PEOPLE OF MI V ANGEL MORENO JR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 10, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 294840
Ottawa Circuit Court
LC No. 09-033445-FH
ANGEL MORENO, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: OWENS, P.J., and O’CONNELL and TALBOT, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by leave granted1 the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to
quash and for reconsideration. We affirm.
Defendant was charged with resisting and obstructing a police officer, MCL 750.81d(1),
and resisting and obstructing a police officer causing injury, MCL 750.81d(2). Defendant
contends that police lacked probable cause and that exigent circumstances did not exist to justify
a warrantless entry by officers into defendant’s home. As such, defendant asserts he had a
constitutional right to refuse entry and resist an illegal and forcible entry into his residence.
Defendant also argues that due process was violated because no reasonable person would have
known he could be charged under MCL 750.81d for defending his home from an aggressive
police officer acting without a warrant or pursuant to any recognized exception to the warrant
requirement. In addition, defendant asks this Court to declare that a person’s right to not retreat
and defend his home constitutes a defense to MCL 750.81d.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
While on patrol, Holland police officer Troy DeWys observed an occupied vehicle
parked in the street during the early morning hours of December 30, 2008. When DeWys
returned to issue a parking ticket the vehicle was unoccupied. DeWys determined that the car
was registered to Shane Adams, who had several outstanding warrants. DeWys then observed a
vehicle pulling out of the driveway at 385 West 22nd Street in the immediate vicinity of the
1
People v Moreno, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered December 9, 2009
(Docket No. 294840).
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parked vehicle. When the driver, Rusty Hoek, saw DeWys’ patrol car, he put the car into
reverse, turned off the ignition and exited the vehicle. DeWys approached Hoek, who indicated
that his girlfriend was inside the house with several minors and they were consuming alcohol.
DeWys inquired whether Adams was inside the residence and Hoek indicated that he was
unsure. At this time DeWys sought backup before making contact with individuals inside the
residence.
Following the arrival of another officer, DeWys and officer Matthew Hamberg
approached the home and knocked on the front and back doors. The officers were in full police
uniform. DeWys could hear people running inside the residence and voices from an open
window. DeWys verbally identified himself as a police officer and indicated that he wanted to
ascertain the identity of people within the home. Using his flashlight, Hamberg observed
approximately ten to 15 individuals “running around in the basement hiding in different areas”
and a number of empty bottles of alcohol.
Approximately 15 minutes later, the homeowner, Mandy McCarry, opened the front
door. DeWys told McCarry he had information that minors were in the home consuming
alcohol. Although McCarry initially denied the presence of any minors, she subsequently
admitted to under age drinking occurring in the residence. DeWys told McCarry that he only
wanted to identify the people who were in the residence and was not interested in writing “a
bunch of minor in possession tickets.” Officer DeWys asked McCarry if she knew the
identification of the occupants of the vehicle that was parked in the street because there was a
warrant for one of the people who were believed to have arrived in the vehicle. McCarry then
asked the officers if they were looking for Shane Adams, but denied his presence. McCarry
declined to permit officers into the home without a warrant. At this point, the back door was
secured and the house was surrounded following the arrival of three other officers at the scene.
While DeWys was standing at the open door he encountered a strong odor of intoxicants
and burnt marijuana. When DeWys informed McCarry that officers were entering to secure the
residence while they obtained a search warrant, defendant came to the door and, using vulgar
language, refused officers entry into the home. Defendant told the officers to “get off his porch,”
and demanded that the officers obtain a warrant to enter.
Defendant moved to close the front door. At this point, DeWys and Hamberg were not
inside the house, but were positioned on the sill of the front door. The door was almost closed
when Hamberg placed his shoulder to the door to prevent it being closed and a struggle ensued
between defendant and the officers. During this physical confrontation, Hamberg and defendant
were struggling in the doorway and may have crossed the threshold. Ultimately, the officers
were able to physically subdue defendant and remove him from the home’s doorway and
effectuate his arrest. As a result of the struggle, DeWys incurred a tear to his hamstring and
bruising to his elbow. Following defendant’s arrest and before the search warrant was obtained,
officers entered the home to secure the occupants who were patted down for weapons.
Following receipt of the search warrant, officers discovered an ounce of marijuana and some
pills in the home.
After the preliminary examination, defendant was bound over for trial. Defendant filed a
motion to quash based on the illegal entry of officers into the home. The trial court denied
defendant’s motion, but found that the officers’ attempt to enter defendant’s home was unlawful.
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Specifically, the trial court determined that exigent circumstances did not exist based on the mere
possibility that evidence might be destroyed. However, the trial court noted that MCL 750.81d
no longer requires that the “officers’ acts or performance of their duties must be ‘lawful.’” In
addition, the trial court found that the evidence showed that “defendant forcibly resisted the
illegal entry by grabbing Officer Hamberg and wrestling with both officers.” Thus, even if
Michigan recognized a privilege to resist an illegal entry, such a privilege would not apply in this
case, because there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate probable cause that defendant
“committed a subsequent crime against the officer.”
Defendant sought reconsideration arguing that defendant had the right to act in selfdefense because the officers used excessive force. While acknowledging that defendant might be
entitled to a jury instruction at trial, the trial court rejected defendant’s argument based on the
failure to “present[] evidence to show that the officers’ actions put him in fear of physical
violence or that his fear, if any, was reasonable.”
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
As discussed by this Court in People v Kim, 245 Mich App 609, 613 n 3; 630 NW2d 627
(2001), citing People v Hudson, 241 Mich App 268, 276; 615 NW2d 784 (2000):
We review for an abuse of discretion a district court's decision to
bind over a defendant. “The standard for reviewing a decision for an
abuse of discretion is narrow; the result must have been so violative of
fact and logic that it evidences a perversity of will, a defiance of
judgment, or an exercise of passion or bias.” A circuit court's decision
with respect to a motion to quash a bindover order is not entitled to
deference because this Court applies the same standard of review to this
issue as the circuit court. This Court therefore essentially sits in the same
position as the circuit court when determining whether the district court
abused its discretion. In other words, this Court reviews the circuit court's
decision regarding the motion to quash a bindover only to the extent that
it is consistent with the district court's exercise of discretion. The circuit
court may only affirm a proper exercise of discretion and reverse an abuse
of that discretion. Thus, in simple terms, we review the district court's
original exercise of discretion.
***
“We review questions of statutory construction de novo and we review
bindover challenges, in general, to determine whether the district court abused
its discretion in finding probable cause that the defendant committed the
charged offense.”
To bind a defendant over, “the magistrate must always find that there is
‘evidence regarding each element of the crime charged or evidence from which
the elements may be inferred’ in order to bind over a defendant.” Further,
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[t]o bind a defendant over for trial, the magistrate must be satisfied that
there is sufficient evidence that an offense has been committed and that
there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it. The
magistrate has the duty to pass judgment on the credibility of witnesses as
well as the weight and competency of the evidence, but the magistrate
should not engage in fact finding or discharge a defendant when the
evidence raises a reasonable doubt regarding the defendant's guilt. The
district court's inquiry is not limited to whether the prosecution has
presented sufficient evidence on each element of the offense, but extends
to whether probable cause exists after an examination of the entire matter
based on legally admissible evidence. [Internal citations omitted.]
For the first time on appeal, defendant raises a due process challenge. We review unpreserved
constitutional issues for plain error affecting a defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines,
460 Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
III. MCL 750.81d
This Court has recently discussed the requirements to establish the propriety of a
bindover on charges pertaining to MCL 750.81d, which provides, in pertinent part:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (2), (3), and (4), an individual who
assaults, batters, wounds, resists, obstructs, opposes, or endangers a person who
the individual knows or has reason to know is performing his or her duties is
guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 2 years or a fine
of not more than $2,000.00, or both.
(2) An individual who assaults, batters, wounds, resists, obstructs,
opposes, or endangers a person who the individual knows or has reason to know
is performing his or her duties causing a bodily injury requiring medical attention
or medical care to that person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for
not more than 4 years or a fine of not more than $5,000.00, or both.
The term “obstruct” is statutorily defined to encompass “the use or threatened use of physical
interference or force or knowing failure to comply with a lawful command.” MCL
750.81d(7)(a). In accordance with People v Corr, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2010),
slip op at 22:
Under MCL 750.81d(1), the elements required to establish criminal liability are:
(1) the defendant assaulted, battered, wounded, resisted, obstructed, opposed, or
endangered a police officer, and (2) the defendant knew or had reason to know
that the person that the defendant assaulted, battered, wounded, resisted,
obstructed, opposed, or endangered was a police officer performing his duties.
2
We note that an application for leave to appeal was filed with the Michigan Supreme Court on
March 15, 2010.
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MCL 750.81d(1); MCL 750.81d(7)(b)(v); People v Ventura, 262 Mich App 370,
373, 374-375; 686 NW2d 748 (2004).
In Corr, the defendant was a passenger in an automobile stopped by police. The defendant
disobeyed instructions from the police to return to the vehicle and began physically assaulting
the officers. Finding the defendant’s behavior “constituted the type of conduct specifically
prohibited [by] MCL 750.81d(1),” this Court determined that the statute makes it “illegal to
assault, batter, resist, or obstruct an officer even if the officer is taking unlawful action, so long
as the actions are done in the performance of the officer’s official duties.” Corr, ___ Mich App
___, slip op at 3, citing Ventura, 262 Mich App at 377.
As in Corr, we first evaluate whether defendant’s conduct comprised the type of actions
precluded by the statute. In this instance, defendant not only attempted to close the door of the
home, following the officers’ verbal indication they intended to enter the premises to preclude
the destruction of evidence pending receipt of a search warrant, but also engaged in a physical
altercation with the officers. Defendant does not dispute that he grabbed and pushed Hamberg
against the door. Clearly, defendant’s physical confrontation and resistance in response to the
officers’ verbal statements indicating their intent to secure the premises is the type of behavior
the statute seeks to prohibit. As noted in Ventura:
Assaulting, resisting, or obstructing an officer while he is performing his duty
must be avoided for the safety of all society, regardless of the legality of the
arrest. It is the immediate harm that can be attendant to an arrest when a subject
engages in assaultive, resistant, or obstructive behavior that the Legislature seeks
to eradicate. Solid mechanisms are in place to guarantee the safety of those
arrested, and, to correct any injustices that may result from an illegal arrest. The
statute at issue, MCL 750.81d, now serves as another mechanism to reduce the
likelihood and magnitude of the potential dangers inherent in an arrest situation,
thereby dually protecting both the general public and its police officers. [Ventura,
262 Mich App at 377 (internal citations omitted).]
In addition, credible evidence was presented at the preliminary examination to
demonstrate that defendant knew or had reason to know that the individuals he assaulted were
police officers in the course of performing their duties. MCL 750.81d(1). As noted in Corr:
The phrase “has reason to know” “requires the fact-finder to engage in an analysis
to determine whether the facts and circumstances of the case indicate that when
resisting, defendant had ‘reasonable cause to believe’ the person he was assaulting
was performing his or her duties.” [Corr, ___ Mich App ___, slip op at 3, quoting
People v Nichols, 262 Mich App 408, 414; 686 NW2d 502 (2004).]
It is undisputed that the officers were in uniform and had verbally identified themselves as police
officers when knocking on the door of the residence. In addition, the officers advised defendant
that they intended to enter the residence to secure the premises pending their obtaining of a
search warrant. The fact that defendant refused entry to the officers unless they obtained a
search warrant is indicative of defendant’s knowledge of their status as police officers and that
they were engaged in the performance of their official duties. Therefore, there can be no
question that defendant possessed a “reasonable cause to believe” the officers conduct in
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preparing to enter the premises constituted the performance of their official duties when he
attempted to block their entry by closing the door and physically engaged with them in an
altercation. Nichols, 262 Mich App at 414. Consequently, the trial court properly bound
defendant over for trial on the charges brought pursuant to MCL 750.81d.
Defendant contends that an improper, warrantless entry into his home should provide an
exception or serve to negate the applicability of the statute. As recognized in People v Snider,
239 Mich App 393, 406-407; 608 NW2d 502 (2000):
Both the United States and the Michigan Constitutions guarantee the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The lawfulness of a search or seizure
depends on its reasonableness. “Generally, a search conducted without a warrant
is unreasonable unless there exist both probable cause and a circumstance
establishing an exception to the warrant requirement.” Probable cause requires a
“‘“substantial basis for . . . [concluding]” that a search would uncover evidence of
wrongdoing.’” For probable cause to exist, there must be “‘a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” However,
a finding of probable cause does not require that “it is more likely than not that a
search will turn up the type of item suspected.” In People v Davis, 442 Mich 1,
10; 497 NW2d 910 (1993), the Court observed that “exigent circumstances”
represents an exception to the warrant requirement. [Internal citations omitted.]
Specifically, addressing the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement our
Supreme Court has indicated:
Pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception, we hold that the police may
enter a dwelling without a warrant if the officers possess probable cause to
believe that a crime was recently committed on the premises, and probable cause
to believe that the premises contain evidence or perpetrators of the suspected
crime. The police must further establish the existence of an actual emergency on
the basis of specific and objective facts indicating that immediate action is
necessary to (1) prevent the imminent destruction of evidence, (2) protect the
police officers or others, or (3) prevent the escape of a suspect. If the police
discover evidence of a crime following the entry without a warrant, that evidence
may be admissible. [Id. at 408 (citation omitted).]
The destruction or removal of evidence has been recognized as meeting the criteria to establish
an exigent circumstance. Specifically:
As pointed out by the Court in People v Blasius, 435 Mich 573, 583; 459 NW2d
906 (1990), “the risk of destruction or removal of evidence may constitute an
exigent circumstance exception to the warrant requirement.” The Blasius Court,
after observing that the “precise contours of the exigent circumstances exception
remain hazy,” stated that “‘[o]ur decisions have recognized that a warrantless
entry by criminal law enforcement officials may be legal where there is
compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant,’” where this
Court found that there were exigent circumstances justifying the police entry into
the defendant's home if the police officers were not in a position to secure the
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premises and to wait for the issuance of a warrant without putting themselves at
risk or running the risk that the crime in progress might continue. [Snider, 239
Mich App at 408-409 (internal citations omitted).]
However, contrary to defendant’s position, the legality of the officers’ conduct in
attempting to enter into the home does not serve to determine the applicability of MCL 750.81d.
As previously explained by this Court in Ventura when comparing the newly enacted MCL
750.81d with the earlier resisting arrest statute3:
“The goal of judicial interpretation of a statute is to ascertain and give
effect to the intent of the Legislature.” To accomplish this objective, the court
must begin by examining the language of the statute. Id. “If the language is clear
and unambiguous, ‘no further construction is necessary or allowed to expand what
the Legislature clearly intended to cover.’” “[A] court may read nothing into an
unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as
derived from the words of the statute itself.” This Court has also stated:
“Courts must read the statutory language being construed in light of the general
purpose sought to be accomplished. Where the language is so plain as to leave no
room for interpretation, courts should not read into it words that are not there or
that cannot fairly be implied.”
Examining the language of the MCL 750.81d, unlike in MCL 750.479, we
find no reference to the lawfulness of the arrest or detaining act. The language of
MCL 750.81d is abundantly clear and states only that an individual who resists a
person the individual knows or has reason to know is performing his duties is
guilty of a felony. MCL 750.81d. Because the language of the statute is clear and
unambiguous, further construction is neither necessary nor permitted, and we
decline to “‘expand what the Legislature clearly intended to cover’” and “read in”
a lawfulness requirement.
“Courts and legislatures in other jurisdictions have found the right to resist
an unlawful arrest to be outmoded in our contemporary society.” In [People v]
Wess[, 235 Mich App 241; 597 NW2d 215 (1999)], after finding that a citizen's
right to use such reasonable force as is necessary to prevent an illegal attachment
and to resist an illegal arrest does not extend to third-party intervenors, this Court
discussed the status of Michigan's unlawful-arrest theory. The Wess Court stated:
We share the concerns of other jurisdictions that the right to resist an illegal
arrest is an outmoded and dangerous doctrine, and we urge our Supreme Court to
reconsider this doctrine at the first available opportunity and to bring Michigan in
line with the majority view as articulated in State v Valentine, 132 Wash 2d 1;
935 P2d 1294 (1997). We see no benefit to continuing the right to resist an
otherwise peaceful arrest made by a law enforcement officer, merely because the
3
MCL 750.479.
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arrestee believes the arrest is illegal. Given modern procedural safeguards for
criminal defendants, the “right” only preserves the possibility that harm will
come to the arresting officer or the defendant.
When the Legislature enacts statutes, it has knowledge of existing laws on the
same subject and it is not within our province to disturb our Legislature's obvious
affirmative choice to modify the traditional common-law rule that a person may
resist an unlawful arrest. When prosecuting a charge drawn upon MCL 750.81d,
we adopt the modern rule that a person may not use force to resist an arrest made
by one he knows or has reason to know is performing his duties regardless of
whether the arrest is illegal under the circumstances of the occasion. [Ventura,
262 Mich App at 375-377 (internal citations omitted).]
Based on this reasoning, defendant cannot assert self-defense or receive an instruction on this
defense at trial.
Finally, defendant asserts for the first time on appeal that his right of due process was
violated by a lack of notice, claiming no reasonable person would have been aware or known he
or she could be charged under MCL 750.81d for defending his own home against an aggressive
police officer acting without either a warrant or under any recognized exception to the warrant
requirement. Statutes “may be challenged for vagueness on three grounds: (1) it does not
provide fair notice of the conduct proscribed; (2) it confers on the trier of fact unstructured and
unlimited discretion to determine whether an offense has been committed; (3) its coverage is
overbroad and impinges on First Amendment freedoms.” Nichols, 262 Mich App at 410. "A
defendant has standing to raise a vagueness challenge to a statute only if the statute is vague as
applied to his conduct." People v Cavaiani, 172 Mich App 706, 714; 432 NW2d 409 (1988).
MCL 750.81d clearly provides that a defendant cannot assault, batter, wound, resist,
obstruct, oppose, or endanger a police officer acting in the performance of his duties. Under the
circumstances of this case, it is clear that the officers were in the process of performing their
official duties and that defendant’s attempt to close the door and push the officers out of the
doorframe was precisely the type of conduct prohibited by the statute. As such, MCL 750.81d
provided sufficient notice of the type of conduct it sought to preclude and cannot be construed as
being void for vagueness when applied to defendant’s conduct.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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