PEOPLE OF MI V LUTHER BURRAGE
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 18, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 290306
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 07-021623-FC
LUTHER BURRAGE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and O’CONNELL and WILDER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury convictions for assault with intent to do great
bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84, intentionally discharging a firearm at a dwelling or
occupied structure, MCL 750.234b, felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. We
affirm.
On August 24, 2007, Devon Thompson was shot in the right shoulder area. Prior to the
shooting, defendant had called and spoken with Thompson’s girlfriend, Jojuana Smith—
defendant’s former girlfriend and the mother of defendant’s son—on the house telephone. When
defendant called Smith a second time, Thompson answered the telephone and then hung up on
defendant. Defendant called two times after that, and neither Thompson nor Smith answered the
telephone. Shortly thereafter, Thompson and Smith heard someone at the open living room
window. When they approached the window, Thompson saw defendant. After Thompson heard
defendant utter Thompson’s name and an expletive, Thompson saw and heard a gunshot.
Thompson felt the bullet enter his right shoulder area and exit through his back.
After defendant was found guilty by a jury, he filed a motion for a new trial. Defendant
argued that he had been denied a fair trial because one of the jurors, Jade Young, committed
misconduct. Young failed to disclose that she had previously been involved in a confrontation
with defendant’s purported girlfriend, Christine Isaacs, who was an alibi witness. That
confrontation was allegedly about Isaacs’ friend having an affair with Young’s husband. Thus,
defendant argued, because of this undisclosed animosity between Young and his alibi witness,
there was a strong possibility that Young was biased against him which prejudiced his right to a
fair trial. The trial court denied the motion, holding that (1) Young did not indicate during voir
dire that she could not be fair and impartial, and (2) defendant failed to show actual prejudice
because he had other alibi witnesses. Defendant appealed to this Court and filed a motion to
-1-
remand related to his request for a new trial. We granted the motion, remanding the matter for
an evidentiary hearing and allowing defendant to file a motion for a new trial. People v Burrage,
unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered September 1, 2009 (Docket No. 290306).
Thereafter, defendant filed a motion for a new trial upon remand premised on the grounds of
juror misconduct and that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.
An evidentiary hearing was conducted. Young testified that she had gone to high school
with Isaacs but, before the trial, she had not seen Isaacs since ninth or tenth grade. She did not
recognize Isaacs’ name, and only recognized Isaacs when she took the witness stand during the
trial. Young did not advise the court about her recognition of Isaacs because Young thought
there was a difference between recognizing someone and knowing someone. Young did not
know anything about Isaacs, and did not know her on a first and last name basis. Young did not
believe that recognizing Isaacs had anything to do with her decision or responsibilities as a juror
in defendant’s case. Young testified that her recognition did not mean anything to her because
she did not interact with Isaacs in high school. During her deliberations, Young stated, she did
not consider the fact that she knew Isaacs from high school. And, with regard to the purported
affair between Young’s husband and Isaacs’ friend, it did not happen. There was no affair.
Young’s husband had been in Iraq for the last couple of years and then had been in Missouri
until May of 2008.
The jury foreperson in defendant’s case testified that he did not see Young interact with
any of the other jurors by herself and had no particular recollection of what Young said during
deliberations.
Isaacs testified that her friend, Shankia Burnett, was sleeping with Young’s husband.
And, in 2002, Isaacs had to break up a words-only fight between Young and Burnett at Burnett’s
house regarding Young’s husband. Isaacs called 911 because Young had a stick in her hand.
Burnett testified that she had an intimate relationship with Young’s husband that had
been off and on over the past seven to eight years. In August of 2007, she spent a week with him
at Six Flags amusement park. Burnett testified that Isaacs was present during a confrontation
between herself and Young that occurred in 2002 when Young showed up at Burnett’s house and
had words with Burnett.
After the witnesses were presented, the trial court permitted argument on defendant’s
claim that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. Defendant argued that there
was not a reliable identification of him as the shooter. The prosecution argued that the evidence,
including the victim’s testimony, the 911 call, and the photographs of the scene all supported the
verdict and showed that the great weight of the evidence was against defendant. Thereafter, the
trial court rejected defendant’s claim that the verdict was against the great weight of the
evidence, holding that the case involved a classic conflict in testimony that was properly within
the province of the jury. The trial court also rejected defendant’s juror misconduct claim on the
ground that the presumption of partiality had not been overcome by defendant. Defendant had
not established that he was actually prejudiced by the juror’s presence on the jury, i.e., that
Young was not impartial.
On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
his motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct. We disagree. This Court reviews for an
-2-
abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision on a motion for a new trial and for clear error its
findings of fact. People v Miller, 482 Mich 540, 544; 759 NW2d 850 (2008). An abuse of
discretion occurs when the result is outside the range of principled outcomes. People v
Blackston, 481 Mich 451, 460; 751 NW2d 408 (2008).
MCR 6.431(B) provides, “[o]n the defendant’s motion, the court may order a new trial on
any ground that would support appellate reversal of the conviction or because it believes that the
verdict has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” People v Brown, 279 Mich App 116, 144-145;
755 NW2d 664 (2008); see, also, MCL 770.11. A criminal defendant has the right to be tried by
a fair and impartial jury. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20; see, also, Miller, 482 Mich
at 547. The defendant must show actual prejudice resulted from the presence of the juror to
justify a new trial. Id. at 548-549. A juror’s failure to reveal relevant information is prejudicial
if the defendant was denied an impartial jury. Id. at 548-549, 561. Jurors are presumed to be
impartial, and the burden is on the defendant to establish that a juror was not impartial or at least
impartiality is in reasonable doubt. Id. at 550.
In this case, we agree with the trial court that the evidence presented by defendant at the
evidentiary hearing did not overcome the presumption of impartiality. As the trial court held, the
connection between Young and defendant was too attenuated. Defendant’s argument, that
Young was not impartial because defendant’s girlfriend’s friend, Burnett, was allegedly having
an affair with Young’s husband and that Isaacs was allegedly involved in breaking up a fight
between Burnett and Young about six years earlier, is not persuasive. Further, Young testified at
the evidentiary hearing that she did not recognize Isaacs, defendant’s girlfriend, until she actually
saw Isaacs on the witness stand. Young also stated that her husband was not having an affair
with Burnett. The jury foreman testified that Young did not bring up the affair during jury
deliberations and did not attempt to persuade other jurors that defendant was guilty. And,
although Isaacs and Burnett both testified that Young knew of the affair and that she was biased
because of the affair, the trial court found the credibility of both Isaacs and Burnett questionable.
The trial court may evaluate each witness’ credibility in deciding a motion for a new trial.
People v Cress, 468 Mich 678, 692; 664 NW2d 174 (2003). Accordingly, defendant has failed
to show actual prejudice resulted from Young being a juror in this case and it was not an abuse
of discretion for the trial court to deny defendant’s motion for a new trial based on juror
misconduct.
Defendant’s claim that his attorney was ineffective for failing to request an evidentiary
hearing when he filed the initial motion for a new trial in the trial court is also without merit. It
is not reasonably probable that the outcome of the trial would have been different had
defendant’s attorney made the request because the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion
for a new trial based on juror misconduct after the evidentiary hearing was completed. See
People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 314; 521 NW2d 797 (1994).
1
MCL 770.1 provides, “[t]he judge of a court in which the trial of an offense is held may grant a
new trial to the defendant, for any cause for which by law a new trial may be granted, or when it
appears to the court that justice has not been done, and on the terms or conditions as the court
directs.”
-3-
Next, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions
because the identification of defendant as the shooter was questionable. We disagree. When
reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, this Court reviews the record de novo in the light
most favorable to the prosecution and determines whether a rational trier of fact could find that
the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Roper, 286
Mich App 77, 83; 777 NW2d 483 (2009). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this
Court “must not interfere with the jury’s role as the sole judge of the facts.” People v Meshell,
265 Mich App 616, 619; 696 NW2d 754 (2005).
Identity is an essential element of every crime. People v Oliphant, 399 Mich 472, 489;
250 NW2d 443 (1976). The prosecution must present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crimes alleged. People v Kern, 6 Mich App
406, 409; 149 NW2d 216 (1967).
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that
the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the
shooter. Thompson testified that approximately two weeks before the shooting, he and
defendant were involved in a confrontation related to Thompson disciplining defendant’s son.
Thompson and Smith both testified that on the night of the shooting defendant called their home
four times. Smith answered defendant’s first phone call, Thompson answered defendant’s
second phone call and hung up on defendant, and then neither Thompson nor Smith answered the
last two calls from defendant. Thompson testified that he recognized defendant’s voice and saw
defendant’s face through the front room window immediately before he was shot. Trooper
David Stokes, Officer Christopher Mark, Sergeant Jay Parker, and Cynthia Ferguson-Williams
all testified that Thompson stated that defendant shot him. Additionally, Smith initially told the
911 operator, Stokes, Mark, and Parker that defendant shot Thompson, although Smith retracted
her statements at trial. Although defendant presented contradictory evidence through three
witnesses, it was for the trier of fact to determine the credibility of the proofs presented. See
People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 642-43; 576 NW2d 129 (1998); People v Unger, 278 Mich
App 210, 232; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). The jury heard the evidence and determined each
witness’ credibility. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a
rational trier of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant shot Thompson.
Finally, defendant argues that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence
and the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a new trial on this basis.
We disagree. This Court reviews the trial court’s decision on a motion for a new trial for an
abuse of discretion. Miller, 482 Mich at 544. An abuse of discretion occurs when the result is
outside the range of principled outcomes. Blackston, 481 Mich at 460.
The test to determine whether a verdict is against the great weight of the evidence is
“whether the evidence preponderates so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage
of justice to allow the verdict to stand.” People v McCray, 245 Mich App 631, 637; 630 NW2d
633 (2001). That is, the verdict “does not find reasonable support in the evidence, but is more
likely to be attributed to causes outside the record such as passion, prejudice, sympathy, or some
extraneous influence.” People v DeLisle, 202 Mich App 658, 661; 509 NW2d 885 (1993)
(internal quotations omitted.) Conflicting testimony and questions of witness credibility are
generally insufficient grounds for granting a new trial. Unger, 278 Mich App at 232. Usually,
issues of witness credibility are for the trier of fact to resolve. Id.
-4-
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting defendant’s claim that the verdict
was against the great weight of the evidence. This case centered on the conflicting testimony of
the prosecution’s and defendant’s witnesses. The prosecution offered Thompson who testified
that he saw and heard defendant outside the front room window immediately before he was shot.
The prosecution also produced several officers who testified that, on the night of the shooting,
Thompson and Smith both told them that defendant shot Thompson. In contrast, defendant
offered two alibi witnesses who testified that defendant was at his house when the shooting
occurred. Further, Smith retracted the statements she made during her 911 call, testifying that
she only assumed defendant was the shooter on that night because he was the last person she
spoke with on the telephone. Smith also testified that it was very dark outside on the night of the
shooting because there were no outside lights on her home. The jury resolved the issues of
witness credibility in favor of the prosecution. We cannot conclude that the evidence
preponderated so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow it
to stand; thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting this argument.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.