WALTER TOEBE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY V MICHIGAN DEPT OF TREASURY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
WALTER TOEBE CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY,
UNPUBLISHED
July 27, 2010
Petitioner-Appellant,
v
No. 291764
Tax Tribunal
LC No. 00-344354
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,
Respondent-Appellee.
Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and SAAD and SERVITTO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner appeals as of right the order of the Tax Tribunal granting respondent’s motion
for summary disposition. We affirm.
Petitioner is a Michigan corporation engaged in the construction business. The local tax
assessor classified a portion of petitioner’s property commercial personal property for tax year
2006. The parties agree that the property in question should have been classified industrial
personal property, and that the assessor simply erred in the classification.
In filing its 2006 single business tax return, petitioner claimed a tax credit of $17,810 for
$118,731 it claimed to have paid on industrial personal property. Respondent sent a notice of
adjustment, informing petitioner that it was disallowing the credit because petitioner had not
attached any statement that the taxes had been levied and paid, or that the property was classified
industrial personal property.
Petitioner, through its accountant, responded that it had paid property taxes on the
property at issue, and that the property fit the definition of industrial personal property found in
§ 34c of the general property tax act1 (GPTA).
1
MCL 211.34c.
-1-
The hearing referee found, “Industrial personal property is defined by statute and not by
an assessor.” Because the property fit the definition in the GPTA, the referee recommended
allowing the credit, despite the assessor’s classification.
Respondent rejected the hearing referee’s recommendation. It asserted that the definition
in the GPTA was inapplicable, and that the appropriate definition was that found in the single
business tax act2 (SBTA). Countering petitioner’s argument that the SBTA definition had simply
imported the GPTA definition, respondent noted that the SBTA definition requires the property
to be “classified industrial personal property” under the GPTA. Because the property in question
had never been classified industrial personal property, according to respondent, it did not meet
the SBTA definition, and petitioner was ineligible for the credit.
Petitioner petitioned the Tax Tribunal for a redetermination of the decision. The Tax
Tribunal agreed with respondent’s argument and affirmed its decision. Petitioner brings this
appeal.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the Tax Tribunal erred in holding that the sincerepealed SBTA definition of “industrial personal property” depends on the classification of the
property by the tax assessor, or whether it only indicates that the SBTA has imported the
definition of industrial personal property from the GPTA. We review questions of statutory
interpretation and application de novo. People v Stone Transp, Inc, 241 Mich App 49, 50; 613
NW2d 737 (2000). Our goal in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent.
People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 284; 597 NW2d 1 (1999).
Many sections of the SBTA imported definitions from other statutes. For example, the
SBTA defined a “United States corporation” with reference to section 7701(a)(3) and (4) of the
internal revenue code,3 by using the words “as those terms are defined in,” not “classified as.”
Former MCL 208.3(1). Similarly, the act defined “Insurance company” with reference to section
106 of the insurance code of 1956,4 again with the words “as defined in,” not “classified as.”
Former MCL 208.5a. Throughout the act, “as defined in” or “as defined by” were the phrases
used to denote an adoption of a statutory definition from another statute. See also, e.g., former
MCL 208.9(3)(g)(iii); 208.9(7)(c)(ii); 208.10(4); 208.19(d); 208.31a(5)(d). Significantly, the
word “classified” was never used for this purpose.
It follows, then, that if the Legislature, in drafting the SBTA, had wished to import the
definition of “industrial personal property” from the GPTA, it would have chosen, as it did
throughout the SBTA, to say, “‘Industrial personal property’ means that term as defined in
section 34c of the general property tax act,” or something similar. Instead, the Legislature chose
to define “industrial personal property” as “personal property classified as industrial personal
property under section 34c of the general property tax act.” Former MCL 208.35d (emphasis
2
Former MCL 208.1 et seq., repealed by 2006 PA 325, effective December 31, 2007.
3
26 USC 7701(a)(3) and (4).
4
MCL 500.106
-2-
added). Section 34c of the GPTA contains not only a definition of “industrial personal
property,” but also imposes on assessors a duty to classify property under that section. MCL
211.34c. The most reasonable inference to be drawn from the Legislature’s use of language is
that it intended to allow respondent to rely on the assessor’s classification of property under
MCL 211.34c(1), and did not intend to require respondent to make an independent assessment of
whether taxpayers’ property met the definition in MCL 211.34c(3).
We are bound, in interpreting a statute, to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. Because
it is clear from reading the SBTA that the Legislature intended to make the definition of
“industrial personal property” dependent on the assessor’s classification, and because the
property at issue in this case was never classified industrial personal property by the assessor, we
affirm the decision of the Tax Tribunal disallowing the tax credit.
Petitioner argues that respondent’s interpretation of the statute, which we adopt today,
leads to an absurd result. The tax credit at issue required a taxpayer to “file within the time
required the statement of personal property described in section 19 of the general property tax
act.5” Former MCL 208.35d(3). Petitioner notes, correctly, that the deadline for filing the
statement of personal property is February 20, MCL 211.19(2), but that the assessor does not
classify the property until March, MCL 211.34c(1). Petitioner argues that it would therefore be
impossible for a taxpayer to rely on the assessor’s classification in making its statement of
personal property, and therefore impossible to claim the tax credit. However, the statement of
personal property described in MCL 211.19 does not require a taxpayer to know or assert how its
personal property should be classified by the assessor. A taxpayer would then file its single
business tax return four months after the close of its tax year. Former MCL 208.73(1). By this
time, of course, the taxpayer would have had the classification of the property from the assessor,
and there would be nothing impossible about claiming the tax credit. Further, if petitioner’s
argument were correct, the GPTA would be absurd regardless of the SBTA, because the GPTA
requires the statement of personal property to precede the assessor’s classification of property.
But there is no absurdity or impossibility in requiring this, because the statement of personal
property does not require knowledge of the assessor’s classification.
Affirmed.
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
5
MCL 211.19.
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.