PEOPLE OF MI V ARTHUR CORTEZ GREER JR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 10, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 286912
Muskegon Circuit Court
LC No. 07-055536-FH
ARTHUR CORTEZ GREER, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: OWENS, P.J., and O’CONNELL and TALBOT, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of felonious assault, MCL 750.82,
carrying a concealed weapon (“CCW”), MCL 750.227, felon in possession of a firearm, MCL
750.224f, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL
750.227b. He was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to concurrent prison
terms of 5-1/2 to 15 years for the felonious assault conviction and 5-1/2 to 30 years each for the
CCW and felon in possession convictions, to be served consecutive to concurrent two-year terms
of imprisonment for the felony-firearm convictions. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant’s convictions arise from a shooting assault of Jomarco Mattox, who was shot
once in the shoulder. Mattox admitted that he robbed defendant during the early morning hours
on the day of the shooting. According to Mattox, defendant confronted him on the street later
that morning and produced a gun. Mattox ran, but was shot in the shoulder. In addition to the
weapons offenses, defendant was charged with alternative counts of assault with intent to
commit murder, MCL 750.83, and assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder,
MCL 750.84. At defense counsel’s request, the trial court instructed the jury on the lesser
offense of felonious assault. The jury acquitted defendant of the greater assault charges, but
found him guilty of felonious assault and the weapons offenses.
I. FELONIOUS ASSAULT
We first address defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on
felonious assault because it is only a lesser cognate offense, not a necessarily included lesser
offense of assault with intent to commit murder.
As defendant correctly observes, felonious assault is a lesser cognate offense of assault
with intent to commit murder, People v Otterbridge, 477 Mich 875; 721 NW2d 595 (2006), and
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MCL 768.32(1) does not permit a court to instruct on uncharged lesser cognate offenses, People
v Cornell, 466 Mich 335, 353-354; 646 NW2d 127 (2002); People v Nyx, 479 Mich 112, 121;
734 NW2d 548 (2007) (TAYLOR CJ.). However, because defense counsel expressly requested
the felonious assault instruction, this claim of error is waived. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206,
216; 612 NW2d 144 (2000); Nyx, 479 Mich at 128 n 43. A waiver extinguishes any error and
thus there is no error to review. Carter, 462 Mich at 216. Accordingly, defendant’s sole avenue
for relief is his alternative claim that defense counsel was ineffective for requesting the
instruction.
Because defendant did not raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the trial
court, our review of that issue is limited to mistakes apparent from the record. People v Jordan,
275 Mich App 659, 667; 739 NW2d 706 (2007). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel,
defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below objective standards of
reasonableness, and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result
of the proceedings would have been different. People v Frazier, 478 Mich 231, 243; 733 NW2d
713 (2007). Defense counsel has wide discretion in matters of trial strategy. People v Odom,
276 Mich App 407, 415; 740 NW2d 557 (2007). The decision whether to request an instruction
on a lesser offense is generally a matter of trial strategy. People v Sardy, 216 Mich App 111,
116; 549 NW2d 23 (1996). This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of counsel
regarding matters of trial strategy, nor will it assess counsel’s competence with the benefit of
hindsight. People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 242-243; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). To establish
that counsel was ineffective, a defendant must overcome the strong presumption of sound trial
strategy. People v Riley (After Remand), 468 Mich 135, 140, 659 NW2d 611 (2003).
The principal defense strategy at trial was to attack the credibility of Mattox and the other
prosecution witnesses. Although MCL 768.32(1) did not permit the trial court to instruct on
felonious assault, a defense attorney has discretion to waive “‘a broad array of constitutional and
statutory provisions.’” Carter, 462 Mich at 217-218 (citations omitted). By requesting the
felonious assault instruction, counsel gave the jury a means by which to find defendant guilty of
a less serious offense in the event it found the prosecution witnesses credible. Defendant has
failed to overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s strategy was sound. Thus, defendant’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim cannot succeed.1
II. MISSING WITNESS INSTRUCTION
Next, we address defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in denying his request for
a missing witness instruction after the prosecution failed to produce Marlon Ezell, an endorsed
witness, for trial. Defendant argues that he was entitled to the instruction because the
prosecution failed to exercise due diligence to locate and produce Ezell at trial. We disagree.
We review a trial court’s determination of due diligence and its decision whether to give a
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Defendant also argues that if his felonious assault conviction is vacated, his attendant felonyfirearm conviction must also be vacated. Because we conclude that defendant is not entitled to
have the felonious assault conviction vacated, there is no need to vacate the corresponding
felony-firearm conviction.
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missing witness instruction for an abuse of discretion. People v Eccles, 260 Mich App 379, 388;
677 NW2d 76 (2004). We review for clear error the trial court’s factual determinations
underlying its due diligence decision. People v Lawton, 196 Mich App 341, 348; 492 NW2d 810
(1992).
The prosecution is obligated to exercise due diligence to produce endorsed witnesses at
trial. Eccles, 260 Mich App at 388. The test for due diligence “is one of reasonableness and
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, i.e., whether diligent good-faith efforts
were made to procure the testimony, not whether more stringent efforts would have produced it.”
People v Bean, 457 Mich 677, 684; 580 NW2d 390 (1998). If due diligence is not exercised, a
missing witness instruction, CJI2d 5.12, which allows the jury to infer that the missing witness’s
testimony would have been unfavorable to the prosecution, may be appropriate. People v Perez,
469 Mich 415, 420; 670 NW2d 655 (2003).
The record discloses that Deputy Robillard attempted to locate Ezell at his grandmother’s
house, which was the address at which Ezell’s mother said he lived and where Ezell had
instructed the post office to forward his mail. Numerous attempts were made to contact Ezell at
that address, but all were unsuccessful, and Ezell’s grandmother later denied that Ezell lived
there. Deputy Robillard also ascertained that Ezell was not in jail or at other addresses
associated with him, and he also checked the LEIN and Secretary of State databases to see if
there were any other addresses listed for Ezell. The record indicates that Ezell had other pending
criminal matters and was apparently evading service. Given the circumstances, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in determining that Ezell could not be produced for trial despite the
exercise of due diligence. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s request
for a missing witness instruction.
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Next, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. In
reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, this Court reviews the record de novo by viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact
could have found that the essential elements of the charged crimes were proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Unger, 278 Mich App at 222.
“The elements of felonious assault are (1) an assault, (2) with a dangerous weapon, and
(3) with the intent to injure or place the victim in reasonable apprehension of an immediate
battery.” People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). The elements of
felony-firearm are: (1) the defendant possessed a firearm, (2) during the commission of, or
attempt to commit, a felony. Id. The elements of felon in possession of a firearm are: (1) the
defendant possessed a firearm, (2) the defendant was previously convicted of a felony, and (3)
less than five years elapsed since the defendant’s discharge from probation. People v Perkins,
262 Mich App 267, 270-271; 686 NW2d 237 (2004). To establish the offense of carrying a
concealed weapon, the prosecution must prove that the defendant knowingly possessed a
concealed weapon without a license. People v Hernandez-Garcia, 477 Mich 1039, 1040 n 1;
728 NW2d 406 (2007).
At trial, Mattox testified that defendant shot him at close range with a gun that defendant
pulled from his waistband. Although Mattox’s credibility was challenged during trial, “[t]his
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Court will not interfere with the trier of fact's role of determining the weight of the evidence or
the credibility of witnesses.” People v Kanaan, 278 Mich App 594, 619; 751 NW2d 57 (2008).
“All conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the prosecution.” Id. Mattox’s
testimony, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, alone was sufficient to prove
that defendant committed a felonious assault and to establish the possessory elements of the
weapons offenses. The testimony did not need to be corroborated. Further, defendant admitted
that he had a prior felony conviction for distribution of a controlled substance, which made him
ineligible to carry a firearm, MCL 28.422(3)(e), and a certified copy of that conviction was
entered into evidence, thereby establishing the remaining elements of the felon-in-possession
charge. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions.
IV. GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant also argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the jury’s verdicts are
against the great weight of the evidence. We review the trial court's decision denying
defendant’s motion for a new trial based on the great weight of the evidence for an abuse of
discretion. Unger, 278 Mich App at 232. A trial court abuses its discretion when it selects an
outcome that is not within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. People v Blackston,
481 Mich 451, 460; 751 NW2d 408 (2008).
A motion for a new trial based on the great weight of the evidence should be granted only
when the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict and a serious miscarriage of justice
would result if the verdict were allowed to stand. Unger, 278 Mich App at 232. Conflicting
testimony and questions of witness credibility are generally insufficient grounds for granting a
new trial. People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 642-643; 576 NW2d 129 (1998). Absent
exceptional circumstances, issues of witness credibility are for the trier of fact. Id. “[U]nless it
can be said that directly contradictory testimony was so far impeached that it ‘was deprived of all
probative value or that the jury could not believe it,’ or contradicted indisputable physical facts
or defied physical realities, the trial court must defer to the jury's determination.” Id. at 645-646
(citation omitted).
We disagree with defendant’s argument that the testimony of an eyewitness, Cher’zell
Shelby, was contradicted by the forensic evidence. Based on the location of recovered bullet
fragments, Detective Orrison surmised that the shooter stood either in the middle of the street or
possibly on the west side and shot in an east to southeasterly direction. This testimony was not
wholly inconsistent with Shelby’s generalization that the shooting occurred across the street from
where he stood. Also, defendant’s argument assumes that, in Shelby’s account, the shooter
remained standing in the same direction from which he came as he fired his gun. However,
Shelby did not indicate what direction defendant or Mattox were facing when the first shot was
fired. Mattox testified that he turned to run when he saw defendant begin to pull a gun from his
waistband. Based on the gunshot residue on Mattox’s wound and Mattox’s testimony that he
was shot as he turned to flee, it was reasonable to infer that the first shot Shelby heard was the
one that injured Mattox. The bullet that struck Mattox was never found, so Shelby’s testimony
did not conflict with any physical evidence. Further, Shelby did not testify regarding defendant’s
movements after the first shot was fired. Shelby fled after the first shot and only heard the
subsequent shots.
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Defendant also argues that the testimony of Shelby and Mattox was so impeached that
neither witness could be believed. We disagree. Shelby’s and Mattox’s testimony regarding the
shooting was largely consistent. Defendant asserted an alibi defense. Some witnesses
contradicted specific aspects of Shelby’s testimony and other witnesses asserted that Mattox had
a reputation for being a liar. Although parts of Shelby’s testimony were inconsistent with other
witnesses’ testimony and Mattox’s credibility was impeached, this does not mean that their
testimony had no probative value. The determinations of who and what testimony to believe,
and the weight of the testimony, were for the jury to resolve. Lemmon, 456 Mich at 642-643.
Defendant further argues that Alicia Brooks’s testimony regarding her car had no
probative value because it was improperly influenced by Detective Bleich’s threats and lies.
Defendant presented this argument to the jury, which had the benefit of hearing Brooks’s police
interview to assess for itself whether it may have been influenced by Detective Bleich. It was for
the jury to determine the credibility and weight of Brooks’s testimony in light of Detective
Bleich’s statements. Id.
Moreover, none of defendant’s other arguments support his claim that he is entitled to a
new trial. Defendant simply relies on evidence favorable to him and argues that any conflicting
testimony was not credible. However, matters regarding conflicting testimony and credibility
were properly left to the jury, and are not grounds for granting a new trial. Lemmon, 456 Mich at
643. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a
new trial on this basis.
V. DUE PROCESS
Defendant also argues that the he was denied his right to due process and a fair trial
because of misconduct by the police and the prosecutor. Specifically, defendant argues that (1)
the prosecutor improperly allowed Shelby to give false testimony; (2) that Brooks’s testimony
was improperly obtained through police threats and lies; and (3) the statements of Mattox and his
girlfriend were improperly procured as a condition for the return of their child. We review de
novo the constitutional question whether defendant was denied due process. People v Herndon,
246 Mich App 371, 417; 633 NW2d 376 (2001).
A. PERJURED TESTIMONY
A prosecutor may not knowingly present perjured testimony and has a duty to correct
false evidence when it arises. Id. A conviction obtained through the knowing use of perjured
testimony offends a defendant’s due process protections guaranteed under the Fourteenth
Amendment. People v Aceval, 282 Mich App 379, 389; 764 NW2d 285 (2009). Here, however,
the record does not support defendant’s claim that Shelby’s testimony was false, or that the
prosecutor knew it to be false. As previously discussed, Shelby’s testimony was not inconsistent
with the physical evidence. Further, the mere existence of some inconsistencies within his
testimony or with the testimony of other witnesses does not equate to perjury. The record shows
that defendant was fully aware of the alleged inconsistencies and contradictions in Shelby’s
testimony and had an opportunity to explore these matters before the jury at trial. But the mere
existence of these inconsistencies does not establish that the prosecutor presented testimony that
was known to be false. People v Parker, 230 Mich App 677, 690; 584 NW2d 753 (1998).
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B. WITNESS INTIMIDATION
Defendant also argues that Detective Bleich improperly coerced the statements of three
witnesses. Prosecutors may not intimidate witnesses, and threats from law enforcement officers
may be attributed to the prosecution. Such attempts, if successful, can constitute a denial of due
process. People v Stacy, 193 Mich App 19, 25; 484 NW2d 675 (1992). The statements of
Mattox and his girlfriend were not presented at trial, and neither witness testified regarding any
alleged misconduct by Detective Bleich. Thus, the record does not support defendant’s claim of
misconduct with respect to these two witnesses.
Defendant also asserts that Detective Bleich threatened Brooks with the loss of her child
in order to obtain her statement. However, a review of her interview reveals that Detective
Bleich merely informed Brooks that she could possibly be charged as an accessory after the fact
and the consequences of not telling the truth. Based on her conduct pursuant to defendant’s
instructions from jail, an accessory after the fact charge was not baseless. In addition, although
Detective Bleich admittedly lied to Brooks when he told her that he knew defendant had used her
car, this deception alone is insufficient to taint Brooks’s statement. See People v Hicks, 185
Mich App 107; 460 NW2d 569 (1990) (a police officer’s false statement of fact alone does not
render a confession involuntary).
In sum, the record does not support defendant’s claims of police and prosecutorial
misconduct. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s
motion for a new trial on this ground.
VI. JAIL CREDIT
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to award him sentence credit
pursuant to MCL 769.11b. Defendant acknowledges that because he committed the instant
offenses while on parole, our Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v Idziak, 484 Mich 549,
552; 773 NW2d 616 (2009), precludes an award of sentence credit against his new sentences.
Although defendant argues that Idziak was incorrectly decided, this Court is bound to follow that
decision. See People v Beasley, 239 Mich App 548, 559; 609 NW2d 581 (2000).
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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