IN RE ANTHONY EDWARD VOGEL SR LIVING TRUST
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In re Anthony Edward Vogel Sr. Living Trust.
MARK EUGENE VOGEL,
UNPUBLISHED
May 27, 2010
Appellant,
v
No. 288837
Gladwin Probate Court
LC No. 08-013477-TV
MICHAEL LEVI VOGEL as Trustee and
Individually for the ANTHONY EDWARD
VOGEL, SR. LIVING TRUST, NOREEN S.
VOGEL, PAUL A. VOGEL, KATHLEEN M.
VOGEL, RONALD YOUNG, VALERIE D.
YOUNG, GLORIA ANN GOVITZ and PHIL
VOGEL,
Appellees.
Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and JANSEN and DONOFRIO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s finding of no cause of action following a
bench trial in this matter concerning a beneficiary’s challenge to the administration of the
Anthony Edward Vogel, Sr. Living Trust. Plaintiff also challenges the trial court’s determination
that his suit violated the trust’s no-contest provision, resulting in the forfeiture of his distributive
share of the trust. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I. FACTS
The dispute in this matter relates to distributions of real property made by defendant
Michael Vogel, who was named successor trustee following Anthony Vogel, Sr.’s (grantor’s)
death. The trust contained a provision, providing for distribution of the residuary assets of the
trust following the death of the grantor in equal shares to his surviving children. At the time of
grantor’s passing, the Vogel farm consisted of approximately 300 acres, with little frontage.
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Grantor’s surviving children included plaintiff Mark Vogel, defendant Michael Vogel, Paul
Vogel, Valerie Young, and Gloria Govitz.1
Acting as trustee, defendant sold a portion of the trust property to his son, Phil Vogel, by
land contract. The terms of the land contract referenced 48 acres, which included five acres that
the parties agree had been paid for prior to grantor’s death. Defendant maintained that he was
simply honoring grantor’s wishes by completing the sale. To support the alleged prior
agreement between Phil Vogel and grantor, defendant relied on a copy of a land survey that
included handwriting stating that five acres had been paid for on June 17, 2003, and also
included language that stated Phil Vogel was to be credited $5.00 per hour for work on the farm
toward the purchase of 68 acres. Defendant credited his son with $15,500 toward the purchase
on his land contract for hours the son had worked on the farm. Defendant testified that he
recognized grantor’s signature on the document, but acknowledged that the rest of the writing
was not grantor’s.
Defendant also transferred the homestead and six acres to Valerie Young and her
husband. Defendant explained that he transferred this property in order to satisfy a $20,000
claim Young allegedly had against the trust as a result of money that had been loaned to grantor
prior to his passing. Defendant maintained that he believed the transfer of property was fair in
light of home’s poor condition. Defendant also transferred an additional piece of trust property
by land contract consisting of 20 acres to the north of the six-acre homestead parcel. Defendant
testified that the 20 acres sold to Young on land contract had been “released” by his son, who
had been promised a total of 68 acres. The terms of the land contract required Young to pay
$766.80 per year for thirty years with no interest. Defendant explained that the property
transferred by land contract provided access to Young’s distributive share of the trust, a piece of
property that would otherwise be landlocked. In addition, defendant sold approximately 16 acres
of trust property to Paul Vogel and his wife on land contract. The terms of the land contract
required payments of $643.20 per year for thirty years, with no interest. Thereafter, defendant
made distributions of parcels of the remainder of trust property consisting of approximately 42
acres to each of the named beneficiaries.
Plaintiff brought suit alleging that defendant had violated his duties as trustee and
requested that certain property transfers defendant had effectuated as trustee be voided and the
property be returned to the trust. Following a two-day bench trial, the trial court found no cause
of action against plaintiff, and further ordered that plaintiff’s share in the trust forfeit for
violating a no-contest provision of the trust.
II. DECISION TO LIMIT TESTIMONY
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court’s decision to limit the testimony and exhibits of
plaintiff’s expert witness at trial constituted error. We disagree.
1
For ease of reference, the singular “defendant” will refer to the successor trustee, Michael
Vogel, unless otherwise noted.
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This issue is unpreserved, given that plaintiff’s counsel never disputed the trial court’s
ruling that the failure to provide the document at issue constituted a violation of the court’s
pretrial discovery order. Detroit Leasing Co v Detroit, 269 Mich App 233, 237; 713 NW2d 269
(2005). Consequently, we will review this unpreserved evidentiary issue for plain error affecting
substantial rights. Hilgendorf v St John Hosp & Med Ctr Corp, 245 Mich App 670, 700; 630
NW2d 356 (2001).
During trial, plaintiff called witness Kyle Kigar, an appraiser and real estate broker, to
testify regarding land values of certain property involved in this case. Kigar explained that, in
addition to the property descriptions he received from plaintiff’s counsel, he visited the property
and reviewed comparable sales in the area. The trial court declined to allow the information on
comparable sales to be introduced at trial because plaintiff had failed to abide by the terms of the
pretrial order, but allowed the admission of the limited use appraisals.
Pursuant to MCR 2.313(B)(2)(b), a trial court may sanction a party who fails to comply
with discovery orders by preventing that party from “support[ing] or oppos[ing] designated
claims or defenses, or prohibiting the party from introducing designated matters into evidence.”
A pretrial order related to this matter contained the following provision: “The parties shall
review all anticipated exhibits and exchange and file lists of them within 100 days of this order.”
There is no dispute that the materials at issue were not provided to opposing counsel within the
100-day period. Plaintiff argues on appeal that the language of the pretrial order should be read
to require only that a list be exchanged within the 100-day period set forth in the order, rather
than that the actual exhibits themselves be exchanged. Defendant disagrees and maintains that
the exhibits themselves were required to be exchanged, the view taken by the trial court. We
find that the trial court’s interpretation of this language was reasonable. Thus, plaintiff has failed
to demonstrate plain error.
III. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in excluding certain trial testimony of
grantor’s prior attorney concerning conversations the attorney had with defendant pursuant to the
attorney-client privilege rule. We disagree.
A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Waknin v Chamberlain, 467 Mich 329, 332; 653 NW2d 176 (2002). Whether the
attorney-client privilege applies to a communication is a question this Court reviews de novo.
Leibel v General Motors Corp, 250 Mich App 229, 236; 646 NW2d 179 (2002).
The scope of the attorney-client privilege is narrow and attaches only to confidential
communications by the client to his attorney that are made for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice. In re Costs & Attorney Fees, 250 Mich App 89, 99; 645 NW2d 697 (2002). In this case,
plaintiff argues that the privilege had been waived when the attorney testified at a deposition in
this matter. We do not find this argument persuasive.
“While either the attorney or the client can raise the privilege, only the client can waive
the privilege.” Kubiak v Hurr, 143 Mich App 465, 473; 372 NW2d 341 (1985) (citations
omitted). Plaintiff does not argue that the client waived the privilege, only that the attorney’s
appearance and answers during an earlier deposition effectively waived the privilege. While a
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general proposition exists that the attorney-client privilege is waived when a client testifies
concerning the contents of a privileged communication, McCarthy v Belcher, 128 Mich App 344,
348; 340 NW2d 848 (1983), we do not find that this proposition necessitates the conclusion that
the privilege is also waived when the attorney testifies. Here, there is no indication that
defendant, the client, agreed to waive the privilege.
Plaintiff acknowledges that the privilege is defendant’s to waive. Nevertheless, citing
Franzel v Kerr Mfg Co, 234 Mich App 600; 600 NW2d 66 (1999), he argues that defendant
implicitly waived this privilege through his acquiescence in permitting the attorney to testify at
an earlier deposition. However, we find that plaintiff’s argument contains at least one fatal flaw.
Plaintiff did not provide below, nor has he now provided, a copy of the attorney’s deposition.
The attorney, Gregory Michael Simon, did testify about matters concerning conversations with
the grantor regarding the estate and the trust, including the grantor’s wishes concerning division
of the property, and defendant’s future duties as trustee. It was only when plaintiff’s counsel
attempted to question Simon about his personal conversations with defendant after the grantor’s
death, that defendant asserted the privilege. Defendant’s assertion of the privilege runs to
defendant personally, or perhaps as the trustee, not to conversations Simon might have had with
grantor or others. Although the parties do not dispute that a deposition occurred, plaintiff has not
shown that defendant was present during the deposition and provided permission for Simon to
testify about his conversations with defendant. Nor has plaintiff provided any evidence that
Simon made any statements during the deposition that concerned these conversations. It is not
enough for plaintiff to assert error and then leave it up to this Court to discover the basis for his
claims. Mudge v Macomb Co, 458 Mich 87, 105; 580 NW2d 845 (1998). Plaintiff has not
shown that the trial court abused its discretion here.
IV. REMOVAL OF DEFENDANT AS TRUSTEE
Plaintiff next argues the trial court erred in denying his request for the removal of
defendant as successor trustee. We agree.
A probate court’s decision whether to remove a trustee is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Comerica Bank v City of Adrian, 179 Mich App 712, 729; 446 NW2d 553 (1989).
The probate court has jurisdiction to appoint or remove a trustee upon a showing of negligence
or a violation of duty. MCL 700.1302(b)(i). Our Supreme Court has stated “a trustee must show
the utmost good faith.” Michigan Home Missionary Soc v Corning, 164 Mich 395, 402; 129 NW
686 (1911). See also former MCL 700.7301 and MCL 700.7302, amended effective April 1,
2000; MCL 700.7801.2
2
Former MCL 700.7301 provided that a trustee has a general duty to administer a trust
expeditiously for the benefit of the beneficiaries of the trust. Former MCL 700.7302 provided
that a trustee is required to act “as would a prudent person in dealing with the property of another
. . . .” These provisions have now been replaced with similar requirements outlining the duties of
trustees in MCL 700.7801; MCL 700.7802, and MCL 700.7803, effective April 1, 2010. MCL
700.7801 now provides, [u]pon acceptance of a trusteeship, the trustee shall administer the trust
in good faith, expeditiously, in accordance with its terms and purposes, for the benefit of the trust
(continued…)
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In the instant case, the trust document ordered that the residuary assets of the trust be
distributed to the grantor’s remaining children in equal shares. As will be discussed in more
detail below, defendant, in his capacity as trustee, made improper transfers of trust property to
his own son and to two of the named beneficiaries prior to the distributions to each of the
beneficiaries, to the detriment of the other trust beneficiaries. Defendant violated his duty as
trustee by conducting these transfers.
Moreover, defendant himself testified that, in 2005, a 10-acre parcel of land belonging to
a local farmer was leased in the trust’s name to farm hay, but that defendant then leased the
property in his own name the following year, used trust equipment to farm the parcel, and did not
include the resulting income from 2006 in the trust’s accounting. This testimony demonstrates
that defendant personally benefited from an opportunity originally belonging to the trust. Such
conduct constitutes a violation of defendant’s fiduciary duty to the trust and its beneficiaries.
In addition, defendant failed to create and provide annual accountings related to the trust.
In fact, no accounting was created until plaintiff’s suit was instituted.
The trial court itself acknowledged that “[t]here was a lot of playing fast and loose,” but
apparently excused the conduct for reason that it was a “familial situation” and “[t]hat’s the way
some families are.” We find no authority to support the trial court’s proposition that “family
situations” are excused from judicial scrutiny to ensure that a trustee’s conduct reflects the intent
of a grantor as evidenced by the provisions of his or her trust. Furthermore, given that trusts are
often set up in lieu of wills, the adoption of such a premise would result in beneficiaries being
able to circumvent the plain language of a trust so long as enough of them “agree” that their
recollection is consistent with the grantor’s intent. Indeed, defendants appear to advance such an
argument in this case, noting that all of the other beneficiaries had no problem with the trustee’s
actions. That the other beneficiaries agreed with defendant’s actions cannot render valid those
actions that are inconsistent with the trust language. Plaintiff presented ample evidence that
defendant had violated his duty as trustee. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in
denying plaintiff’s request to remove defendant as trustee. On remand, the trial court shall
remove defendant as trustee and appoint an independent, non-family member trustee.
V. TRANSFER OF TRUST PROPERTY PRIOR TO DISTRIBUTION TO BENEFICIARIES
Plaintiff next argues the trial court erred in approving the initial real property transfers
made by defendant as trustee to Phil Vogel. Again, we agree.
(…continued)
beneficiaries, and in accordance with this article.”
MCL 700.7802 outlines further
responsibilities and duties of trustees to administer the trust solely for the benefit of the trust’s
beneficiaries. MCL 700.7803 provides; “The trustee shall act as would a prudent person in
dealing with the property of another, including following the standards of the Michigan prudent
investor rule. If the trustee has special skills or is named trustee on the basis of representation of
special skills or expertise, the trustee is under a duty to use those skills.”
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Following a bench trial, a trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error and its
conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Glen Lake-Crystal River Watershed Riparians v Glen
Lake Ass’n, 264 Mich App 523, 531; 695 NW2d 508 (2004).
As noted above, a trustee has a general duty to administer a trust expeditiously for the
benefit of the beneficiaries of the trust. Former MCL.700.7301; MCL 700.7801; MCL
700.7802. Moreover, it is well established that a trustee’s duties to beneficiaries are determined
by the trust agreement and the intent of the settlor. In re Butterfield Estate, 418 Mich 241, 259260; 341 NW2d 453 (1983). Here, the trust specifically ordered that residuary assets be
distributed evenly among the beneficiaries after the death of the grantor and after “the payment
of the Grantor’s just debts, funeral expenses and expenses of last illness. . . .”
Defendant argues, and the trial court apparently agreed, that his actions were permissible
under the broad enumerated trustee powers of the trust. Indeed, the trust provided the trustee
with authority to retain assets, settle claims, dispose of or encumber assets, enter contracts, and
distribute property. The provision allowing for the distribution of property also authorizes the
trustee to “make division or distribution in money or kind, or partly in either including
disproportionate in-kind distributions, at values to be determined by the trustee, and the trustee’s
judgment shall be binding upon all interested parties.”
However, to the extent this provision conflicted with the residuary clause, the trial court
was required to read and construe the trust as a whole. Detroit Trust Co v Rivard, 315 Mich 62,
70-71; 23 NW2d 206 (1946). We note that, in addition to the two provisions above, the trust
contained the following language, “The purpose of this Agreement is to establish a Trust to
receive and manage assets for the benefit of the Grantor during the Grantor’s lifetime, and to
further manage and distribute the assets of the Trust upon the death of the Grantor.” When these
three provisions are viewed in this context, they evidence an intent on the part of the grantor that,
while defendant, as trustee, had the power to effectuate the grantor’s wishes to divide his estate
equally, defendant was not free to play favorites among the beneficiaries, or among nonbeneficiaries, at the expense of the other beneficiaries. We find that it was grantor’s intent that
defendant utilize the powers enumerated in the trust, including authorizing disproportionate
distributions of property, to immediately distribute the trust assets equally among the
beneficiaries after the decedent’s outstanding obligations were satisfied and after payment of
funeral or last medical expenses.
Defendant’s son, Phil Vogel, was not a named beneficiary of the trust. In addition, while
some evidence was presented to show what might be characterized as a “just debt” of grantor’s
to defendant’s son, plaintiff argued that the evidence presented to support the debt did not meet
the requirement of the statute of frauds for a valid claim against the trust. However, the trial
court responded to this objection with the following:
“You’re overruled; I’ll tell you why. This is a familial situation; it’s quite
obvious to me. There was a lot of playing fast and loose. That’s the way some
families are.”
Following the close of proofs, the trial court found that Phil Vogel provided credible testimony.
However, it did not make specific findings that he had already paid the grantor for five acres;
that his account of his hours of farm work was reasonable; or, that the prior agreement between
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Phil and the grantor was valid or enforceable against the trust. To the contrary, at the end of
trial, the trial court appeared to concede that the transfer or agreement between grantor and Phil
Vogel could not satisfy the statute of frauds. Nevertheless, it found that defendant had the power
to effectuate the transfer anyway due to his broad powers as trustee.
We hold that the trial court erred when it upheld the land contract transfer made by
defendant to his son. If the prior agreement does not satisfy the statute of frauds, but some of the
claimed debt is valid due to Phil Vogel’s farm work or a prior payment, Phil Vogel did not have
any right to specific performance, but can still claim that he should be compensated for services
rendered. See King v First Michigan Bank & Trust Co of Zeeland, 11 Mich App 144, 146; 160
NW2d 721 (1968). We thus reverse the trial court’s decision upholding this transfer and remand
for a determination of the amount of “just debt” enforceable against the trust, if any, the value of
the property transferred to Phil Vogel,3 and whether this transfer was in the best interests of the
trust’s beneficiaries. To the extent that the parties do not dispute that Phil Vogel paid for five
acres prior to the grantor’s death, the transfer of those five acres remains valid. Whatever
remains of the other 43 acres after distribution to Phil Vogel of the value of the “just debt” shall
be returned to the trust res to be reincorporated into the overall properties to be distributed
equally among the beneficiaries.
In addition, we find that the trial court erred when it upheld the land contracts defendant
entered into as trustee with Valerie Young and Paul Vogel. The parties do not appear to dispute
that Valerie Young had loaned grantor $20,000. However, we find the trial court’s reliance on
defendant’s personal testimony that value of the transferred six acres of land and the house was
equal to this debt clearly erroneous and due to its unfounded decision not to require adequate
appraisals of the grantor’s property. We thus remand for further factual proceedings concerning
this transfer.
Further, the trial court should have invalidated the remaining land contracts to Valerie
Young and Paul Vogel. Although the 20-acre land contract to Valerie Young was ostensibly
made in order for Young to have access to her “other” distributive share of the trust property, this
was improper. So too was the additional 16-acre land contract to Paul Vogel. Under the terms
of the trust, once the “just debts” were satisfied, the remaining property, which includes these
two parcels, should have been divided equally. While presumably Valerie Young and Paul
Vogel could have still properly received some or all of these parcels as their distributive share,
3
In reaching our decision, we specifically disapprove of the trial court’s reliance on defendant’s
personal valuations of all of the pieces of property involved. No reasonable basis for these
valuations was presented to the court. Nor did the trial court discuss defendant’s qualifications
to make them. The trial court apparently decided to reduce the trustee’s burden of performance
in this respect based on the fact that the “underfunded” trust, containing over 300 acres of prime
farmland, could not afford to pay for “adequate appraisals.” We submit that either the trial court
could have ordered part of the property sold to pay for these and other necessary expenses, or
that the trustee, or the beneficiaries, could have advanced the trust sufficient funds, given that
they all had a direct interest in the valuations.
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the parcels, or the value thereof, should have been offset by a reduced remaining distributive
share, and an increased relative distributive share to plaintiff and defendant.
The trial court made numerous references to the instant case being a “family situation”
and refused to scrutinize defendant’s decisions to transfer trust property because “it’s within the
family and because the Court concludes it was the moral and absolute right thing to do.” As
already noted, we reject the premise that “family situations” are exempt from judicial oversight
to ensure that the intentions of the grantor of a trust are followed or should be judged in light of
the “moral” thing to do. Instead, courts are mandated to look to the plain language of the trust to
determine a grantor’s intent. In re Woodworth Trust, 196 Mich App 326, 327; 492 NW2d 818
(1992). Nothing in the trust provided for “pre-distribution” land contracts to beneficiaries at the
expense of the interests of the remaining beneficiaries.
We thus reverse the trial court’s holding concerning the specific land contracts
challenged by plaintiff and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
VI. FORFEITURE OF PLAINTIFF’S DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE
Finally, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in ordering his share under the trust
forfeit pursuant to the trust’s no-contest provision. We agree.
The trust in the instant matter contains a no-contest provision in Section XIII (G) that
reads as follows:
Unsuccessful Contest Invalidates Contestor’s Devise: Should any of the
beneficiaries unsuccessfully contest any of the provisions of this Trust, [t]he
distributive share of the contesting beneficiary under paragraph V(a) of this Trust
shall be void as to the contesting beneficiary. Said contesting beneficiary’s share
shall be distributed according to paragraph V(a) of this Trust as though said
contesting beneficiary had predeceased Grantor. (emphasis added)
Following the close of proofs, the trial court stated that in addition to finding no cause of
action plaintiff’s share of the trust should be forfeit according to the above referenced provision.
This decision constituted error because plaintiff’s suit served to contest the propriety of the
trustee’s actions, rather than a challenge to the provisions of the trust itself. See In re Payment
Estate, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued November 17, 2009
(Docket No. 282529) (holding that the defendant’s challenges to the personal representative’s
performance of his duties was not a direct or indirect contest or attack, such that the no-contest
clause was not invoked).
The provision mandating forfeiture in the event of an unsuccessful contest specifically
identified that the unsuccessful contest must relate to the provisions of the trust. The gist of
plaintiff’s complaint related to his assertions that defendant had failed to execute his duties as
trustee in conformity with the trust. Thus, plaintiff filed suit in an effort to enforce the trust, not
contest it. Consequently, even though plaintiff was unsuccessful in the pursuit of his claim
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below, the no-contest provision was not implicated in the instant matter. In any event, because
we find that the trial court erred in its analysis below, plaintiff’s contest is not “unsuccessful.”4
VII. CONCLUSION
On remand, the trial court shall remove defendant as trustee and appoint a new,
independent trustee. The trial court shall also reinstate plaintiff as a beneficiary under the trust
and void all property transfers and land contracts made by defendant on behalf of the trust as
necessary to comply with the following instructions.
All distributions made to the beneficiaries pursuant to the trust (i.e. the “42”-acre parcels)
shall be voided and all property returned to the trust res for redistribution. To the extent that land
valuations are necessary, the trial court may order part of the property sold to pay for these and
other necessary expenses, or the trustee, or the beneficiaries, may advance the trust sufficient
funds. The trial court shall not consider that this is a “family matter” in making any of its
rulings.
The trial court shall determine what amount, if any, is enforceable as a “just debt” against
the trust for Phil Vogel’s work on the farm, the value of the property transferred to Phil Vogel,
and whether the transfer was in the best interest of the trust’s beneficiaries. To the extent that the
value of the property transferred was more than the value of the debt, that property shall be
placed back into the trust. Additionally, Phil Vogel shall either be awarded land in an amount
equal to the payments he has made under the voided land contract, or the trustee may elect to
reimburse him for the payments and retain the land within the trust.
The trial court shall also determine the value of the land that Young received in exchange
for the $20,000 debt. To the extent that the land has a higher value than $20,000, Young may
select which of the homestead acres she receives up to a value of $20,000, with the remaining
acreage being returned to the trust res. To the extent that the land is worth less than $20,000,
Young may receive additional acreage in an amount sufficient to repay the debt that is contained
within the land she received pursuant to the voided land contract. Young shall also receive the
value of the monies paid the trust under the land contract, either in cash or land at the discretion
of the trustee. All of the remaining land under the voided land contract shall be returned to the
trust res.
4
We note that the Legislature has recently enacted MCL 700.7113, effective April 1, 2010,
which specifically provides:
A provision in a trust that purports to penalize an interested person for
contesting the trust or instituting another proceeding relating to the trust shall not
be given effect if probable cause exists for instituting a proceeding contesting the
trust or another proceeding relating to the trust.
Due to its effective date, this statute does itself not invalidate the trial court’s decision.
However, because it may be implicated on remand, we reference it for future guidance.
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The trial court shall award to Paul Vogel his two acres, for which he paid $2,000. Paul
Vogel shall also receive the value of all monies paid to the trust under the land contract, either in
cash or additional land at the discretion of the trustee. The remaining land under the voided land
contract shall be returned to the trust res.
After the property has been valued and Phil Vogel, Young, and Paul Vogel have received
their property as established above, the trustee shall divide the remaining land in the trust into
equal shares. We note that equal shares may, but does not automatically, necessitate equal
acreage. Thus, for example, to the extent that a 30-acre parcel has the same value as a 40-acre
parcel, those different-sized parcels would reflect equal shares of the assets. If equal land
distribution is not possible, the trustee is permitted to use whatever powers are provided under
the terms of the trust to create equal distributions to the beneficiaries, including selling the
property.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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