IN RE OSTRANDER MINORS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of DANIEL OSTRANDER,
TERRAH OSTRANDER, and ROBERT
OSTRANDER, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
June 3, 2010
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 293934
Shiawassee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2008-012155-NA
JAMIE DANIEL OSTRANDER,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
JAMIE SUE OSTRANDER,
Respondent.
In the Matter of DANIEL OSTRANDER,
TERRAH OSTRANDER, and ROBERT
OSTRANDER, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 294534
Shiawassee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2008-012155-NA
JAMIE SUE OSTRANDER,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
JAMIE DANIEL OSTRANDER,
-1-
Respondent.
Before: BANDSTRA, P.J., and FORT HOOD and DAVIS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondent-father appeals as of right the trial court order
terminating his parental rights to the minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii),
and (g), and respondent-mother appeals by delayed leave granted the same order terminating her
parental rights to the minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (with
regard to the youngest child only) (j). We affirm.
In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the
statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met by clear and convincing
evidence. In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1991). We review the trial
court’s decision for clear error. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
“Clear error signifies a decision that strikes us as more than just maybe or probably wrong.” In
re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 271; 779 NW2d 286 (2009). “A decision qualifies as clearly
erroneous [only] when, ‘although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.’” Id.,
quoting In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 209-210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003). When reviewing the trial
court’s decision, MCR 2.613(C) requires that this Court accord due deference to the trial court’s
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it. In re Miller, 433 Mich
331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989); MCR 2.613(C). As observed by our Supreme Court in In re
Miller,
The deference required by MCR 2.613(C) can make a critical difference in
difficult cases such as the one before us. In contrast to the reviewing court, the
trier of fact has the advantage of being able to consider the demeanor of the
witnesses in determining how much weight and credibility to accord their
testimony. [Id.]
Having carefully reviewed the lower court record, and affording the required deference
due the trial court’s findings, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by concluding
that at least one statutory ground for termination was established by clear and convincing
evidence with respect to both respondents. The issues that led to adjudication included
respondents’ long history of protective services involvement regarding domestic violence,
deplorable home conditions, and inability to manage money and pay necessary household
expenses, as well as respondents’ inability to benefit from services and concerns from hospital
staff regarding respondents’ ability to care for newborn Robert’s considerable medical needs.
Respondents received many services both before and after the minor children were removed
from the home. However, the issues that led to adjudication continued to exist at the termination
hearing, almost a year later. Although there was evidence that respondents made progress on the
cleanliness of their home, they had been unable to maintain a stable home suitable for the
children, or to maintain employment. At the time of trial, respondent-father, and apparently,
respondent-mother were living in a one-room efficiency apartment, but they were unable to pay
-2-
their rent for that apartment and were facing eviction. They planned to move in with respondentfather’s father and his girlfriend in a three-bedroom trailer if the minor children were returned to
their care until they could secure employment and obtain appropriate housing. The testimony of
the workers assisting respondents with budgeting was that they did not make good financial
decisions, choosing to purchase items that they did not need rather than pay necessary bills.
Domestic violence continued to be an issue, not only involving verbal threats and name calling
but escalating to physical violence, including hitting or kicking walls causing holes and an
incident in which respondent-father threw a hot beverage on respondent-mother.
The evidence showed that the minor children were detrimentally affected by the domestic
violence in respondents’ home. The children showed regression in their acting out behaviors
when they were returned to respondents’ care for a period of time and were exposed to domestic
violence between respondents. Respondents were involved in counseling for anger management
and parenting issues and attended several parenting classes, but the evidence did not show that
they benefited from these services. In addition, the trial court was concerned with respondents’
psychological evaluations, which were admitted into evidence. Respondent-father’s evaluation
stated that he did not put the needs of the children ahead of his own and thought that child
rearing was a mother’s role. It also indicated that he lacked the capacity to contain his anger and
aggression for long and that, as a result, there is a strong likelihood of him acting out in an
aggressive manner, and further, that he is likely to be impatient and respond in an angry or
aggressive manner to typical child transgressions. The report of the psychologist stated that
respondent-mother had issues with paranoia and delusional thinking and that she failed to report
incidents of such thinking to avoid attention from others, or for fear that it would be challenged
or used against her in some way.
While we are sympathetic to respondents’ economic plight, the evidence was sufficient to
permit the trial court to conclude that respondents had not made sufficient progress as to the noneconomic concerns that resulted in the children’s removal, to warrant delaying termination of
respondents’ parental rights to permit them additional time to find employment and suitable,
stable housing. For these reasons, we find no clear error in the trial court’s conclusion that
termination of respondents’ parental rights was warranted.
“If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that
termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court shall order termination of
parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not
be made.” MCL 712A.19(b)(5). Applying the clear error standard of review as described above,
and affording the required deference to the trial court’s assessment of witness credibility, we also
conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in determining that termination of respondents’
parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Petitioner had been involved with the family
for three years and respondents still could not provide the minor children with a stable home,
domestic violence continued to be an issue, and they were unable to show that they could make
appropriate parenting decisions for the minor children. Respondents had not bonded with Robert
because he was removed from respondents’ care shortly after he was born. Although
respondents had a bond with the two older minor children, the trial court was presented with
sufficient evidence to permit it to conclude that the needs of the minor children for stability,
permanence, guidance, and safety outweighed that bond.
-3-
Respondent-mother contends that the trial court showed prejudice toward respondents
because they were poor and that it chose to rule as it did because the foster parents, a more
affluent family, could provide a better home for the children. Respondent-mother argues that her
due process rights were violated because the decision was based on her economic status. This
argument is without merit based on the lower court record. Respondents had received services
for over three years to address their issues and were unable to show that they could make
appropriate financial decisions with regard to paying their bills and maintaining stable housing,
provide an environment for the minor children that was free of domestic violence, and make
appropriate parenting decisions. While the current economic environment surely played some
role in respondent-father’s ability to maintain employment and respondent-mother’s ability to
obtain employment, their issues were longstanding and not entirely dependent on finances.
Respondent-father argues that his due process rights were violated because the trial court
did not hold a dispositional review hearing within 14 days of the removal of the minor children
from his care. Respondent-father does not represent that this issue was raised at the trial level.
Unpreserved constitutional error is reviewed under the plain error rule. Respondent must show
that error occurred, the error was plain, that is clear or obvious, and the plain error affected his
substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 587 NW2d 130 (1999).
Additionally, pursuant to MCR 3.902, limitations on corrections of error in cases filed under the
Juvenile Code are governed by MCR 2.613, which provides:
An error in the admission or the exclusion of evidence, an error in a ruling
or order, or an error or defect in anything done or omitted by the court or by the
parties is not ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside a verdict, or for
vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to
take this action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.
MCR 3.974 governs removal of a child who remains in the home after the initial
disposition hearing, or who has been returned to the home from foster care. As respondentfather correctly points out, when such minor children are removed from the home on an
emergency basis – that is, before a dispositional hearing at which the trial court changes their
placement, MCR 3.974(A)(3) – MCR 3.974(C) provides that a “dispositional review hearing
must commence no later than 14 days after the child is placed by the court, except for good cause
shown.”
The two older children were originally removed from respondents’ home in January
2008. The trial court gave petitioner discretion to return the two older children to respondents’
home and in May 2008, they were returned to their parents’ care. The trial court entered its order
once again removing the two older children from the home on November 20, 2008. The record
reflects that a petition was filed on November 21, 2008, seeking removal of the two older
children; the allegations included substantiated complaints of domestic violence in October and
November 2008, verbal name calling and threats between respondents at least one to two times a
day, unfavorable psychological evaluations of respondents, failure to make progress in therapy,
poor financial choices, and the deterioration of Daniel’s behavior while in the home. The record
further reflects that a preliminary hearing was commenced that same day; it was adjourned to
permit respondents to obtain court-appointed counsel. The hearing was continued three days
later, at which point the trial court found that it was contrary to the welfare of the children to
remain in the home because of verbal threats and domestic violence that occurred in the home
-4-
and the behavior of the children resulting from that violence. The preliminary hearing was
further adjourned for 11 days, for “good cause . . . to allow for legal counsel to be present.” The
hearing concluded on December 4, 2008, at which time, the trial court scheduled a full
dispositional review hearing for January 5, 2009.
Respondent-father’s argument that he was denied his due process rights to a dispositional
review hearing within 14 days after the two older children were removed from his care does not
rise to the level of a constitutional error requiring relief. Respondent was provided with the
opportunity to object to the removal and the timing at the preliminary examination that
commenced the day after the removal, and was then adjourned first to a date three days after
removal and then to a date 14 days after removal. This Court does not have information
regarding the trial court’s reason for setting the dispositional hearing for the date that it chose,
but even assuming that the court committed a plain error in not holding a dispositional review
hearing within 14 days, on the record presented we do not conclude that the error affected
respondent-father’s substantial rights. The children were removed from the home because of
domestic violence between respondents and the affect of the domestic violence on the children
and their behavior. Respondent-father does not dispute that domestic violence occurred between
him and respondent-mother. A full dispositional hearing was held approximately 45 days after
the minor children were removed. Respondent-father does not indicate how the outcome of that
hearing would have been different had it been held 14 days after removal; he does not identify
any witnesses or evidence that would have been available to him had the hearing been held
earlier, nor does he indicate that the trial court relied on events occurring between 14 days and 45
days after the removal in continuing the children’s placement outside the home. Under these
circumstances, this Court cannot conclude that respondent-father’s substantial rights were
violated by the trial court’s failure to hold a dispositional review hearing within 14 days of the
children’s removal.
We affirm.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Alton T. Davis
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.