PEOPLE OF MI V DAMIEN RAPHAEL JOHNSON
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 18, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 290461
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 08-023378-FC
DAMIEN RAPHAEL JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and O’CONNELL and WILDER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted of carjacking, MCL 750.529a, and armed robbery, MCL
750.529, following a jury trial. Defendant was sentenced, as a fourth habitual offender, MCL
769.12, to 25 to 50 years’ imprisonment for the carjacking conviction, and 25 to 50 years’
imprisonment for the armed robbery conviction. Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm.
Sara Reazor testified at trial that at 4:00 a.m. on July 29, 2008, following her shift at
Washington Inventory Service in Flint, she drove her 1998 Pontiac Montana van to her former
boyfriend’s home to check on his cats. She parked her vehicle in the driveway, leaving it
running with the car door open. Discovering the house was locked, she returned to the vehicle,
and noticed defendant coming towards her, hunched over, with his arm behind his back.
She ran to the passenger’s side to get in and quickly lock the door, however, defendant
got into the vehicle on the driver’s side at the same time. He pointed a gun at Reazor’s head and
then struck her with it. Defendant then pushed her out of the van and drove off. Reazor’s purse,
a change container, and other personal belongings were in the van.
Shortly thereafter, dispatched officers observed a van matching the description of the
stolen vehicle parked in the driveway near the location of the carjacking. As the cruiser’s
spotlight shone on the vehicle, the driver door opened and the occupant ran away. Officers
pursued the occupant on foot into the woods. Within minutes, they found defendant kneeling
down at the edge of the woods. A BB gun was found three feet away.
Reazor’s statement to the police immediately after the incident varied somewhat from
what she testified to at trial. Reazor told officers that she had been driving slowly past her exboyfriend’s house with her window rolled down when a man ran up to the window and placed a
-1-
gun to her head. She stated that the man pulled her out of the car on the driver’s side and hit her
with the gun.
Reazor was unable to positively identify defendant in a line-up conducted in the jail
several hours after the incident. However, she positively identified defendant as the carjacker at
his Preliminary Examination on August 15, 2008.
On appeal, defendant claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel due to his
attorney’s failure to object to Reazor’s in-court identification of defendant, and her failure to call
an expert witness regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification. We disagree.
Because this issue was not considered by the trial court and is not preserved, our review
is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. See People v Riley (After Remand), 468 Mich 135,
139; 659 NW2d 611 (2003). “Whether a person has been denied effective assistance of counsel
is a mixed question of fact and constitutional law. The court must first find the facts, and then
must decide whether those facts constitute a violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel.” People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002).
Questions of constitutional law are reviewed de novo. Id.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show: (1)
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms; (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of
the proceedings would have been different; and (3) the resultant proceedings were fundamentally
unfair or unreliable. People v Mesik (On Reconsideration), 285 Mich App 535, 542-543; 775
NW2d 857 (2009). A defendant must meet a heavy burden to overcome the presumption that
counsel employed effective trial strategy. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d
557 (1994).
The decision to call an expert witness is a matter of trial strategy. People v Ackerman,
257 Mich App 434, 455; 669 NW2d 818 (2003). The failure to call a witness at trial constitutes
ineffective assistance of counsel only if it deprives the defendant of a substantial defense.
People v Dixon, 263 Mich App 393, 398; 688 NW2d 308 (2004). A substantial defense is one
that might have made a difference in the outcome of the trial. People v Kelly, 186 Mich App
524, 526; 465 NW2d 569 (1990).
In the instant case, defendant was not deprived of a substantial defense as a result of
defense counsel’s actions. Defense counsel utilized a strategy of attacking Reazor’s truthfulness,
her inability to accurately recall the events of the evening of the carjacking, and inability to
identify defendant shortly after the incident in order to create reasonable doubt. Defense
counsel’s closing argument was replete with references to Reazor’s differing accounts of the
incident immediately after the carjacking and on the witness stand. Counsel also went into
significant detail regarding her failure to identify defendant in the line-up. Counsel fully
presented a defense based on the unreliability of Reazor’s identification of defendant. While this
strategy was ultimately not successful, it did not fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness.
Furthermore, the issue of whether Reazor’s memory would be more accurate shortly after
the event or weeks later is one that a jury could decide for itself even without expert testimony.
-2-
See People v Smith, 425 Mich 98, 106; 387 NW2d 814 (1986) (suggesting expert testimony is
unnecessary where layperson would be qualified to determine the issue without enlightenment
from one having specialized understanding). Even if an expert had been called to state that
Reazor’s identification, made weeks after the event, was less reliable than one made immediately
after the event, it is unlikely that such testimony would add to the jury’s knowledge or affect the
outcome of the trial. Accordingly, defense counsel’s performance was not deficient and
defendant is not entitled to reversal of his convictions on this basis.1
Defendant next argues that he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor attempted to
evoke the jury’s sympathy for Reazor and appealed to the jurors’ civic duty to convict defendant.
Again, we disagree.
Because defendant did not preserve this issue by objecting before the trial judge, it is not
preserved. Our review is limited, therefore, to “plain error affecting the defendant’s substantial
rights.” People v McLaughlin, 258 Mich App 635, 645; 672 NW2d 860 (2003). A defendant
must show that an error occurred, the error was plain, and the plain error affected the defendant’s
rights, i.e., caused prejudice that must have affected the outcome of the proceedings. Id.
The test of prosecutorial misconduct is whether the defendant was denied a fair and
impartial trial. People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 63; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). A defendant’s
opportunity for a fair trial can be jeopardized when the prosecutor interjects issues broader than
the guilt or innocence of the accused. Id. at 63-64. The alleged improper statements must be
considered on a case-by-case basis, examining the record and the remarks in context, and in light
of defendant’s arguments. People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 450, 454; 678 NW2d 631 (2004).
Furthermore, curative instructions “are sufficient to cure the prejudicial effect of most
inappropriate prosecutorial statements.” People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 235; 749 NW2d
272 (2008).
Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly appealed to the jurors’ sympathy for
Reazor by telling the jury that he “spoke for” Reazor and that her testimony should be believed
because to do so would be consistent with justice. Appeals to the jury to sympathize with the
victim can constitute improper argument. People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 591; 629 NW2d
411 (2001). A prosecutor may, however, argue that a witness is credible or worthy of belief.
People v Howard, 226 Mich App 528, 548; 575 NW2d 16 (1997).
1
Defendant has requested a remand for an evidentiary hearing on this issue. Defendant failed to
request a hearing before the trial court. This Court may grant a motion to remand for this
purpose if the defendant files an affidavit or offer of proof regarding the facts to be established
on remand. MCR 7.211(C)(1)(a)(ii). Defendant has neither filed a motion to remand with this
Court nor provided an affidavit or other offer of proof. Furthermore, defendant’s brief includes
only general references to theories on the reliability of eyewitness identifications. Defendant has
failed to “set forth any additional facts that would require development of a record to determine
if defense counsel was ineffective.” People v Williams, 275 Mich App 194, 200; 737 NW2d 797
(2007). Therefore, remand for an evidentiary hearing is not warranted.
-3-
Here, the challenged remark that “Sara is worth believing and justice is worth believing”
was made during closing arguments and in rebuttal to defense counsel’s repeated references to
Reazor being a liar. Even an otherwise improper remark may not rise to error requiring reversal
when the prosecutor is merely responding to defense counsel’s argument. People v Kennebrew,
220 Mich App 601, 608; 560 NW2d 354 (1996). Furthermore, the remark was isolated. Isolated
remarks and appeals that are not blatant will not rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct.
Watson, 245 Mich App at 591. In this context, the remark was not improper.
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor improperly appealed to the jurors’ civic duty
by stating:
I ask you this in the name of Sara Reazor. I ask you this in the name of
the police department and in the name of the Genesee County prosecutor’s office
and in the name of the People of the State of Michigan, but most importantly,
most importantly, here because justice demands a verdict of guilty.
A prosecutor may not tell the jury that it should convict as part of its “civic duty.” People v
Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 58; 687 NW2d 342 (2004). In People v Truong, 218 Mich App
325, 340; 553 NW2d 692 (1996), a panel of this Court found that a prosecutor’s comment that
“on behalf of the Wyoming Police Department and on behalf of the State of Michigan, I am
asking you to convict,” was not a “civic duty” argument because it neither injected issues
broader than the defendant’s guilt or innocence of the charges nor encouraged the jurors to
suspend their powers of judgment. The prosecutor’s statements in this case are very similar to
those in Truong, and cannot, therefore, be considered improper civic duty arguments.
The prosecutor’s exhortation for the jury to convict “because justice demands a verdict of
guilty” was also not improper. In People v Perry, 172 Mich App 609, 617; 432 NW2d 377
(1988), the prosecutor stated in closing argument:
I’m going to ask you for one thing, though. I’m going to ask you for justice. I
think justice is deserved in this case. I think the [using the victim’s name] of this
world demand consideration, demand justice. I think the victims of this world
like [using the victim’s name] demand fair consideration.
Although reversal was ostensibly based on other factors, the Court nonetheless cautioned the
prosecutor to “refrain from making the improper remarks” on remand. Id. at 624. Although the
prosecutor in this case similarly used “justice” as a reason for the jury to convict defendant, the
gravamen of his closing argument was that the evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming.
Accordingly, unlike in Perry, the remarks did not go so far as to invite the jurors to suspend their
powers of judgment and convict simply out of a sense of civic duty.
Finally, defendant points to the prosecutor’s statement at the end of his closing argument:
Now, this is the City of Flint. Okay. Most reasonable People would infer that
there is crime in Flint. In fact that there’s violent crime in Flint. This kind of
crime.
-4-
Of all the alleged errors cited by defendant, this remark comes closest to injecting issues beyond
defendant’s guilt or innocence. In People v Williams, 65 Mich App 753, 756; 238 NW2d 186
(1975), a panel of this Court reversed a conviction after the prosecutor had argued to the jury that
it could affect the drug traffic in the city of Detroit by finding the defendant guilty. The Court
stated:
We recognize, too, that jurors share the average citizen’s desire to eliminate the
narcotics traffic. In such an emotion-laden situation, sensibilities are easily
inflamed. Because emotional reaction to social problems should play no role in
the evaluation of an individual’s guilt or innocence, prosecutors must exercise
special care to avoid arousing jurors’ emotions concerning such issues.
In the instant case, by arguing that the jurors had an ‘opportunity to effect [sic] the
drug traffic in this city’, the prosecutor appealed to the jurors’ fears and
encouraged them to go outside the evidence and decide the case on the basis of
their desire to alleviate the drug problem.
In this case, the prosecutor’s reference to “violent crime in Flint. This kind of crime,” arguably
encouraged the jurors to go outside the evidence and decide the case on the basis of fear of the
overall crime problem in Flint. Moreover, this comment was not made in response to any
argument by defense counsel regarding crime in the city of Flint.
Nonetheless, reversal in such cases is only warranted when the error resulted in the
conviction of an actually innocent defendant or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings. People v Callon, 256 Mich App 312, 329; 662 NW2d
501 (2003). The prosecutor in this case presented substantial evidence of defendant’s guilt and
focused almost exclusively on that evidence in making his closing remarks. The error, therefore,
if any, cannot be said to have resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent person or to have
compromised the integrity of the judicial process. Furthermore, the court’s curative instruction
that “lawyers’ statements and arguments are not evidence,” was sufficient to cure any prejudicial
effect of the statement. Accordingly, no reversal is warranted on the basis of prosecutorial
misconduct.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.