IN RE LOCKE MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of GIOVANNI BRADLEY LOCKE
and GIETANNO PAOLETTI LOCKE., Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
April 27, 2010
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 293490
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC Nos. 2008-000242-NA
2008-000337-NA
AMANDA BJUR,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
BRADLEY JOHN LOCKE,
Respondent.
In the Matter of GIOVANNI BRADLEY LOCKE
and GIETANNO PAOLETTI LOCKE, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 293491
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2008-000242-NA
2008-000337-NA
BRADLEY JOHN LOCKE,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
AMANDA BJUR,
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Respondent.
Before: BANDSTRA, P.J., and BORRELLO and SHAPIRO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondents appeal as of right the circuit court order
terminating their parental rights to their minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and
(j). We affirm.
The children initially came into care because of respondents’ substance abuse, eviction,
and lack of income. Although respondent-mother was referred to outpatient treatment at
Millennium Services in July 2008, the foster care worker testified that she received no
information from Millennium regarding any services provided to respondent-mother, except a
single March 2008 document, from before the children came into care and unrelated to her July
2008 referral, indicating respondent-mother was in services. Respondent-mother provided a log
of appointments with counselors at Millennium, but the log showed that 20 sessions had been
rescheduled. Respondent-father was referred to counseling at New Passages, but there was
minimal attendance and no progress. Respondent-father was also referred to Alternatives to
Domestic Aggression, but he never scheduled an intake appointment.
Although respondent-father made several representations regarding working full time at
various locations, the places that the foster care worker called reported respondent-father did not
work there and respondent-father continually failed to provide the trial court with any evidence
of income, such as a check stub or tax document. Respondent-mother reported that she worked
at Cracker Jack’s Bar and Grill, including doing bartending, even though she had had an alcohol
problem from age 13 until 2004. She was unable to provide any pay stubs because she was
apparently “working under the table.”
Although both respondents were required provide periodic drug testing, both of them
failed to comply. Each was required to daily place a telephone call to a specific number to
determine if a drug screen was required. Respondent-father called only 17 times, missed 60
screens, submitted three positive for cocaine, one positive for cocaine and marijuana, and one
that was negative but diluted. Respondent-mother called only seven times, missed 57 screens,
and submitted only one, on December 16, 2008, which was positive for cocaine. Respondent
mother provided 25 drug screens from Millennium, 19 of which were positive, and admitted to
having had only two consecutive negative screens since January 2009. When the termination
hearing began, respondent-father tested positive for cocaine and respondent-mother admitted she
used cocaine six days before; respondents lived with their parents; although respondents had
completed a parenting class, it was not petitioner-approved; and the foster care worker did not
have complete information about the services respondents participated in.
We conclude that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds
for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 210;
661 NW2d 216 (2003). Petitioner offered sufficient evidence that both respondents had not
rectified the conditions leading to adjudication and were not likely to within a reasonable time,
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). Respondents continued to use substances, even though that meant they
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could not have parenting time. Respondent-father’s positive test for cocaine at the first
termination hearing and respondent-mother’s admission that she used cocaine six days earlier,
along with their failure to comply with drug screens and counseling, supported the circuit court’s
finding that respondents were not reasonably likely to provide proper care and custody in a
reasonable time, MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), and the children were likely to be harmed if returned,
MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).
The circuit court was also required to find that termination was in the children’s best
interests before terminating respondents’ parental rights. MCL 712A.19b(5). The bond between
respondents and the children was relevant to this analysis. See In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286,
301; 690 NW2d 505 (2004); In re AH, 245 Mich App 77, 89; 627 NW2d 33 (2001). The
youngest child was removed at birth and there was testimony that the older child stopped talking
about respondents. Respondents had not seen their children in six months because they failed to
submit three consecutive negative drug screens. The children’s need for permanency and
stability weighed in favor finding that returning the children to respondents was not in the
children’s best interests. See In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 52; 480 NW2d 293 (1991). The
court was not required to restate its factual findings when it held that termination was in the
children’s best interests. The court may consider the entire record in its analysis. See In re Trejo
Minors, 462 Mich 341, 353; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Accordingly, we concluded that the circuit
court did not err in its best interests determination.
Respondent-mother also argues that petitioner failed to make reasonable efforts to rectify
respondent-mother’s problems. See In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 89; 763 NW2d 587 (2009); In re
Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 542; 702 NW2d 192 (2005); MCL 712A.18f. Respondent-mother
was twice enrolled in the required parenting classes but failed to attend. Thereafter, she was
placed on the waiting list behind parents who had not yet had an opportunity to enroll. We
conclude that it was entirely reasonable for priority to be given to parents who had yet to receive
an opportunity to take the parenting class in light of respondent-mother’s failure to attend twice
before. Additionally, although it was unclear why petitioner never received counseling progress
reports from Millennium, there was no evidence that the reports would have changed the
outcome. See In re Fried, 266 Mich App at 543. Respondent-mother obtained counseling and
did not request additional treatment. Petitioner’s efforts were reasonable and any oversights did
not affect the outcome, which was the result of respondent-mother’s continued substance abuse.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
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