JOYCE YURCSO V K K RAVINDRAN MD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JOYCE YURSCO, Personal Representative of the
Estate of PEARL BUNZOW, Deceased,
UNPUBLISHED
June 24, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 291187
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 06-062602-NH
K.K. RAVIDRAN, M.D., K.K. RAVIDRAN,
M.D., P.C., and VALLEY CARDIOLOGY,
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: FORT HOOD, P.J., and BORRELLO and STEPHENS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants appeal as of right the trial court’s denial of their motions for directed verdict
and judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) during a medical malpractice jury trial. We
affirm.
Defendant contends that the trial court should have granted the motion for directed
verdict or the motion for JNOV because plaintiff failed to present the jury with adequate
evidence that defendants caused decedent Pearl Bunzow’s injury. We disagree.
A trial court’s denial of a motion for directed verdict is subject to de novo review.
Roberts v Saffell, 280 Mich App 397, 401; 760 NW2d 715 (2008). “[W]e view the evidence
presented up to the time of the motion in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
granting that party every reasonable inference, and resolving any conflict in the evidence in that
party's favor to decide whether a question of fact existed.” Derbabian v S & C Snowplowing,
Inc, 249 Mich App 695, 701; 644 N.W.2d 779 (2002). A directed verdict may be granted only
when no factual question exists regarding which reasonable jurors could differ. Lewis v LeGrow,
258 Mich App 175, 192; 670 NW2d 675 (2003). Similarly, this Court reviews the denial of the
motion for JNOV de novo. Foreman v Foreman, 266 Mich App 132, 135; 701 NW2d 167
(2005). “[T]he trial court should grant a JNOV motion only if, reviewing the evidence and all
legitimate inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, ‘the evidence fails to establish a claim as a
matter of law.’” Id. at 136, quoting Wiley v Henry Ford Cottage Hosp, 257 Mich App 488, 492;
668 NW2d 402 (2003). Furthermore, “[w]hen the evidence presented could lead reasonable
jurors to disagree, the trial court may not substitute its judgment for that of the jury.” Foreman,
266 Mich App at 136.
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The plaintiff in a medical malpractice cause of action has the burden of establishing that
the defendant's negligent action proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. Weymers v Khera, 454
Mich 639, 647; 563 NW2d 647 (1997). Proximate causation is composed of cause in fact and
legal cause. Id. In the present case, defendants allege that plaintiff failed to establish factual
causation and that the jury was not permitted to return a verdict in favor of plaintiff. To establish
factual causation, a “plaintiff must present substantial evidence from which a jury may conclude
that more likely than not, but for the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff's injuries would not have
occurred.” Genna v Jackson, 286 Mich App 413, 418; 781 NW2d 184 (2009). Furthermore, the
“mere possibility of such causation is not sufficient; and when the matter remains one of pure
speculation and conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty
of the court to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant.” Id. While the question of causation is
typically reserved for the jury, the trial court may decide the issue if there is no genuine issue of
material fact. Id.
Defendants argue that plaintiff's causation theory was based purely on conjecture and
speculation. Specifically, defendants allege that it was unlikely that Dr. K.K. Ravindran could
have successfully utilized the balloon procedure because he did not have the time or ability to do
so. We disagree with defendants’ contention and will first address whether there was sufficient
time to perform the procedure. The record, when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff,
demonstrates that decedent’s bleeding began at 10:55 a.m. According to Dr. A.J. Telmos, Dr.
Ravindran had a four-minute window during which it was more likely than not that he could
intervene and prevent decedent’s death. Dr. Telmos opined that had defendant performed the
balloon procedure to stop decedent’s bleeding, there was a 95 percent chance that the procedure
would have prevented decedent’s death. While there was evidence that the balloons needed for
the procedure were not in the laboratory there was also evidence that the balloons could have
been retrieved within a couple of minutes. Once retrieved, it would take anywhere from 30
seconds to two minutes to insert the balloon, inflate it and cease the flow of blood. Dr.
Ravindran did not need to know the exact location of the arterial perforation in order to
successfully perform the procedure. Rather, he merely needed to know its general location and
to insert the inflated balloon anywhere above the perforation. Dr. Ravindran had already taken
x-rays in order to ascertain the general location of the perforation. Furthermore, it would have
only taken seconds to take additional x-rays. Additionally, Dr. Ravindran was not in the
laboratory by himself during the procedure. While he was locating the perforation, another
hospital employee could have retrieved the balloons. Therefore, although Dr. Ravindran did not
have significant time to spare, he could have retrieved the balloons, located the perforation and
performed the balloon procedure during the available four-minute window.1
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As described above, Dr. Ravindran had adequate time to perform the procedure at issue.
However, even if we concluded that he did not have adequate time to perform the procedure, the
jury would still have been permitted to determine causation. The only reason that time was
arguably limited in this case was because the necessary balloons were not immediately available.
Dr. Telmos testified that it is expected that all of the necessary equipment is in the room in which
the surgery is performed. The jury was therefore permitted to conclude that defendants caused
decedent’s injury by failing to properly prepare for the surgical procedure.
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Likewise, the record does not support defendants’ argument that Dr. Ravindran did not
have the ability to perform the procedure. The record demonstrates that Dr. Ravindran
consciously chose not to utilize the balloon procedure because he did not feel that he was in an
emergency situation and did not feel that the procedure was necessary. Dr. Ravindran
specifically testified that he was aware of the existence of the procedure. He further stated that
he was capable of performing the procedure if he needed to, saying that if he could utilize
balloons in the coronary arteries he could also use them in the peripheral arteries. More
importantly, he stated that he had an “interventional radiologist right there” and that the
interventional radiologist was capable of performing the procedure. The record clearly
demonstrates that Dr. Ravindran had the capabilities to perform the procedure and that he had
immediate access to others who could perform the procedure.
Finally, defendants also imply that it would have been unwise for Dr. Ravindran to
perform the procedure because if he performed it incorrectly, decedent could have instantly died.
This Court is not persuaded by the argument. As stated above, there is no reason to believe that
Dr. Ravindran would not have successfully performed the procedure. Furthermore, he could
have easily obtained the assistance of someone who was capable of performing the procedure.
Additionally, it is illogical to argue that Dr. Ravindran should not have performed the procedure
because of the possibility that it would result in death. Without the procedure, the record
demonstrates that decedent had essentially no chance of surviving her hemorrhage.
Plaintiff’s evidence regarding causation was not based on mere speculation and
conjecture. The evidence demonstrated that Dr. Ravindran had the time and the ability to
perform a procedure that had a 95 percent chance of preventing decedent’s death. He chose not
to perform the procedure in order to pursue an alternative, and ultimately unsuccessful, method
of treatment. While there was conflicting testimony regarding the location of the perforation and
the wisdom of performing the balloon procedure, it is well established that issues of credibility
are properly reserved for the jury. Moore v Detroit Entertainment, LLC, 279 Mich App 195,
202; 755 NW2d 686 (2008). A reasonable jury was certainly permitted to conclude that Dr.
Ravindran’s conduct was more likely than not the cause of decedent’s injury. Had the trial court
granted the motion for directed verdict or JNOV, it would have been improperly substituting its
judgment for that of the jury. Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s denial of those motions.
Defendants are not entitled to relief.
Affirmed.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
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