PEOPLE OF MI V MARCUS LEE HILL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 25, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 289645
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 08-001205-FC
MARCUS LEE HILL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: SAAD, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and SERVITTO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions for first-degree murder, MCL
750.316(a), burning of personal property valued at $20,000 or more, MCL 750.74(1)(d)(i), felon
in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and possession of a firearm during the commission of
a felony, MCL 750.227b. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
defendant’s motion for a new trial, we affirm.
On April 30, 2008, defendant was convicted of the murder of Reginald Sturdivant.
Twenty-eight days later, on May 28, 2008, defendant moved for a new trial. He argued that he
had been denied a fair trial by the failure of the prosecution and police to provide immunity
agreements and to correct false trial testimony. The motion was based on the affidavit of
Christopher Stinson, the brother of Carla Bowers, who was the “primary witness” that connected
defendant to the murder and arson. According to Stinson, Bowers, who had received
information about defendant from William Ledbetter, gave “uncreditable testimony.”1 Defense
counsel admitted that Stinson was listed on defendant’s witness list as “Bam,” but claimed that
because he only had a nickname for Stinson and because defendant had been incarcerated and
unable to help gather information, he was unable to locate Stinson before trial.
The trial court denied defendant’s motion. It found no “substantiated proof” of the
allegations of misconduct by the prosecution and police that were contained in the motion. In
1
In the motion, defendant stated that Stinson would testify that Bowers, in exchange for her
testimony, received immunity from whatever charges may or would have been filed against her.
However, Stinson did not aver that Bowers received immunity for her testimony. No immunity
agreements were attached to defendant’s motion.
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addition, it stated that defense counsel’s claim that counsel could not have procured Stinson as a
witness at trial was “specious at best,” where, within 30 days of defendant being convicted, he
obtained the names of individuals who had been listed by nickname on defendant’s witness list
and secured an affidavit from Stinson. It concluded that, because the exercise of due diligence
could have secured Stinson’s presence at trial, defendant had not met the requirements for a new
trial.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new
trial. We disagree.
We review a trial court's decision to deny a motion for a new trial for an abuse of
discretion. People v Miller, 482 Mich 540, 544; 759 NW2d 850 (2008). An abuse of discretion
occurs when the trial court makes a decision that falls outside the range of principled outcomes.
Id. To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must show: “(1) the
evidence itself, not merely its materiality, was newly discovered; (2) the newly discovered
evidence was not cumulative; (3) the party could not, using reasonable diligence, have
discovered and produced the evidence at trial; and (4) the new evidence makes a different result
probable on retrial.” People v Cress, 468 Mich 678, 692; 664 NW2d 174 (2003) (quotations
omitted).
Defendant claims that the trial court’s assumption that defendant, with the exercise of
reasonable diligence, could have produced Stinson’s testimony at trial is unsupported by the
record. Defense counsel asserted below that he was unable to locate Stinson before trial because
he only had a nickname for Stinson. Yet, as the trial court noted, within 30 days of defendant’s
convictions, defense counsel located, spoke with, and obtained an affidavit from Stinson. The
record contains no explanation for how defense counsel located Stinson after trial. Defendant
has not claimed that Stinson was located using resources or information that were not available
or known before trial. Under the circumstances, defendant’s claim that Stinson could not be
located before trial was “specious.” The trial court’s determination that, with the exercise of
reasonable diligence, defendant could have presented Stinson’s testimony at trial did not fall
outside the range of principled outcomes.
In addition, defendant would have used Stinson’s testimony to challenge Bower’s
credibility. Newly discovered evidence that would only be used for impeachment purposes is
not ground for a new trial. People v Davis, 199 Mich App 502, 516; 503 NW2d 457 (1993).
Thus, Stinson’s testimony, even if newly discovered, would not warrant a new trial.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
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