PEOPLE OF MI V MARCO ANTONIO HERCULES-LOPEZ
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 22, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 280887
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 06-000220-FC
MARCO ANTONIO HERCULES-LOPEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
ON REMAND
Before: MARKEY, P.J., MURPHY, C.J., and BORRELLO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of armed robbery, MCL 750.529,
conspiracy to commit armed robbery, MCL 750.157a, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent
prison terms of 10 to 27 years for the robbery conviction and 9 to 27 years for the conspiracy
conviction, to be served consecutively to a two-year term of imprisonment for the felony-firearm
conviction. In defendant’s appeal by right, a majority of this Court held that structural error
occurred when the trial court, in the absence of defense counsel, responded to a question by the
jury while it was deliberating by providing a hand-written supplemental instruction regarding the
conspiracy charge. People v Hercules-Lopez, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of
Appeals, issued June 30, 2009 (Docket No. 280887). Our Supreme Court reversed this Court
“for the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals dissenting opinion” and remanded this case “for
consideration of the issues raised by the defendant but not addressed by that court during its
initial review of this case.” People v Hercules-Lopez, 485 Mich 1118 (2010). We now affirm.
This case arose from a robbery of a supermarket in Grand Rapids. Defendant admitted
that he acted as a lookout while another person committed the robbery but maintained that he did
so in order to acquire information that might be used against the robber and the getaway driver,
the two of whom defendant thought responsible for other robberies in the area. The trial court
initially instructed the jury regarding defendant’s claims when it read all of the instructions to the
jury in the presence of defense counsel, stating in pertinent part:
You need to understand that it is no defense which excuses criminal
behavior that a defendant acted, if you find that he did, for purposes of helping the
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police. That can, in very limited circumstances, be a defense but only in two
circumstances and they’re not even claimed here.
***
So what you’ve got to decide is did he participate in the crimes in ways
that satisfied the statute, but there is no excuse or justification or over-arching
defense for the fact that he claims he did it to help the police because he doesn’t
even claim he did it in the way that would make that a defense.
***
Like I said yesterday, to prove that kind of a charge [conspiracy] with the
evidence presented at this trial, all of it taken as a whole, has to do is convince
you that Mr. Hercules-Lopez agreed with somebody else to commit an armed
robbery. [Hercules-Lopez, unpub op at 2 (MURPHY, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).]
While the jury was deliberating, it asked the trial court, “Does [defendant’s] intent, goals,
thoughts, change any verbal agreement that he may have made to commit a crime
(conspiracy)[?]” The trial court asked the clerk to summon the prosecutor and defense counsel;
the prosecutor soon returned to the courtroom, but the clerk was unable to reach defense counsel.
After a 15-minute wait, the trial court decided to respond to the jury’s question in the absence of
defense counsel by writing an answer on the jury’s note which read, “If the defendant actually
agreed with another to commit a crime, it does not matter why he agreed.” Defense counsel
arrived within minutes of the note’s being given to the jury and was informed of its contents on
the record while the jury was still deliberating. She raised no objection.
On appeal, defendant challenged the supplemental instruction on the conspiracy charge
on the grounds that it was an ex parte communication with the jury prohibited by court rule,1 that
structural error occurred in its delivery to the jury in the absence of counsel, and that it did not
accurately state the law. Defendant also argued that the prosecutor presented insufficient
evidence to sustain his conviction on the conspiracy charge, and that if that conviction were
reversed, the sentencing guidelines would change requiring that defendant be resentenced on his
conviction for committing armed robbery.
In our prior opinion, this Court unanimously rejected defendant’s challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence regarding the conspiracy charge. Hercules-Lopez, unpub op.
Because our Supreme Court denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal regarding this
Court’s opinion on this issue, it is therefore the law of case.
1
Defendant cites MCR 6.414(A) but it is clear defendant refers to MCR 6.414(B), which
provides in pertinent part regarding a trial court’s responsibilities: “The court may not
communicate with the jury or any juror pertaining to the case without notifying the parties and
permitting them to be present.”
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Although the majority in our prior decision found structural error in the trial court’s
providing the supplemental instruction to the jury in the absence of counsel, Chief Judge Murphy
opined that reversal was not warranted because the provision of the supplemental instruction did
not constitute a critical stage of proceedings when “the absence of counsel did not threaten to
harm defendant’s right to a fair.” Hercules-Lopez, unpub op at 3 (MURPHY, C.J., concurring and
dissenting). Chief Judge Murphy reasoned that the supplemental instruction was substantially
similar or repetitive of instructions the trial court had given earlier in the presence of counsel,
and therefore, providing the supplemental instruction to the jury in the absence of counsel was
not a critical stage of the proceedings. Id. at 3-4, citing Hudson v Jones, 351 F3d 212 (CA 6,
2003). Chief Judge Murphy also observed that “it is difficult to conclude that defendant was
deprived of counsel on the matter or that a critical stage was involved, given that counsel
returned to the courtroom while deliberations were still progressing, that counsel was informed
of what transpired relative to the note and the court’s instruction, and that counsel took no steps
whatsoever to challenge the court’s action or to suggest a different or more appropriate response,
which could still have been given to the jurors during continuing deliberations.” HerculesLopez, unpub op at 4 (MURPHY, C.J., concurring and dissenting). Given our Supreme Court’s
adoption of this reasoning, it too is the law of case. Hercules-Lopez, 485 Mich 1118.
Regarding defendant’s challenge to the substantive accuracy of the supplemental
instruction, because he did not object at trial, defendant must establish plain error affected his
substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). “Reversal is
warranted only when the plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent
defendant or when an error seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings’ independent of the defendant’s innocence.” Id. (internal quotations and
citation omitted). We adopt Chief Judge Murphy’s prior opinion, finding that the substance of
the supplemental instruction did not violate defendant’s substantial rights:
With respect to the legal soundness of the court’s response to the jury’s
note, the law provides that one who is a government informer or police officer
and only feigns participation in a criminal enterprise may not be convicted of
conspiracy. People v Smyders, 398 Mich 635, 640; 248 NW2d 156 (1976);
People v Atley, 392 Mich 298, 311-312; 220 NW2d 465 (1974), overruled on
other grounds in People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417; 646 NW2d 158 (2002);
People v Barajas, 198 Mich App 551, 558-559; 499 NW2d 396 (1993), aff’d 444
Mich 556 (1994). However, there was no factual dispute that defendant was not
an informer, officer, or working on behalf of the police; therefore calling into
question the relevancy of his motivation or reasoning for agreeing to the armed
robbery predicated on the claim that he was doing so to help the police. I do note
that a “[c]onspiracy is a specific-intent crime, because it requires both the intent to
combine with others and the intent to accomplish the illegal objective.” People v
Mass, 464 Mich 615, 629; 628 NW2d 540 (2001). “[T]here must be proof
demonstrating that the parties specifically intended to further, promote, advance,
or pursue an unlawful objective.” People v Justice (After Remand), 454 Mich
334, 347; 562 NW2d 652 (1997). Defendant only argues that the supplemental
instruction misstated the law, without any express argument presented that the
initial instructions on the crime of conspiracy were incorrect, even though they
are consistent with the supplemental instruction. Regardless, assuming any
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mistake in the court’s instructions, I cannot conclude, given the overwhelming
evidence of guilt, that it affected defendant’s substantial rights, nor that defendant
is actually innocent or that the integrity of the proceedings was compromised
independent of defendant’s guilt or innocence. [Hercules-Lopez, unpub op at 4-5
(MURPHY, C.J., concurring and dissenting).]
For much the same reasoning, we conclude that if the trial court’s providing the jury with
the supplemental instruction in the absence of defense counsel violated MCR 6.414(B), prejudice
to defendant’s substantial rights did not occur so as to warrant reversal. MCR 6.414(B) states
that a court “may not communicate with the jury or any juror pertaining to the case without
notifying the parties and permitting them to be present.” In reviewing the application of this
court rule, our Supreme Court in People v France, 436 Mich 138, 142-144; 461 NW2d 621
(1990), defined three types of ex parte communication between a court and a jury and identified
the corresponding level of prejudice that has to be shown in order to require reversal, rejecting
the previous rule of automatic reversal. “[B]efore a reviewing court can make a determination
regarding the prejudicial effect of an ex parte communication, it must first categorize the
communication into one of three categories: substantive, administrative, or housekeeping.” Id.
at 163. Here, the ex parte supplemental instruction was a substantive communication, which is
presumed to be prejudicial. The France Court opined:
Substantive communication encompasses supplemental instructions on the
law given by the trial court to a deliberating jury. A substantive communication
carries a presumption of prejudice in favor of the aggrieved party regardless of
whether an objection is raised. The presumption may only be rebutted by a firm
and definite showing of an absence of prejudice. France, 436 Mich at 143
(emphasis in original).]
For the reasons already discussed, on the facts of this case, we conclude that defendant
was definitely not prejudiced as result of the trial court’s providing an ex parte supplemental
instruction to the jury. Indeed, the France Court essentially described this case as an example of
an ex parte supplemental instruction that is definitely not prejudicial. The Court noted that “[t]he
prosecution may rebut the presumption of prejudice with a showing that the instruction was
merely a recitation of an instruction originally given without objection, and that it was placed on
the record.” Id. at 163 n 34. Consequently, we conclude that defendant has not established that
the trial court’s violation of MCR 6.414(B) affected his substantial rights. Carines, 460 Mich at
763.
The last issue defendant raises that we have not previously addressed is his claim for
resentencing on his armed robbery conviction should his conspiracy conviction be reversed.
Because we have concluded that error warranting reversal did not occur regarding defendant’s
conspiracy conviction, defendant’s last argument is moot.
We affirm.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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