ESTATE OF LISA LOTHAMER V GMAC INSURANCE CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
NATIONAL GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
UNPUBLISHED
June 15, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
HOME-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY,
No. 291131
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 07-003127-CK
Defendant-Appellant,
and
JOHN BECKETT, Personal Representative of the
ESTATE OF LISA LOTHAMER,
Defendant.
JOHN BECKETT, Personal Representative of the
ESTATE OF LISA LOTHAMER,
Plaintiff,
v
No. 291132
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 07-003159-NF
GMAC INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant,
and
NATIONAL GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
HOME-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY,
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Defendant-Appellant.
Before: OWENS, P.J., and O’CONNELL and TALBOT, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In Docket No. 291132, Linda Lothamer (Lothamer), now deceased, sued National
General Insurance Company (National General) and Home-Owners Insurance Company (HomeOwners) seeking personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under the no-fault act, MCL
500.3101 et seq. In Docket No. 291131, National General sued Home-Owners seeking a
declaration that Home-Owners was in the highest order of priority under the no-fault act and
therefore responsible for the PIP benefits. After the cases were consolidated, the circuit court
issued an order granting National General’s motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10) and denying Home-Owners’ motion for summary disposition. Home-Owners
appeals as of right. This Court consolidated the appeals, and we now affirm.
On May 7, 2006, Lothamer was injured in an automobile accident in Tampa, Florida.
She was a passenger in a vehicle owned and operated by Robert Lamphere, which was insured
by National General. Lothamer had apparently been living with Lamphere before she came to
Florida. However, at the time of the accident, Lothamer was living in Florida at the mobile
home of her mother, Brenda Lowe. She initially came for a visit with Lowe but decided to stay
in Florida. She obtained employment, opened a bank account, and continued to live with Lowe,
which she intended to do until she found more permanent housing. She had not changed her
driver’s license to reflect a new address, but received some of her mail at Lowe’s residence.
Lothamer was to begin a job in a new city on the day following the accident and was in the
process of looking for an apartment. According to Lowe, however, at the time of the accident
Lothamer had no other place to live.
Home-Owners was the insurer of a vehicle owned by Lowe. It is undisputed that under
MCL 500.3114, National General would be liable for Lothamer’s PIP benefits unless Lothamer
was domiciled in Lowe’s household. The trial court concluded that Lothamer was domiciled
with Lowe. It noted that Lowe’s home was not a permanent residence but that Lothamer stayed
nowhere else. Further, the court stated that there “was no end date” to this living arrangement
and that Lothamer’s plan was to live there indefinitely until she found a permanent residence.
The court concluded that Lowe’s home was Lothamer’s domicile for an indefinite length of time.
We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(10). In evaluating such a motion, a trial court must consider affidavits,
pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties in the light most
favorable to the opposing party. Cervantes v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co, 272 Mich App 410, 413;
726 NW2d 73 (2006). If the proffered evidence does not establish a genuine issue regarding any
material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The determination
of domicile is typically a question of fact, but where the underlying facts are not in dispute,
domicile is a question of law for the court. Fowler v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 254 Mich App 362,
364; 656 NW2d 856 (2002). “[T]his Court will not reverse the trial court’s determination unless
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the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite direction.” Goldstein v Progressive Cas Ins
Co, 218 Mich App 105, 111; 553 NW2d 353 (1996).
In Beecher v Common Council of Detroit, 114 Mich 228, 231; 72 NW 206 (1897),
quoting Jacobs, Law of Domicile, § 378, the Court held:
“A removal which does not contemplate an absence from the former domicile for
an indefinite and uncertain time is not a change of it. But when there is a
removal, unless it can be shown or inferred from circumstances that it was for
some particular purpose, expected to be only of a temporary nature, or in the
exercise of some particular profession, office, or calling, it does change the
domicile. The result is that the place of residence is prima facie the domicile,
unless there be some motive for that residence not inconsistent with a clearlyestablished intention to retain a permanent residence in another place.”
[Emphasis added.]
A fundamental tenet of domicile is that an individual can only have one domicile, but he must
have a domicile somewhere. Id. at 230. Moreover, a person’s “‘existing domicile continues
until he acquires another, and, vice versa, by acquiring a new domicile he relinquishes his former
one.’” Id., quoting Cooley, Taxation (2d ed), p 369. Domicile has also been characterized as
“that place where a person ‘has voluntarily fixed his abode not for a mere special or temporary
purpose, but with a present intention of making it his home, either permanently or for an
indefinite or unlimited length of time.’” Henry v Henry, 362 Mich 85, 101-102; 106 NW2d 570
(1960), quoting Williams v North Carolina, 325 US 226, 236; 65 S Ct 1092; 89 L Ed 1577
(1945) (emphasis added).
In Workman v DAIIE, 404 Mich 477, 496-497; 274 NW2d 373 (1979), the Court set forth
four factors to be considered in determining a person’s domicile:
(1) the subjective or declared intent of the person of remaining, either
permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time, in the place he
contends is his “domicile” or “household”; (2) the formality or informality of the
relationship between the person and the members of the household; (3) whether
the place where the person lives is in the same house, within the same curtilage or
upon the same premises; [and] (4) the existence of another place of lodging by the
person alleging “residence” or “domicile” in the household[.] [Internal citations
omitted.]
“[N]o one factor is, in itself, determinative; instead, each factor must be balanced and weighed
with the others.” Id. at 496. In Dairyland Ins Co v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 123 Mich App 675,
682; 333 NW2d 322 (1983), this Court identified other factors indicative of domicile that were
specific to young adults transitioning out of their parents’ home: (1) whether the claimant used
the parents’ home as his mailing address; (2) whether the claimant kept some of his possessions
with the parents; (3) whether the claimant used the parents’ address on his driver’s license or
other documents; (4) whether a room was maintained for the claimant; and (5) whether the
claimant was dependent on his parents for support.
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Regardless whether she was welcome to return to Lamphere’s home, the evidence
indicates that Lothamer relinquished Lamphere’s residence as her home when she decided to
stay in Florida. Lothamer said that she lived at Lowe’s residence, although she did not intend to
stay there forever, and Lothamer and Lowe did, in fact, live in the same house. Lothamer was
not merely at Lowe’s house for a special occasion or visiting for some temporary purpose, such
as a vacation, but was staying there indefinitely. Further, Lothamer did not sign a rental
agreement or otherwise enter into a formal agreement with Lowe; Lowe was simply letting her
daughter live with her for as long as she wanted. Although Lothamer may have had a place to
stay in Michigan, although she had no intent of returning to the state, she had no other place to
stay in Florida, where she was working and where she planned to live. Lothamer used Lowe’s
address for some of her mail and kept her clothes there; she kept the rest of her belongings in a
Florida storage unit. She had not yet changed her driver’s license but used Lowe’s address on an
employment application and to open a bank account. She had exclusive use of a bedroom while
she was there. Finally, she made her own money but was at least partially dependent on Lowe;
i.e., Lowe provided lodging and transportation. There was no evidence that Lothamer was
receiving financial assistance from anyone else.
Based on these facts, the evidence does not clearly preponderate against the trial court’s
conclusion that Lothamer intended to make Lowe’s residence her home indefinitely until a more
permanent situation developed and that, as a result, Lothamer was domiciled with Lowe. See
Dobson v Maki, 184 Mich App 244, 252-254; 457 NW2d 132 (1990). Accordingly, HomeOwners, as the insurer of Lowe’s vehicle, was in the highest order of priority for purposes of
paying Lothamer’s PIP benefits.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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