CIERA SHAPRICE ARNOLD V LIN'Z LAMARR BATES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CIERA SHAPRICE ARNOLD,
UNPUBLISHED
July 13, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 296337
Kalamazoo Circuit Court
LC No. 2005-006898-DP
LIN’Z LAMARR BATES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’CONNELL, P.J., and METER and OWENS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Lin’z Lamarr Bates appeals as of right in propria persona from the trial
court’s modification of a custody order following an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
Construing defendant’s appellate brief generously, we discern that he has essentially
presented two allegations of error: (1) that the trial court failed to follow up with information
provided by defendant, and (2) that the January 15, 2010, custody order should be vacated and
the previous custody order reinstated. In both cases, defendant has merely announced his
positions without providing any discussion of those allegations of error or providing a basis for
relief. Defendant “may not merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover
and rationalize the basis for his claims, nor may he give issues cursory treatment with little or no
citation of supporting authority.” Peterson Novelties, Inc v City of Berkley, 259 Mich App 1, 14;
672 NW2d 351 (2003) (internal citations omitted). Defendant’s appellate brief almost entirely
consists of unsubstantiated complaints against plaintiff regarding alleged conduct that occurred
after the entry of the present custody order. This information is not properly within our scope of
review on appeal and constitutes an improper attempt at expansion of the record on appeal.
Sherman v Sea Ray Boats, Inc, 251 Mich App 41, 56; 649 NW2d 783 (2002).1 Defendant’s
failure to properly address the merits of his allegations of error constitutes abandonment on
appeal. Yee v Shiawassee Co Bd of Comm’rs, 251 Mich App 379, 406; 651 NW2d 756 (2002).
1
With respect to the allegations raised by defendant following the present custody order, we
believe that these allegations are best raised in a subsequent motion to change custody in the trial
court if defendant chooses to do so.
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Nevertheless, we have reviewed the issues and find that defendant’s claims lack merit.
First, the trial court has no duty to verify a party’s assertions made at an evidentiary hearing after
the fact. If defendant sought to prove a fact at the hearing, or to dispute or undermine plaintiff’s
factual assertions, then the onus was on him to produce some sort of documentary or testimonial
evidence to do so.
Second, after our thorough review of the record, we are satisfied that the trial court did
not make findings of fact that were against the great weight of the evidence, commit a palpable
abuse of discretion, or make a clear legal error on a major issue in this case. MCL 722.28;
Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 876-877; 526 NW2d 889 (1994). In this case, the trial court
found that there was a basis to revisit the existing custody order without expressly stating if there
was proper cause or a change in circumstances. On the record, we conclude that there was
proper cause or a change in circumstances, where plaintiff alleged that defendant had not
allowed her to see the minor child for approximately three months. See Killingbeck v
Killingbeck, 269 Mich App 132, 145; 711 NW2d 759 (2005); Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich
App 499, 511; 675 NW2d 847 (2003). The trial court failed to determine whether a custodial
environment existed in this case. However, based on the record, we conclude that a custodial
environment existed with defendant. See Jack v Jack, 239 Mich App 668, 670; 610 NW2d 231
(2000). With respect to the best interests factors, the trial court found that factor (a) favored both
parties, it found no preference for either party regarding factors (c), (d), (e), and (h), it found that
factor (i) did not apply, and it expressed no findings with regard to factors (b), (f), and (g). The
trial court did not make an express finding regarding which party factor (j) favored, but the trial
court appeared to favor plaintiff with respect to this dispositive factor. The statutory best
interests factors need not be given equal weight, McCain v McCain, 229 Mich App 123, 131;
580 NW2d 485 (1998), and the trial court need not “‘comment upon every matter in evidence or
declare acceptance or rejection of every proposition argued.’” Bowers v Bowers, 198 Mich App
320, 328; 497 NW2d 602 (1993). The parties produced little evidence at the evidentiary hearing.
Significantly, however, it was undisputed that defendant refused to facilitate plaintiff’s parenting
time for approximately three months. Notably, defendant does not challenge the trial court’s
findings or conclusions and, ultimately, the facts do not clearly preponderate in a direction other
than that taken by the trial court. See Rittershaus v Rittershaus, 273 Mich App 462, 473; 730
NW2d 262 (2007). Therefore, the trial court’s findings with respect to factor (j) are not against
the great weight of the evidence. There is no basis on the record before us to grant defendant the
relief he has requested.
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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