IN RE MORGADO MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
__________________________________________
UNPUBLISHED
June 10, 2010
In the Matter of MORGADO, Minors.
No.
295186
Cass Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 08-000139-NA
Before: OWENS, P.J., and O’CONNELL and TALBOT, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent Brenda Morgado appeals as of right from an order that terminated her
parental rights to her minor twin children pursuant to MCL712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We
affirm.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination of
respondent’s parental rights were established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Trejo, 462
Mich 341, 355; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). The children were removed in October 2008 after
respondent left them with her mother, Alice Brown, in order to go see a movie, but then failed to
return for five days. Brown could not properly care for the children because of her own physical
infirmities. Her home was without running water, and she had no legal authority to take the
children to the doctor. Although Brown testified that she believed respondent was a good
mother, even she admitted that respondent had not provided an adequate explanation for her
whereabouts during that time. Respondent originally told the caseworkers that she had been hit
on the head outside of an eating establishment and “blacked out.” She stayed with a friend for
two days and lost her cell phone, so she could not call her mother. At the time of the termination
hearing, however, respondent’s account of what happened was completely different. She
testified that she was effectively held hostage by Scott Shepard, the children’s putative father.
Before the termination hearing, respondent never told anyone this version of events, although she
was asked frequently what happened. Respondent’s lack of candor severely limited her ability to
benefit from services. Truthfulness and accountability were paramount in order to allow
respondent to understand how her actions affected her children and their well-being.
Respondent initially complied with a psychological evaluation in November 2008. This
was a promising first step, as the adjudication and disposition did not take place until December
2008. However, even though the psychologist recommended that respondent immediately begin
individual therapy, respondent did not contact the office until March 2009. Respondent then
missed the first appointment and her treatment did not begin until May 2009 -- six months after
she could have begun and four months after she was ordered to begin. The psychologist believed
that respondent’s prognosis was poor based on her history of failing to comply with the service
agreement. In addition to respondent’s tardy start to individual therapy, she failed to consistently
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drug test. She was ordered to begin submitting screens in January 2009, but she did not do so
until April 2009. She also had numerous missed screens, claiming that she did not understand
that a missed screen was deemed positive. Further, respondent missed the first scheduled
appointment for the parenting assessment. Again, she provided more than one explanation for
her absence. Quite simply, respondent did nothing for several months. At the termination
hearing she claimed that she did not understand what was expected of her. However, her IQ
testing was within the normal range, and everyone agreed that respondent appeared capable of
understanding instructions and following through on the recommendations. Respondent’s
contention that the caseworkers did not make reasonable efforts to reunify the family was
without merit. Respondent was not entitled to referrals for additional services until she began to
minimally comply with the services already in place.
Although respondent loved the children, the consensus was that she did not possess the
consistency, responsibility, or maturity needed to be a stable parent. She could not provide a
safe and stable environment for them. Respondent’s delay and lack of effort with respect to her
case service plan was a predictor of her future actions as a parent. It was doubtful that additional
time to comply with services would have yielded a different result. Respondent did well with the
“mechanics” of parenting, such as feeding and diapering, but she seemed to be more of a
babysitter than a mother. The children were simply not her priority.
The foregoing evidence supports the trial court’s decision to terminate respondent’s
parental rights. The conditions leading to adjudication continued to exist without a reasonable
likelihood that they would change in a reasonable amount of time considering the children’s
ages. Respondent would also not be in a position to care for the children within a reasonable
amount of time. Finally, the children would have been at risk of harm if returned to respondent’s
care. Having found the statutory grounds proven by clear and convincing evidence, the trial
court then had to determine whether termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the
children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5). The children were brought into care when they
were only three months old and had been in care for nearly a year. All accounts were that
respondent behaved appropriately and lovingly toward the children during visits. She tended to
their needs. However, all accounts also indicated that respondent acted more like a babysitter
than a mother. She refused to participate in services that would have facilitated reunification.
The children were young and had been asked to wait for their mother long enough. They were
entitled to permanence and stability.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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