KEITH TAYLOR V ANDREW KOCHANOWSKI
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
KEITH TAYLOR,
UNPUBLISHED
July 8, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
ANDREW KOCHANOWSKI, SOMMERS
SCHWARTZ, P.C., JEFFREY A. PINE,
MICHAEL H. BANIAK, and BANIAK, PINE &
GANNON, P.C.,
No. 289660
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 07-708724-NM
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and JANSEN and DONOFRIO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motions for
summary disposition and dismissing plaintiff’s claims for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary
duty, and fraud. We affirm.
In 1989, plaintiff obtained a patent for a lighted rearview mirror.1 The mirror housing
allowed a lighted turn signal within it to be visible to oncoming traffic. In 1997, plaintiff
approached Chrysler Corporation with his idea. Plaintiff was referred to Chrysler Corporation’s
parts supplier, Reitter & Schefenacker USA, LP (“Reitter”), and participated in negotiations with
Reitter’s president, Phil Warburton, but no agreement was reached. In 1999, after Daimler-Benz
AG acquired Chrysler Corporation and formed DaimlerChrysler, plaintiff again met with
Warburton and was informed that Reitter was already manufacturing lighted rearview mirrors for
Mercedes automobiles. Plaintiff thereafter retained defendants to pursue a patent infringement
claim on his behalf against both DaimlerChrysler and Reitter. Defendants eventually filed a
lawsuit in federal district court. Following discovery, defendants recommended that plaintiff
voluntarily dismiss Reitter, without prejudice, which plaintiff agreed to do. The case continued
1
Although plaintiff ’s invention is described as a rearview mirror, it is designed for placement on
the sides of a vehicle.
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against DaimlerChrysler. After conducting a Markman2 hearing, the federal court found that
DaimlerChrysler’s mirror assembly did not literally infringe on plaintiff’s patent and,
accordingly, granted DaimlerChrysler’s motion for summary judgment.
Taylor v
DaimlerChrysler AG, 295 F Supp 2d 729 (ED Mich, 2003), rec den 313 F Supp 2d 703 (ED
Mich, 2004), aff’d 124 Fed Appx 661 (CA Fed, 2005).
Plaintiff subsequently filed this action against defendants, alleging claims for legal
malpractice related to defendants’ advice to voluntarily dismiss Reitter from the federal patent
infringement action and the adequacy of defendants’ presentation of the patent infringement
claim against DaimlerChrysler. Plaintiff also asserted claims for breach of fiduciary duty and
fraud. The trial court determined that defendants were entitled to summary disposition on
grounds of collateral estoppel, the attorney-judgment rule, failure to allege a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty independent of the legal malpractice claim, and failure to establish a prime facie
case of fraud.
This Court reviews a trial court’s summary disposition decision de novo. Spiek v Dep’t
of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). Defendants moved for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10).
Summary disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(7) when collateral estoppel
operates to bar a claim. The following standards apply to a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7):
A defendant who files a motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(7) may (but is not required to) file supportive material such as affidavits,
depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence. MCR 2.116(G)(3);
Patterson v Kleiman, 447 Mich 429, 432; 526 NW2d 879 (1994). If such
documentation is submitted, the court must consider it. MCR 2.116(G)(5). If no
such documentation is submitted, the court must review the plaintiff ’s complaint,
accepting its well-pleaded allegations as true and construing them in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff. [Turner v Mercy Hosps & Health Servs of Detroit, 210
Mich App 345, 348; 533 NW2d 365 (1995).]
Whether a party is collaterally estopped from challenging an issue addressed in a prior
proceeding also involves a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. Horn v Dep’t of
Corrections, 216 Mich App 58, 62; 548 NW2d 660 (1996).
A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint
by the pleadings alone. Patterson v Kleiman, 447 Mich 429, 432; 526 NW2d 879 (1994). All
well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true, as well as any reasonable inferences or
conclusions that can be drawn from the allegations. Peters v Dep’t of Corrections, 215 Mich
App 485, 486; 546 NW2d 668 (1996). The motion should be granted only if the claims are so
2
Markman v Westview Instruments, Inc, 52 F3d 967, 979 (CA Fed, 1995), aff’d 517 US 370,
384; 116 S Ct 1384; 134 L Ed 2d 577 (1996).
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clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could justify recovery.
Patterson, 447 Mich at 432.
A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a claim. The court must
consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence
submitted by the parties. MCR 2.116(G)(5). Summary disposition should be granted if, except
as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Babula v Robertson, 212 Mich App 45, 48; 536 NW2d
834 (1995).
I. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
The trial court determined that in light of the federal court’s determination that the mirror
assemblies in question did not infringe on plaintiff’s patent, plaintiff was collaterally estopped
from prevailing on his claim that defendants committed malpractice by agreeing to voluntarily
dismiss Reitter from the patent infringement action without prejudice.
Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue in a subsequent, different case
between the same parties if the prior action resulted in a valid final judgment and the issue was
actually and necessarily determined in the prior matter. Horn, 216 Mich App at 62. “To be
necessarily determined in the first action, the issue must have been essential to the resulting
judgment; a finding upon which the judgment did not depend cannot support collateral estoppel.”
Bd of Co Rd Comm’rs for the Co of Eaton v Schultz, 205 Mich App 371, 377; 521 NW2d 847
(1994). Further, the ultimate issue in the second case must be the same as that in the first
proceeding. Detroit v Qualls, 434 Mich 340, 357; 454 NW2d 374 (1990). The doctrine requires
that the same parties must have had a full opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding
and there must be mutuality of estoppel. Nummer v Dep’t of Treasury, 448 Mich 534, 542; 533
NW2d 250 (1995). However, where collateral estoppel is being asserted defensively against a
party who has already had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, mutuality is not
required. Monat v State Farm Ins Co, 469 Mich 679, 691-692, 695; 677 NW2d 843 (2004).
The elements of a legal malpractice claim are: “(1) the existence of an attorney-client
relationship; (2) negligence in the legal representation of the plaintiff; (3) that the negligence was
the proximate cause of an injury; and (4) the fact and extent of the injury alleged.” Manzo v
Petrella & Petrella & Assoc, PC, 261 Mich App 705, 712; 683 NW2d 699 (2004).
In order to establish proximate cause, a plaintiff must show that a
defendant’s action was a cause in fact of the claimed injury. Hence, a plaintiff
must show that, but for an attorney’s alleged malpractice, the plaintiff would have
been successful in the underlying suit. This is the “suit within a suit” requirement
in legal malpractice cases. [Id.]
Here, it was appropriate for the trial court to allow defendants to defensively rely on
collateral estoppel. To prove his claim for malpractice, plaintiff was required to show that, but
for defendants’ alleged negligence in agreeing to voluntarily dismiss Reitter, he would have
prevailed on his patent infringement claim against Reitter. Thus, it would be necessary to show
that the mirror assemblies in question infringed on plaintiff’s patent. However, that issue was
fully litigated in connection with plaintiff’s separate claim against DaimlerChrysler.
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We disagree with plaintiff’s argument that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to
litigate this claim because defendants did not properly present his claim for patent infringement.
Plaintiff argues that defendants did not properly argue the meaning of the term “translucent
housing” in the federal case. In this regard, plaintiff relies on an affidavit from Kenneth Kohn,
who helped plaintiff prepare his patent application, in support of his contention that a different
outcome might have been possible in the federal patent infringement action if defendants had
addressed the meaning of the term “translucent housing” in his patent application. However, the
construction of that term was specifically addressed by the federal court and that court did
consider the meaning asserted by plaintiffs. Taylor, 295 F Supp 2d at 739-743; Taylor, 313 F
Supp 2d at 705-707. Furthermore, the federal court’s decision rejecting plaintiff ’s patent
infringement claim was not based solely on the construction of “translucent housing.” The
federal court reviewed five elements of plaintiff ’s patent application, only one of which involved
the construction of “translucent housing.” Taylor, 295 F Supp 2d at 738. The court additionally
found that there was no infringement because DaimlerChrysler’s mirror assembly allowed for
incident light to pass through the wall and the closed end of the assembly, whereas plaintiff ’s
design prevented incident light from passing through. Id. at 744-746. Accordingly, because the
federal court found that at least one other element or limitation of plaintiff’s patent was not
shared with DaimlerChrysler’s mirror assembly, a different definition of “translucent housing”
would not have changed the outcome of plaintiff’s underlying case. Thus, plaintiff cannot
relitigate the issue of the voluntary dismissal, as he is collaterally estopped from arguing the
merits of the case within the case.
This same result follows to the extent plaintiff argues that defendants were also negligent
for not advising him of the limitations period for further pursuing any claim against Reitter.3
Because plaintiff cannot establish that there was any infringement, he cannot establish that
defendants’ alleged malpractice proximately caused any injury. Additionally, we reject
plaintiff’s claim that there can be no collateral estoppel where his common law claims of unjust
enrichment and commercial appropriation were not fully litigated because these claims were
preempted by his patent law claim. Plaintiff’s claims against Reitter were based on providing
Reitter a “copy of my patent and photos of a prototype I had developed using the technology in
the patent.” When a patent is granted, the patent holder’s property right in the trade secret ceases
prospectively. Scharmer v Carrolton Mfg Co, 525 F2d 95, 99 (CA 6, 1975). This is because
when “a trade secret is patented there is no further right to secrecy. The patent is a legal
disclosure with the right to a limited, temporary monopoly granted as the reward for disclosure.”
Id. Thus, plaintiff’s patent preempted any claim to commercial appropriation and, because the
unjust enrichment claim is simply a derivative of his commercial misappropriation, it must also
fail from preemption. See Waner v Ford Motor Co, 331 F3d 851, 856-857 (CA Fed, 2003).
Because the common law claims were preempted, the fact that they were not actually litigated is
irrelevant to the application of collateral estoppel. The claims were essentially subsumed by the
existence of the patent, and we have held that plaintiff is collaterally estopped from relitigating
3
We note that plaintiff’s briefing does not set forth the actual limitations period or explain if,
when, or how his opportunity to refile against Reitter was extinguished.
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that claim. Accordingly, plaintiff must also be collaterally estopped from attempting to litigate
the preempted common law claims.4
II. THE ATTORNEY-JUDGMENT RULE
The trial court ruled that plaintiff ’s legal malpractice claim related to defendants’
recommendation to dismiss Reitter from the underlying lawsuit was also subject to summary
disposition under the attorney-judgment rule, because there was evidence that Reitter did not
manufacture the questionable mirror assemblies and defendants’ decision to voluntarily dismiss
Reitter in this circumstance avoided plaintiff’s exposure to possible sanctions. The trial court
also ruled that plaintiff’s common law claims should be dismissed under the attorney-judgment
rule.
The attorney-judgment rule is discussed in Mitchell v Dougherty, 249 Mich App 668,
677-679; 644 NW2d 391 (2002), as follows:
To determine whether defendant attorneys were negligent in this case we
must first examine the duty they owed plaintiffs. An attorney has an implied duty
to exercise reasonable skill, care, discretion, and judgment in representing a
client. Simko v Blake, 448 Mich 648, 655-656; 532 NW2d 842 (1995). Further,
an attorney is obligated to act as an attorney of ordinary learning, judgment, or
skill would under the same or similar circumstances. Id. at 656. However, an
attorney is not a guarantor of the most favorable possible outcome, nor must an
attorney exercise extraordinary diligence or act beyond the knowledge, skill, and
ability ordinarily possessed by members of the legal profession. Id. Further,
“where an attorney acts in good faith and in honest belief that his acts and
omissions are well founded in law and are in the best interest of [the] client, [the
attorney] is not answerable for mere errors in judgment.” Id. at 658.
Here, plaintiffs allege that defendant attorneys were negligent in failing to
file a medical malpractice action against Oakwood. It is important to note that
this alleged failure was not mere oversight or the result of poor case management,
but rather was an affirmative decision on the part of defendant attorneys not to
pursue the action. According to defendant attorneys, they investigated plaintiffs’
claims against Oakwood and determined, in their professional opinion, that the
case was not worth pursuing.
Plaintiffs do not dispute whether defendant attorneys conducted an
investigation into the merits of their case. Instead, plaintiffs argue that defendant
attorneys’ determination that the case against Oakwood was not worth pursuing is
4
Assuming that we are incorrect and collateral estoppel does not apply because the claims were
not litigated, we would reach the same conclusion, because the preemption of the claims means
that there were no claims to litigate. Thus, there can be no attorney malpractice in the failure to
litigate claims that do not exist.
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clearly negligent because plaintiffs’ counsel in this legal malpractice action was
able to locate more than one expert who would testify that the treatment Cara
Mitchell received at Oakwood constituted medical malpractice. Further, plaintiffs
stress that there were issues of fact regarding whether Cara was given an
excessive dosage of the incorrect medication. However, the critical question here
is not whether plaintiffs would have ultimately prevailed on their medical
malpractice claim. Rather, the issue is whether defendant attorneys exercised
reasonable skill, care, discretion, and judgment when they determined that
plaintiffs’ claim was not worth pursuing. Simko, supra at 655-656.
Here, the attorneys’ opinion on the merit of plaintiffs’ case was influenced
in part by the attorneys’ inability to locate an expert physician who would support
plaintiffs’ claim that Oakwood’s treatment of Cara Mitchell was negligent. In
addition, defendant attorneys point to the inherent conflicts in the evidence
regarding whether Cara received either an incorrect medication or an incorrect
dosage. Plaintiffs admitted that defendant attorneys informed them of their
decision to file a complaint against Family First Clinic only and their reasons for
not naming Oakwood in the suit.
Although it is true that plaintiffs’ present counsel was able to obtain the
affidavits of experts supporting plaintiffs’ medical malpractice claim, this
evidence does not negate the fact that defendant attorneys sought the opinion of
an expert and received an opinion that was not favorable. The necessity of
obtaining the testimony of an expert physician to support allegations of medical
malpractice is codified in MCL 600.2912d and MCL 600.2169, and factual
disputes without an expert opinion are insufficient to initiate, let alone maintain, a
medical malpractice action. Given the high standard for pursuing medical
malpractice claims in this jurisdiction, we cannot fault defendant attorneys’
reluctance to bring a malpractice action where they were unable to obtain the
supportive testimony of a physician.
Plaintiffs present no evidence that the measures that defendant attorneys
took in investigating plaintiffs’ claims were less than an attorney of ordinary
learning, judgment, or skill would have done under the same or similar
circumstances. Simko, supra. In essence, plaintiffs allege that defendant
attorneys erred in their judgment that plaintiffs’ medical malpractice claim against
Oakwood was without merit. Although “gross” errors in judgment can be
actionable, Basic Food [Indus, Inc v Grant, 107 Mich App 685, 694; 310 NW2d
26 (1981)], mere errors in judgment by attorneys acting in good faith are not.
Simko, supra at 658. Plaintiffs presented no evidence that defendant attorneys’
determination that the case was not worth pursuing was anything other than an
honest belief well founded in the law and in the best interest of their clients.
Simko, supra at 694. Although there may be a question of fact regarding the merit
of plaintiffs’ medical malpractice action, we decline to create precedent whereby
an attorney is obligated to file suit whenever there is some scintilla of evidence
supporting the client’s claim.
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In this case, like Mitchell, there has been no showing that defendants did not properly
investigate the claim against Reitter before advising plaintiff to dismiss it without prejudice, or
that defendants’ exercise of judgment was not in good faith. The recommendation was made
because there was very strong evidence that plaintiff would not be able to establish a claim
against Reitter and could be liable for sanctions if Reitter was not dismissed. The
recommendation was made in plaintiff ’s best interests. The fact that plaintiff was not able to
prevail on his claim against the only remaining party, DaimlerChrysler, further shows that
defendants’ advice was reasonable.
Although plaintiff argues that a lawyer may be liable for “gross” errors in judgment,
Mitchell, 249 Mich App at 679, plaintiff has not shown any conduct by defendants that arises to
this level. He appears to rely solely on the fact that Reitter’s European parent company was
making translucent mirrors to argue that his patent infringement claim had merit. However,
evidence in the federal case indicated that Reitter’s European parent corporation had developed a
similar mirror assembly two years before plaintiff met with Warburton to discuss his patent and,
as noted above, the federal court found on several grounds that the same mirror assembly did not
infringe on plaintiff’s patent.
III. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
Plaintiff next argues that he properly pleaded a separate claim for breach of fiduciary
duty in addition to his malpractice claim. The trial court dismissed this claim because it found
that it was actually a claim for legal malpractice, with a different title. We agree.
“[A] fiduciary relationship arises from the reposing of faith, confidence, and trust and the
reliance of one on the judgment and advice of another.” Meyer & Anna Prentis Family
Foundation, Inc v Barbara Ann Karmanos Cancer Institute, 266 Mich App 39, 43; 698 NW2d
900 (2005). When a fiduciary relationship exists, it is the fiduciary’s duty to act for the benefit
of the principal on matters within the scope of the relationship. Id. Whether a duty exists is a
question of law for the court. Id.
A complaint must be reviewed as a whole to determine the focal point of the claim.
Aldred v O’Hara-Bruce, 184 Mich App 488, 490; 458 NW2d 671 (1990). Where an alleged
duty arises out of an attorney-client relationship, a claim for breach of that duty “is one for
malpractice and malpractice only.” Barnard v Dilley, 134 Mich App 375, 378-379; 350 NW2d
887 (1984).
Here, plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim is based on the following allegations:
55. Defendants all owed the fiduciary duties of loyalty, good faith, and
fair and vigorous representation to Plaintiff, including the duty to exercise due
care and diligence in the pursuit of Plaintiff ’s claims against Reitter.
56. Defendants’ breaches of their fiduciary duties to Plaintiff include, but
are not limited to, making material misrepresentations to Plaintiff as to whether
Reitter manufactured certain lighted rearview mirrors, pressuring Plaintiff to
dismiss Reitter from the case, abandoning the common law claims against Reitter,
failing to advise Plaintiff of his common law claims against Reitter for stealing
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his lighted rearview mirror concept, discouraging Plaintiff from pursuing his
common law claims against Reitter, and allowing Reitter to be dismissed from the
suit.
59. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ breaches of their
fiduciary duties Plaintiff has suffered damages.
These allegations all relate to defendants’ representation of plaintiff in the underlying
lawsuit. Plaintiff has not alleged that defendants breached any duties that arise outside the
attorney-client relationship. Thus, plaintiff’s allegations only state a claim for legal malpractice.
Therefore, the trial court properly granted summary disposition with respect to plaintiff ’s breach
of fiduciary duty claim.
IV. FRAUD
The trial court dismissed plaintiff ’s fraud claim because plaintiff failed to “show any
falsehoods or material misrepresentations to set forth a prima facie case of fraud.”
Although a fraud claim arising out of an attorney-client relationship is distinct from a
malpractice claim, Brownell v Garber, 199 Mich App 519, 532; 503 NW2d 81 (1993), we agree
with the trial court that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of fraud.
The elements of a cause of action for fraud are:
“(1) That defendant made a material representation; (2) that it was false;
(3) that when he made it he knew that it was false, or made it recklessly, without
any knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; (4) that he made it with the
intention that it should be acted upon by plaintiff; (5) that plaintiff acted in
reliance upon it; and (6) that he thereby suffered injury. Each of these facts must
be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty, and all of them must be found to
exist; the absence of any one of them is fatal to a recovery.” [Id. at 533 (citation
omitted).]
In his second amended complaint, plaintiff made the following relevant allegations in
support of his claim for fraud:
61. Defendant Kochanowski made material misrepresentations to Plaintiff
by pressuring Plaintiff to dismiss Reitter from the case, by stating in his letter to
Plaintiff that he had no reason to doubt the Warburton affidavit, and by telling
Plaintiff that it would be in Plaintiff ’s interest to dismiss his claims against
Reitter.
62. These statements were false. Defendants had already successfully
defeated Reitter’s motion to dismiss on the very issue of whether Reitter made the
mirrors in question. Defendant Kochanowski therefore falsely represented to
Plaintiff that Reitter did not make the mirrors and therefore should not be a party
to the case.
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63. At the time Defendant Kochanowski made the statements concerning
the Warburton affidavit and dismissal of Reitter to Plaintiff, Defendant knew the
statements were false, or made the statements recklessly, without knowledge of
their truth and as a positive assertion. Defendants had already argued Reitter’s
motion to dismiss, which centered on Reitter’s claims that they did not make the
mirrors. Defendant Kochanowski, therefore, has an understanding of Reitter’s
claims, and access to evidence of who made the mirrors. Despite this, Defendant
made a materially misleading statement to Plaintiff in order to pressure Plaintiff to
dismiss Reitter from the case.
64. Defendant Kochanowski made the misrepresentations with the clear
intention that Plaintiff would act on them by dismissing Reitter from the case.
65. Plaintiff relied on Defendant’s statements regarding Reitter’s
manufacture of the mirrors, and on Defendant’s statements pressuring Plaintiff to
agree to dismiss Reitter from the case.
66. Plaintiff suffered damages as a result of his reliance on Defendant’s
statements. Plaintiff ’s claims against Reitter were dismissed as a result, and the
claims are now time-barred.
67. Defendant Kochanowski was, at all relevant times, employed by
Defendant Sommers Schwartz as an attorney, and Defendant Sommers Schwartz
is therefore also liable for the fraud alleged above.
68. Defendants Baniak, Pine, and Baniak Pine, upon information and
belief, knew that Plaintiff agreed to dismiss Reitter from the suit based upon
material misrepresentations made to him by Defendant Kochanowski. Despite
this, the Baniak Pine Defendants allowed the dismissal to occur, did nothing to
correct the misrepresentation, and omitted to tell Plaintiff about the
misrepresentation, despite a duty to do so.
69. Plaintiff suffered Damages [sic] as a result of his reliance upon
Defendants [sic] material misrepresentations and omissions. In particular,
Plaintiff was damaged by Reitter’s dismissal from the case; by his belief, based on
Defendants [sic] statements and omissions, that he had no valid claims against
Reitter; and by his resulting inability to pursue his common law claims against
Reitter.
Plaintiff ’s fraud claim is premised on the contention that he was wrongly persuaded to
dismiss Reitter from the federal case because, contrary to Warburton’s affidavit and sworn
testimony, there was evidence that Reitter had manufactured the mirrors in question, namely that
the mirrors had the letters “rs” stamped on them.
Plaintiff ’s allegations are without merit because, as referenced above, two years earlier
Reitter’s German parent corporation had developed and sought a German patent for a similar
mirror assembly. Plaintiff has not shown that the factual basis for defendants’ advice to dismiss
Reitter was inaccurate. Indeed, plaintiff does not even appear to dispute that it was Reitter’s
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European parent corporation that had been manufacturing the mirror assemblies, which
explained the “rs” stamp on the mirrors. There was no reason why defendants could not rely on
the affidavit and uncontradicted sworn testimony to recommend that plaintiff voluntarily dismiss
Reitter from the lawsuit. In sum, there was no genuine issue of material fact that defendants
made any misrepresentations when advising plaintiff to dismiss Reitter from the federal lawsuit.
Therefore, the trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s claim for fraud.
V. DISCOVERY
Plaintiff lastly argues that summary disposition was premature because discovery had not
been completed. We disagree.
Ordinarily, summary disposition is inappropriate before the completion of discovery on a
disputed issue unless further discovery does not stand a fair chance of uncovering additional
factual support for the opposing party’s position. VanVorous v Burmeister, 262 Mich App 467,
476-477; 687 NW2d 132 (2004). If a party believes that summary disposition is premature
because discovery has not been completed, that party must at least assert that a dispute exists and
support the allegation with some independent evidence. Davis v Detroit, 269 Mich App 376,
379-380; 711 NW2d 462 (2005). A party is not entitled to discovery based on mere conjecture;
otherwise discovery would be just a “fishing expedition.” Id. at 380.
In this case, plaintiff has not shown how additional discovery would support his claim.
He relies solely on Kenneth Kohn’s affidavit for his position that defendants failed to properly
articulate his patent infringement claim, but as previously discussed, the federal court’s decision
indicates that it fully considered plaintiff ’s position that the term “translucent housing” should
be more broadly construed. Plaintiff has not presented any basis for concluding that further
discovery would uncover additional factual support for his position.
Affirmed.
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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