RANDY BISARD V EAGLE XPRESS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RANDY BISARD,
UNPUBLISHED
July 1, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
EAGLE XPRESS and ALAN J. DEMEESTER,
No. 291246
Mason Circuit Court
LC No. 08-000119-NZ
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: FORT HOOD, P.J., and BORRELLO and STEPHENS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting summary disposition for defendants
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) in this action based on the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act
(“WPA”), MCL 15.361 et seq. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the trial court.
This appeal has been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Plaintiff, a truck driver, was directed by defendants to deliver a load to Akron, Ohio on
January 31, 2008. Plaintiff claims that he was fired when he threatened to report defendants to
the Michigan Department of Transportation (“MDOT”) for requiring that he violate rules and
regulations; specifically, he claimed he was being directed to deliver the load without a sufficient
break and to fudge his time logs to falsely indicate otherwise. Defendants acknowledged that
plaintiff was fired when he refused to take the load, but asserted that plaintiff was fired for his
refusal and not in response to any threat to report. Defendants further claimed that the load could
have been delivered at a later time such that plaintiff would not have been in violation of any
rules or regulations.1
Plaintiff testified that he was in Gilman, Illinois on January 31, 2008, and began driving
at 6:45 a.m. He stopped for gas along the way and then drove straight through to Ludington, MI.
1
Under the regulations at issue, a truck driver can drive for 11 hours and then must take at least a
ten-hour break. Further, the truck driver’s hours cannot exceed 70 hours per week.
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Plaintiff said that he came in around 5:30 p.m., which means he had been on the road for
approximately 10.75 hours.2
Plaintiff said that upon arrival, he filled out an inspection report noting mechanical
problems3. He said he was then told he was being assigned another load that had to be in Akron,
Ohio by 8:00 a.m. the next morning. He indicated that the load sheet he was given listed the
8:00 a.m. time. Plaintiff denied being told that the load did not need to be there at 8:00 a.m. He
claimed he could not take the load because, having almost met the 11-hour ceiling, he would be
required to take a ten-hour break and would not be able to make the 8:00 a.m. deadline. He also
commented that defendants knew he had his kids every other weekend; plaintiff would have
exceeded the 70-hour restriction while away and thus, would have had to stay off duty in Akron
and miss the visitation with his children. Plaintiff claimed that, simultaneously with refusing the
load, he advised Al DeMeester, the president of the company and the person who fired him, that
if he were forced to go he would be contacting MDOT. Plaintiff asserted that he contacted
MDOT the day after he was fired. Plaintiff also testified that there was a history with defendant
corporation, whereby defendants would dispatch plaintiff with loads back to back, even though
he would be over the limit of hours.
Plaintiff gave somewhat inconsistent testimony on whether anyone had ever told him to
drive outside of the hours requirement. He first stated that no one from defendant Eagle Xpress
directly asked him to drive outside of the hours requirement and that he did so voluntarily. He
then said that “Jack” (Jack Wingate) specifically told him to violate regulations on January 31,
2008 by testifying as follows:
A:
[Jack] told me to make it work. He made me go ahead and he pretty much
said just drive there, you know, however I got to do it, just get it there.
***
A:
He told me that if I was out of hours that you can make it work or to make
it work and that they could try to flex the times a little bit.
***
Q:
Get a later delivery date?
A:
Maybe, yeah.
2
Using slightly different time frames, plaintiff has alternatively asserted that it was 10.25 hours.
This fact is not critical.
3
Plaintiff claimed that he had a taillight out, that the steering wheel “was not at a straightacross”, that he was missing a splashguard, and that he had a clutch problem. He acknowledged
that he was told the clutch would be fixed.
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Q:
So that would have allowed you to take your applicable rest period and
then still get to Akron, Ohio, and not have violated the company policy; is that
correct?
A:
No.
***
A:
that.
He was talking about flexing the time on my log sheets, make it work like
Q:
So you’re saying that Jack specifically told you to falsely report your log
sheets?
A:
He didn’t say it like that.
Q:
How did he say that?
A:
He said “make it work.”
Q:
You took that to mean?
A:
To mess with my log sheets. If I was out of hours, he told me to drive. I
mean Plaintiff further testified that if a load is not delivered by the delivery time, the company has the
choice of making the driver lay over until the next day. When asked if Jack could have meant, in
using the term “work it out”, for plaintiff to take the ten-hour break and then get the load there as
soon as possible, plaintiff said he couldn’t “read his mind.” Wingate attested that he told
plaintiff he “needed to make it work and get the loads done”, but did not direct plaintiff to violate
regulations.
In maintaining that it was intended that he manipulate the log sheet, plaintiff stated:
Well, it’s implied. It’s my job. I mean, obviously they’ve said several things like
this at different times, you know, I mean--basically it’s your load, get it there. Its
got to be there at eight o’clock. You know, you ain’t got eight hours to do it,
make it work.
Plaintiff further stated that he had seen Donna Hallin, an employee of defendant, change records
on the computer several times in order to comply with the 70-hour time limit. He said he would
write up his daily logs with Donna so that the documents were consistent.
Defendants submitted three affidavits in support of their motion for summary disposition.
Jack Wingate attested that he directed plaintiff to carry the load, and had him check with Donna
Hallin regarding hours when plaintiff raised this as an issue. Wingate acknowledged that
plaintiff advised he would have had to go off duty in Akron. He said that in response he
“indicated to Mr. Bisard that all I was concerned with was the drop of the load, and that he
needed to make it work and get the load done.” Wingate said he never directed plaintiff to
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violate any rules or regulations, and that when plaintiff refused the load, Al DeMeester fired
plaintiff. Wingate claimed that plaintiff never threatened to report or advised that he had
reported anything to any government agency.
DeMeester, the president of Eagle Xpress, attested that he fired plaintiff for refusing to
carry the load and not because of a threat to report. Further, DeMeester claimed that no one ever
directed plaintiff to violate any rules or regulations and that he was never threatened with
reporting or advised that anyone else had been threatened. DeMeester claimed he directed
plaintiff to verify with Hallin that he had enough hours, and that when it was confirmed that he
did, plaintiff was fired for refusing to take the load. Hallin attested that she verified for plaintiff
that he had enough hours to travel to Akron without violating any state or federal regulations.
Further, she claimed plaintiff never made any threat to her that he was going to report Eagle
Xpress or any employee.
At the first of two hearings on the motion for summary disposition, the court inquired
whether plaintiff had previously delivered a load to the Akron company and was advised that
plaintiff had done so twice. The court indicated that it needed to see whether the load sheets for
those two deliveries said 8:00 a.m. but were delivered later, and also wanted evidence from the
Akron company indicating whether the 8:00 a.m. delivery time was firm. The trial court noted
plaintiff’s claim that he was being told to leave in time to get the load there by 8:00 a.m.; he
contrasted this with defendants’ claim that the 8:00 a.m. designation was simply a notation on
the delivery order and that delivery could be had at any time on the day in question. That being
the case, defendants were arguing, plaintiff could have taken a ten-hour break, left at 3:30 a.m.,
and gotten the load there by 3:00 p.m. the following day.
An affidavit was provided by a Mr. Cline of the Akron company; however, it is not part
of the record. It is referenced in the court’s opinion and in a responsive affidavit by plaintiff that
he sought to have admitted with his motion for reconsideration. The trial court stated:
Defendant did present affidavit statements to the effect that . . . the delivery to
Akron on February 1, 2008 could have been properly done without MDOT
violation if Plaintiff had retired for the night after arriving home at 5:30, obtained
his required sleep hours, and then departed in the early morning hours at
approximately 3:00 a.m. in that the Akron terminal was open for business until
5:00 p.m. on February 1, 2008. The trip itself normally took twelve hours or less,
thus a 3:00 a.m. departure would have gotten Mr. Bisard to Akron by 3:00 in the
afternoon. Plaintiff argues that the delivery order itself specified a delivery time
of 8:00 in the morning. However, via further discovery subsequent to our
December 15, 2008 hearing, Defendant has supplied an affidavit from the
receiving dock at Akron that they do not expect such an order to require an 8:00
a.m. delivery but that any delivery pursuant to normal hours that day would be
accepted. Therefore, defendant’s statement that the 8:00 a.m. order is simply a
default time was confirmed by the Akron terminal. In addition, defendant argues
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that Mr. Bisard has made the same delivery two or more times on prior occasions
and is aware that there is not an 8:00 a.m. deadline per se.4
With his March 6, 2009, motion for reconsideration, plaintiff submitted an affidavit stating that
he had delivered to the Akron company several times and that its “specific known policy was
delivery mandated at the time designated on the load/run sheet.” Plaintiff further averred that his
employer specifically told him that the delivery had to be when designated and that through
contacts with the company “it was clear and certain that this was the required time.” In denying
plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, the court stated that it was not enough to simply deny the
truth of the matter asserted or say that plaintiff’s position would be proven at trial.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that he was engaged in a protected activity in that he refused
an order to work beyond his allowed hours and falsify his log sheets. He had been driving for
10.25 hours, and had .75 hours left before his allowed hours for the day would expire and a tenhour break would be required. His complaint in this matter avers that he was discharged after he
advised his supervisors that he would report the violations to MDOT, a measure that would have
protected public interests. Further, plaintiff argues on appeal that he contradicted defendants’
claim that the 8:00 a.m. delivery time was flexible, thus the trial court erred in making findings
of fact in favor of defendants.
Whether summary disposition was properly granted is a question of law that is reviewed
de novo. Vega v Lakeland Hosp, 479 Mich 243, 245; 736 NW2d 561 (2007). When considering
a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court must review the evidence
“submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Brown v Brown,
478 Mich 545, 551-552; 739 NW2d 313 (2007). “Summary disposition is appropriate if there is
no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Id. at 552. A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the
benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable
minds might differ. Shallal v Catholic Social Services of Wayne Co, 455 Mich 604, 609; 566
NW2d 571 (1997).
In Taylor v Modern Engineering, Inc, 252 Mich App 655, 659; 653 NW2d 625 (2002),
this Court explained:
When considering claims under the WPA, we apply the burden-shifting
analysis used in retaliatory discharge claims under the Civil Rights Act, MCL
37.2101 et seq. Roulston v Tendercare (Michigan), Inc, 239 Mich App 270, 280281; 608 NW2d 525 (2000). If the plaintiff has successfully proved a prima facie
case under the WPA, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate
business reason for the plaintiff’s discharge. Id. If the defendant produces
evidence establishing the existence of a legitimate reason for the discharge, the
4
It is not clear whether the Cline affidavit would have established the two prior deliveries.
Despite being part of the trial court’s opinion, there is no indication from the record before us
that the load orders for the two prior deliveries were ever provided.
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plaintiff then has the opportunity to prove that the legitimate reason offered by the
defendant was not the true reason, but was only a pretext for the discharge. Id.
“Once a defendant presents a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason rebutting a plaintiff’s prima
facie case of discrimination, even if it is in the context of a motion for summary judgment, the
plaintiff must put forth factual allegations to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the
proffered reasons were a mere pretext.” Clark v Uniroyal Corp, 119 Mich App 820, 825-826;
327 NW2d 372 (1982).
In Roulston, 239 Mich App at 281, this Court further stated:
Once the pretext question is reached, the question of mixed motive, i.e.,
retaliation plus a legitimate business reason, must be considered. Melchi v Burns
Int’l Security Services, Inc, 597 F Supp 575, 583 (ED Mich, 1984). The Melchi
court offered four standards for proving pretext in a retaliatory discharge case:
(1) whether participation in the protected activity played any part in the discharge,
no matter how remote, (2) whether the plaintiff’s protected activity was a
substantial factor in the discharge, (3) whether the plaintiff’s protected activity
was the principal, but not sole, reason for the discharge, or (4) whether the
discharge would have occurred had there been no protected activity. A plaintiff
can prove pretext either directly by persuading the court that a retaliatory reason
more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. [Hopkins v Midland, 158 Mich
App 361, 380; 404 NW2d 744 (1987).]
The plaintiff bears the burden of casting doubt on the employer’s articulated reasons for an
adverse employment decision. Taylor, 252 Mich App at 659-660.
MCL 15.362 provides:
An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an
employee regarding the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location, or
privileges of employment because the employee, or a person acting on behalf of
the employee, reports or is about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a
suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of
this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public
body, unless the employee knows that the report is false, or because an employee
is requested by a public body to participate in an investigation, hearing, or inquiry
held by that public body, or a court action. [Emphasis added.]
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, it must be accepted that plaintiff
made a threat to DeMeester to report an hours violation. Moreover, it is undisputed that plaintiff
was discharged. Thus, this case turns on the evidence relative to whether a causal connection
existed between the threat to contact MDOT and plainitff’s discharge.
Plaintiff averred that there was a connection. However, defendants responded and stated
that no threats had been made and that, in any event, plaintiff was fired for refusing to carry the
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load. Thus, plaintiff had to come forward with evidence showing that the proffered reason was a
pretext.
The trial court focused on whether there was an hours violation. Cline’s affidavit
established that the load could have been delivered later than 8:00 a.m. on the scheduled date. In
his affidavit, plaintiff professes to know the Akron company’s shipping and receiving policies,
but he cannot lay a foundation for knowing the policies of a company with which he has no
affiliation. Plaintiff also attests in his affidavit that his employer specifically told him that the
delivery had to be at the time designated on the load run sheet. However, in his deposition he
indicated he was not directly told the delivery had to be at 8:00 a.m., but that he inferred as much
based on the delivery order and prior practice. Plaintiff’s affidavit cannot be used to contradict
his deposition testimony. Casey v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 273 Mich App 388, 396; 729 NW2d 277
(2006), lv den 478 Mich 866 (2007). Thus, the evidence established that plaintiff could have
carried the load without an hours violation. His testimony did not establish that he was told
otherwise. Where there was no violation and no express direction to violate an hours restriction,
plaintiff has not established that firing him for not carrying the load was a pretext for a firing
based on the threat to report.
Even if plaintiff made a threat to report and it was a reason for the discharge, we
conclude that plaintiff has failed to establish pretext. At best, plaintiff’s assertions could create a
genuine issue of fact as to whether there was a mixed motive for the firing. As noted above,
plaintiff would have to show that “a retaliatory reason more likely motivated the employer” or
“that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Roulston, 239 Mich App at
281. It is undisputed that plaintiff refused to carry the load. While defendants may have been
affected by a threat to report, there is no evidence to indicate that this, as opposed to the refusal,
more likely motivated defendants. Similarly, in the face of the refusal, defendants’ claim that the
firing was motivated by the refusal is not unworthy of credence.
Affirmed.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
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