PEOPLE OF MI V JAMIE LEE HOFFNER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 10, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 289457
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 07-012625-FC
JAMIE LEE HOFFNER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: OWENS, P.J., and O’CONNELL and TALBOT, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of second-degree murder, MCL
750.317, and witness intimidation, MCL 750.122(6), (7)(c). Defendant was sentenced as a
fourth offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to life imprisonment for the second-degree
murder conviction and 10 to 15 years’ imprisonment for the witness intimidation conviction. We
affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences but remand for correction of the judgment of
sentence.
Defendant’s convictions arise from the stabbing death of Robert Goss. Goss was in a
park drinking beer with several friends when defendant approached the group, while holding a
bottle of gin. Defendant began to harass Goss and his friends by pouring gin on the head of one
individual and knocking Goss’ hat off. Goss verbally indicated to defendant to cease the
harassment. Goss and his friends then began to walk out of the park when defendant used a
pocketknife to stab Goss in the neck. Goss expired at the scene due to blood loss from a severed
jugular vein.
On appeal, defendant first contends that insufficient evidence was presented to
demonstrate he possessed the requisite intent to sustain his convictions for second-degree murder
and witness intimidation. Specifically, defendant contends that his own intoxication and lack of
mental clarity or coherence at the time of the assault precluded a finding that he had the requisite
degree of malice or intent. We note at the outset that defendant’s mental status was evaluated
and it was determined that defendant was competent to stand trial. Defendant does not challenge
the trial court’s competency determination.
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. People v Martin, 271
Mich App 280, 340; 721 NW2d 815 (2006). Our Court reviews a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution in order to determine whether a
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rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the charged crime was proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich App 656, 677; 765 NW2d 44
(2009). In addition:
The standard of review is deferential: a reviewing court is required to draw all
reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the jury verdict.
The scope of review is the same whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial.
“‘Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence
can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime.’” [People v Nowack,
462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000), quoting People v Carines, 460 Mich
750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).]
“In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must not interfere with the jury’s role as
the sole judge of the facts.” People v Meshell, 265 Mich App 616, 619; 696 NW2d 754 (2005).
The elements of second-degree murder include: “(1) a death, (2) the death was caused by
an act of the defendant, (3) the defendant acted with malice, and (4) the defendant did not have
lawful justification or excuse for causing the death.” People v Smith, 478 Mich 64, 70; 731
NW2d 411 (2007), citing People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442, 464; 579 NW2d 868 (1998). The
term “malice” has been defined “as the intent to kill, the intent to cause great bodily harm, or the
intent to do an act in wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of
such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm.” Id. In addition:
Malice may be inferred from evidence that the defendant ‘intentionally set in
motion a force likely to cause death or great bodily harm.’ “The offense of
second-degree murder does not require an actual intent to harm or kill, but only
the intent to do an act that is in obvious disregard of life-endangering
consequences.” [People v Roper, 286 Mich App 77, 84; 777 NW2d 483 (2009)
(internal citations omitted).]
Consequently, intoxication does not comprise a defense to a charge of second-degree murder.
People v Langworthy, 416 Mich 630, 651; 331 NW2d 171 (1982).
In the circumstances of this case, sufficient evidence existed to sustain defendant’s jury
conviction of second-degree murder. Defendant approached Goss and his friends in the park and
attempted to instigate an altercation by pouring alcohol and making physical contact with the
victim. When the victim attempted to retreat, defendant pulled a knife and stabbed Goss in the
neck. The intent to kill can be inferred from the facts in evidence, which include the use of a
dangerous weapon, the type of injuries inflicted, and a defendant’s conduct. People v Mills, 450
Mich 61, 71; 537 NW2d 909 (1995), mod 450 Mich 1212 (1995); People v McRunels, 237 Mich
App 168, 181; 603 NW2d 95 (1999); People v Ray, 56 Mich App 610, 615; 224 NW2d 735
(1974). A pocketknife or folding knife can be construed as a dangerous weapon if it is used to
accomplish an assault and if it is capable of inflicting serious injury. People v Brown, 406 Mich
215, 220-221; 277 NW2d 155 (1979). Based on the inherent difficulty in establishing or proving
a defendant’s state of mind, only minimal circumstantial evidence is required. McRunels, 237
Mich App at 181; Ray, 56 Mich App at 615. As such, given the weapon used and the location of
the injury inflicted to Goss, coupled with defendant’s aggressive behavior in approaching the
victim and his friends, permits an inference of defendant’s malicious intent. Roper, 286 Mich
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App at 84. Although defendant appeared confused and incoherent after the assault, he was
deemed competent to stand trial. Further, during questioning by police, defendant’s responses
suggest he had some awareness of his actions by both denying his culpability and suggesting an
alternative sequence of events to suggest that the stabbing was an accident. To the extent
defendant implies he was intoxicated at the time of the offense and, therefore, incapable of the
requisite intent, it does not comprise a defense.
Defendant was also convicted of witness intimidation. Specifically, MCL 750.122(6)
provides, in relevant part: “A person shall not willfully impede, interfere with, prevent, or
obstruct or attempt to willfully impede, interfere with, prevent, or obstruct the ability of a witness
to attend, testify, or provide information in or for a present or future official proceeding.” The
statutory provisions seeking to preclude witness intimidation “identify and criminalize the many
ways individuals can prevent or attempt to prevent a witness from appearing and providing
truthful information in some sort of official proceeding.” People v Greene, 255 Mich App 426,
438; 661 NW2d 616 (2003). Evidence was presented that defendant, following the stabbing of
Goss, made verbal comments to two individuals that could be construed as threatening in order
to “prevent” or “interfere” with the provision of testimony or information by these witnesses in a
subsequent proceeding. Although the witnesses could not recall the specific words used by
defendant, the meaning conveyed, context and timing of the comments by defendant were of a
sufficiently threatening nature to be construed by the jury as an attempt to intimidate the
witnesses. Again, defendant’s voluntary intoxication does not constitute a defense. See MCL
768.37(1), (2).
Finally, defendant contends that a photograph exhibited at trial showing the victim with
his daughter at a birthday party was improperly admitted into evidence. Specifically, defendant
asserts the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the photograph because it was proffered
merely to elicit juror sympathy and had no probative value. This Court reviews the admission of
evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v Johnson, 474 Mich 96, 99; 712 NW2d 703 (2006).
An abuse of discretion is found to have occurred “when the trial court chooses an outcome
falling outside [the] principled range of outcomes.” People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666
NW2d 231 (2003).
The decision to admit or exclude photographic evidence is solely within the discretion of
the trial court. Mills, 450 Mich at 76. Consistent with the admission of any other form of
evidence, a photograph must be deemed relevant to be admissible. People v Unger, 278 Mich
App 210, 247; 749 NW2d 272 (2008); MRE 401. However, even relevant evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Mills, 450 Mich at 74-76; MRE 403.
There is only one challenged photograph, which depicted the victim with his child at a
birthday party. In the circumstances of this case, the victim’s size or stature was relevant for the
jury to consider when evaluating defendant’s contention regarding the events that led up to the
stabbing. Further, the photograph served to corroborate testimony regarding the victim’s size
and to demonstrate the unlikelihood that he was the instigator of the confrontation with
defendant. There is nothing in the record to suggest that this one photograph was given undue or
preemptive weight by the jury. As such, the trial court’s admission of the photograph did not
comprise an abuse of discretion.
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We note, sua sponte, that defendant’s judgment of sentence improperly reflects a
conviction of “homicide – open murder – statutory short form.” As such, we remand this case to
the trial court solely for the ministerial purpose of correction of the judgment of sentence.
Affirmed, but remanded for correction of judgment of sentence. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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