PEOPLE OF MI V JUSTIN SCOTT STAIR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 20, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 288175
Grand Traverse Circuit Court
LC No. 07-010394-FC
JUSTIN SCOTT STAIR,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: WHITBECK, P.J., and SAWYER and BORRELLO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL
750.316(1)(a), and assault of a pregnant individual causing a miscarriage or death of a fetus,
MCL 750.90a. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction and 18 to 50
years’ imprisonment for the assault conviction. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
I. UNDERLYING FACTS
Defendant was convicted of murdering a coworker (hereafter the “victim”), with whom
he had been involved in a brief sexual relationship while the victim was estranged from her
husband. In February or March 2006, the victim discovered that she was pregnant and believed
that defendant was the father of her unborn child. According to testimony at trial, defendant
wanted the victim to have an abortion because he planned to move away and join the military,
but the victim was opposed to an abortion. It is undisputed that the victim met with defendant on
April 1, 2006, and that she disappeared after that date. More than a year later, in May 2007, her
deceased body was discovered in a shallow grave on property near the home of defendant’s
parents, where defendant had been living at the time the victim disappeared. An autopsy
revealed that the victim died from a single gunshot wound to the head. During a search of
defendant’s residence, a .32-caliber handgun and the victim’s purse were found in a trash bag
that was hidden in a dropped ceiling in defendant’s bedroom. Defendant’s fingerprints were on
the trash bag. The keys to the victim’s car were found under some other ceiling tiles in an
adjacent area of the house. A firearm’s expert later determined that a bullet recovered from the
victim’s head during the autopsy was fired from the same handgun that was discovered in
defendant’s bedroom. The prosecution’s theory at trial was that defendant lured the victim to his
home on the night of April 1, 2006, by assuring her that he had changed his mind and wanted to
be a father to her child, but instead shot her with his father’s handgun.
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The defense theory at trial was that the victim was killed by her estranged husband,
Timothy Harrell, who had a previous history of domestic violence and was upset that the victim
had become pregnant by another man. Defendant argued that Harrell planted the evidence that
was found in defendant’s home and buried the victim’s body in a place where defendant would
be blamed for her death. Defendant admitted meeting with the victim shortly before she
disappeared, but claimed that she left a note in his home in which she wrote that defendant was
not the father of her child and that she was running away to Mexico with the real father.1
II. APPELLATE COUNSEL’S ISSUES
A. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant first argues that he is entitled to a new trial because trial counsel was
ineffective. Defendant did not raise this issue in an appropriate motion in the trial court and this
Court denied his motion to remand. Therefore, our review is limited to errors apparent from the
record. People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 48; 687 NW2d 342 (2004).
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that the representation so
prejudiced defendant that he was denied his right to a fair trial. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298,
338; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). Defendant must overcome the presumption that the challenged
action might be considered sound trial strategy. People v Tommolino, 187 Mich App 14, 17; 466
NW2d 315 (1991). To establish prejudice, defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
People v Johnnie Johnson, Jr, 451 Mich 115, 124; 545 NW2d 637 (1996).
Defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective for not timely requesting that the
victim’s remains be preserved so that a defense expert could examine them. The record discloses
that defense counsel was retained on or about May 23, 2007. On June 1, 2007, defense counsel
contacted the prosecutor’s office to request that the victim’s remains be preserved, but the
remains had been cremated two days earlier, on May 30, 2007. Even if we were to credit
defendant’s argument that counsel erred by not making an earlier request to preserve the victim’s
remains, defendant has failed to show that he was prejudiced. Defendant did not dispute that the
victim died from a gunshot wound to the head. His principal theory at trial was that Harrell was
the shooter, and that Harrell had planted evidence to focus suspicion onto defendant. These
theories were not dependent upon an examination of the victim’s remains. Defendant also
theorizes that if a defense expert had been able to examine the victim’s remains, he possibly
could have determined whether the victim was pregnant when she died, or discovered further
evidence regarding the angle and trajectory of the gunshot. Defendant has not provided any
factual support for these arguments. Further, the pathologist who performed the autopsy testified
1
The victim’s mother agreed that the note appeared to be written in the victim’s handwriting, but
explained that the content of the message contained information that the victim would not have
written. For example, the victim stated that she was going to Mexico to bask in the sun and
drink, but the victim could not be in the sun for more than 15 minutes because of her fair skin
and she did not drink.
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that the victim’s remains were so severely decomposed that he was unable to identify any
internal organs, so he could not determine if there was any embryonic material that could be
examined. The brain tissue was also severely decomposed, preventing him from determining the
precise path of the bullet. Given this testimony, there is no reasonable probability that an
examination of the victim’s remains by a defense expert would have produced a different result.
Defendant also argues that defense counsel was ineffective because it was defendant’s
family members, not defense counsel, who arranged for various friends and family members to
testify as character witnesses at defendant’s trial. Regardless of who arranged for the witnesses
to testify, because they ultimately did testify at trial, defendant cannot establish that he was
prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficiency.
Defendant also argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to emphasize the
lack of physical evidence that the victim was pregnant at the time of her death, and for not
moving for dismissal or a directed verdict of the assault charge on this basis. As previously
indicated, the pathologist testified that he was not able to detect physical evidence of the victim’s
pregnancy during the autopsy because of the severely decomposed condition of the victim’s
remains. But as explained in section II(D), infra, there was other circumstantial evidence that the
victim was pregnant at the time she was killed. Therefore, any motion for dismissal or a directed
verdict would not have been successful. Counsel is not ineffective for failing to make a futile
motion. People v Darden, 230 Mich App 597, 605; 585 NW2d 27 (1998). Defendant also
argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena the victim’s medical records,
but he does not identify any medical records that could have aided his case. Although defendant
suggests that the records would have been relevant to the charge that he assaulted a pregnant
individual causing a miscarriage, testimony was presented at trial that the victim’s pregnancy
was confirmed during an ultrasound procedure just two days before she disappeared. Thus, there
is no basis for concluding that defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to obtain the
victim’s medical records.
Defendant also asserts that defense counsel was ineffective for agreeing to the trial
court’s decision to limit his family’s access to the courtroom during jury voir dire. As discussed
in section II(E), infra, the trial court’s decision did not violate defendant’s right to a public trial.
Further, defendant has not explained how he was prejudiced by his family’s limited access to the
courtroom during voir dire. Therefore, this ineffective assistance of counsel claim cannot
succeed.
B. EVIDENCE OF HARRELL’S THREATS
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of the victim’s
manager at work, Penny Larcom, regarding the victim’s disclosure of alleged threats made by the
victim’s estranged husband, Timothy Harrell. On a separate record, Larcom testified that shortly
before the victim’s disappearance, the victim disclosed that after she had informed Harrell that
she was pregnant with another man’s child, Harrell threatened to kill the victim, her baby, and
the baby’s father. The trial court determined that the victim’s statements regarding the alleged
threats were inadmissible hearsay. We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude
evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v Steele, 283 Mich App 472, 478; 769 NW2d 256
(2009).
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Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously determined that the victim’s statements
regarding the alleged threats were not admissible under the excited utterance exception to the
hearsay rule. We disagree. MRE 803(2) provides that a hearsay statement is admissible if it is
“[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the
stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” Thus, for a statement to be admissible
under this rule, there must be (1) a startling event, and (2) the statement at issue must have
resulted from the startling event while the declarant was still acting under the excitement caused
by the event. People v Larry Smith, 456 Mich 543, 550; 581 NW2d 654 (1998).
Initially, we agree with defendant that the trial court erred to the extent that it determined
that there must be evidence of the startling event, here the alleged threats, independent of the
statements being considered for admission. After defendant’s trial ended, the independent
evidence requirement adopted in People v Burton, 433 Mich 268; 445 NW2d 133 (1989), was
overruled in People v Barrett, 480 Mich 125, 127-128; 747 NW2d 797 (2008). In Barrett, the
Supreme Court held that a trial court may consider the statement in question, along with any
other non-privileged evidence, to prove the existence of a startling event or condition. Id. In this
case, however, the trial court also determined that defendant failed to establish that the victim
was acting under the influence of the excitement caused by the startling event when she made the
statements, and we find no error in that determination.
For a statement to be admissible under MRE 803(2), it must have been made while the
declarant was still under the influence of the excitement caused by the startling event. Smith,
456 Mich at 550-551. The amount of time that passes between a statement and the startling
event is not the sole consideration in deciding the admissibility of the statement. Id. at 551.
Rather, the focus of the rule is the lack of capacity to fabricate, not the lack of time to fabricate.
Id. If there is a delay between the startling event and the statement, it is necessary to consider
whether there was a plausible explanation for the delay. Id. A period of delay may be affected
by physical factors, such as pain, shock, or unconsciousness. Id. Again, the inquiry “is not
strictly one of time, but of the possibility for conscious reflection.” Id. Similarly, a statement
made in response to questioning is not automatically excluded. Id. at 553. It is necessary to
consider the circumstances of the questioning and whether it appears that the statement was the
result of reflective thought. Id. “The trial court’s determination whether the declarant was still
under the stress of the event is given wide discretion.” Id. at 552.
In this case, Larcom testified that approximately a week before the victim disappeared,
she arrived for work and was upset and crying. Larcom asked the victim what was wrong, and
the victim recounted that when she told Harrell that she was pregnant with another man’s child,
Harrell became upset and threatened to kill the victim, her baby, and the baby’s father. Although
Larcom’s testimony established that the victim was emotionally upset when she made the
statements, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the evidence failed to
show that the victim was acting under the influence of Harrell’s threats when she made the
statements.
The mere fact that the victim was emotional and crying when she made the statements is
not dispositive of whether she was acting under the influence of the excitement caused by
Harrell’s alleged threats. The victim was discussing an inherently emotional subject matter,
during a confused and troubling time in her life, so it is not surprising that she was emotional.
The victim did not indicate, nor did Larcom know, when Harrell’s alleged threats were made.
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However, Larcom testified that a few days before the victim revealed Harrell’s alleged threats,
she related that Harrell had threatened to take the baby. Because the victim’s statements
suggested that Harrell’s threats were made when the victim first revealed her pregnancy to him,
and the evidence showed that Harrell was aware of the pregnancy at least a few days before, it
appears that the alleged threats were also made at least a few days, if not more, before the victim
recounted the threats to Larcom. Also, the victim’s statements were made after she reported for
work, outside the presence of Harrell, and the statements were made in response to Larcom’s
question. These facts, along with the other circumstances, support the trial court’s determination
that Harrell was not acting under the influence of the stress caused by Harrell’s threats when she
made the statements to Larcom. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that the victim’s statements to Larcom were not admissible under MRE 803(2).
Defendant also argues that the victim’s statements to Larcom were admissible under
MRE 803(3), as statements of the victim’s “then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or
physical condition.” However, the victim’s statements were not offered to explain why the
victim was crying or may have been afraid of Harrell. See In re Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 18-19;
761 NW2d 253 (2008). Rather, they were offered for the purpose of showing Harrell’s alleged
motive and intent to kill the victim. Because the statements were not offered for a purpose
relevant to the victim’s state of mind, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to
admit the statements under MRE 803(3).
Defendant also briefly asserts that Harrell’s threats were admissible under MRE
804(b)(3), as statements against Harrell’s penal interests. However, that rule applies only if the
declarant (i.e., Harrell) is unavailable, which was not established in this case. Further, that
exception applies only to Harrell’s threats to the victim; it does not apply to the victim’s
statements to Larcom.
For these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the evidence of
the victim’s hearsay statements to Larcom.
C. CHANGE OF VENUE
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a change of
venue. A motion for change of venue is addressed to the discretion of the trial judge and will not
be disturbed on appeal absent there clearly being a palpable abuse of discretion. People v
Jendrzejewski, 455 Mich 495, 499-500; 566 NW2d 530 (1997) (citation omitted).
Defendant argues that a change of venue was required because of pretrial publicity,
which hindered his ability to obtain a fair and impartial jury in Grand Traverse County. In
Jendrzejewski, 455 Mich at 500-501, the Court explained:
Federal precedent has used two approaches to determine whether the
failure to grant a change of venue is an abuse of discretion. Community prejudice
amounting to actual bias has been found where there was extensive highly
inflammatory pretrial publicity that saturated the community to such an extent
that the entire jury pool was tainted, and, much more infrequently, community
bias has been implied from a high percentage of the venire who admit to a
disqualifying prejudice.
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The facts of this case are similar to those in People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 254255; 749 NW2d 272 (2008), which also involved a publicized murder case in a small community
in the northern lower peninsula, just west of Grand Traverse County. In Unger, this Court
stated:
“[T]he right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by
a panel of impartial, ‘indifferent’ jurors.” Irvin v Dowd, 366 US 717, 722; 81 S
Ct 1639; 6 L Ed 2d 751 (1961). Therefore, it may be appropriate to change the
venue of a criminal trial when widespread media coverage and community
interest have led to actual prejudice against the defendant. “Community prejudice
amounting to actual bias has been found where there was extensive highly
inflammatory pretrial publicity that saturated the community to such an extent
that the entire jury pool was tainted, and, much more infrequently, community
bias has been implied from a high percentage of the venire who admit to a
disqualifying prejudice.” Jendrzejewski, supra at 500-501. Changes of venue
might be required in cases involving “extensive egregious media reporting,” “a
barrage of inflammatory publicity leading to a ‘pattern of deep and bitter
prejudice’ against the defendant,” and “a carnival-like atmosphere surrounding
the proceedings.” Id. at 506-507 (citations omitted). Changes of venue might
also be required in cases involving “highly inflammatory attention to sensational
details . . . .” Id. at 508.
We recognize that there was substantial media interest in this case. We
also recognize that Benzie County is a small community that does not generally
experience the degree of media coverage exhibited here. However, defendant has
failed to show that the media coverage was anything other than nonsensational,
factual coverage. There is no evidence that the coverage was invidious or
inflammatory, as opposed to simple factual news reporting. Id. at 504. There is
simply no indication in the present case that the community was inundated with
adverse publicity or that this publicity resulted in actual bias against defendant.
In sum, the media attention in this case was neither prejudicial nor inflammatory.
Therefore, even if a motion had been filed, the trial court would have been under
no obligation to change the venue of defendant’s trial. Trial counsel was not
ineffective for failing to file a meritless motion. People v Ish, 252 Mich App 115,
118-119; 652 NW2d 257 (2002). [Unger, 278 Mich App at 254-255.]
In this case, defendant did not meet his burden of showing that a change of venue was
necessary because of prejudicial or sensational media coverage. Although the case received
television, radio, and newspaper coverage, defendant did not show that the coverage involved
sensational publicity or prejudicial information that could have biased the community against
him.
Defendant focuses much of his argument on the voir dire questioning. The trial court
asked the prospective jurors if they had heard about the case and many admitted hearing or
reading about it from television, radio, newspapers, or online. It appears that 52 jurors were
questioned, and only 27 stated that they had heard about the case. Of those 27, only four were
unable to set aside previously formed opinions, and those jurors were dismissed. The trial court
also asked any jurors who had heard about the case if they could set aside any information they
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may have heard, and the overwhelming majority indicated that they could be fair and impartial
and decide the case based on the evidence presented at trial. A juror who has previously formed
an opinion about a case need not be dismissed for cause if the juror is able to set aside any
previous opinion formed about the case and can decide the case with an open mind at the time of
trial. MCR 2.511(D)(1); MCR 6.412(D)(1); People v Lee, 212 Mich App 228, 251; 537 NW2d
233 (1995) The few jurors who were not sure whether they could be fair, or whether they could
set aside information they had previously heard or opinions they had previously formed, were
excused for cause. The trial court also excused for cause any jurors who had discussed the case
with others. Ultimately, the court was able to select a jury in one day.
The trial court refused to question any of the jurors individually outside the presence of
the venire as suggested in People v Tyburski, 445 Mich 606, 621-624; 518 NW2d 441 (1994).2
However, the court did not elicit factual details about the case before the entire venire; it only
questioned the jurors to determine if they had previously formed opinions about the case. Thus,
other members of the venire who had not seen or heard any media reports were not exposed to
factual details about the case, or to opinions others may have formed, before hearing the
evidence. The court otherwise generally complied with the guidelines set forth in Tyburski, 445
Mich at 621-624, by asking the jurors about the type of publicity they had seen or heard, when
they had seen or heard anything, whether they had formed any opinions, and whether they could
remain impartial. See Lee, 212 Mich App at 248. The record discloses that the trial court’s
questioning of jurors, supplemented by questions from counsel, was adequate to allow defendant
to intelligently exercise his challenges. Jendrzejewski, 455 Mich at 509.
In sum, the record does not disclose the type of prejudicial or inflammatory media
coverage resulting in actual prejudice against defendant. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a change of venue.
D. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Next, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of
assault of a pregnant individual causing a miscarriage or death of a fetus. We disagree.
In determining whether sufficient evidence was presented to sustain a conviction, an
appellate court “must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and
determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the
crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d
748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
Defendant was convicted of violating MCL 750.90a, which provides:
If a person intentionally commits conduct proscribed under sections 81 to
89 [MCL 750.81 to MCL 750.89] against a pregnant individual, the person is
2
In Jendrzejewski, 455 Mich at 509, the Court noted that the sequestering of jurors during voir
dire is not required as a matter of law.
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guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for life or any term of years if all
of the following apply:
(a) The person intended to cause a miscarriage or stillbirth by that
individual or death or great bodily harm to the embryo or fetus, or acted in wanton
or willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of the person’s
conduct is to cause a miscarriage or stillbirth or death or great bodily harm to the
embryo or fetus.
(b) The person’s conduct resulted in a miscarriage or stillbirth by that
individual or death to the embryo or fetus.
Defendant argues that he could not be convicted of assaulting a pregnant individual
because there was insufficient evidence that the victim was pregnant at the time she was killed.
We disagree.
Defendant relies solely on the fact that the pathologist was unable to confirm the presence
of an embryo or fetus during the autopsy. According to the pathologist, the victim’s remains
were too decomposed to identify any internal organs, so he was unable to detect any embryonic
material that could be examined. Contrary to what defendant argues, however, circumstantial
evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of
the elements of a crime. People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). At trial, a
doctor who treated the victim testified that an ultrasound procedure conducted just two days
before she disappeared confirmed that she was almost five weeks pregnant. There was no
evidence suggesting that the victim’s pregnancy was terminated before she disappeared. On the
contrary, the evidence indicated that the victim had planned on meeting defendant to discuss her
pregnancy on the night she disappeared, and was happy because she believed that defendant
wanted to be a father to her child. Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the
evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find, as it did, that the victim was pregnant when she
was killed, resulting in the death of the fetus.
E. PARTIAL CLOSING OF THE COURTROOM DURING JURY VOIR DIRE
Defendant argues that the trial court’s restriction on the number of spectators who could
be present during jury voir dire violated his constitutional right to a public trial. US Const, Am
VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. Because defendant did not object to the trial court’s restrictions, this
issue is unpreserved and our review is limited to plain error affecting defendant’s substantial
rights. People v Pipes, 475 Mich 267, 274; 715 NW2d 290 (2006).
The Sixth Amendment provides that a defendant has a right to a “public trial.” People v
Kline, 197 Mich App 165, 169; 494 NW2d 756 (1992). “Although the right to an open trial is
not absolute, that right will only rarely give way to other interests.” Id. In this case, the trial
court anticipated that it would need approximately 150 jurors to select a jury. Because of space
limitations, however, the courtroom could not accommodate many more than 50 jurors at a time.
Therefore, the court intended to conduct voir dire in three groups of approximately 50 jurors
each. In addition, because of the space limitations, the court proposed to limit the number of
spectators to only two people from each side. Neither the prosecutor nor defendant objected to
this procedure.
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In In re Closure of Jury Voir Dire, 204 Mich App 592; 516 NW2d 514 (1994), this Court
addressed a trial court’s decision to close a courtroom during voir dire because of space
limitations. The Court stated:
A First Amendment right of access applies to criminal trials, including
jury voir dire proceedings. Richmond Newspapers, Inc v Virginia, 448 US 555;
100 S Ct 2814; 65 L Ed 2d 973 (1980); Press-Enterprise Co v Superior Court,
464 US 501; 104 S Ct 819; 78 L Ed 2d 629 (1984). In Press-Enterprise, the
Court said that the presumption of open criminal trials can be overcome only by
“an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve
higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” Id., p 510. That is
the test to be applied where the state attempts to deny the right of access in order
to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information. Globe Newspaper Co v
Superior Court, 457 US 596; 102 S Ct 2613; 73 L Ed 2d 248 (1982).
B
In the present case, access was denied for a reason not related to disclosure
of sensitive information. The reason given by the trial court was simply lack of
space. Our Supreme Court has observed that the size of the courtroom may
justifiably limit attendance. Detroit Free Press v Recorder’s Court Judge, 409
Mich 364, 386-387; 294 NW2d 827 (1980). However, even where the reason
offered is space limitations, the court must still narrowly tailor the closure order.
In re Times-World Corp, 7 Va App 317, 327; 373 SE2d 474 (1988).
The court in this case did not narrowly tailor the order. The concern over
lack of space did not necessarily mandate closing the entire proceeding to all
members of the press. Because there were not enough permanent seats in the
courtroom, the court brought in twenty additional chairs to accommodate the
prospective jurors. It seems that space for a limited number of journalists, or at
least one, could also have been found. The court’s concern regarding the
reporters mingling with the prospective jurors could have been addressed by an
order requiring the reporters to be segregated from the prospective jurors or by
informing the prospective jurors about the presence of the journalists and warning
both prospective jurors and journalists not to talk about the case. Further, the
court gave no reason why every member of the jury pool had to be in the
courtroom at one time. The court apparently did not even consider keeping some
of the prospective jurors in jury rooms or other parts of the courthouse until it was
determined that they were needed in the courtroom.
It is clear that any number of simple solutions might have been considered
to accommodate the legitimate concerns of the press with regard to the right of
access to the jury selection process. Because the trial court’s closure order did not
evidence an attempt to do so, and was not narrowly tailored to the particular
circumstances of the case, we reverse it. [In re Closure of Voir Dire, 204 Mich
App at 594-596.]
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This case is clearly distinguishable from In re Closure of Voir Dire. First, there was no
objection to the trial court’s decision in this case. Second, the trial court’s decision was directed
only at the number of spectators from each side. There is no indication in the record that the trial
court’s restrictions extended to the media, or that the media was otherwise denied access to the
courtroom. Third, while a defendant has a compelling interest in having members of his family
present during trial, Johnson v Sherry, 586 F3d 439, 446 (CA 6, 2009), the trial court’s decision
involved only a partial closure, not a total one. Thus, the court did not completely preclude
members of defendant’s family from being present. It appears that the trial court narrowly
tailored its restriction on access by limiting the restriction to the voir dire proceedings, where
space was an issue due to the large number of jurors, while at the same time allowing for the
limited presence of spectators from each side. Accordingly, defendant has failed to show a plain
error.
III. DEFENDANT’S STANDARD 4 BRIEF
Defendant raises several issues in a pro se supplemental brief, filed pursuant to Supreme
Court Administrative Order No. 2004-6, Standard 4, none of which have merit.
A. THE DESTRUCTION OR WITHHOLDING OF EVIDENCE
Defendant first argues that the prosecutor violated his due process rights by withholding
exculpatory evidence. Although defendant raised the issue of the premature cremation of the
victim’s remains below, he did not argue that it involved the intentional destruction or
withholding of exculpatory evidence, and he did not raise any other claim below that evidence
was improperly withheld by the prosecution. Therefore, this issue is not preserved.
Accordingly, our review is limited to plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Pipes,
475 Mich at 274.
Defendant relies on Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83; 83 S Ct 1194; 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963),
in which the Supreme Court recognized a defendant’s due process right of access to certain
information possessed by the prosecution. This disclosure requirement applies to evidence that
might lead a jury to entertain a reasonable doubt about a defendant’s guilt. People v Lester, 232
Mich App 262, 281; 591 NW2d 267 (1998). The disclosure requirements of Brady apply to
evidence within the prosecutor’s possession, regardless of a request by the defendant. People v
Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 666; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). To establish a Brady violation, a
defendant must prove the following:
(1) that the state possessed evidence favorable to the defendant; (2) that he
did not possess the evidence nor could he have obtained it himself with any
reasonable diligence; (3) that the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence;
and (4) that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable
probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.
[Lester, 232 Mich App at 281-282.]
Defendant argues that the prosecution violated his due process rights under Brady when it
prematurely allowed the victim’s remains to be cremated, without providing him with an
opportunity to have the remains reviewed by his own expert. In section II(A), supra, we
concluded that, given the evidence of the severe decomposition of the victim’s body and the fact
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that defendant’s principal theory of defense at trial was not dependent upon an examination of
the victim’s remains, there was no reasonable probability that an examination of the victim’s
remains by a defense expert would have produced a different result. Thus, even assuming that
the prosecution prematurely released the victim’s remains for cremation, defendant cannot
satisfy the fourth element necessary to establish a Brady violation. Thus, there was no plain
error.
Although defendant also asserts that the prosecution withheld other exculpatory evidence,
nothing in the record suggests that any exculpatory evidence was withheld. Absent record
support for this claim, defendant cannot establish a plain error.
B. DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL
In addition to repeating appellate counsel’s argument that the trial court violated
defendant’s right to a public trial by limiting his family members’ access to the courtroom during
voir dire, a claim we rejected in section II(E), supra, defendant also asserts here that the trial
court closed the courtroom at times during the trial. Because defendant did not preserve this
issue by raising it below, our review is limited to plain error affecting defendant’s substantial
rights. Pipes, 475 Mich at 274.
The record does not support defendant’s claims that the courtroom was closed during
other portions of the trial. At most, defendant has submitted evidence suggesting that the
number of his supporters who were allowed to be present at any given time during trial was
limited to 12, due to the limited space available in the courtroom. As previously explained,
however, a trial court does not violate a defendant’s right to a public trial by imposing reasonable
limitations on access to the courtroom during trial based on space limitations. See In re Closure
of Jury Voir Dire, 204 Mich App at 594-596. Given the information in the record concerning the
limited size of the courtroom, we are not persuaded that a restriction limiting defendant to 12
supporters at any given time is unreasonable. Further, nothing in the record suggests that the
courtroom was closed to the media or general members of the public. To the extent that
defendant asserts that some family members or supporters were at times denied access to the
courtroom, those instances appear to involve situations in which the court restricted the
movement of spectators while trial was in progress, to avoid disrupting the proceeding. Such
restrictions do not implicate defendant’s right to a public trial.
In sum, there is no basis in the record for concluding that defendant’s right to a public
trial was violated. Therefore, defendant also cannot succeed on his related claim that defense
counsel was ineffective for not objecting or raising this issue below. On the basis of the record
presented, any objection would have been futile. Counsel is not required to make a futile
objection. Darden, 230 Mich App at 605.
C. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on first- and seconddegree murder when it stated that, to convict defendant of murder, the jury was required to find
that the defendant caused the death of [the victim]. That is, that [the victim] died
as a result of a gunshot wound to her head. [Emphasis added.]
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Because defendant did not object to the court’s jury instructions, we review this issue for plain
error affecting defendant’s substantial rights.3 People v Gonzalez, 468 Mich 636, 643; 664
NW2d 159 (2003).
The trial court instructed the jury in accordance with CJI2d 16.1 and 16.5. Although
defendant argues that the court’s instructions improperly permitted the jury to convict him if it
merely found that the victim died from a gunshot wound, without finding that he inflicted the
wound, defendant’s argument improperly ignores the first part of the trial court’s instruction.
Jury instructions must be reviewed in their entirety to determine if there is error requiring
reversal. People v McKinney, 258 Mich App 157, 162; 670 NW2d 254 (2003). Immediately
preceding the challenged instruction, the trial court clearly stated that the jury was required to
find that “the defendant caused the death of [the victim].” Thus, viewed as a whole, we find no
error, plain or otherwise. Because there was no error, defense counsel was not ineffective for
failing to object. Darden, 230 Mich App at 605.
D. FAILURE TO PRODUCE AN ENDORSED WITNESS
Defendant argues that he was deprived of a fair trial by the prosecutor’s failure to
produce William Ball, an endorsed witness. Because defendant did not request Ball’s production
at trial or object to the prosecutor’s failure to produce Ball, this issue is not preserved.
Accordingly, we review this issue for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Pipes,
475 Mich at 274.
MCL 767.40a does not require the prosecution to produce all res gestae witnesses, but
only to reveal known res gestae witnesses and produce those witnesses named on its witness list.
See People v Perez, 469 Mich 415, 418-419; 670 NW2d 655 (2003). A prosecutor who endorses
a witness under MCL 767.40a(3) is required to exercise due diligence to produce that witness for
trial. People v Eccles, 260 Mich App 379, 388; 677 NW2d 76 (2004). But a prosecutor may add
or delete from the list of witnesses he intends to call at trial at any time upon leave of the court
for good cause shown or by stipulation of the parties. MCL 767.40a(4). “The inability of the
prosecution to locate a witness listed on the prosecution’s witness list after the exercise of due
diligence constitutes good cause to strike the witness from the list.” People v Canales, 243 Mich
App 571, 577; 624 NW2d 439 (2000). Where a prosecutor fails to secure the presence of an
endorsed witness without proper excuse, an instruction based on CJI2d 5.12 may be appropriate.
Perez, 469 Mich at 420. Whether CJI2d 5.12 is appropriate depends on the facts of each
particular case. Id. at 420-421.
3
We note that the trial court instructed the jury consistent with the prosecutor’s proposed jury
instructions, which defendant expressly approved. A defendant’s express approval of jury
instructions waives appellate review of any claimed error with the instructions. Matuszak, 263
Mich App at 57; People v Lueth, 253 Mich App 670, 688; 660 NW2d 322 (2002). But because
defendant also argues that defense counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the instructions,
we will address the issue.
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Because defendant did not request Ball’s presence at trial, or object to the prosecution’s
failure to produce Ball, a due diligence hearing was not held.4 Accordingly, defendant must
demonstrate that the failure to produce Ball was a plain error. A “plain error” is one that is
“clear or obvious.” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Here, it is not
clear or obvious from the existing record that the prosecution failed to exercise due diligence to
attempt to produce Ball for trial. The record discloses that Ball was living in Arizona, where he
was facing other criminal charges, and that he also had outstanding warrants in Michigan. The
prosecutor had previously requested an adjournment of trial in order to locate and attempt to
secure Ball’s presence at trial in Michigan. Ball apparently was not willing to voluntarily submit
to Michigan’s jurisdiction. In November 2007, the prosecutor obtained a certificate for
attendance of an out-of-state witness. Despite these efforts, Ball was not produced as a witness
at trial. On this record, there is no clear basis for concluding that the prosecutor failed to
exercise due diligence to attempt to produce Ball for trial. Thus, it is not clear that good cause
for failing to produce Ball was lacking. And without a clear showing that good cause for
deleting Ball from the witness list did not exist, an instruction based on CJI2d 5.12 was not
appropriate.
For these reasons, defendant has not shown that the prosecution’s failure to produce Ball
at trial was plain error.
E. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant also argues that trial counsel was ineffective. Because defendant did not raise
his claims in an appropriate motion in the trial court and this Court denied his motions to
remand, our review is limited to errors apparent from the record. Matuszak, 263 Mich App at 48.
Although defendant asserts that defense counsel was experiencing personal legal
problems at the time of defendant’s trial, counsel’s personal affairs do not themselves provide a
basis for concluding that defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel. It is still
necessary for defendant to demonstrate that counsel’s performance at defendant’s trial was
constitutionally deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced defendant by denying
him a fair trial. Pickens, 446 Mich at 338.
Defendant suggests that counsel may not have done all that he could have to prepare for
trial or to present the best possible defense. A defendant is entitled to have his counsel prepare,
4
On appeal, defendant asserts that Ball was a material witness because he possibly could have
identified someone who fit the description of an Hispanic male described in the note that the
victim allegedly left at defendant’s home. However, because defendant never requested Ball’s
production, or objected to the prosecutor’s failure to produce Ball, his materiality to the defense
was never addressed. The record indicates that only the prosecutor expressed a desire to call
Ball at trial, for the limited purpose of establishing a foundation for the admission of photographs
of the victim that Ball apparently took on the day the victim disappeared. The prosecutor
ultimately was able to establish a foundation for the admission of the photographs through
another witness, and defendant has not challenged that ruling on appeal. In sum, the record does
not support defendant’s claim that he considered Ball to be a material witness at the time of trial.
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investigate, and present all substantial defenses. Where there is a claim that counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise a defense, the defendant must show that he made a good-faith
effort to avail himself of the right to present a particular defense and that the defense of which he
was deprived was substantial. A substantial defense is one that might have made a difference in
the trial’s outcome. People v Kelly, 186 Mich App 524, 526; 465 NW2d 569 (1990). Failure of
counsel to conduct a reasonable investigation can also constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel. People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 626; 709 NW2d 595 (2005). “Decisions
regarding what evidence to present and whether to call or question witnesses are presumed to be
matters of trial strategy[.]” People v Marcus Davis, 250 Mich App 357, 368; 649 NW2d 94
(2002). Although this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of trial counsel with respect
to matters of sound trial strategy, People v Duff, 165 Mich App 530, 545-546; 419 NW2d 600
(1987), a sound strategy is one based on investigation and supported by reasonable professional
judgments. People v Grant, 470 Mich 477, 486-487, 498; 684 NW2d 686 (2004). It is counsel’s
duty to make an independent examination of the facts, laws, pleadings, and circumstances
involved in the matter and to pursue all leads relevant to the issues. Id.
Defendant argues that defense counsel did not properly investigate the circumstances of
the victim’s death. He suggests that the angle of the gunshot wound might have supported
possible defenses of accident or self-defense, or supported an argument that the wound was selfinflicted. The fact that defense counsel did not pursue these theories at trial does not mean that
he did not investigate or consider them. The record indicates that defense counsel provided the
autopsy results to Dr. Ljubisa Dragovic, the Oakland County medical examiner, for his review.
Thus, the record does not support defendant’s claim that defense counsel failed to investigate
these matters. Furthermore, defendant has not presented any expert opinion suggesting that an
analysis of the physical evidence could have supported a theory of accident or self-defense, or a
theory that the wound was self-inflicted. Thus, he has not established that counsel’s failure to
pursue these theories at trial deprived him of a substantial defense.
Defendant also argues that unidentified prints found on the gun used in this crime should
have been compared to the victim’s fingerprints or palm prints to determine if she had handled
that weapon. However, defendant has not shown that the victim’s fingerprints or palm prints
were available for comparison, or that it was even possible to obtain the victim’s prints
posthumously given the severely decomposed condition of her remains.
Defendant also complains that defense counsel failed to investigate the victim’s mental
health history. He contends that the victim had a history of depression and had attempted suicide
in the past. Again, the record does not indicate to what extent counsel may have investigated
these matters. And while defendant apparently believes that an investigation of the victim’s
mental health history might have produced evidence to support a theory that the victim may have
committed suicide, defendant has not identified any such evidence on appeal and, therefore,
cannot establish prejudice. Moreover, given the victim’s disappearance for approximately 13
months, the discovery of her body in a shallow grave, and the discovery of the gun at another
location, there is no reasonable basis for concluding that a suicide theory would have been
viable.
Defendant also argues that defense counsel was ineffective for not challenging whether
the victim was pregnant at the time of her death. To the extent defendant suggests that defense
counsel should have requested a chemical or hormone test to determine whether the victim was
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pregnant at the time of her death, he has not shown that any such test could have been performed,
or would have been effective, given the severely decomposed condition of the victim’s remains.
Furthermore, as previously explained, there was strong circumstantial evidence that the victim
was pregnant at the time she disappeared. Thus, this claim cannot succeed.
Defendant also complains that defense counsel called only two defense witnesses, whose
testimony took only 30 minutes to present. However, the mere number of witnesses called or the
length of their testimony does not establish the requisite deficient performance or prejudice
necessary to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Also, defendant cannot
show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to subpoena the character witnesses where
those witnesses were contacted by other family members and ultimately testified at defendant’s
trial.
Although defendant also claims that defense counsel was ineffective for not challenging
the prosecutor’s failure to produce allegedly exculpatory evidence, he does not indicate what
evidence was not produced.
For these reasons, defendant has not established that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel.
F. DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by not adjourning the hearing on his motion to
exclude evidence related to the autopsy. A trial court’s ruling on a motion for a continuance is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Steele, 283 Mich App at 484. Defendant argues that the
trial court should have afforded him more time to allow his defense expert to review the autopsy
results to determine whether he might have been prejudiced by the premature destruction of the
victim’s remains. However, the trial court’s ruling did not prevent defendant from still having an
expert review the autopsy results. Defendant never subsequently came forward with evidence to
support his position that he was prejudiced by the destruction of the victim’s remains, and he has
not presented any such evidence on appeal. Thus, even if it would have been appropriate for the
trial court to delay deciding defendant’s motion, defendant has not established that he was
prejudiced. Accordingly, any error was harmless. Id. at 485.
G. DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO BE PRESENT
Defendant next argues that his statutory and constitutional right to be present at trial was
violated because he was not present at pretrial conferences held in November 2007. As
defendant concedes, he did not preserve this issue by raising it below. Therefore, defendant must
establish a plain error affecting his substantial rights. Pipes, 475 Mich at 274.
MCL 768.3 provides that “[n]o person indicted for a felony shall be tried unless
personally present during the trial.” People v Mallory, 421 Mich 229, 246; 365 NW2d 673
(1984). The right to be present for trial is also impliedly guaranteed by both the federal and state
constitutions. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20; Mallory, supra at 246 n 10. In People
v Clyburn, 55 Mich App 454, 460; 222 NW2d 775 (1974), this Court observed:
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An in-chambers conference to discuss matters of procedure or law
attended by his counsel to which the defendant raises no objection, does not
violate defendant’s right to be present during his trial and does not constitute
reversible error.
Here, defendant was absent, without objection, from in-chambers pretrial conferences at which
the court and the attorneys discussed matters of procedure and law. Accordingly, defendant has
not established a plain error affecting his substantial rights.
H. CUMULATIVE ERROR
In his final issue, defendant argues that the cumulative effect of several errors deprived
him of a fair trial such that reversal is required. We disagree. In determining whether reversal is
required under a cumulative error theory, only actual errors may be aggregated to determine their
cumulative effect. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 591 n 12; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). In this
case, defendant has failed to establish that multiple errors were committed below. Thus, there is
no basis for finding that the cumulative effect of multiple errors denied him a fair trial. People v
Taylor, 185 Mich App 1, 10; 460 NW2d 582 (1990).
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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