IN RE WILLIAM T MANUEL TRUSTS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In re WILLIAM T. MANUEL TRUSTS
HENRY MANUEL,
UNPUBLISHED
May 11, 2010
Petitioner-Appellant,
v
No. 288922
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2007-312331-TV
THERESA MCCANN, TRUSTEE,
Respondent-Appellee.
Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and O’CONNELL and WILDER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner Henry Manuel appeals as of right from the trial court’s order granting summary
disposition in favor of respondent Theresa McCann, petitioner’s sister and the trustee of their
father’s trust, with regard to ownership of their father’s property located at 3192 Loon Lake
Shores in Waterford, Michigan, (the Loon Lake property) and ruling that petitioner (who was not
a beneficiary to the trust) lacked standing to remove respondent as trustee or request an
accounting of the trust assets. We affirm.
William T. Manuel (“William”) and his wife, Ada, had four children, John Manuel
(John), Daisy Presson (Daisy), respondent, and petitioner. It appears that William used trusts as
his preferred method of estate planning. Both parties acknowledged the existence of the
“Revocable Living Trust Agreement” created on March 28, 1974, (the 1974 trust), in which
William named himself as trustee, named John and Comerica Bank as co-successor trustees, and
specified that upon the deaths of both him and Ada, the trust would be dissolved and the trust
assets would be distributed equally among his four children and their descendants. Petitioner
provided two unsigned copies of “amendments” to the 1974 trust, which purportedly were
executed in the 1970s as well, that again specified that he would be entitled to a one-quarter
share of the trust assets upon the deaths of both William and Ada.
On August 19, 1999, William executed the William T. Manuel Living Trust (the 1999
trust), naming himself as trustee and naming respondent as the successor trustee in the event of
-1-
his death or disability.1 The trust provided that upon the deaths of both William and Ada, John
and Daisy would each get a one-quarter share of the trust property, respondent would get half the
trust property, and petitioner would get nothing. The trust stated, “I acknowledge the existence
of my child, HENRY MANUEL, and have intentionally, and with full knowledge, chosen not to
provide for HENRY MANUEL or his issue.” On the same day, William executed his last will
and testament, providing for the distribution of all his property to the 1999 trust on the event of
his death and appointing respondent his personal representative. Ada died soon after the trust
was executed. On October 4, 1999, William transferred the Loon Lake property to the 1999
trust. William died in 2006.
The record indicates that petitioner has a long history of legal and financial difficulties
and would often turn to his parents for financial assistance. According to respondent, William
decided not to make petitioner a beneficiary of the 1999 trust because he had given petitioner
significant amounts of money during his life and would pay many of petitioner’s legal bills.
Apparently, even this lawsuit was commenced as part of a settlement agreement arising from the
efforts of certain of petitioner’s creditors to recover money owed to them.
On August 27, 2007, petitioner filed a petition to remove respondent as successor trustee
of William’s trust. In this initial petition, petitioner claimed that according to the 1974 trust, he
was entitled to a one-quarter share of all property held by the trust upon the death of both his
parents. Petitioner then claimed that William had deeded the Loon Lake property to the 1974
trust in 1993, so he was entitled to a one-quarter share of the proceeds from the sale of this
property. According to petitioner, because the Loon Lake property had already been transferred
to the 1974 trust, the later transfer of the property to the 1999 trust was invalid. Petitioner also
claimed that respondent unduly influenced William to create the 1999 trust, and asked the court
to remove respondent as successor trustee of the 1999 trust and require a full accounting of all
William’s assets, including those in the 1999 trust. With his petition, petitioner submitted a copy
of a quit claim deed dated April 8, 1993, (the 1993 deed) that purported to show that William and
Ada had quit-claimed the Loon Lake property to the “William T. Manuel and Ada Manuel
Living Trust,” not the 1974 trust.
Respondent acknowledged in her response that William wanted her to be the trustee of
his estate and that petitioner had no interest in the 1999 trust, per William’s express wish.
Respondent claimed that the 1974 trust lacked assets and did not exist. Respondent also filed a
motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(5), (8), and (10). In her brief in
support of this motion, she argued that the 1993 deed was null because the William T. Manuel
and Ada Manuel Living Trust did not exist. Respondent also maintained that petitioner did not
have the authority to request her removal as trustee of the 1999 trust because he was not a
beneficiary under the trust.
Although the lower court file is spotty, it appears that after respondent pointed out that
the 1993 deed purportedly transferred the Loon Lake property to the William T. Manuel and Ada
1
The trust also provided that if respondent were unwilling or unable to serve as trustee, John
would be named the successor trustee.
-2-
Manuel Living Trust, petitioner dropped his claim that the 1993 deed transferred the property to
the 1974 trust and instead claimed that the William T. Manuel and Ada Manuel Living Trust
existed and, therefore, the transfer was valid.2 In support of his position, petitioner claimed that
affidavits by himself, John, and Daisy, as well as a 1995 complaint and lis pendens listing the
William T. Manuel and Ada Manuel Living Trust as a party to litigation, established the trust’s
existence.
However, only John’s affidavit is included in the lower court record. In the affidavit,
John claimed that he was named as successor trustee of all his parents’ trusts, including the
“William T. Manuel and Ada Manuel Individual Living Trust,” until the 1999 trust named
respondent trustee. He also claimed that he was the successor trustee to the “William T. Manuel
and Ada Manuel Trust,” and that as co-trustee of this trust, he did not execute the 1999 deed
transferring the Loon Lake property to the 1999 trust. However, John made no mention of the
William T. Manuel and Ada Manuel Living Trust in his affidavit.
Although the affidavits signed by petitioner and Daisy were not included in the lower
court record, it appears that the trial court was aware of these affidavits as well.3 Petitioner
attached both affidavits to his brief on appeal in this case. In his affidavit, petitioner claimed that
he was aware of the William T. Manuel and Ada Manuel Trust and that he transacted business
with, and transferred real property to, this trust. Although petitioner mentioned the William T.
Manuel and Ada Manuel Trust three times in his affidavit, he made no mention of the William T.
Manuel and Ada Manuel Living Trust. More tellingly, he claimed that the Loon Lake property
was transferred in 1993 to the William T. Manuel and Ada Manuel Trust (as opposed to the
William T. Manuel and Ada Manuel Living Trust). Similarly, Daisy mentioned the William T.
Manuel and Ada Manuel Trust in her affidavit, but she made no mention of the William T.
Manuel and Ada Manuel Living Trust. Instead, she claimed that the Loon Lake property was
transferred to the William T. Manuel and Ada Manuel Trust.
Accordingly, it appears that the 1993 deed indicating that the Loon Lake property was
transferred to the William T. Manuel and Ada Manuel Living Trust was the only “evidence”
presented to the trial court indicating this trust’s existence. Petitioner attaches to his brief on
appeal copies of a 1995 complaint and notice of lis pendens in a lawsuit in which the William T.
Manuel and Ada Manuel Living Trust was named as a co-plaintiff along with William, Ada, and
Noreen E. Manuel.4 However, neither the complaint nor the lis pendens was included in the
lower court file, and the trial court did not indicate that either the complaint or the lis pendens
was included among the evidence provided by the parties for his review.5
2
In this reply, petitioner also requested summary disposition in his favor pursuant to MCR
2.116(I)(2).
3
Petitioner attached both these affidavits to his brief on appeal.
4
Apparently Noreen was petitioner’s wife.
5
Although neither the complaint nor the notice of lis pendens was included in the lower court
file and, therefore, are not part of the record provided for this Court to review, we will briefly
summarize the contents of these documents. The notice of lis pendens makes no mention of the
(continued…)
-3-
On August 1, 2008, the trial court issued an opinion and order granting respondent’s
motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(5), (7), and (10) with regard to
petitioner’s claims regarding ownership of the Loon Lake property.6 The trial court then ordered
“that the Loon Lake property is an asset of the William T. Manuel Trust u/a/d 3/28/74 and the
William T. Manuel Trust u/a/d 8/19/99.” Finally, the trial court determined that petitioner lacked
standing to challenge the 1999 trust.
First, petitioner challenges the trial court’s determination that the William T. Manuel and
Ada Manuel Living Trust does not exist. Because at least a question of fact remains regarding
whether the trust exists, petitioner argues, the trial court should not have granted respondent’s
motion for summary disposition. Instead, petitioner claims, the trial court should have
recognized that the Loon Lake property had been deeded to either the William T. Manuel and
Ada Manuel Trust or the William T. Manuel and Ada Manuel Living Trust in 1993, that this
trust probably provided for all assets to be distributed evenly among William and Ada’s four
children after their deaths, and that as a result, petitioner was entitled to a share of the proceeds
of the sale of the Loon Lake property.
Petitioner does not dispute the trial court’s conclusion that proof of the existence of the
William T. Manuel and Ada Manuel Living Trust must be established in order to survive a
motion for summary disposition. He argues only that summary disposition was inappropriate
because the William T. Manuel and Ada Manuel Living Trust does exist (or that, at the very
least, the evidence provided to the trial court is sufficient to establish a question of fact regarding
the trust’s existence).
It appears that the trial court granted summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10). We review de novo the trial court’s grant of summary disposition pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(10). Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich 557, 561; 664 NW2d 151 (2003). “A trial
court tests the factual support of a plaintiff’s claim when it rules upon a motion for summary
disposition filed under MCR 2.116(C)(10).” Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 161; 516
NW2d 475 (1994). “The court’s task is to review the record evidence, and all reasonable
(…continued)
William T. Manuel and Ada Manuel Living Trust, except in the heading. The complaint states
that the William T. Manuel and Ada Manuel Living Trust “is a trust entity with its principal
location at 3192 Loon Lake Shores, Waterford, Michigan, County of Oakland.” The complaint
addresses the defendants’ attempts to foreclose on a mortgage on property located at 8215 Ellis
Road in Clarkston, Michigan, (the Ellis Road property) and claims that either William and Ada
or the William T. Manuel and Ada Manuel Living Trust were the actual owners of the property.
According to the complaint, plaintiff and his wife had transferred title to the Ellis Road property
to either William and Ada or the William T. Manuel and Ada Manuel Living Trust one day
before the mortgage at issue in the complaint was executed. An attached affidavit signed by
William indicated that he only attested that plaintiff and his wife had transferred the Ellis Road
property to William and Ada or to the William T. Manuel and Ada Manuel Living Trust.
William did not affirm in his affidavit that the William T. Manuel and Ada Manuel Living Trust
actually existed.
6
Similarly, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(I)(2) with respect to this same issue.
-4-
inferences therefrom, and determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists to warrant a
trial.” Harrison v Olde Fin Corp, 225 Mich App 601, 605; 572 NW2d 679 (1997).
In support of his position, petitioner references the affidavits signed by him, John, and
Daisy. However, none of these affidavits establishes that the William T. Manuel and Ada
Manuel Living Trust exists; instead, these affidavits discuss the existence of the William T.
Manuel and Ada Manuel Trust, and claim that the Loon Lake property was transferred to this
trust, contrary to the 1993 deed.7 In his brief on appeal, petitioner argues that the 1995 complaint
and notice of lis pendens naming the William T. Manuel and Ada Manuel Living Trust as a coplaintiff also establish the trust’s existence. However, neither the complaint nor the notice of lis
pendens is included in the lower court record, and a petitioner cannot expand the record on
appeal. MCR 7.210(A); Sherman v Sea Ray Boats, Inc, 251 Mich App 41, 56; 649 NW2d 783
(2002) (“This Court’s review is limited to the record established by the trial court, and a party
may not expand the record on appeal.”).
Because petitioner could not produce an actual copy of the William T. Manuel and Ada
Manuel Living Trust, he relies on secondary evidence to establish its existence. Yet in order to
recognize the existence of a lost document, the court must be provided with proof of its
execution, loss, and inability to be retrieved, as well as evidence establishing the substance of the
document. See Thompson v Flint & Pere Marquette R Co, 131 Mich 95, 99-101; 90 NW 1037
(1902); Henry v Gates, 118 Mich 379, 381; 76 NW 765 (1898). Petitioner does not provide any
testimony or other evidence regarding the contents of the William T. Manuel and Ada Manuel
Living Trust. In particular, he provides no evidence regarding who was named the trustee and
successor trustee of that trust, whether he was included as a beneficiary of that trust, and the
nature of any possible trust distribution to which he might be entitled. Although he and two of
his siblings provided affidavits claiming that William intended to provide for all his children
equally after his death, any use of this alleged intent to establish that petitioner was a named
beneficiary of the William T. Manuel and Ada Manuel Living Trust would be speculative at best,
especially in light of evidence indicating that William intentionally excluded petitioner from the
1999 trust. Similarly, petitioner provides little testimony or evidence establishing that the
William T. Manuel and Ada Manuel Living Trust was executed and indicating why it is lost and
irretrievable. In fact, the affidavits that petitioner provides appear to indicate a certain level of
confusion regarding which trust is even being discussed.
In fact, petitioner only provided the trial court with one document included in the lower
court record that even mentioned the existence of the William T. Manuel and Ada Manuel Living
Trust. This document, the 1993 deed, makes one reference to the William T. Manuel and Ada
Manuel Living Trust and provides no indication regarding the substance of the trust. In the
7
We acknowledge that our insistence on distinguishing between two similarly named trusts
might appear meticulous. However, petitioner claims that William created several similarly
named trusts over the years, and petitioner’s case rests on his ability to establish that a particular
deed transferred the Loon Lake property to a particular trust that actually exists. Petitioner has
the burden of proving the existence of the William T. Manuel and Ada Manuel Living Trust, not
a similarly named trust, and must be held to that burden.
-5-
absence of any evidence regarding the substance, execution, and loss of the William T. Manuel
and Ada Manuel Living Trust, the 1993 deed is insufficient to establish that this trust ever
existed. Because the existence of the William T. Manuel and Ada Manuel Living Trust has not
been established, the 1993 deed is void. Price v Nat’l Union Fire Ins Co, 294 Mich 289, 292;
293 NW 652 (1940). The trial court’s determination on this point was not in error.8
Further, even if the evidence that petitioner provided was sufficient to establish the
existence of the William T. Manuel and Ada Manuel Living Trust, petitioner has failed to
establish that the trustee of this trust lacked the authority to transfer the Loon Lake property to
the 1999 trust. In his brief on appeal, it appears that petitioner does not dispute that William
would have had the authority to transfer the property if he were the sole trustee of his various
trusts. Instead, petitioner simply argues that William could not transfer the property because
John, as co-trustee, did not sign off on the transfer of the Loon Lake property to the 1999 trust.
Yet John’s affidavit was unclear regarding whether William typically named him a co-trustee or
a successor trustee to the various trusts that he established before 1999, while Daisy claimed that
John was typically named the successor trustee of William’s trusts. Petitioner does not appear to
dispute that William typically named himself trustee of his various trusts. Accordingly,
petitioner fails to establish that if the William T. Manuel and Ada Manuel Living Trust existed,
William was not its sole trustee.
Further, petitioner provides no indication regarding the amount of discretion that
William, as a trustee of the purported William T. Manuel and Ada Manuel Living Trust, might
have had to transfer trust property to himself and his wife in their individual capacities or to
another trust that he established. More specifically, assuming that William would be the trustee
of the purported William T. Manuel and Ada Manuel Living Trust, petitioner failed to provide
any indication that William did not have the authority to transfer the Loon Lake property to
another trust that he created.
Next, petitioner challenges the trial court’s determination that he lacks standing to
petition for removal of respondent as trustee of the 1999 trust and to demand an accounting of
William’s assets. However, petitioner only mentions his lack of standing in the first sentence of
his argument regarding this issue, when he states, “The Lower Court’s Opinion and Order,
granted Summary disposition on Petitioner/Appellant, Henry Manuel’s claims to remove
McCann as Trustee, in that the Court found that he had no standing.” Although petitioner briefly
mentions that John and Daisy (who are named beneficiaries in the 1999 trust) would have
standing to pursue such an action, this is the only other mention of standing that he makes in his
argument. Petitioner uses the balance of his argument to criticize the trial court for failing to
address his concerns that William was unduly influenced by respondent to sign the 1999 trust,
that a 1999 warranty deed did not properly transfer all William’s Loon Lake property to the 1999
trust, and that William would have wanted all his children (including petitioner) to share equally
8
Because the trial court’s grant of summary disposition to respondent was appropriate, we need
not consider petitioner’s claim that the trial court should have granted summary disposition in his
favor pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2).
-6-
in his estate, because this is what the 1974 trust dictated. Yet such arguments are immaterial to
the question whether petitioner has standing to challenge the 1999 trust.
Accordingly, petitioner has failed to provide any sort of argument addressing the question
of his standing to challenge the 1999 trust on appeal. Specifically, petitioner has failed to
provide any argument or citation to authority in support of his stated position that the trial court
erroneously failed to recognize that he has standing to petition for removal of respondent as
trustee of the 1999 trust and to demand an accounting of William’s assets, instead discussing
other issues that are completely irrelevant to the matter at hand.
It is not enough for an appellant in his brief simply to announce a position
or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the
basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then
search for authority either to sustain or reject his position. [LME v ARS, 261 Mich
App 273, 286–287; 680 NW2d 902 (2004), quoting Mitcham v Detroit, 355 Mich
182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959).]
Consequently, petitioner has abandoned his claim of error on appeal. In light of petitioner’s
abandonment of this issue, we affirm the trial court’s determination that petitioner lacks standing
to petition for removal of respondent as trustee of the 1999 trust and to demand an accounting of
William’s assets.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
