ESTATE OF JOYCE A TREMBLAY V ROBERT BURGIN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ESTATE OF JOYCE A. TREMBLAY, by its
Personal Representative DEBORAH S. STRINE,
and DEBORAH S. STRINE, Individually,
DELORES A. HEMBOLT, SHARON L.
SIZEMORE, BARBARA J. TREMBLAY,
WINIFRED A. STEPHENS, and CAROL M.
ALLRED,
UNPUBLISHED
June 22, 2010
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
ROBERT BURGIN, Individually and as Trustee of
the J. GLEN BURGIN TRUST,
No. 289480
Antrim Circuit Court
LC No. 2008-008394-CH
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: MURRAY, P.J., and SAAD and M. J. KELLY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this suit to reform a deed, declare the rights of the parties to real property, and for
damages, plaintiffs Estate of Joyce A. Tremblay, Deborah S. Strine, Delores A. Hembolt, Sharon
L. Sizemore, Barbara J. Tremblay, Winifred A. Stephens, and Carol M. Allred appeal as of right
the trial court’s order dismissing their claims against Robert Burgin and the J. Glen Burgin Trust
as untimely. On appeal, the primary question is whether the 15-year period of limitations for
claims concerning title to real property applied to plaintiffs’ claims and whether the claims
accrued more than 15 years before plaintiffs filed the present suit. We conclude that the trial
court correctly determined that the 15-year period of limitations applied to all plaintiffs’ claims
and that the claims accrued in 1988. Because plaintiffs’ filed the present suit more than 15 years
after the date their claims accrued, the trial court properly dismissed the claims as untimely. For
that reason, we affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In October 1971, Bernice Tremblay (Bernice), as the survivor of “herself and Napoleon J.
Tremblay,” deeded by quitclaim deed 120 acres of property to herself and her son, Wilfred J.
Tremblay (Wilfred), as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship. The deed described
property that was located in Custer Township in Antrim County and included the southern half
of the north half of the southeast quarter of Section 22 and the entire northern half of the
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southwest quarter of Section 23. Thus, the deed conveyed 40 acres from Section 22 and 80 acres
from Section 23.
In June 1977, Bernice and Wilfred entered into a land contract with Northern Land
Company (Northern), which was listed as a partnership on the deed. J. Glen Burgin (Burgin)
signed as a partner on behalf of Northern. In the land contract, Bernice and Wilfred agreed to
sell Northern the southern half of the north half of the southeast quarter of Section 22 and the
northwest quarter of the southwest quarter of Section 23—that is, the 40 acre strip of land in
Section 22 and the western half of the 80 acres in Section 23 for a total of 80 acres. However,
the land contract provided that the sale only included one-half the oil and mineral rights. In
addition, the land contract provided that Bernice and Wilfred would provide warranty deeds for
portions of the land as Northern made payments according to a formula stated in the contract.
The land contract was recorded in the same month.
At various times after entering into the land contract, Bernice and Wilfred executed deeds
that conveyed some portion of the property covered by the land contract to Burgin individually.
The deeds referred to parcels that were approximately 10 acres in size. Each of these deeds
stated that the transfer included only one-half the gas, oil, and mineral rights. Bernice and
Wilfred executed one such deed—covering three parcels and about 30 acres—in August 1988.
In 1988, Bernice and Wilfred also executed a warranty deed that purported to convey all
the land covered by the land contract—including the parcels already conveyed—to Burgin. This
deed did not include a reservation of any gas, oil, or mineral rights. Bernice and Wilfred
“Signed” and “Delivered” the deed in the presence of Ross Hickman, Esquire, who also
notarized the deed, and Jana Lanning.
In February 1992, Bernice died. Plaintiffs, who are Bernice’s daughters, were the
residual beneficiaries under Bernice’s will. In March 1992, after Bernice died, someone
recorded the 1988 deed that conveyed all 80 acres of the land described in the land contract to
Burgin.
Beginning in 2001, two different drilling operators began to operate drilling units on the
land at issue. One operator operated the drilling unit that encompassed the land in Section 22
and another operated the unit in Section 23. The operator of the unit in Section 22 has been
paying one-half the royalties for the 40 acres purchased by Burgin to plaintiffs. However, the
operator of the unit in Section 23 has paid 100% of the royalties for the 40 acres purchased by
Burgin in that section directly to Burgin and his successors.
In July 2007, Joyce Tremblay, Barbara Walker, Delores Helmbolt and Strine sued their
brother Wilfred. In the complaint Strine alleged that she owned with Wilfred the 40 acres from
Section 23 that Bernice and Wilfred did not sell to Burgin and that Wilfred was wrongfully
excluding her from the property. Strine also requested her share of the gas, oil, and mineral
royalties paid on that property and plaintiffs collectively sought recovery of the royalties paid on
the one-half interest in the oil, gas, and mineral rights to the 40 acres in Section 23 that Bernice
and Wilfred sold to Burgin. They alleged that there “was and is an agreement, express and
implied, that [the plaintiffs] and their sisters would receive all revenues and other benefits from
the 50% of the mineral rights to [the] additional acreage . . . in Custer Township.”
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Wilfred entered into a partial consent judgment with his sisters. In the consent judgment,
Wilfred agreed that, since September 1977, the mineral interests in the 80 acres sold to Burgin
belong to plaintiffs in equal shares “except whatever interest was intended to be sold or
conveyed to [Burgin].” He also agreed that he “had and has no interest in same.” He also agreed
that he and Strine owned the mineral rights to the 40 acres that were not sold to Burgin in equal
shares since May 1986. The trial court signed the consent judgment in October 2007.
In June 2008 plaintiffs sued defendant Robert Burgin, individually as the sole heir of J.
Glen Burgin, and as the trustee of the J. Glen Burgin Trust. In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged
that they were the successors in interest to the 1977 land contract entered into between Bernice,
Wilfred, and Burgin on behalf of Northern. They further alleged that Bernice and Wilfred
executed the 1988 deed but that, as a result of mutual mistake or scrivener’s error, the deed did
not contain the reservation of oil, gas, and mineral rights contemplated under the land contract.
They indicated that defendants have been wrongfully accepting 100% of the royalty payments
for the 40 acres sold to Burgin in Section 23 notwithstanding defendants’ knowledge that
plaintiffs were entitled to one-half the royalties. This, plaintiffs claimed, amounted to unjust
enrichment and conversion. On the basis of these allegations, plaintiffs asked the trial court to
reform the 1988 deed to include a reservation of the oil, gas, and mineral rights to the 40 acres in
Section 23 that were sold by Bernice and Wilfred to Burgin in favor of plaintiffs. They also
asked the trial court to declare that plaintiffs were entitled to one-half the royalties previously
paid as well as one-half the royalties from any future royalty payments for that same property.
Finally, they asked the trial court to order defendants to pay treble damages for the royalties that
defendants wrongfully withheld.
Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) in August 2008. In
their motion, defendants argued that plaintiffs did not contest the validity of the 1988 deed;
rather, they only argued that, as a result of mistake, the deed did not include a reservation of oil,
gas, and mineral rights. Defendants argued that Bernice and Wilfred had 15 years from the date
they executed the 1988 deed in order to reform the deed or otherwise reclaim their interest in the
mineral rights. Because plaintiffs did not file the present suit within that time, their claims were
untimely.
The trial court agreed with defendants’ position and signed an opinion and order
dismissing plaintiff’s claims as untimely on October 9, 2008.
After the trial court denied their motion for reconsideration, plaintiffs appealed as of
right.
II. PERIOD OF LIMITATIONS
A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Plaintiffs first argue that the trial court erred when it concluded that MCL 600.5801
barred plaintiffs’ claims and, for that reason, granted defendants’ motion for summary
disposition under MCL 2.116(C)(7). Specifically, plaintiffs argue that, under the undisputed
evidence, their claims did not accrue until they had notice that they had been deprived of their
mineral rights, which did not occur until—at the earliest—2001. This Court reviews de novo a
trial court’s decision to grant summary disposition. Johnson Family Ltd Partnership v White
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Pine Wireless, LLC, 281 Mich App 364, 371; 761 NW2d 353 (2008). This Court also reviews de
novo the proper interpretation of statutes. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co v Corby Energy
Services, Inc, 271 Mich App 480, 483; 722 NW2d 906 (2006).
B. MCR 2.116(C)(7)
A party is entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) if the opposing
party’s claim or claims are barred under the applicable statute of limitations. The parties may
support or oppose a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) with affidavits,
depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence. Odom v Wayne Co, 482 Mich 459,
466; 760 NW2d 217 (2008); MCR 2.116(G). In reviewing motions under MCR 2.116(C)(7), this
Court will accept the plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true unless contradicted by
the parties’ supporting affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence.
Odom, 482 Mich at 466. This Court will construe the parties’ submission in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Alcona Co v Wolverine Environmental Production, Inc, 233
Mich App 238, 246; 590 NW2d 586 (1998). However, if no material facts are in dispute and
reasonable minds could not differ on the legal effect of those facts, whether the statute of
limitations bars the plaintiff’s claim is a matter of law for the Court. Guerra v Garratt, 222 Mich
App 285, 289; 564 NW2d 121 (1997).
C. ACCRUAL OF CLAIMS
The parties agree that MCL 600.5801(4) is the applicable period of limitations for
plaintiffs’ claim to reform the 1988 deed and declare the parties’ rights under that deed. See
Ross v Damm, 271 Mich 474, 483; 260 NW 750 (1935) (noting that an action to reform a deed
was not untimely because the 15 years period had not yet passed). This statute bars any action
“for the recovery or possession of any lands or [to] make entry upon any lands” if the claim is
not brought within 15 years after the claim first accrued. MCL 600.5801. The parties do not,
however, agree about when plaintiffs’ claims accrued. Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ claims
accrued in 1988 when Bernice and Wilfred executed and delivered the deed or when the deed
was recorded in 1992. Plaintiffs argue that their claims did not accrue until, at the earliest, 2001,
which is when defendants began to exercise the powers and privileges of ownership over the oil,
gas, and mineral rights on the disputed parcel. Plaintiffs argue that this is the case because they
were not disseised until that time.
The applicable period of limitation runs from the time the claim accrues. MCL 600.5827.
Under MCL 600.5829(1), a person’s right to make entry on and claim to recover land accrues at
the time of his or her disseisin. Generally, in cases involving an adverse deed, disseisin occurs
when the record owner receives notice of the adverse deed. Adams v Adams (On
Reconsideration), 276 Mich App 704, 720; 742 NW2d 399 (2007).
In the present case, it is undisputed that plaintiffs’ claim to the oil, gas, and mineral rights
derives from the ownership interests held in the disputed property by their predecessors, Bernice
and Wilfred Tremblay. However, it is also undisputed that Bernice and Wilfred Tremblay
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agreed to sell the land to Burgin under a land contract in 1977. Further, it is undisputed that
Bernice and Wilfred executed a deed in 1988 that purported to transfer full title to the property at
issue—including the oil, gas, and mineral rights—to Burgin and that he or his successors in
interest had actual possession of all the land at issue since that time.1 Thus, to the extent that the
1988 deed was a valid transfer, Bernice and Wilfred were disseised of any interest in the
properties when they executed the 1988 deed with the intent to perfect a conveyance of title.
Thus, whether they should be deemed to have been on constructive notice after the deed was
recorded in 1992 is of no significance under the facts of this case, because—in the absence of
any evidence of fraud—they clearly had actual notice of the 1988 deed when they executed it
and caused it to be delivered. See Adams, 276 Mich App at 720. Because Bernice and Wilfred’s
right to reform the 1988 deed based on mistake accrued when they executed it, plaintiffs’ claims
concerning the 1988 deed necessarily accrued at the same time. See MCL 600.5801(1) (stating
that a person’s claim accrues when it “first accrued to himself or to someone through whom he
claims.”). Moreover, there is no basis for tolling the accrual until the time when plaintiffs’
discovered the alleged mistake.
In cases involving mistakes in deeds, many jurisdictions follow the rule that a claim for
reformation does not accrue until the party claiming the mistake discovers or should have
discovered the alleged mistake. See Am Jur 2d, Reformation of Instruments, § 88, p 306. In
contrast, other jurisdictions follow the rule that one who executes a deed is charged with
knowledge of its content in the absence of fraud or other exceptional circumstances. See Law v
Law Co Bldg Associates, 42 Kan App 2d 278, 288-290; 210 P3d 676 (2009) (stating that, with
regard to the reformation of deeds, the action accrues when the deed is executed and not when
the mistake is discovered); Green Harbour Homeowners Ass’n, Inc v Ermiger, 50 AD 3d 1199,
1200-1201; 855 NYS 2d 295 (NY App Div, 2008) (stating that an action to reform a deed must
generally be commenced within six years of the time when the mistake was made except that the
period does not run against one in actual possession of the land in the absence of actual notice);
Overholt v Independent School Dst No. 2, 852 P2d 823, 826 (Okla App, 1993) (stating that the
grantor was on notice of the mistake as of the recording of the deed he executed); Troiano v
Troiano, 549 So2d 1053, 1056 (Fla App, 1989) (noting that fraudulent conduct will toll the
period of limitations until the mistake is discovered); Lee v Harris, 219 SW2d 892, 893 (Tenn,
1942) (refusing to apply discovery rule to applicable period of limitations in reformation cases
involving mistake because it “would be impossible under such circumstances for title to real
estate to ever become absolute and secure.”). Even in those states that have a discovery rule, the
rule is often limited where the mistake is one that would be plainly evident to one reading the
document; in such cases, the signatories are charged with knowledge of the mistake. See, e.g.,
Veterans Land Bd v Lesley, 281 SW3d 602, 624-625 (Tex App, 2009) (noting that Texas courts
generally apply the discovery rule for reformation based on mistake, but holding that, because
the mistakes were so plainly evident that the grantors should have known about the mistakes
1
We reject plaintiffs’ contention that Burgin and his successors could only be in possession of
the oil, gas, and mineral rights through actual exploitation of those rights. Once Burgin or his
successors took possession of the surface under color of a deed that purported to give them full
title to the surface and subsurface rights, that possession was sufficient.
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when they executed the deeds, the claim for reformation accrued when the deeds were executed).
Although no Michigan courts appear to have directly addressed whether a discovery rule applies
to actions to reform a deed based on mutual mistake, we are not at liberty to adopt any of these
exceptions.
In Trentadue v Buckler Sprinkler, 479 Mich 378, 386-394; 738 NW2d 664 (2007), our
Supreme Court examined the Revised Judicature Act and determined that only those tolling
methods codified in the act could be employed to toll the various periods of limitation:
Because the statutory scheme here is comprehensive, the Legislature has
undertaken the necessary task of balancing plaintiffs’ and defendants’ interests
and has allowed for tolling only where it sees fit. This is a power the Legislature
has because such a statute of limitations bears a reasonable relationship to the
permissible legislative objective of protecting defendants from stale or fraudulent
claims. Accordingly, the lower courts erred when they applied an extrastatutory
discovery rule to allow plaintiff to bring her claims . . . . [Id. at 392-393 (citation
omitted).]
Here, plaintiffs do not allege that Bernice and Wilfred were induced to execute the deed
through fraudulent or inequitable conduct or that defendants’ otherwise fraudulently concealed
the existence of the claim or the identity of any person who was liable. See MCL 600.5855.
And, as already noted, Bernice and Wilfred were on notice of the existence of the 1988 deed
after they executed it and caused it to be delivered—even if they were unaware of the alleged
mistake. Consequently, plaintiffs’ claim for reformation accrued when it accrued to their
predecessor’s in interest—that is, when Bernice and Wilfred executed the 1988 deed and caused
it to be delivered. MCL 600.5829(1).
D. DELIVERY
Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court erred to the extent that it determined that the 1988
deed was valid. Plaintiffs contend that there is no evidence that the deed was delivered in
Bernice’s lifetime and, therefore, it was void.
A deed takes effect from the time of its delivery, not from the date of its execution or
recording. Ligon v Detroit, 276 Mich App 120, 128; 739 NW2d 900 (2007). As plaintiffs
correctly note, a deed must be delivered within the lifetime of the grantors in order to be
effective. Hynes v Halstead, 282 Mich 627, 634; 276 NW 578 (1937). “The purpose of the
delivery requirement is to show the grantor’s intent to convey the property described in the
deed.” Energetics, Ltd v Whitmill, 442 Mich 38, 53; 497 NW2d 497 (1993). In order to show
delivery, there must be some evidence that the parties intended “that the deed should operate
presently to convey title.” Wandel v Wandel, 336 Mich 126, 132; 57 NW2d 468 (1953).
However, delivery does not necessarily require the transfer of physical possession of the deed;
rather, “it is that act of the grantor, indicated either by acts or words, or both, which shows an
intention on his part to perfect the transaction by a surrender of the instrument to the grantee, or
to some third person for his use and benefit.” Schmidt v Jennings, 359 Mich 376, 381; 102
NW2d 589 (1960), citing Hynes, 282 Mich 627. In examining whether deeds were delivered,
courts will look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the grantor intended the
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deed to convey the property. See Schultz v Silver, 323 Mich 454, 461; 35 NW2d 383 (1949);
Power v Palmer, 214 Mich 551, 559-561; 183 NW 199 (1921).
In this case, the undisputed evidence shows that plaintiffs’ predecessors in interest agreed
to sell the land at issue on land contract. Under the terms of that land contract, Bernice and
Wilfred Tremblay repeatedly executed and delivered deeds to portions of the property as
defendants’ predecessor in interest completed performance under the land contract. This process
apparently culminated in the execution of the final 1988 deed, which specifically transferred all
the property described in the land contract. The evidence that Bernice and Wilfred executed the
deed as part of this land contract is evidence that they did so with the intent to actually convey
the land at issue. Further, when Bernice and Wilfred executed the 1988 deed, Ross Hickman,
Esquire and Jana Lanning witnessed the deed under a caption noting that the deed was “Signed
and Delivered in [their] Presence.” Hence, this too is evidence that the 1988 deed was actually
delivered. Finally, although it is unclear who recorded the deed in 1992, the fact that the deed
was recorded permits an inference that it was either physically delivered to defendants’
predecessor in interest before Bernice died or that Bernice and Wilfred made arrangements for it
to be recorded prior to Bernice’s death.2 See Energetics, 442 Mich at 53 (stating that the
recording of a deed creates a presumption of delivery). Thus, the totality of this evidence
strongly supports the conclusion that Bernice and Wilfred executed and delivered the 1988 deed.
In contrast to this evidence, plaintiffs merely note that the 1988 deed does not reserve any
oil, gas, or mineral interests as required under the land contract. But this does not establish a
question of fact as to whether the 1988 deed was actually delivered. Rather, the parties may
have later orally agreed that Bernice and Wilfred would convey the property at issue without a
reservation of oil, gas, or mineral rights upon full completion of the land contract. In the
alternative, the parties may have intended to finalize their land contract with a warranty deed
covering the whole property, but inadvertently omitted the reservation. In either case, the fact
that there is no reservation in the 1988 deed does not permit an inference that Bernice and
Wilfred did not execute and deliver the deed. For the same reasons, plaintiffs’ speculation that
there was no need for a final transfer given that Bernice and Wilfred already transferred all the
individual lots also does not create a question of fact as to whether the 1988 deed was delivered;
the parties may have intended to execute a master deed to cover the entire transaction after
Burgin completed performance under the land contract and, indeed, may have intended to
transfer the rights now in dispute.
Plaintiffs failed to establish a question of fact concerning whether the 1988 deed was
actually delivered.
2
Even if the 1988 deed were delivered after Bernice’s death, it would still be effective as to
Wilfred. See, e.g., Thomson v Flint & Pere Marquette RR Co, 131 Mich 95; 90 NW 1037
(1902). Therefore, to the extent that Wilfred obtained full title to the property at issue as
Bernice’s survivor, the delivery of the deed after Bernice’s death was still effective to transfer
full title to the property at issue to Burgin and his successors, including the oil, gas, and mineral
rights.
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E. DECLARATORY RELIEF, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, AND CONVERSION
Plaintiffs also argue that their claims for unjust enrichment and conversion are not
covered by the period of limitations set forth in MCL 600.5801(4) and that the respective six and
three year periods of limitation applicable to these claims did not accrue until the drilling
operators began to make payments in 2001.
Unjust enrichment is an implied contract to pay a plaintiff for a benefit received by a
defendant where it would be inequitable not to pay. Belle Isle Grill Corp v City of Detroit, 256
Mich App 463, 478; 666 NW2d 271 (2003). “Conversion is any distinct act of dominion
wrongfully exerted over another’s personal property. It occurs at the point that such wrongful
dominion is asserted.” Trail Clinic, PC v Bloch, 114 Mich App 700, 705; 319 NW2d 638
(1982). However, “the gravamen of an action is determined by reading the complaint as a
whole, and by looking beyond mere procedural labels to determine the exact nature of the
claim.” Adams, 276 Mich App at 710-711. In this case, plaintiffs seek to reform the deed to
reserve to themselves and their predecessors in interest one-half of the oil and mineral rights
attributable to the 40 acres in Section 23. The unjust enrichment and conversion claims, which
seek to recover past and future proceeds from the mineral rights, are merely incidental and not
determinative of the nature of the action. See id. at 719. The gravamen of the complaint was to
reform the 1988 deed and effectively quiet title to the oil and mineral rights in Section 23. Thus,
the 15-year period of limitations applies and accrued when plaintiffs’ predecessors in interest
executed the 1988 deed.3
F. ESTOPPEL
Finally, we disagree with plaintiffs’ contention that the trial court erred when it failed to
address their argument that defendants should be precluded from asserting the period of
limitations under estoppel. This Court reviews de novo the proper application of legal doctrines,
including estoppel. See Madison Dist Pub Schools v Myers, 247 Mich App 583, 588; 637 NW2d
526 (2001). Even if we were to conclude that estoppel could apply to bar defendants from
asserting the period of limitations, plaintiffs would not be entitled to any relief because they
failed to present any admissible evidence to support their estoppel argument. The only evidence
plaintiffs submitted in support of their estoppel argument was an affidavit apparently made by
someone from plaintiffs’ lawyer’s office. Because the content of this affidavit was inadmissible,
it cannot be considered on a motion for summary disposition. Barnard Mfg, 285 Mich App at
373. Plaintiffs also argue that the fact that the 1988 deed was not recorded until 1992 supports
their estoppel argument. However, there is no record evidence detailing who recorded the 1988
3
We note that, even if plaintiffs’ claims for unjust enrichment and conversion could be said to be
timely, given that plaintiffs cannot now reform the 1988 deed, those claims must fail. When
Bernice and Wilfred executed and delivered the 1988 deed, they divested themselves of the oil,
gas, and mineral rights to the property at issue. As such, plaintiffs never had the right to any
royalties from either the Section 22 or Section 23 properties. Therefore, plaintiffs cannot
establish—as a matter of law—that defendants converted their property or were otherwise
unjustly enriched. See Belle Isle Grill, 256 Mich App at 478; Trail Clinic, 114 Mich App at 705.
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deed. Therefore, whatever inferences one might draw from the late recording, those inferences
cannot on the present record be attributed to defendants.
The trial court did not err in failing to consider plaintiffs’ estoppel argument.
G. CONCLUSION
The undisputed facts showed that Bernice and Wilfred executed the deed at issue in 1988
and that the deed was delivered at around that time. Because they had actual notice of the 1988
deed and there is no evidence of fraud, any claim that they or their successors may have had to
reform the deed based on mutual mistake accrued at the time they executed the deed. Here,
plaintiffs did not file their claims based on the mistaken omission of a reservation in the 1988
deed until 2008; hence, their claims were plainly barred under MCL 600.5801(4). The trial court
did not err when it dismissed their claims as untimely.
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
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