PEOPLE OF MI V TESHARRA LASANDRA SMITH
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 17, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 291177
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 07-001590-FH
TESHARRA LASANDRA SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: FORT HOOD, P.J., and BORRELLO and STEPHENS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right from her conviction for first-degree child abuse, MCL
750.136b(2). Defendant was sentenced to serve 50 to 180 months in prison. Defendant’s
conviction stems from the physical abuse of her daughter, who was 17 months old at the time of
the incident in question. We affirm.
On appeal, defendant challenges the sentencing court’s scoring of offense variable (OV)
7 and OV 4. “A sentencing court has discretion in determining the number of points to be
scored, provided that evidence of record adequately supports a particular score.” People v
Hornsby, 251 Mich App 462, 468; 650 NW2d 700 (2002). Thus, we review the scoring to
determine whether the sentencing court properly exercised its discretion and whether the
evidence adequately supported a particular score. People v Steele, 283 Mich App 472, 490; 769
NW2d 256 (2009).
Defendant first argues that the sentencing court erred in scoring OV 7 at 50 points
because it relied on defendant’s conduct that occurred after the sentencing offense was complete.
We disagree. OV 7 covers aggravated physical abuse, and 50 points is appropriate if the “victim
was treated with sadism, torture, or excessive brutality or conduct designed to substantially
increase the fear and anxiety a victim suffered during the offense.” MCL 777.37(1)(a).
“Sadism” is defined as “conduct that subjects a victim to extreme or prolonged pain or
humiliation and is inflicted to produce suffering or for the offender’s gratification.” MCL
777.37(3). “Excessive brutality” is not statutorily defined. “[W]hen terms are not expressly
defined by a statute, a court may consult dictionary definitions.” People v Denio, 454 Mich 691,
699; 564 NW2d 13 (1997).
-1-
Contrary to defendant’s assertion, there is no indication that the sentencing court relied
on conduct after the crime was completed as a basis for scoring OV 7. The primary definition of
“brutality” found in The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1996) is, “The
state or quality of being ruthless, cruel, harsh, or unrelenting.” “Excessive” means “[e]xceeding
a normal, usual, reasonable, or proper limit.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language (1996). Presuming as axiomatic that in the context of child abuse no brutality is
properly characterized as reasonable or proper, or normal in the sense that it is not typical of the
population as a whole, excessively brutal conduct is understood to be that which exceeds the
norm for child abusers.
The sentencing court specifically stated that the lacerated frenulum and neck bruising
showed evidence of choking, an action that it considered to be excessively brutal. The court
prefaced this finding by linking it to what the prosecutor had just argued, i.e., that the lacerated
liver and broken femur was evidence of excessive brutality. In context, the court agreed with the
prosecutor and noted that additional injuries likewise supported a finding of excessive brutality
with respect to the infliction of the child’s numerous physical injuries. Infliction of all of these
injuries constituted conduct occurring within the sentencing offense, People v McGraw, 484
Mich 120, 127; 771 NW2d 655 (2009), and supported the scoring of 50 points for OV 7,
Hornsby, 251 Mich App at 468.1
Defendant also argues that the sentencing court erred when it scored OV 4 at 10 points
based on speculation that the child would suffer psychological injury in the future. We agree,
but conclude that defendant is not entitled to resentencing because a correction of the total OV
score would not result in a different recommended sentence range. People v Francisco, 474
Mich 82, 89 n 8; 711 NW2d 44 (2006).
In sum, the record supports a score of 50 points for OV 7, but does not support a score of
10 points for OV 4. However, defendant is not entitled to resentencing because a correction of
the total OV score would not result in a different recommended sentence range.
Defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed. We remand for the ministerial task of
modifying defendant’s OV score in accordance with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
1
Defendant also points to the sentencing court’s statement that it “consider[ed] the overall
circumstances” in scoring OV 7 at 50 as evidence that the sentencing court considered conduct
after the crime was completed. Given that the sentencing court first articulated specific instances
of abuse that it considered excessive brutality, its subsequent statement that it was considering
the overall circumstances does not create error.
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.