IN RE DILLON MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of MATTHEW BRANDON
DILLON, MICHAEL STEPHEN DILLON, and
MARK THEODORE DILLON, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
May 20, 2010
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 291903
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC Nos. 2007-000577-NA
2007-000578-NA
2007-000579-NA
MICHELLE CHRISTINE LONG,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
HOWARD RAYMOND DILLON, JR.,
Respondent.
Before: METER, P.J., and MURRAY and BECKERING, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the trial court’s order terminating her
parental rights to her children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (j).1 We affirm.
In order to terminate parental rights, a trial court must find that at least one of the
statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been established by clear and
convincing evidence. In re Jackson, 199 Mich App 22, 25; 501 NW2d 182 (1993).
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Although petitioner also sought termination under MCL 712A.29b(3)(g), the court only
addressed subsections (c)(i) and (j) in its findings made on the record.
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If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights
and that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests, the court shall
order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for
reunification of the child with the parent not be made. [MCL 712A.19b(5).]
We review the trial court’s findings for clear error. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612
NW2d 407 (2000).
We find no clear error in the trial court’s determination that the evidence supported
termination of respondent-appellant’s parental rights under subsections (c)(i) and (j). The
condition that led to the adjudication was respondent-appellant’s inability to provide the children
with a safe environment, related to her failure to protect one of the children from her live-in
boyfriend’s physical abuse. Despite the fact that the children implicated her boyfriend in the
abuse and despite the boyfriend’s conviction of child abuse stemming from the allegations,
respondent-appellant continued her involvement with, lived with, and remained emotionally and
financially dependent on her boyfriend and repeatedly denied that he had hit the child.
Respondent-appellant’s choice to remain with her boyfriend for at least 17 months after the
children’s removal from her care posed a serious risk of harm to the children, was clearly
detrimental to reunification efforts, and evidenced a serious lack of progress in addressing her
issues. Her failure to fully participate in domestic violence counseling, a crucial aspect of her
Parent-Agency Agreement (considering her pattern of involvement with domestically violent
partners), further indicated that the children would be at a substantial risk of harm if returned to
her custody. See, generally, Trejo, 462 Mich at 346 n 3.
Under the circumstances, the efforts respondent-appellant made to comply with the terms
of her Parent-Agency Agreement were not enough to ensure that the children would be safe in
her custody. The evidence clearly and convincingly established that she failed to rectify the
domestic-violence issues that led to the adjudication and was not reasonably likely to do so
within a reasonable time considering the ages of the children. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). The
evidence also clearly and convincingly established that there was a reasonable likelihood that the
children would be harmed if returned to respondent-appellant’s care. MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).
Although the children were older and had a longstanding relationship with respondent-appellant,
testimony indicated a “very definite need” for safety, stability, and predictability, which
respondent-appellant clearly could not provide, considering her lack of progress during the
proceedings.
We disagree with respondent-appellant’s argument that termination was improper
because she had separated from her boyfriend by the time of the termination hearing. Indeed,
testimony indicated a likelihood of future involvement with him. Aside from the very recent
nature of their alleged separation, which reportedly occurred only one month before the
termination hearing, their relationship was longstanding. Respondent-appellant was emotionally
and financially dependent on her boyfriend and had been unable to separate from him, despite
her intentions otherwise, multiple times during the proceedings, even though his presence was a
serious detriment to reunification with her children. It is also noteworthy that respondentappellant had not ended all ties with the boyfriend by the time of the termination hearing because
she continued to use his car for transportation, and it remained titled and insured in his name.
Moreover, respondent-appellant had a serious need for additional therapy to address her
domestic violence issues. Under such circumstances, we find no clear error in the trial court’s
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finding that respondent-appellant failed to take enough steps in a timely manner to separate from
her boyfriend and did not adequately address the domestic violence issues within the home.
Trejo, 462 Mich at 356-357 (discussing the standard of review).
We likewise find no clear error in the court’s determination that termination was in the
children’s best interests, considering respondent-appellant’s failure to make meaningful progress
toward rectifying the domestic-violence issues in her home. MCL 712A.19b(5). We recognize
that the children, who were older, had a longstanding relationship with respondent-appellant.
However, all the children had anxieties and fears about the domestic violence they witnessed
while in her care, expressed fear about returning home, and had a “very definite need” for a safe,
stable, and predictable environment. Unfortunately, respondent-appellant could not provide the
environment necessary for the children’s well-being, considering her conduct during the
proceedings and her failure to adequately address her domestic-violence issues. She also did not
have suitable housing for the children at the time of the termination hearing. The children were
doing “very well” in their relative placement, which provided them with the stable and safe
environment they needed. Under such circumstances, it would be detrimental for the children to
wait for respondent-appellant to work toward reunification, and the trial court did not clearly err
in terminating her parental rights instead of further delaying their permanency and stability.
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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