PEOPLE OF MI V JOHN WILLIAM GONZALES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 11, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 289079
St. Clair Circuit Court
LC No. 08-00147-FC
JOHN WILLIAM GONZALES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and O’Connell and WILDER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b),
and first-degree child abuse, MCL 750.136b(2). He was sentenced as a second offense habitual
offender, MCL 769.10, to concurrent prison terms of life for felony murder and 10 to 22 years
and 6 months for first-degree child abuse. He now appeals as of right. We affirm.
The victim in this case is defendant’s one-year-old son. The victim was fatally injured
when he received a blow to the head in July 2005. The resulting fracture to the base of the
victim’s skull was 9.2 centimeters in length, with the majority of the fracture running entirely
through the bone. After the killing, defendant and his family moved to Fort Wayne, Indiana. In
December 2007, the police there received information about a body in defendant’s home. A
subsequent search led to the discovery of the victim’s mummified remains in a plastic container
in the living room. At first, defendant denied having any knowledge of the victim. Eventually,
he admitted the boy was his and that he had died, but asserted that he was accidentally injured
while he was playing with defendant.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence several autopsy
photographs of the victim because they were overly gruesome and prejudicial. However, the
photographs supported and contextualized the medical examiner’s testimony by illustrating the
depth, location, and severity of the skull fracture. This was relevant to the element of intent,
particularly in light of defendant’s claim that the injury was accidental. MRE 402; People v
Mills, 450 Mich 61, 76; 537 NW2d 909, mod on other grounds 450 Mich 1212 (1995)
(“Photographs may . . . be used to corroborate a witness’ testimony.”); People v Mesik (On
Reconsideration), 285 Mich App 535, 544; 775 NW2d 857 (2009). “[W]hile gruesome
photographs should not be admitted solely to garner sympathy from the jury,” Mesik noted, “a
photograph that is admissible for some other purpose is not rendered inadmissible because of its
gruesome details.” Mesik, 285 Mich App at 544. Rather, Mills explains, “[t]he proper inquiry is
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always whether the probative value of the photographs is substantially outweighed by unfair
prejudice.” Mills, 450 Mich at 77. Because the record does not indicate that the photographs
were unfairly prejudicial, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographic
evidence.
Defendant also challenges the trial court’s admission of other acts evidence regarding
defendant’s abuse of his other children. Plaintiff sought admission of the evidence under both
MRE 404(b) and MCL 768.27b. To be admissible under MRE 404(b), evidence (1) must be
offered for a proper purpose, (2) must be relevant, and (3) must not have a probative value
substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. People v Steele, 283 Mich App
472, 479; 769 NW2d 256 (2009). MCL 768.27b states that “in a criminal action in which the
defendant is accused of an offense involving domestic violence, evidence of the defendant’s
commission of other acts of domestic violence is admissible for any purpose for which it is
relevant, if it is not otherwise excluded under” MRE 403.
The evidence of other instances of child abuse by defendant was offered for the proper
purpose of showing defendant’s pattern of conduct, involving intentional abuse against children.
The evidence demonstrated a lack of mistake or accident in defendant’s actions. MRE
404(b)(1); People v Johnigan, 265 Mich App 463, 466; 696 NW2d 724 (2005) (“a prosecutor
may introduce evidence of other acts for the proper purpose of demonstrating a lack of mistake
(or fabrication) in a witness’s accusations.”). The evidence was probative of whether defendant
knowingly and intentionally caused serious physical harm to the victim. MCL 750.136b(2). The
record does not establish that the tendency existed that the evidence would be given preemptive
or undue weight. People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 500; 577 NW2d 673 (1998). Unfair prejudice is
not established merely because of the abhorrent nature of prior assault. Id. Furthermore, they
jury was specifically instructed stated that the other acts evidence was to be considered only for
“certain purposes,” specifically that defendant “specifically meant to do great bodily harm,”
“acted purposefully,” “not by accident or mistake, or because he misjudged the situation.”
Generally, a jury is presumed to have followed its instructions. People v Graves, 458 Mich 476,
486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998). Thus, the other acts evidence cannot be characterized as unfair, and
the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted this evidence.
Next, defendant asserts that he should be granted a new trial because the trial court failed
to instruct the jury on second-degree child abuse, MCL 750.136b(3). However, defendant
waived any claim of error by accepting the instructions as given. People v Lueth, 253 Mich App
670, 688; 660 NW2d 322 (2002).
In a related argument, defendant asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of
counsel because his attorney failed to request an instruction on second-degree child abuse, MCL
750.136b(3)(a), which he maintains is a necessarily included lesser offense of first-degree child
abuse. To demonstrate ineffective assistance, a defendant must show: (1) that his attorney’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that this performance so
prejudiced him that he was deprived of a fair trial. People v Grant, 470 Mich 477, 485-486; 684
NW2d 686 (2004). Prejudice exists if a defendant shows a reasonable probability that the
outcome would have been different but for the attorney’s errors. Id. at 486.
“A person is guilty of child abuse in the first-degree if the person knowingly or
intentionally causes serious physical or serious mental harm to a child.” MCL 750.136b(2).
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“Intentional” is defined to mean “‘done with intention or on purpose. . . .’” In re Certified
Question from the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 468 Mich 109, 114; 659 NW2d 597
(2003), quoting Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1991). “Knowledge” is defined
as, “An awareness or understanding of a fact or circumstance; a state of mind in which a person
has no substantial doubt about the existence of a fact.” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed).
In contrast, MCL 750.136b(3) provides, in relevant part:
A person is guilty of child abuse in the second-degree if any of the following
apply:
(a) The person’s omission causes serious physical harm or serious mental harm to
a child or if the person's reckless act causes serious physical harm or serious
mental harm to a child.
In People v Gregg, 206 Mich App 208, 212; 520 NW2d 690 (1994), this Court quoted the
following definition of “reckless” from Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed):
“Not recking; careless, heedless, inattentive; indifferent to consequences.
According to circumstances it may mean desperately heedless, wanton or willful,
or it may mean only careless, inattentive, or negligent. For conduct to be
‘reckless’ it must be such as to evince disregard of, or indifference to,
consequences, under circumstances involving danger to life or safety to others,
although no harm was intended.”
This Court also quoted The Random House College Dictionary, Revised Edition,
defining “reckless” as:
1. utterly unconcerned about the consequences of some action; without caution;
careless . . . 2. characterized by or proceeding from such carelessness. [Id.]
Assuming, without deciding, that second-degree child abuse is a lesser included offense
of first-degree child abuse, defendant has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the
outcome would have been different if his attorney had requested the instruction. Grant, 470
Mich at 486. In finding that defendant knowingly or intentionally caused serious physical harm
to the victim to support the first-degree child abuse conviction, the jury clearly did not find
credible defendant’s defense that the injury was an accident caused by pushing the victim while
playing with him. Therefore, defendant was not prejudiced by his attorney’s failure to request an
instruction that defendant merely acted recklessly or with indifference to the consequences.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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