JOHN GUIDOBONO II REVOCABLE TRUST AGREEMENT V SANDRA JONES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JOHN GUIDOBONO II REVOCABLE TRUST
AGREEMENT and JOHN GUIDOBONO II,
Trustee,
UNPUBLISHED
June 24, 2010
Plaintiffs/Counter-DefendantsAppellants,
v
SANDRA JONES, WILLIAM KRIST, DONNA
KRIST, TODD KRIST, and CHERYL KRIST,
No. 290589
Livingston Circuit Court
LC No. 06-022328-CH
Defendants/CounterPlaintiffs/Third-Party PlaintiffsAppellees,
and
JOHN GUIDOBONO II and CATHY
GUIDOBONO,
Third-Party Defendants-Appellants.
Before: FORT HOOD, P.J., and BORRELLO and STEPHENS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs, the John Guidobono II Revocable Trust Agreement and its trustee, and thirdparty defendants, John Guidobono II and Cathy Guidobono, appeal as of right two January 6,
2009 orders, which granted defendants partial summary disposition in this case involving
easement rights. We affirm.
Appellants argue that the trial court erred because it determined that the language in
defendants’ easements was ambiguous. Based on that determination, the trial court improperly
considered defendants’ historical use of the easements and held that defendants were entitled to
shoreline activities, such as lounging, picnicking, and parking vehicles, as well as riparian rights,
such as mooring boats and installing a dock. We agree.
We review a trial court’s dispositional ruling on equitable matters de novo. Blackhawk
Dev Corp v Village of Dexter, 473 Mich 33, 40; 700 NW2d 364 (2005). We also review a
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decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Coblentz v Novi, 475 Mich 558, 567;
719 NW2d 73 (2006). We must review the record in the same manner as the trial court to
determine whether the movant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Morales v AutoOwners Ins, 458 Mich 288, 294; 582 NW2d 776 (1998). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10)
tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119; 597
NW2d 817 (1999). Summary disposition is proper under MCR 2.116(C)(10) where the
proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. MCR 2.116(C)(10); MCR 2.116(G)(4);
Coblentz, 475 Mich at 568.
The Court in Little v Kin, 468 Mich 699, 700; 664 NW2d 749 (2003), explained:
Where the language of a legal instrument is plain and unambiguous, it is to
be enforced as written and no further inquiry is permitted. If the text of the
easement is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence may be considered by the trial court in
order to determine the scope of the easement. [Citation omitted.]
We conclude as a matter of law that being granted access or ingress or egress to a lake
does not result in being granted riparian rights on the lake or the right to use the land for
shoreline activities, which do not relate to the use of the water itself. See Delaney v Pond, 350
Mich 685, 686-687; 86 NW2d 816 (1957); Dyball v Lennox, 260 Mich App 698, 699-709; 680
NW2d 522 (2003). Moreover, the addition of the word “use” in the easement did not create
riparian rights where none otherwise existed, nor did it create ambiguity. Hence, in this case, the
plain language of the easements did not convey riparian rights, and the language was
unambiguous. The trial court incorrectly concluded that the easements were ambiguous and
considered defendant’s historical use in deciding the case. Nevertheless, we find that the trial
court reached the correct result and we affirm the disposition. See Taylor v Laban, 241 Mich
App 449, 458; 616 NW2d 229 (2000), where we indicated that “we will not reverse the [trial]
court's order when the right result was reached for the wrong reason.”
We conclude, as did the trial court, that defendants were granted the disputed use rights
by acquiescence. Historically, the doctrine of acquiescence was developed in order to promote
the resolution of disputes regarding land boundaries. Killips v Mannisto, 244 Mich App 256,
260; 624 NW2d 224 (2001). Importantly, however, the doctrine of acquiescence also may apply
to easements. Id. at 259-261. The doctrine of acquiescence does not require hostility or lack of
permission. Id. at 260. Further, “[t]he acquiescence of predecessors in title can be tacked onto
that of the parties in order to establish the mandated period of fifteen years.” Id. “The proper
standard applicable to a claim of acquiescence is proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.
In this case, the record demonstrates that defendants used the easements for purposes
such as maintaining docks, driving vehicles on the property, mooring boats, and entertaining
social guests. These activities were conducted beginning in 1968, when the land contracts of
defendant Sandra Jones and defendants William and Donna Krist (hereafter Krist senior) were
executed, and certainly no later than in the early 1970s when Richard Bilbie, officer of Bilbie
Hall, Inc., the seller, installed a dock on the easement. Moreover, these activities were not only
condoned, but were encouraged by Richard. Further, no action was instituted to reclaim the
property until this suit was brought in 2006, thus the 15-year period required for acquiescence,
MCL 600.5801(4), was easily met. Hence, the trial court correctly concluded that plaintiffs were
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barred from their causes of action by the doctrine of acquiescence. Richard acquiesced to
defendants Jones and Krist senior’s possession of the property for the uses complained of by
appellants. In addition, because defendants Todd and Cheryl Krist (hereafter Krist junior)
received whatever Krist senior obtained from Bilbie Hall, the doctrine of acquiescence also bars
plaintiffs’ claim against Krist junior.
We also conclude that the defense of prescriptive easement barred plaintiffs’ claim with
regard to Krist senior and Krist junior. A prescriptive easement can be established in two ways.
First, a prescriptive easement can arise when there is the "use of another's property that is open,
notorious, adverse, and continuous for a period of fifteen years." Plymouth Canton Community
Crier, Inc v Prose, 242 Mich App 676, 679; 619 NW2d 725 (2000). In this case, all defendants
used the servient estate in an open, notorious, and continuous fashion for a period of 15 years.
However, their use of the servient estate was not adverse, but rather permissive. Because
Richard permitted their use of the property, and adverse or hostile use cannot be established
where the use is permissive, regardless of the length of the use, none of the defendants can
establish a prescriptive easement in this way. West Michigan Dock & Market Corp v Lakeland
Investments, 210 Mich App 505, 511; 534 NW2d 212 (1995).
A prescriptive easement can also “be established where an express easement failed
through some defect and was treated as if it had been properly established.” Plymouth Canton
Community Crier, 242 Mich App at 684-685; Mulcahy v Verhines, 276 Mich App 693, 699-703;
742 NW2d 393 (2007). Specifically, a prescriptive use is made “pursuant to the terms of an
intended but imperfectly created servitude, or the enjoyment of the benefit of an intended but
imperfectly created servitude.” Plymouth, 242 Mich App at 684, quoting Restatement of
Property, Servitudes, 3d, § 216. Thus, in this situation,
people try to create a servitude but fail, initially because they do not fully
articulate their intent or reduce their agreement to writing, or because they fail to
comply with some other formal requirement imposed in the jurisdiction. If they
proceed to act as though they have been successful in creating the servitude, and
continue to do so for the prescriptive period, the servitude is created by
prescription. [Id. at 685 (emphasis in original).]
However, the improper use of the easement must still be open and notorious and continued
without effective interruption for the prescriptive period. Id.
In this case, the record reflects that Richard and Krist senior intended for Krist senior to
possess the right to use the easement for maintaining docks, driving vehicles on the property,
mooring boats, and entertaining social guests, despite the fact that that intention was not reflected
in the easement. The document that created the imperfect servitude was executed on October 4,
1979. In addition, Krist senior’s use of the property continued without effective interruption for
at least 15 years. Thus, we conclude that since the alleged improper use of the easement was
open and notorious and continued without effective interruption for the prescriptive period of 15
years, Krist senior, and therefore Krist junior as well, had a prescriptive easement to conduct the
disputed activities.
We note that the doctrine of laches may bar plaintiffs’ claims in this case. Laches is an
equitable affirmative defense that is applicable where circumstances make it inequitable to grant
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relief to a plaintiff who unreasonably delays filing a claim. Yankee Springs Twp v Fox, 264
Mich App 604, 611; 692 NW2d 728 (2004). The unreasonable delay must cause a change in a
material condition, which results in prejudice. Id. at 612. The defendant bears the burden of
proving that a lack of due diligence by the plaintiff to file a claim caused him prejudice. Id. We
conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to whether laches barred
plaintiffs’ claims in this case. Nevertheless, resolution of any factual issues is unnecessary
because the trial court correctly granted defendants partial summary disposition for the reasons
already stated, and we affirm the trial court’s orders.
Finally, in reaching our conclusion, we have determined that the defense of equitable
estoppel is inapplicable in this case. An equitable estoppel arises when: (1) a party, by
representation, admissions, or silence, intentionally or negligently induces another party to
believe alleged facts, (2) the other party justifiably relies and acts on this belief, and (3) the other
party will be prejudiced if the first party is permitted to deny the existence of those alleged facts.
AFSCME Int’l Union v Bank One, 267 Mich App 281, 293; 705 NW2d 355 (2005). We
conclude that this defense does not apply in this case because defendants cannot establish the
first prong of the above-described test. Hence, the trial court’s decision was incorrect to the
extent that it may have provided that equitable estoppel existed in this case with regard to Jones.
Nevertheless, partial summary disposition was properly granted for the reasons discussed above.
Affirmed.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
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