical, learned
about the RFP. In 2003, Hart Medical primarily provided ambulance services at special events;
apparently the company had never taken on a municipal contract as extensive as that proposed in
the RFP. Gottlieb decided to bid on the contract, but realized that he would need to obtain
financing to expand into Monroe County. At the time, Levine was working for Hart Medical as
a paramedic; Gottlieb asked Levine to become a stockholder and co-owner of the company in
exchange for providing capital to Hart Medical.
Gottlieb and Levine relied on Richard Schaffner, the Hart Medical operations manager, to
prepare the bid proposal.7 Levine was not heavily involved in preparing the bid proposal and did
not know what information the county provided in the RFP. Gottlieb and Schaffner took
responsibility for preparing their proposal, submitting the bid, and later, negotiating toward a
final contract.8
The MCEMA selected Hart Medical’s bid to provide ambulance and life support services
in Monroe County,9 and on November 7, 2003, the MCEMA and Hart Medical entered into a
three-year contract.10 The contract specified that Hart Medical would have six ALS units
available at all times and have another two units available as backup, in the manner set forth in
the RFP. Hart Medical was scheduled to begin providing services in Monroe County on January
1, 2004.
(…continued)
traditional bidding process for a public-works contract, and the parties refer to the process in
question as a bidding process and the request submitted by plaintiffs as a “bid.” We shall do the
same.
6
The RFP was not included in the lower court record, and we do not know what information was
disclosed in it. It appears, however, that the RFP reflected the county’s decision to require the
centralization of all emergency communications and to increase the number of ALS ambulances
within the county.
7
Schaffner had never worked up a bid proposal for a contract with a municipality or other unit of
government before.
8
Levine said that he “looked over” the figures on the bid proposal, but he did not verify that the
figures were correct.
9
The parties never provided copies of Hart Medical’s bid, and it was not included in the lower
court record.
10
Gottlieb signed the contract on behalf of Hart Medical.
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Gottlieb and Levine never formalized in writing their agreement transferring partial
ownership of Hart Medical to Levine. After Hart Medical began service pursuant to the Monroe
County contract, the business began to struggle. Levine continued loaning Hart Medical
significant amounts of money, totaling over $800,000. The relationship between Levine and
Gottlieb soured, and on September 30, 2004, Gottlieb and plaintiffs entered into an agreement to
sever their business relationship and divide Hart Medical. Plaintiffs received control over the
portion of the business located in Monroe County, taking on both the debts and assets associated
with the Monroe County operation, while Gottlieb received the portion of the business outside
Monroe County. Levine renamed the Monroe County business “Hart EMS Monroe, PLLC”
(Hart EMS). Hart EMS continued to lose money, and by March 2005, Levine gave up the
Monroe County contract and ended the business.
Although Levine admitted that he heard “rumors” of the Ludwig Report before Hart EMS
closed, he first acquired a copy of the report in April 2005.11 Levine claimed that his failed
experiences executing the Monroe County contract corresponded with the predictions set forth in
the report, that he would have needed a subsidy in order for Hart EMS to survive, and if he had
seen this report at the time Gottlieb and Schaffner were preparing the bid, he would have
recommended that they not bid on the contract and he would have not invested in the company.
Gottlieb and Schaffner also admitted that they had not been aware of the report when they placed
their bid, but had they been aware of the report and the information provided therein, they would
have seriously discussed whether to place a bid and, if placing a bid, they would have asked for a
subsidy and other concessions.12
On appeal, plaintiffs claim that defendants had a common law duty to disclose the
Ludwig Report to representatives of Hart Medical before the company placed a bid for the
Monroe County EMS contract. Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred when it concluded that
defendants had no duty to disclose the report to them. We disagree, finding instead that the trial
court did not err when it granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition. We review a trial
court’s grant of summary disposition de novo. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597
NW2d 817 (1999).
To describe what they mean by a “common law duty,” plaintiffs quote Buczkowski v
McKay, 441 Mich 96, 100-101; 490 NW2d 330 (1992), which states,
Duty is actually a “‘question of whether the defendant is under any obligation for
the benefit of the particular plaintiff’ and concerns ‘the problem of the relation
between individuals which imposes upon one a legal obligation for the benefit of
the other.’” Friedman v Dozorc, 412 Mich 1, 22; 312 NW2d 585 (1981); Prosser
& Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 53, p 356. “‘Duty’ is not sacrosanct in itself, but is
11
Levine never formally requested a copy of the Ludwig Report from the county until after he
gave up the Monroe County contract.
12
Neither Gottlieb nor Schaffner read the entire report. Schaffner read selections of the report
and conveyed the information to Gottlieb.
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only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead
the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection.” Id., p 358. See also
Friedman v Dozorc, supra, and Antcliff v State Employees Credit Union, 414
Mich 624, 631; 327 NW2d 814 (1982).
In Valcaniant v Detroit Edison Co, 470 Mich 82, 86; 679 NW2d 689 (2004), our Supreme Court
noted,
In determining whether a legal duty exists, courts examine a variety of factors,
including “foreseeability of the harm, degree of certainty of injury, closeness of
connection between the conduct and injury, moral blame attached to the conduct,
policy of preventing future harm, and . . . the burdens and consequences of
imposing a duty and the resulting liability for breach.” Buczkowski[, supra at 101
n 4] (citing Prosser & Keaton, Torts [5th ed], § 53, p 359 n 24).
The foreseeability of harm, alone, does not automatically mean that one party owes a legal duty
to another; instead, all the applicable factors must be considered, Buczkowski, supra at 101;
Samson v Saginaw Professional Bldg, Inc, 393 Mich 393, 406; 224 NW2d 843 (1975), and a
balancing test employed, see Rodriguez v Detroit Sportsmen’s Congress, 159 Mich App 265,
271; 406 NW2d 207 (1987) (“[T]he determination of whether a duty should be recognized in any
individual case is based on a balancing of the societal interest involved, the severity of the risk,
the burden upon the defendant, the likelihood of occurrence and the relationship between the
parties.”).
Before applying the standard described in Buczkowski to determine whether a common
law duty existed in this case, we note that the controlling case law concerning the duty to
disclose information to bidders for a contract does not require disclosure of the type of
information included in the Ludwig Report.13 A government organization or other entity
requesting bids on a contract has some duty to release pertinent information in its possession that
would not otherwise be available to those submitting bids on the contract. However, the
controlling Supreme Court authorities establishing this rule all concern the disclosure of soil
conditions not otherwise known to contractors bidding on public works projects.
In Hersey Gravel Co v State Hwy Dep’t, 305 Mich 333, 335-336; 9 NW2d 567 (1943),
the plaintiff contractor claimed that the Michigan State Highway Department failed to include
information in its possession regarding soil conditions at the construction site that was more
detailed than the information provided in the blueprints that it released to those submitting bids
on a highway contract. The Hersey Court affirmed the trial court’s determination that a duty to
disclose existed, indicating that under the circumstances present in this case, the bidder could
rely on the department’s representations in the blueprints regarding the nature of the soil
13
Again, this case concerns the solicitation of proposals to provide ambulance service within the
county, not the solicitation of a bid per se. However, because this process is analogous to a
bidding process, we will look to relevant cases concerning disclosure requirements during the
solicitation of bids for public works projects for guidance.
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conditions and that the department had an obligation to make a full disclosure of the results of
tests of soil conditions at the site. Id. at 340-341.
In W H Knapp Co v State Hwy Dep’t, 311 Mich 186, 188; 18 NW2d 421 (1945), the
plaintiff building company claimed that the state did not fully disclose the nature of soil
conditions at the worksite in the specifications set forth for bids on a public works contract,
requiring the company to spend more time and resources excavating the soil than it had
anticipated when it bid on the contract. The Knapp Court held that the state had a duty to “set
forth in the specifications descriptive language which would not mislead a bidder” regarding the
type of soil present at the worksite. Id. at 199.
Finally, in Valentini v City of Adrian, 347 Mich 530, 531; 79 NW2d 885 (1956), the
plaintiff sewer contractor claimed that the defendant municipality knew that quicksand and
excessive water were present in the construction areas but failed to disclose this information
during the bid process for a sewer construction contract. As a result, plaintiff submitted a bid
that was too low and, after the bid was accepted and he began work on the project, he discovered
the difficult soil conditions and experienced delays and cost overruns in constructing the sewer.
Id. The Valentini Court concluded that “[t]he withholding by the city of its knowledge of the
known conditions, resulting in excessive cost of construction, forms an actionable basis for
plaintiff’s claim for damages.” Id. at 534.
These cases establish that a public entity soliciting bids on a contract has a duty to
disclose soil conditions not otherwise known to contractors bidding on public works projects.
This Court has extended this requirement to include disclosure of other permanent conditions
known to the public entity. In Earl L Reamer Co v City of Swartz Creek, 76 Mich App 227, 235;
256 NW2d 447 (1977), this Court determined that the city of Swartz Creek breached its duty to
disclose by failing to provide a sewer contractor information that it possessed concerning the
existence of underground structures before the contractor placed a bid on a sewer project.14
Cases from both the Eastern and Western Districts of Michigan have addressed the extent
to which Hersey, Knapp, Valentini, and Reamer require disclosure. In Performance Abatement
Services, Inc v Lansing Bd of Water & Light, 168 F Supp 2d 720, 724, 729 (WD Mich, 2001),
the plaintiff contractor claimed that defendant, a public utility, failed to disclose drawings and
other information detailing the full extent to which asbestos was present in a power plant that it
had a contract to remodel. Judge Enslen determined that a duty to disclose existed, explaining,
[Hersey, Knapp, Valentini, and Reamer] require as part of Michigan law that a
party which submits a project for bids has a legal duty to inform bidders of the
nature and scope of work to be performed by giving bidders all relevant
information on the project in its possession. Failure to comply with this duty has
been treated as a breach of contract or implied warranty. Furthermore, the above
cases do not permit a city or its contractor to circumvent the implied duty by
14
Because Reamer was issued before November 1, 1990, it is not binding on this Court. MCR
7.215(J)(1).
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contract language requiring the bidder to make its own inspections, requiring the
bidder to assume the risk of non-discovery, or disclaiming the accuracy of the
information. [Id. at 734 (internal citations omitted).]
However, in Hunt Constr Group, Inc v Constr Services, Inc, 375 F Supp 2d 612, 619 (ED
Mich 2005), Judge Gadola disagreed with the broad conclusion set forth in Performance
Abatement Services. Instead, he concluded that Hersey, Knapp, Valentini, and Reamer were
distinguishable, noting that, among other reasons, the controlling Michigan cases “involve
natural conditions such as soil quality.”15 Id. at 619.
Obviously, neither Performance Abatement Services nor Hunt is binding on this Court.
However, they illustrate a conflict in opinion regarding the extent to which the holdings in
Hersey, Knapp, Valentini, and Reamer should be expanded to implement a duty to disclose in
other scenarios. We conclude, though, that Judge Gadola correctly determined that the reading
of the relevant Michigan case law in Performance Abatement Services was overly broad. The
controlling law does not require a party to disclose “all relevant information on the project in its
possession” without qualification. Instead, as Judge Gadola aptly observed, the controlling
Michigan authorities only require disclosure of “natural conditions” that are unchanging.
Accordingly, the nature of the information in question must be considered when determining
whether the controlling Michigan case law would require disclosure of information in a
particular circumstance.
The undisclosed information at issue in the relevant Michigan cases was objective and
unchanging in nature. The plaintiffs in these cases were not seeking the disclosure of
projections, opinions, or statistics that would change with time. Instead, they sought information
concerning soil conditions or the presence of underground structures. Such information is, for all
practical purposes, static, and realistically there would be no chance of it changing between the
time of the information’s compilation and release. Conversely, the information that plaintiffs
claim should have been released in this case is not static.
The Ludwig Report was not simply a compilation of unchanging data and other
information that would remain fixed indefinitely. To the contrary, the Ludwig Group, in
compiling its study, emphasized that its recommendations were based largely on factors that
were in “constant flux.” Much of the information on which the Ludwig Group relied in making
its recommendations, including population distribution and demographics, was constantly
changing and, as such, would decrease the usefulness of the Ludwig Report over time.
Accordingly, any duty to disclose information of a changing nature, such as that permeating the
Ludwig Report, is not the equivalent of a duty to disclose information that is, for all practical
purposes, static. We are not suggesting that the changing nature of information automatically
15
In Hunt, a subcontractor who had entered into a contract with the general contractor to provide
metalwork at Detroit Metropolitan Airport claimed that the contractor had “superior knowledge”
of the project that it did not disclose. Id. at 614, 617. The opinion does not indicate the nature of
this “superior knowledge,” although it indicates that defendant claimed that it lacked “plans and
information when it entered into the subcontract.” Id. at 619.
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precludes any duty to disclose it. Instead, we simply conclude that the holdings in Heresy,
Knapp, Valentini, and Reamer should not be read to automatically require disclosure of
information of a changing nature, even if a plaintiff claims that such information is somehow
relevant.
Instead, in Buczkowski, our Supreme Court sets forth the proper test to apply to determine
whether defendants had a legal duty to disclose the Ludwig Report. As discussed earlier, this
test requires weighing several factors, including (1) the foreseeability of harm, (2) the degree of
certainty of injury, (3) the closeness of the connection between the conduct and injury, (4) the
moral blame attached to the conduct, (5) a policy of preventing future harm, and (6) the burdens
and consequences of imposing a duty and the resulting liability for the breach. See Valcaniant,
supra at 86.
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred when it held that defendants had no duty to
disclose the Ludwig Report, instead mischaracterizing the expert nature of the Ludwig Group’s
report and recommendations as just “another person’s opinion.” According to plaintiffs, the trial
court incorrectly determined that plaintiffs could have simply conducted their own study and
discovered the same information as that found in the report because the report contained certain
information that would otherwise be unavailable to plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs acknowledge that a substantial amount of information included in the Ludwig
Report is not relevant and, therefore, not subject to a duty to disclose.16 Instead, it appears that
they are simply arguing that defendants had the duty to disclose that the Ludwig Report said that
(1) AMR had a four percent profit margin while contracted to provide only four ambulances, (2)
trends indicated an increase of 800 runs each year, (3) AMR had a 40 percent non-transport rate,
and (4) an ambulance services provider would need a subsidy of between $150,000 and $375,000
to be profitable.17
Admittedly, requiring defendants to disclose a copy of the Ludwig Report would not have
been burdensome on them; disclosure would require nothing more than making copies of the
report and including them with the RFPs provided to bidders. However, we believe that, on
balance, the evidence presented does not establish that defendants had a duty to disclose this
information.
16
For example, the Ludwig Report discussed, in great detail, the creation of a hazardous material
incident response team in the county and the purchase of a mobile command vehicle by the
county. There is little indication that the such information would be relevant to bidders
preparing to submit bids for an EMS contract with the county, and plaintiffs do not suggest that
defendants had an independent duty to release such information.
17
We note that defendants received a copy of the Ludwig Report over a year before they began
soliciting bids for the EMS contract, and the report itself contained data that would have been
two to three years old at the time the RFPs were released. Again, no copy of the RFP is included
in the lower court record, and the parties do not otherwise discuss what information was actually
provided to bidders in the RFP. However, there does not appear to be a dispute regarding
plaintiffs’ claim that the information in question was not otherwise provided in the RFP.
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Plaintiffs first claim that they were harmed because when Hart Medical bid on the
contract, it did not have access to otherwise unavailable information found in the Ludwig Report
indicating that AMR only had a four percent profit margin. However, this comment was
probably made in 2001, when the Ludwig Group was compiling information for its report.
Plaintiffs fail to explain how a comment by one manager about the profitability of AMR’s EMS
operation in 2001 would indicate that Hart Medical’s EMS operation would be unprofitable in
2004 and 2005.18 Further, the Ludwig Report discussed, in great detail, problems with AMR’s
management and organizational structure that could have affected its profitability in the county,
but which would not necessarily have been a factor in Hart Medical’s operations. For example,
the Ludwig Report indicated that AMR’s profitability was negatively affected by its long
response times and low transport rates. This, in turn, was caused in part by AMR’s centralized
call structure, in which a local dispatcher would need to contact AMR’s dispatch unit to dispatch
an AMR ambulance, creating an extra step in the process. One reason for AMR’s low transport
rate was its failure to arrive at the emergency scene in a timely fashion, resulting in some
situations in which a fire department’s first responder vehicle would instead be used to transport
a patient to the hospital.
Further, other demographic changes within the county, including changing population
distributions and fluctuating socio-economic demographics, reduce the reliability of profitability
statistics from years before. Although plaintiffs claim that they were harmed by a failure to
disclose AMR’s profitability, they fail to explain how it would have been foreseeable to
defendants that Hart Medical would have been harmed by not having two-year old data
concerning the profitability of AMR when this information was, in part, a reflection of structural
problems within AMR and was based on a different number and placement of ambulances than
called for in the RFP. Similarly, plaintiffs identify little connection between defendants’ failure
to provide this information and the resulting unprofitability of Hart Medical/Hart EMS.
Similarly, the evidence presented does not establish that defendants had a legal duty to
disclose that AMR had a 40 percent non-transport rate. As with the information concerning
AMR’s profitability, this statistic was based on data that was at least two years old at the time
Hart Medical bid on the RFP. The Ludwig Group emphasized in its report that the non-transport
rate would vary from year to year, and it noted factors specific to AMR, such as reports of slow
response times in some circumstances, that would affect its non-transport rate. Again, plaintiffs
do not explain how defendants’ failure to disclose a non-transport rate based on data that was at
least two years old at the time Hart Medical presented its bid caused the company to be
unprofitable in 2004 and 2005. Further, it would not have been foreseeable that defendants’
failure to provide this statistic in 2003 would have resulted in the failure of Hart Medical/Hart
EMS when the Ludwig Report indicated that this low transport rate was due, in part, to problems
within AMR and its Monroe County operation.
18
Further, plaintiffs provide no evidence to indicate whether a four percent profit is good or bad
in the industry.
-11-
The evidence presented also does not establish that defendants had a duty to disclose the
trend increase of 800 runs annually predicted in the Ludwig Report. This rate increase was
calculated using data compiled between 1997 and 2000, and it would have been of increasingly
marginal usefulness in subsequent years. The report acknowledged that the prediction was based
upon the assumption that the rate of increase in call volume would remain consistent in
subsequent years, but in the absence of any indication that call volumes rose between 2000 and
2003 at the same rate as between 1997 and 2000, there is little indication that defendants would
have still found this prediction to be useful in 2003 or that they could have contemplated that any
failure to disclose this data would have so deceived Hart Medical that it unknowingly entered
into an unprofitable contract.19
Finally, defendants had no duty to disclose the conclusion made in the Ludwig Report
that the county should provide an annual subsidy of between $150,000 and $375,000 to AMR if
it decided to keep AMR as its EMS provider in the county. First, this conclusion is nothing more
than an opinion by the Ludwig Group regarding the estimated financial subsidy that AMR or
another provider would need to increase ambulance deployment in the county, and the Ludwig
Group indicated that the need for a subsidy would depend on the nature of the bids received for
the EMS contract. Also, the extent to which AMR would need a subsidy to overcome
deficiencies in its internal structure and operation that another provider would not face is unclear.
Further, this opinion is based on the assumption that seven ambulances would be deployed at all
times for service to the county, and not based on the “six full-time, two backup” deployment
arrangement called for in the RFP. We do not see how defendants could predict that plaintiffs
would be harmed by defendants’ failure to mention that the Ludwig Group recommended that
defendants consider providing a subsidy to an ambulance service provider under different
circumstances than those required in the RFP. Further, considering that Levine, Gottlieb, and
Schaffner were in the best position to determine whether Hart Medical’s resources and
operational structure would permit the company to provide EMS service in Monroe County
without receiving a subsidy, and considering that Levine, Gottlieb, and Schaffner were not
prohibited from requesting a subsidy from the county in the bid, we do not believe that there is a
particularly close connection between any failure to disclose this recommendation and the
subsequent failure of Hart Medical/Hart EMS.
In addition, plaintiffs do not explain why they could not have conducted their own study
to acquire the aforementioned statistics and related information (except to imply that it would
have cost too much), nor do they indicate why any of this information was otherwise unavailable
to them. Plaintiffs also do not explain why they, Gottlieb, or Schaffner would have been unable
to acquire information that the Ludwig Group was able to acquire. It is difficult for us to assign
much moral blame to defendants for any failure to disclose this information in light of the fact
that the Ludwig Report was publicly available and in the absence of any indication (besides
plaintiffs’ self-serving assertions) that plaintiffs, Gottlieb, or Schaffner would not have been able
to acquire this information without much trouble if they had simply thought to ask for it.
19
Plaintiffs do not provide data indicating whether the actual number of runs they conducted in
2004 reached 10,000 runs, as predicted in the report.
-12-
Accordingly, defendants did not have a legal duty to disclose the Ludwig Report or the
“otherwise unavailable information” contained therein. It was not foreseeable that Hart Medical
would present an unprofitable bid and, as Hart EMS, eventually be forced to give up the Monroe
County contract and disband because it did not have access to a few two-year-old statistics.
Further, considering the wealth of information and research that is needed to craft a bid that is
economically strategic, fiscally sound, feasible, and competitive, it is difficult for us to believe
that any failure by defendants to release a few outdated statistics and a marginally relevant
recommendation was so significant as to cause the downfall of plaintiffs’ business. Accordingly,
the trial court’s decision to grant defendants’ motion for summary disposition was not erroneous.
Plaintiffs also argue that defendants “breached their duty to maintain fundamental
fairness in the competitive bid process” by disclosing the Ludwig Report to AMR, but not to
Hart Medical. The trial court did not address this issue in its ruling in this case. However,
because the information contained in the Ludwig Report was at least two years old and of
marginal relevance, we do not believe that the “fundamental fairness of the competitive bid
process” was intrinsically undermined because plaintiffs, Gottlieb, and Schaffner were not aware
of the report at the time Hart Medical made its bid. Regardless, there is no evidence in the lower
court record that defendants provided the Ludwig Report to some bidders, but not others, during
the bidding process, nor is there evidence of any attempt to deliberately prevent representatives
of Hart Medical from receiving a copy. To the contrary, the evidence presented indicates that
anyone could request a copy of the report at no charge.
Further, plaintiffs do not present any case law supporting their apparent contention that
the mere fact that one bidder for a contract has publicly available information that another bidder
does not have constitutes a breach of a “duty to maintain fundamental fairness” in the bidding
process by the party requesting bids. A party requesting bids for a contract should not be
punished because one bidder, on its own initiative, acquires publicly available information that
another bidder does not have. The cases that plaintiffs claim support their argument involve
circumstances in which the bidding process itself was obstructed. There is no evidence
suggesting that such circumstances are present in this case, and we do not find the authority that
plaintiffs cite applicable or persuasive.
It is unfortunate that plaintiffs suffered such significant financial turmoil as a result of
their investment in Hart Medical/Hart EMS. As difficult as plaintiffs’ circumstances are, and as
much as we sympathize with their plight, plaintiffs’ financial losses are nothing more than the
result of a series of bad business decisions. This Court is not commissioned to remedy every bad
business decision that a company or individual makes.
Finally, because the trial court did not err when it granted summary disposition to
defendants, we need not address whether governmental immunity or the presence of an
arbitration agreement in the November 2003 contract bar plaintiffs’ claims. We also need not
address plaintiffs’ claims that the MCEMA was acting as an agent of Monroe County when it
entered into the contract with Hart Medical and is an appropriate party to this case.
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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