PEOPLE OF MI V WILLIE RICH CHAPPELL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 1, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 290834
Eaton Circuit Court
LC No. 08-020234-FC
WILLIE RICH CHAPPELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MURRAY, P.J., and SAAD and M.J. KELLY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of armed robbery, MCL
750.529, and one count of possession of a firearm while committing a felony (felony-firearm),
second offense, MCL 750.227b. Defendant was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender, MCL
769.12, to serve 280 months to 60 years in prison for the armed robbery convictions, and to serve
a consecutive term of 60 months in prison for the felony-firearm, second offense, conviction.
Defendant appeals as of right, and we affirm.
Two men robbed an Eaton County Taco Bell at gunpoint during the early morning hours
of July 23, 2008. Defendant and a companion were taken into custody later that morning and
two handguns, gloves, a backpack, facial coverings, and approximately $200 cash were
recovered from their vehicle. The two employees working during the robbery identified
defendant as one of the robbers.
A. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL
Defendant initially argues that he was the denied effective assistance of counsel related to
several alleged errors. Defendant preserved this issue for appellate review by moving for a new
trial and requesting an evidentiary hearing related to his claims that he was denied the effective
assistance of trial counsel. People v Sabin (On Second Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 658-659;
620 NW2d 19 (2000). We review the trial court’s factual findings for clear error and conduct a
de novo review of legal issues related to a preserved claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
People v Dendel, 481 Mich 114, 124; 748 NW2d 859, amended 481 Mich 1201 (2008).
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show: (1)
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms; (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of
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the proceedings would have been different; and (3) the resultant proceedings were fundamentally
unfair or unreliable. People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 714; 645 NW2d 294 (2001).
Defendant must also overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s actions were the product of
sound trial strategy, People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001), and defense
counsel has no obligation to raise a meritless motion or make a meritless objection. People v
Goodin, 257 Mich App 425, 433; 668 NW2d 392 (2003).
Defendant first argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his
trial counsel failed to challenge the admission of the victims’ identification of him as one of the
robbers.
The robbery victims first identified defendant as one of the robbers at a preliminary
hearing held approximately one week after the robbery. Neither victim was asked to view a
corporeal or photographic lineup prior to the preliminary examination. While defendant asserts
that this constituted error, a review of the record indicates that trial counsel strategically elected
not to request a line-up prior to the preliminary exam. We are not permitted to substitute our
judgment for that of trial counsel related to matters of trial strategy. People v Matuszak, 263
Mich App 42, 58; 687 NW2d 342 (2004).
The record demonstrates that trial counsel put forth the issue of suggestiveness to the jury
during his thorough cross-examination of the victims and highlighted the fact that neither witness
participated in a corporeal, photographic, or voice lineup before the preliminary exam. The fact
that this strategic decision was ultimately unsuccessful does not necessitate the conclusion that
defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel. People v Kevorkian, 248 Mich App
373, 414-415; 639 NW2d 291 (2001).
Defendant also argues that the victims’ initial identifications of him were the result of an
unduly suggestive procedure. Defendant specifically claims the identifications were tainted
because the identification procedure was unduly suggestive where he and his co-defendant were
the only two African-Americans sitting at a table labeled “defendant,” and while attired in jail
clothing.
An identification procedure violates a defendant’s right to due process of law when it is
“unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable misidentification . . . .” People v
Williams, 244 Mich App 533, 542; 624 NW2d 575 (2001). When a pretrial identification
procedure is unduly suggestive, the witness’s in-court identification will not be allowed at trial
unless an independent basis sufficient to purge the taint of the improper pretrial identification
exists. People v Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289, 303; 505 NW2d 529 (1993) (opinion by GRIFFIN, J.).
A reviewing court considers the following eight factors to determine if such an independent basis
exists: (1) prior relationship with or knowledge of the defendant; (2) opportunity to observe the
offense, including length of the observation, lighting, noise and proximity; (3) length of time
between the offense and the disputed identification; (4) accuracy or discrepancies in the
prelineup or show up description and the defendant’s actual description; (5) any previous proper
identification or failure to identify the defendant; (6) any identification of another person as the
assailant; (7) the nature of the alleged offense and the physical and psychological state of the
victim; and (8) any idiosyncratic or special features of the defendant. People v Gray, 457 Mich
107, 116-124; 577 NW2d 92 (1998). Not all of these factors will always be relevant to a
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particular case and each factor may be given greater or lesser weight, depending on the
circumstances of the case. Id. at 117 n 12.
Assuming that the identification procedure was unduly suggestive, we nevertheless hold
that an independent basis existed for the identification. Neither robbery victim had a prior
relationship with defendant, and nothing in the record indicates that defendant had any special
physical features. These factors weigh in defendant’s favor in our evaluation of whether an
independent basis for the in-court identifications existed.
On the other hand, the initial identifications occurred just days after the robbery, and the
final in-court identification occurred fewer than four months later. In addition, both victims
identified defendant as robber number one and his companion as robber number two, even
though both defendant and his companion were wearing jumpsuits and sitting at the same table
during the preliminary hearing. Also, neither victim identified anyone else as the perpetrator.
Finally, both victims testified that they were in close proximity with both robbers at least part of
the time during the robbery and the lighting in the restaurant was good.
When these factors are reviewed as a whole, there is an independent basis for the in-court
identifications of defendant as one of the robbers. Accordingly, trial counsel was not ineffective
for failing to move to suppress the identifications made by the robbery victims because such a
motion would have been without merit. Goodin, 257 Mich App at 433.
In arguing that the identifications in the instant case were unreliable, defendant refers to
numerous scholarly treatises and articles that indicate misidentification is common. While we
recognize that misidentification can occur and that a conviction based on misidentification alone
can lead to an unjust result in the absence of other independent, inculpatory evidence, that is not
the situation in this case. Defendant was taken into custody wearing clothing that matched the
descriptions given by the robbery victims and witnesses outside the restaurant. Also, a gun
matching the victims’ descriptions was located on the passenger side of the vehicle, effectively
placing it at defendant’s feet. Gloves matching the description of those worn by the robbers
were also located on defendant’s side of the vehicle. In addition, a dark bandana that could have
been used as a facial covering was recovered from defendant’s passenger seat and both victims
testified that the “bag man” (i.e., defendant) wore a dark covering over his face. Finally, cash in
small denominations and approximately equal to the amount taken in the robbery was recovered
from the vehicle. Thus, there was ample evidence aside from the in-court identification to
convict defendant of these crimes.
Defendant also argues that his trial counsel should have made a request to have an expert
in witness identification appointed to assist him. A criminal defendant may request appointment
of an expert if he can demonstrate there is a nexus between the facts of the case and the need for
an expert. MCL 775.15; People v Carnicom, 272 Mich App 614, 617; 727 NW2d 399 (2006).
However, “[i]t is not enough for the defendant to show a mere possibility of assistance from the
requested expert.” People v Tanner, 469 Mich 437, 443; 671 NW2d 728 (2003). Defendant has
failed to make the necessary showing that an expert was necessary for him to safely proceed to
trial. As described above, defense counsel was able to challenge the strength and reliability of
the identification testimony by eliciting apparent discrepancies and arguable bases for
questioning the accuracy of the identifications. Thus, defendant’s ineffective assistance claim
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cannot succeed on this basis because defense counsel’s failure to request an identification expert
was not objectively unreasonable. Rodgers, 248 Mich App at 714.
Defendant’s final argument on ineffective assistance is that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to file a motion to suppress evidence. Specifically, defendant argues that trial counsel
should have moved to suppress evidence recovered from the vehicle because the arresting officer
lacked a constitutional basis to initiate the stop.
Both the United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution protect against
unreasonable searches and seizures. See US Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1 § 11. However,
this protection is not activated until a search or seizure has occurred. Not all encounters between
police officers and the public implicate Fourth Amendment protections. People v Jenkins, 472
Mich 26, 32; 691 NW2d 759 (2005). “[T]o constitute a seizure for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment there must be either the application of physical force or the submission by the
suspect to an officer’s show of authority.” People v Lewis, 199 Mich App 556, 559; 502 NW2d
363 (1993). Stated differently, an individual is seized “only if, in view of all the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.”
Michigan v Chesternut, 486 US 567, 573; 108 S Ct 1975; 100 L Ed2d 565 (1988) (quotation
marks and citation omitted).
Our Supreme Court’s holding in Jenkins, 472 Mich at 33-34, makes clear that the Fourth
Amendment is not implicated when an officer engages an individual in conversation or requests
an individual’s identification. Such was the case here. This conclusion is also buttressed by the
fact that defendant’s companion was allowed to leave the officer’s presence and return to the
store, while the officer waited for LEIN results.
Defendant argues that the arresting officer’s initial seizure was based merely on a hunch,
and that trial counsel should have recognized this as a basis for suppression of the evidence.
Defendant is correct that a “hunch” is not an acceptable basis for a Fourth Amendment seizure.
See Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 27; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed2d 889 (1968). Nevertheless, as
discussed above, there was no seizure until after the officer had verified that defendant’s
companion had been driving without a valid driver’s license, thereby subjecting him to lawful
arrest. Thus, regardless of whether the officer had a “hunch” that criminal activity was afoot
when she first engaged defendant’s companion in conversation, this conduct did not constitute a
seizure. The ensuing search of the automobile was then permissible at that time as a search
incident to lawful arrest, People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 115; 549 NW2d 849 (1996), and the
seizure of evidence from it was constitutional. Accordingly, defendant lacks standing to have the
evidence suppressed. People v Labelle, 478 Mich 891, 892; 732 NW2d 114 (2007). As a result,
defendant’s claim that trial court was ineffective for moving to suppress evidence cannot succeed
because the motion would have been without merit. Goodin, 257 Mich App at 433.
B. GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant’s final argument is that his convictions were against the great weight of the
evidence, which defendant preserved by raising the issue in a motion for a new trial. People v
Musser, 259 Mich App 215, 218; 673 NW2d 800 (2003). A trial court’s ruling on a motion for a
new trial based on the claim that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Lueth, 253 Mich App 670, 680; 660 NW2d 322
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(2002). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision results in an outcome that
is not within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247,
269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003); Carnicom, 272 Mich App at 616-617.
A verdict is against the great weight of the evidence if the evidence preponderates so
heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage for the verdict to stand. People v
Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 232; 749 NW2d 272. A review of the whole body of proofs is
necessary to determine whether a verdict is against the great weight of the evidence. People v
Herbert, 444 Mich 466, 475; 511 NW2d 654 (1993), overruled in part on other grounds by
People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625; 576 NW2d 129 (1998). Whether a verdict is against the great
weight of the evidence usually involves matters of credibility or circumstantial evidence. In re
Robinson, 180 Mich App 454, 463; 447 NW2d 765 (1989).
Defendant primarily argues that his convictions are against the great weight of the
evidence because the witnesses’ identifications were unreliable. As noted above, the
identification of defendant as one of the robbers was properly admitted because there was an
independent basis for the victims’ in-court identifications. Moreover, defendant is essentially
asking this Court to act as a “thirteenth juror” and revisit credibility issues, which is a role that
we are not permitted to take. People v Gadomski, 232 Mich App 24, 28; 592 NW2d 75 (1998).
Defendant also argues that the jury verdict was against the great weight of the evidence
because no direct evidence linking him to the robbery was recovered from the vehicle. However,
this argument ignores the well-settled rule that circumstantial evidence and the reasonable
inferences that arise from the evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a
crime, including identity. People v Sullivan, 290 Mich 414, 418-419; 287 NW2d 567 (1939);
People v Greenwood, 209 Mich App 470, 472; 531 NW2d 771 (1995). Consequently, even
without the victims’ identifications of defendant as one of the robbers, there was substantial
circumstantial evidence linking defendant to the crimes, including the weapons, gloves, facial
coverings, backpack, and cash recovered from the vehicle. Thus, it would not be a miscarriage
to allow the verdicts to stand.1
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
1
We decline to address defendant’s assertion that law enforcement involved in the instant case
inadequately investigated the armed robbery because he has failed to adequately support this
assertion. See People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641; 588 NW2d 480 (1998).
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