NANNETTE MARIE SZUKALA V ALAN DAVID SZUKALA
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
NANNETTE MARIE SZUKALA,
UNPUBLISHED
June 22, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
v
No. 289456
Muskegon Circuit Court
LC No. 07-034976-DO
ALAN DAVID SZUKALA,
Defendant-Appellant/CrossAppellee.
Before: MARKEY, P.J., and ZAHRA and GLEICHER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right, and plaintiff cross appeals by leave granted, from the trial
court’s judgment of divorce. We affirm.
I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
On appeal, both parties raise several issues challenging the trial court’s division of
property. The following factors should be considered by a trial court, as relevant, when
distributing the marital estate: (1) duration of the marriage, (2) contributions of the parties to the
marital estate, (3) ages of the parties, (4) health of the parties, (5) life status of the parties, (6)
necessities and circumstances of the parties, (7) earning abilities of the parties, (8) past relations
and conduct of the parties, and (9) general principles of equity. Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App
700, 717; 747 NW2d 336 (2008). The trial court’s division of property need not be equal, but it
must be equitable and any significant departure from congruence must be clearly explained. Id.
at 716-717.
On appeal, this Court must first review the trial court’s findings of fact for
clear error. A finding is clearly erroneous if, after a review of the entire record,
the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake was
made. The trial court’s factual findings are accorded substantial deference. If the
trial court’s findings of fact are upheld, this Court must decide whether the trial
court’s dispositional ruling was fair and equitable in light of those facts. This
Court will affirm the lower court’s discretionary ruling unless it is left with the
firm conviction that the division was inequitable. [Id. at 717-718 (citations
omitted).]
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In addition, we review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision whether to award
attorney fees in a divorce action, but the trial court’s findings underlying its decision are
reviewed for clear error. Reed v Reed, 265 Mich App 131, 164; 693 NW2d 825 (2005). We also
review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s determination of the proper time for valuation of
an asset. Gates v Gates, 256 Mich App 420, 427; 664 NW2d 231 (2003). “An abuse of
discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision falls outside the range of reasonable and
principled outcomes.” Smith v Smith, 278 Mich App 198, 207; 748 NW2d 258 (2008).
II. EDWARD JONES CREDIT CARD DEBT
Defendant argues that there was no basis for the trial court to find that the Edward Jones
credit card debt was his separate, premarital debt. When dividing property, a trial court must
first determine whether it is separate or marital. Reeves v Reeves, 226 Mich App 490, 493-494;
575 NW2d 1 (1997). Marital property can be divided, while separate property generally cannot.
Id. at 494. All property that has come to either party by reason of the marriage is considered
marital property. Byington v Byington, 224 Mich App 103, 110; 568 NW2d 141 (1997).
Conflicting testimony was presented regarding the source of the Edward Jones credit card
debt. Although defendant claimed that the debt was marital debt, generated after the parties were
married, plaintiff testified that the debt reflected defendant’s premarital debt, which was rolled
over to the new credit card. Defendant acknowledged having some premarital credit card debt,
but stated that he did not know how much. The trial court found plaintiff’s testimony regarding
this issue to be more credible. In light of plaintiff’s testimony, and giving deference to the trial
court’s credibility determination, Johnson v Johnson, 276 Mich App 1, 11; 739 NW2d 877
(2007), we find no clear err in the trial court’s assignment of the Edwards Jones credit card debt
as defendant’s separate, premarital debt.
III. LAWN MOWER
Defendant next argues the trial court erred in awarding plaintiff $500 in exchange for
defendant being awarded the couple’s riding lawn mower. Defendant maintains the award
cannot logically be justified given the evidence presented in regard to the value of the mower. It
appears the mower was purchased on plaintiff’s Home Depot credit card with $1000 down and a
minimum payment of $50 due monthly. While the divorce was pending, defendant had
possession of and used the mower and plaintiff made the monthly payments. Given this fact, as
well as the overall mass of the property division, we decline to fly speck the trial court’s award
in regard to this particular matter. In short, given the overall property division, the manner by
which the mower was purchased and paid for during these proceedings, and relatively minor
amount in controversy, we cannot find clear error in the trial court’s disposition of this chattel.
IV. PERSONAL PROPERTY AWARDS
Defendant challenges the trial court’s decision to award plaintiff $7,500 to allow her to
acquire home furnishings that she disposed of before the marriage, and plaintiff challenges the
trial court’s refusal to award her certain personal property items in defendant’s possession, or the
equivalent value of those items.
The trial court recognized that the parties presented conflicting testimony regarding what
items may have been taken from the marital home and who took the items. The court awarded
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the parties the property in their possession, but also awarded plaintiff $7,500 to be used to
purchase replacement household items, which it believed was justified “in light of the fact that
[plaintiff] was encouraged to discard household furnishings she had before the marriage.”
Although defendant argues that the $7,500 award was inappropriate because plaintiff voluntarily
disposed of her property before their marriage, we find no clear error in the trial court’s
determination that defendant encouraged plaintiff to dispose of her premarital furnishings.
Further, the trial court implicitly found that plaintiff did not take sufficient property from the
marital home to furnish a new home. Plaintiff argues on cross appeal that the trial court erred by
failing to award her half the marital personal property, or its equivalent value, that defendant
admittedly retained. According to plaintiff’s estimations, the items admittedly retained by
defendant had an estimated value of $5,524, not including the lawn mower and its corresponding
debt.
Considering the circumstances involving plaintiff’s premarital disposition of her home
furnishings, and the value of the disputed property that remained in defendant’s possession, we
conclude that the trial court’s decision to allow defendant to retain the property in his possession,
while granting plaintiff a credit of $7,500 to allow her to acquire her own home furnishings, was
equitable. Accordingly, we uphold those decisions.
V. 2007 INCOME TAXES
Defendant argues that the trial court’s decision to require the parties to file a joint tax
return for 2007 is inequitable because plaintiff did not live in or contribute to the marital
household for the entire year and, therefore, she should not receive the benefits of the household
tax deductions. We disagree.
In 2007, the parties were married for the entire year. During the six months that plaintiff
lived in the house, her contributions were essentially the same before and after filing for divorce.
Even after plaintiff moved out of the marital home, she still paid marital bills that were in her
name. Further, the trial court observed that plaintiff did not receive full tax benefits in 2006,
because defendant filed his tax return separately. Under the circumstances, the trial court’s
decision to require the parties to file a joint tax return for 2007 was equitable.
VI. VALUATION OF MARITAL HOME
Defendant argues that because of the declining housing market, the trial court should
have valued the parties’ marital home at a time closer to when the judgment was entered rather
than accept the parties’ stipulation regarding value, which was made on the first day of trial in
October 2007. We disagree. For the purposes of dividing property, marital assets are typically
valued at the time of trial or the time judgment is entered, although the court may, in its
discretion, use a different date. Byington, 224 Mich App at 114 n 4.
In this case, on the first day of trial, the parties stipulated to the value of the marital
home. Plaintiff was entitled to rely on that stipulation. Defendant did not attempt to set aside the
stipulation or otherwise put plaintiff on notice that he intended to offer conflicting evidence of
value. Further, defendant’s valuation evidence was based on an appraisal, the accuracy of which
plaintiff disputed and which the trial court refused to admit into evidence. Under the
circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in accepting the parties’ stipulation to
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determine the value of the home. The trial court’s decision to divide the home’s negative equity
equally also was equitable.
VII. ATTORNEY FEES
“In domestic relations cases, attorney fees are authorized by both statute, MCL 552.13,
and court rule, MCR 3.206(C),” but they are not recoverable as of right. Reed, 265 Mich App at
164. They may be awarded only when a party needs financial assistance to prosecute or defend
the lawsuit. Id. The trial court found that plaintiff was in need of financial assistance based on
her limited income and because she was not awarded any income-producing marital property.
Further, there was also evidence that during the proceedings plaintiff cashed in CDs to pay for
household expenses. These were funds that otherwise could have been used to prosecute the
lawsuit. Because the attorney’s bill appears fair and appropriate, the trial court was not required
to conduct a separate hearing over the reasonableness of the attorney’s $4,000 bill. The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in awarding plaintiff attorney fees.
VIII. MARITAL HOME EQUITY
In dividing the marital home, the trial court determined the parties’ respective
contributions of premarital funds to the purchase of the home. The court stated that defendant
purchased the lot on which the home was built for $44,415. The evidence does indicate that
defendant purchased the lot with a loan for $40,000, without mentioning costs to originate the
loan. Regardless, when defendant’s premarital home sold, he used the proceeds to pay off the
remaining loan balance. Thus, regardless of the price of the lot, defendant took out a loan that
was repaid, and the amount of surplus was not disputed. Accordingly, any mistake in regard to
the lot price by the trial court was harmless.
IX. HONDA ELEMENT
The trial court found that plaintiff’s Honda Element was purchased with $10,000 of
marital funds. Plaintiff argues on cross appeal that she purchased this vehicle using $17,445 of
her separate funds, consisting of $2,900 from the sale of her premarital vehicle, $4,545 from a
gift from her father, and $10,000 from her parents as an early inheritance. Property acquired by
gift or inheritance is generally considered a separate asset, but may be considered marital
property where it is commingled with marital property, or otherwise contributed to the marital
household. Pickering v Pickering, 268 Mich App 1, 13-14; 706 NW2d 835 (2005).
Plaintiff admitted that the $2,900 profit from the sale of her premarital vehicle was
deposited into the parties’ joint checking account and used for marital expenses. Thus, the trial
court did not err in finding that this money was marital property that was not part of the Honda
down payment. Conflicting testimony was presented regarding the $4,545 check from plaintiff’s
father, whether the money was intended as a separate gift, and whether the money was used as
part of the down payment on the Honda. Plaintiff admitted that the money was deposited in the
parties’ joint bank account, and defendant denied that it was intended as a gift. Given the
conflicting testimony that was presented, and giving deference to the trial court’s credibility
determinations, we cannot conclude that the trial court clearly erred in finding that the $4,545
was marital property and was not part of the Honda down payment.
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Lastly, conflicting testimony was presented with regard to whether the 2005 Christmas
check from plaintiff’s parents for $10,000 was written in the names of both parties, or only
plaintiff. Further, it is undisputed that the check was deposited into the parties’ joint bank
account, and that the Honda was not purchased until several months later, in April 2006. Thus,
the evidence did not clearly establish the $10,000 gift as the source of the Honda down payment.
Given this record, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the $10,000 down payment on
the Honda was made with marital funds.
X. WASHINGTON MUTUAL CREDIT CARD DEBT
Plaintiff argues on cross appeal that the Washington Mutual (“WaMu”) credit card debt
should have been assigned to defendant because the majority of the debt was attributable to
expenses to assist defendant’s son. At trial, plaintiff testified that the WaMu credit card debt
consisted of $1,356 in martial debt and $3,623 in debt attributable to defendant’s son.1 By
characterizing only part of the debt as marital debt, plaintiff essentially contends that the
remaining debt is defendant’s separate debt. However, both parties testified that they gave
marital funds to their children at various times during their marriage and plaintiff represented
that the money was owed “to us.” Moreover, all of the WaMu debt was accumulated during the
parties’ marriage. By assigning the debt to plaintiff, the trial court implicitly found that all of the
WaMu debt was marital debt. That finding is not clearly erroneous. Further, the debt
assignment was not inequitable considering the assignment of other debt to defendant.
XI. CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT
Plaintiff also argues on cross appeal that the trial court erred in treating certificates of
deposit (“CDs”) that were in the names of plaintiff and her daughter, and the funds that plaintiff
received from cashing in those CDs, as marital property. Plaintiff argues that the CDs were
neither marital property nor her separate property, but rather belonged to her daughter, and that
the funds she received from cashing in the CDs to pay for household expenses were in essence a
loan from her daughter.
Testimony was presented that the funds in the CDs were comprised of monies plaintiff
received as child support payments for her daughter or monetary gifts intended for her daughter.
Regardless of their source, the money became marital property when plaintiff took possession of
the funds, commingled it with the parties’ joint checking account funds, and used it to pay for
household expenses. Pickering, 268 Mich App at 13-14. Therefore, the trial court did not
clearly err in finding that the cashed-in CD funds were marital property.
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Plaintiff calculated the $3,623 amount by subtracting the outstanding loan amounts her children
allegedly owed the parties from the total amount of the outstanding loans defendant’s son
allegedly owed the parties, and then dividing the number in half. Thus, the amount did not
represent the actual portion of the WaMu debt used to assist defendant’s son, which plaintiff
represented was $4,304.
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Defendant also argues that his demand for reimbursement of the value of the cashed-in
CDs should not have been considered a “wash” with plaintiff’s request for reimbursement for
household bills that she purportedly paid. To the extent that defendant seeks a decision more
favorable than that granted by the trial court with respect to this issue, rather than merely
advancing an alternative basis for affirming the trial court’s decision on this matter, his request is
not properly before this Court because he failed to raise it in his direct appeal and an appellee
may not seek a more favorable decision without filing a cross appeal. See Cheron, Inc v Don
Jones, Inc, 244 Mich App 212, 221; 625 NW2d 93 (2000). Thus, defendant is not entitled to
affirmative relief with respect to this issue.
Affirmed. Neither party may tax costs.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
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