PEOPLE OF MI V ROBERT LUKE MILLER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 20, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 290488
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2008-219319-FH
ROBERT LUKE MILLER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: SAAD, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and SERVITTO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of second-degree home invasion, MCL
750.110a(3). The trial court sentenced him as an habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12,
to 29 months to 15 years’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals as of right. Because defendant was
not denied a fair and impartial trial by prosecutorial misconduct and because defendant was not
denied a speedy trial, we affirm.
I. FACTS
On January 13, 2007, Barbara Turner and her ten-year-old daughter, returning from a
church service, discovered that someone had broken into their Oak Park house. The intruder had
taken a television with a built-in DVD player, a DVD player, a laptop computer, and a diamond
tennis bracelet. The intruder had also broken the glass out of the front door.
Officer Adam Hughes, the first police officer to respond, discovered several drops of
blood in Turner’s house. Another officer, Michael Hodakoski, collected samples of the blood.
The samples were sent to a Michigan State Police crime laboratory for testing. A DNA profile
from the blood was developed and entered in the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS).
The crime lab was notified that CODIS contained a matching DNA profile. The
matching profile belonged to defendant. Detective Jason Ginopolis, using a buccol swab,
obtained a DNA sample from defendant. A profile of defendant’s DNA was developed, and the
profile matched the DNA profile obtained from the blood found in Turner’s house.
Ginopolis contacted local pawnshops to learn if defendant had pawned any items. He
received a response from American Jewelry and Loan. According to Rodney Riley, the
manager, American Jewelry and Loan, loaned $40 to a Robert Miller on January 13, 2007, for a
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20-inch television with a built-in DVD player and another $10 on January 15, 2007, for a DVD
player. A print of Miller’s right thumb taken by Riley when the items were pawned matched the
right thumbprint on defendant’s arrest card.1
II. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Defendant argues that he was denied his right to a fair trial by prosecutorial misconduct.
Specifically, defendant argues that the prosecutor elicited evidence of his pretrial incarceration,
commented on his decision not to testify, and shifted the burden of proof. We disagree.
The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether the defendant was denied a fair and
impartial trial. People v Mesik (On Reconsideration), 285 Mich App 535, 541; 775 NW2d 857
(2009). We review preserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct de novo, People v Pfaffle, 246
Mich App 282, 288; 632 NW2d 162 (2001), and unpreserved claims for plain error affecting the
defendant’s substantial rights, Mesik, 285 Mich App at 541.
A
Defendant first claims that the prosecutor deliberately elicited testimony of his pretrial
incarceration. After Turner testified that defendant had contacted her in writing, the prosecutor
asked Turner how she knew the letters were from defendant. Turner replied that the letters had
defendant’s name on them. The prosecutor then asked Turner if the letters contained a return
address, and after Turner answered, “Yes,” the prosecutor asked for the return address. Turner
said that the address was “Oakland County Jail.”
References to a defendant’s incarceration are generally inadmissible. People v Spencer,
130 Mich App 527, 537; 343 NW2d 607 (1983). Turner’s response that the return address of
defendant’s letters was Oakland County Jail was a direct response to the prosecutor’s question.
However, even if the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when she asked Turner for the return
address on defendant’s letters, the prosecutor’s question and Turner’s answer did not deprive
defendant of a fair trial. Immediately after Turner answered, defendant objected. The trial court
sustained the objection and instructed the jury to “disregard the question.” Jurors are presumed
to follow their instructions. People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998).
Defendant received appropriate relief when the trial court instructed the jury to ignore the
prosecutor’s question. People v Miller (After Remand), 211 Mich App 30, 42-43; 535 NW2d
518 (1995).
B
Defendant next claims that the prosecutor improperly commented on his right not to
testify during her closing argument. During her closing argument, the prosecutor stated:
1
The pawnshop had sold the television and the DVD player before it was contacted by
Ginopolis. Thus, the pawned items could not be identified by Turner.
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You heard the testimony of Ms. Turner. She came here and she told you
she didn’t know this man from Adam. She never seen him before, she never
heard of him before, she didn’t know anything about him. So we know he had no
business being in her house. His blood should not have been in his (sic) house, he
was never invited in and accidentally cut himself, he should have not been there.
But yet he was there, there was blood with his DNA profile in her house on the
same day that her house was broken into and items were missing.
That evidence is uncontroverted. No one came in and refuted that her
house had been broken into. You didn’t hear any evidence to the contrary.
You didn’t hear any evidence to the contrary that DNA belonged to
somebody else or matched with a statistical probability in the quadrillions and
quintillions other than that of the defendant.
Defendant did not object to the comment.
Defendant claims that, because he was the only person that could have accounted for his
whereabouts on January 13, 2007, the prosecutor’s statement was a comment on his right not to
testify. A prosecutor’s remark that evidence is uncontradicted or undisputed generally does not
amount to improper comment on the defendant’s decision not to testify, even if the defendant is
the only person that could have provided contradictory testimony. People v Guenther, 188 Mich
App 174, 177; 469 NW2d 59 (1991).2 “A prosecutor’s remark that evidence is undisputed is
proper in urging the weight to be given the testimony.” Id. In addition, the prosecutor’s remark
was not of such a nature that the jury would necessarily take it as a comment on defendant’s
failure to testify. See id. at 179. The prosecutor’s comment that the evidence was
uncontroverted was not clearly or obviously improper. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763;
597 NW2d 130 (1999).
Even if the prosecutor’s comment was improper, defendant has failed to show that a
curative instruction could not have alleviated any prejudice resulting from the prosecutor’s
comment. People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 235; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). Curative
instructions are presumed to cure most errors. Id. In addition, the evidence that implicated
defendant as the perpetrator of the home invasion was strong. Defendant’s DNA matched the
DNA of the blood found in Turner’s house, and defendant pawned a television with a built-in
DVD player the day of the home invasion and a DVD player two days later. Defendant has not
shown that, in the face of this evidence, the prosecutor’s comment affected the outcome of the
trial. Carines, 460 Mich at 763.3
2
However, the Court suggested that prosecutors refrain from using terms like “unrebuttable”
when only the defendant could have disputed or rebutted the evidence. Guenther, 188 Mich App
at 178.
3
We reject defendant’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s
comment that the evidence was uncontroverted. To establish a claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must establish that counsel’s performance was deficient and that, but for
(continued…)
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C
Defendant also claims that the prosecutor shifted the burden of proof in her rebuttal
closing argument. The prosecutor stated Hodakoski, in collecting and packaging the blood
samples, followed procedures and training. The following discourse then took place:
Prosecutor. . . . You heard no evidence to the contrary, you heard no witness
come in here and say, Officer Hodaleski (ph) -Defendant.
Your Honor, I’m going to object. I don’t have a burden to produce
any witnesses or a burden of proof as it relates to this case.
***
The Court.
Why don’t you -- why don’t you rephrase that.
***
Prosecutor. You heard absolutely no evidence that Officer Hodaleski (ph) did
not follow procedures. No other person contradicted him, nobody impeached
him, there was not a witness called to say, you know what, he should have
done, A B -***
The Court.
Okay, now please disregard that last comment by the Prosecutor.
What she means to say basically is, the witnesses that were called, you know,
said what they did. Okay.
Prosecutor.
There’s nothing to contradict what he said. Okay.
A prosecutor may not comment on a defendant’s failure to present evidence; such an
argument tends to shift the burden of proof. People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 273; 662
NW2d 836 (2003); People v Green, 131 Mich App 232, 237; 345 NW2d 676 (1983). However,
a prosecutor’s remarks must be considered in context of the defense counsel’s arguments.
People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 592-593; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). Once a defendant
advances a theory, the prosecutor may comment on the improbability of the theory. People v
Fields, 450 Mich 94, 115-116; 538 NW2d 356 (1995). Defendant, in his closing argument,
challenged the manner in which Hodakoski collected, packaged, and preserved the blood
samples, even stating that there was a good probability of contamination. The prosecutor’s
(…continued)
counsel’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the
proceedings would have been different. People v Payne, 285 Mich App 181, 188-18; 774 NW2d
714 (2009). In light of the DNA evidence and the evidence that defendant pawned items similar
to two of the items taken from Turner’s house, there is no reasonable probability that, absent
counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s comment, the result of the proceedings would have
been different.
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comments responded to defendant’s theory that the blood samples were not properly collected
and preserved. Thus, even while the trial court instructed the jury not to consider the comment
that no witness was called to contradict Hodakoski, the prosecutor’s comments were not
improper. Id. In addition, because jurors are presumed to follow their instructions, Graves, 458
Mich at 486, the trial court’s instructions that defendant is presumed innocent, that the
prosecution must prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt, and that defendant is not
required to prove his innocence or to do anything cured any prejudice to defendant.
III. SPEEDY TRIAL
Defendant asserts that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial when
ten months lapsed between his arrest in January 2008 and the commencement of trial in
November 2008. We disagree.
The determination of whether a defendant was denied a speedy trial is a mixed question
of law and fact. People v Waclawski, 286 Mich App 634, ___; 780 NW2d 321 (2009). Factual
findings are reviewed for clear error and the constitutional issue is a question of law reviewed de
novo. Id.
The United States Constitution, US Const, Am VI, and the Michigan Constitution, Const
1963, art 1, § 20, guarantee a criminal defendant a speedy trial. People v Walker, 276 Mich App
528, 541; 741 NW2d 843 (2007), vacated in part on other grounds 480 Mich 1059 (2008). We
apply a four-part balancing test to determine whether a defendant has been denied a speedy trial.
Id. The four factors are “(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) the
defendant’s assertion of the right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” Id. (quotation omitted). If
the delay is less than 18 months, the defendant has the burden to show that he suffered prejudice.
Waclawski, 286 Mich App at ___. If the delay is more than 18 months, prejudice is presumed,
and the prosecution has the burden to rebut the presumption. People v Williams, 475 Mich 245,
262; 716 NW2d 208 (2006).
The delay between defendant’s arrest and the commencement of trial was ten months.
Defendant acknowledges that the delay falls short of the 18-month “‘presumptive prejudice’
trigger,” but claims that, because his case was “a simple criminal case”—the case against him
consisted of blood samples and thumbprint—the case did not compel a ten-month delay.
Defendant, however, acknowledges that the delay was primarily to allow a defense expert to
review the DNA test results. He does not contest the trial court’s factual finding that the delay
was “at his behest and for his benefit.”
Because the delay was less than 18 months, defendant has the burden to establish
prejudice. Waclawski, 286 Mich App at ___. There are two kinds of prejudice: prejudice to the
person and prejudice to the defense. Id.4 “Prejudice to the defense is the more serious concern,
because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the
entire system.” Williams, 475 Mich at 264 (quotations omitted). Defendant does not name any
4
Defendant does not claim prejudice to the person.
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potential defense witness that was lost or identify any exculpatory evidence that was misplaced
during the delay. Moreover, the delay, which was primarily to allow a defense expert to examine
the DNA test results, had the potential to benefit defendant. Defendant has not established
prejudice resulting from the delay. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to
dismiss.5
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
5
We reject defendant’s request for 314 days credit for time served. The issue is not properly
before us because it was not raised in the questions presented. People v Anderson, 284 Mich
App 11, 16; 772 NW2d 792 (2009). Regardless, the record indicates that defendant, after his
arrest, was jailed because he was on parole at the time of the home invasion. Under these
circumstances, defendant is not entitled to jail credit. People v Idziak, 484 Mich 549, 562; 773
NW2d 616 (2009).
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