KEVIN DUNN SR V OFFICER B MATATALL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
KEVIN DUNN, SR.,
UNPUBLISHED
May 18, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 291254
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 07-732258-NI
OFFICER B. MATATALL and SGT.
LAWRENCE PORTER,
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: METER, P.J., and MURRAY and BECKERING, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants, officers with the Southfield Police Department, appeal as of right the trial
court’s order denying their motion for summary disposition predicated in part on governmental
immunity. We reverse and remand.
Plaintiff brought this action seeking damages for injuries he allegedly sustained when
defendants arrested him. The complaint, alleging counts for assault, battery, gross negligence,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress, was filed after a federal court dismissed
plaintiff’s § 19831 action against the same defendants based on a finding that the officers acted
reasonably in the matter. See Dunn v Matatall, 549 F3d 348 (CA 6, 2008). Both the federal
district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on a video recording of the arrest that
was captured by a device affixed to defendant Officer B. Matatall’s patrol car. The federal
district court’s opinion and order granting the officers’ motion for summary judgment provides
what the Sixth Circuit describes as “an accurate and thorough summary of the events depicted in
the video,” id. at 350, and states as follows:
“The recording, which is about fifteen and a half minutes long, begins at
2:30:53. At about 2:31:29, Matatall turned on his flashing lights along with a few
siren bursts to initiate the traffic stop while Plaintiff was making a right turn onto
a residential street. (2:31:29-47.) Matatall reported over the radio that “the
vehicle is not stopping.” (2:31:58.) He then sounded the siren until Plaintiff
1
42 USC 1983.
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eventually stopped almost two minutes later. (2:32:04-2:33:48.) Plaintiff failed
to stop at the first stop sign he encountered. (2:32:06-10.) Plaintiff then crossed
to the other side of the street to pass another vehicle as Matatall announced his
speed at fifty miles per hour. (2:32:10-18.) Plaintiff at that point ran through a
second stop sign at [a speed very near fifty miles per hour], and then accelerated
noticeably[.] (2:32:20-23.) Plaintiff continued, passing another vehicle driving in
the opposite direction and executing a number of turns while Matatall verbally
recorded his speed at forty-five miles per hour. (2:32:24-33:15.) Plaintiff ran a
third stop sign and encountered a more commercial area that Matatall announced
as eastbound on 7 Mile Road. (2:33:16-22.)”
“On 7 Mile, Plaintiff began to slow somewhat in the left lane and slowly
pulled over to the right and stopped driving. (2:33:35-55.) Matatall instructed
Plaintiff to place the car keys outside of the car and to drop the keys, which
Plaintiff did onto the roof of the car through his open window[, holding one or
both hands outside the window]. (2:33:55-34:15.) Matatall then exited his car
and approached the rear passenger side of Plaintiff’s car with a flashlight in one
hand and his gun in the other. (2:34:16-21.) Using the flashlight, Matatall took a
few seconds to briefly examine Plaintiff’s vehicle from the passenger side and reholster his gun. He then walked up to the driver’s side window, telling Plaintiff
not to move his hands. (2:34:21-26.) Matatall attempted to open the driver’s
door, instructed Plaintiff to unlock the door and grabbed one of Plaintiff’s hands.
(2:34:26-29.) Plaintiff unlocked the door, Matatall opened it and began to attempt
to remove Plaintiff from the car. (2:34:29-31.) At that moment, Porter pulled up
and came to an abrupt stop in his police car, parking at an angle in front of
Plaintiff’s car. (2:34:31-36.) As Porter parked, Matatall struggled with Plaintiff,
ordering him with a raised voice to get out of the car. (Id.) Plaintiff yelled that
his seatbelt was preventing him from exciting (“my seatbelt; my seatbelt”).
(2:34:36-39.) Matatall told Plaintiff to get his hands in the air. (2:34:39-40.) In
the meantime, Porter stepped out of his car and rapidly approached Plaintiff’s
door from the front of the car, leaving the door between Porter and Matatall.
(2:34:40-44.) Porter briefly—for about one second—pointed his firearm in
Plaintiff’s direction and then put the gun away and walked around the open door
to assist Matatall, who at this point was grabbing Plaintiff’s hands or wrists;
Porter stood now on the other side of Matatall, between Matatall and the camera.
(2:34:44-46.) Plaintiff said “okay” and “I’m coming, I’m coming” as his belt was
apparently now unfastened and together Defendants pulled Plaintiff out of his car.
(2:34:46-49.) Plaintiff was somewhat bent over at the waist as Defendants pulled
him out, clutching his wrists or forearms as they forced him between them out and
onto the street. (Id.) As he was being pulled from both sides while still bent over,
Defendant Matatall [seems to have] lost his grip on Plaintiff’s right wrist while
Defendant Porter maintained his grip on the other side. Plaintiff then twisted or
spun slightly around on his left foot, [apparently] lost [his] balance and fell hard
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on his right side, landing with his back to the camera. (2:34:47-50.) Plaintiff
remained on the ground as Defendants handcuffed him. (2:34:50-[35:]13.)
Plaintiff exclaimed a few times, saying he was a “sick man,” “you broke my hip”
and asking the officers to feel where the bone was “sticking out.”[2] (2:34:5535:30.) Within a few seconds, Matatall assessed Plaintiff’s injury and called for
medical help over the radio. (2:35:31-34.) The remaining several minutes of the
video show additional officers on the scene, who, along with Defendants, search
Plaintiff’s pockets, ask him why he ran and announce that medical help is on the
way.” [Id. at 350-352.]
The Sixth Circuit, applying an objective-reasonableness standard as guided by pertinent case
law, concluded “that the video shows that the Officers acted reasonably in attempting to
neutralize a perceived threat by physically removing [plaintiff] from his vehicle after he led
Officer Matatall [defendant] on a car chase and then appeared to refuse the Officers’ commands
to exit the car.”3 Id. at 354.
2
It is unclear from the video or elsewhere in the record whether plaintiff’s fracture broke through
his skin or whether he simply referred to a subcutaneous displacement of his bone. Officer
Matatall can be heard on the video telling plaintiff, “Your bone is not sticking out.” (2:35:5052.) Plaintiff testified at deposition that he was unsure if the bone broke the skin.
3
The Sixth Circuit further elaborated on why it deemed the officers’ conduct to be reasonable
under the circumstances:
Regarding the threat to the safety of the Officers, neither Officer could
have known what threat Dunn may have posed. Up to that point, Dunn had
evaded Officer Matatall’s attempts to pull him over, suggesting that he may have
had something to hide, had driven recklessly, and appeared recalcitrant in
complying with the Officers’ commands to exit his vehicle. It would have been
reasonable for the Officers to be apprehensive that Dunn may have a weapon in
the car, that the passenger may have a weapon, or that the car may be used as a
weapon.5 When Sergeant Porter arrived on the scene, he saw an apparent struggle
between Dunn and Officer Matatall, giving him ample reason to believe that
Dunn was a threat to the Officers’ safety. A reasonable officer on the scene
would have believed that the threat posed by Dunn was not contained until Dunn
was out of the car and handcuffed.
As to Dunn’s level of resistance, it is undisputed that he resisted by failing
to stop for Officer Matatall’s signals for approximately two minutes. When Dunn
finally pulled over, however, he put his hands out of the car and dropped a set of
keys as instructed. When Officer Matatall approached the car and grabbed
Dunn’s hands, a struggle ensued. Even if, as Dunn argues, the struggle was
caused by Dunn’s seatbelt, it is clear from the video that the Officers were having
a hard time getting Dunn out of the car. Once Officer Matatall unfastened the
seatbelt, Dunn was launched out of the car. Although Dunn’s statement, “I’m
(continued…)
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Defendants filed a motion for summary disposition in this case, arguing that the federal
court’s determination that the officers’ actions were reasonable barred relitigation of that issue.
The trial court denied defendants’ motion, opining that the federal litigation had no preclusive
effect.
At issue on appeal is the extent to which the result of the federal litigation operates to
preclude plaintiff’s attempts to avoid governmental immunity in connection with his suit against
defendants.
Applications of res judicata, as well as decisions on motions for summary disposition, are
reviewed de novo as questions of law. Wayne Co v Detroit, 233 Mich App 275, 277; 590 NW2d
619 (1998). The applicability of collateral estoppel is also a question of law, calling for review
de novo. McMichael v McMichael, 217 Mich App 723, 727; 552 NW2d 688 (1996).
For negligent torts committed by lower-level governmental employees, MCL
691.1407(2) provides that “each officer and employee of a governmental agency . . . is immune
from tort liability for an injury to a person . . . caused by the officer . . . while in the course of
employment or service . . . ,” if that officer “is acting or reasonably believes he or she is acting
within the scope of his or her authority,” the “governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or
discharge of a governmental function,” and the officer’s “conduct does not amount to gross
negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury.” MCL 691.1407(7)(a) defines “[g]ross
negligence” as “conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether
an injury results.”
MCL 691.1407(3) indicates that governmental employees may remain subject to liability
for their intentional torts. See Odom v Wayne Co, 482 Mich 459, 470-471; 760 NW2d 217
(2008). To invoke governmental immunity in connection with intentional torts, “the
governmental employee must first establish that the acts were taken ‘during the course of . . .
employment and’ that the employee was ‘acting, or reasonably believe[d] [he or she was] acting,
within the scope of [his or her] authority[.]’” Id. at 473, quoting Ross v Consumers Power Co
(…continued)
coming, I’m coming,” may indicate that he had decided to exit the vehicle on his
own, only seconds elapsed between the time the seatbelt was unfastened and
when Dunn was pulled out of the car, giving the Officers little opportunity to fully
comprehend whether Dunn had finally decided to become compliant. It was
reasonable for the Officers still to consider Dunn resistant. As Sergeant Porter
stated, “at what point do we then trust this resistant person to suddenly say, okay,
I give up.” J.A. at 63 (Porter Dep. at 40).
5
Although Dunn did drop his keys as instructed, the Officers still would
have been reasonable in fearing the use of the car as a weapon. First, Dunn
dropped the keys on the roof of the car, rather than dropping them on the ground
outside the car where they would be less accessible. Second, the Officers did not
know whether that was the only set of keys in the car, much less whether they
were even the keys to that car. [Id. at 354-355.]
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(On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 633; 363 NW2d 641 (1984) “The governmental employee must
also establish that he [or she] was acting in ‘good faith.’” Id. There is no immunity when the
governmental employee “‘does not act honestly and in good faith, but maliciously, or for an
improper purpose.’” Id. at 473-474, quoting Prosser, Torts (4th ed), § 132, p 989.
“Under the doctrine of res judicata, ‘a final judgment rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to
them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or
cause of action.’” Wayne Co, 233 Mich App at 277, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed,
1990), p 1305. “The doctrine operates where the earlier and subsequent actions involve the same
parties or their privies, the matters of dispute could or should have been resolved in the earlier
adjudication, and the earlier controversy was decided on its merits.” Id.
However, “as a general rule, where . . . all federal claims are resolved before trial, federal
courts will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims,
preferring to dismiss them without prejudice for resolution in the state courts.” Pierson Sand &
Gravel, Inc v Keeler Brass Co, 460 Mich 372, 384; 596 NW2d 153 (1999). Accordingly, “where
the district court dismissed all . . . federal claims in advance of trial, and there are no exceptional
circumstances that would give the federal court grounds to retain supplemental jurisdiction over
the state claim, . . . it is clear that the federal court would not have exercised its supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.” Id. at 387. In such situations, “res judicata
will not act to bar the state claims.” Id. Accord Bergeron v Busch (On Remand), 228 Mich App
618, 626-628; 579 NW2d 124 (1998). In this case, the trial court specifically held that the
federal district court would not have exercised jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state claims.
Accordingly, res judicata does not apply to bar the claims.
However, the related doctrine of collateral estoppel does come to bear. That doctrine
precludes relitigation of an issue in a different, subsequent action “between the same parties or
their privies when the earlier proceeding resulted in a valid final judgment and the issue in
question was actually and necessarily determined in that prior proceeding.” Leahy v Orion Twp,
269 Mich App 527, 530; 711 NW2d 438 (2006), citing 1 Restatement Judgments, 2d, § 27, p
250. Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of issues where the parties had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate those issues in an earlier action. See Arim v Gen Motors Corp, 206 Mich
App 178, 194-195; 520 NW2d 695 (1994).
Although, as the trial court below observed, plaintiff’s federal § 1983 claims and his state
intentional tort claims present somewhat different evidentiary questions and standards, this Court
has identified the incongruence in allowing state tort litigation to go forward concerning police
conduct that was found to be reasonable in federal court. In VanVorous v Burmeister, 262 Mich
App 467, 483; 687 NW2d 132 (2004), this Court stated:
[G]overnment actors may find it necessary—and are permitted—to act in ways
that would, under different circumstances, subject them to liability for an
intentional tort. To find for plaintiff on these claims, our courts would have to
determine that the officers’ actions were not justified because they were not
objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Because the federal district court
reached and decided the question, further litigation regarding this issue was
collaterally estopped. [Citations omitted.]
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Accordingly, in VanVorous, this Court applied a federal reasonableness determination to defeat
the plaintiff’s state claims of assault, battery, gross negligence, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, the same claims at issue in this case. Id. at 481-484.
Plaintiff suggests that VanVorous is not compatible with Pierson Sand and Bergeron, and
suggests that VanVorous should not control to the extent that it deviates from those binding
authorities. See MCR 7.215(J)(1). However, Pierson Sand and Bergeron concerned the
inapplicability of res judicata where a federal court declines, or would have declined, to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over state claims, whereas VanVorous applied collateral estoppel not to
bar state claims outright, but to apply the federal court’s determination of a necessary issue in
deciding those state claims. VanVorous thus presents no conflict with Pierson Sand or Bergeron.
With respect to plaintiff’s gross negligence claim against defendants, the exception to
governmental immunity in cases of gross negligence applies to conduct that is “so reckless as to
demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results.” MCL 691.1407(7)(a).
The federal court’s determination that defendants acted reasonably when arresting plaintiff
cannot be reconciled with a characterization of that conduct as constituting such recklessness.
Accordingly, the determination in the federal court establishes that governmental immunity
applies in connection with plaintiff’s assertion of gross negligence.
With respect to plaintiff’s intentional tort claims against defendants, governmental actors
are immune in connection with even intentional torts where they act in good faith in the course
of their governmental employment and within the scope of their authority. Odom, 482 Mich at
473-474. Accordingly, the federal determination that defendants acted reasonably when
arresting plaintiff is fatal to plaintiff’s claims of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. See VanVorous, 262 Mich App at 481-484.
For these reasons, the trial court erred in failing to recognize that a necessary issue
determined in the federal litigation, that of defendants’ reasonableness, was not subject to
redetermination, and that defendants are therefore protected by governmental immunity. We
therefore reverse the trial court’s decision and remand for entry of an order granting summary
disposition to defendants on grounds of governmental immunity.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. We do
not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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