PEOPLE OF MI V WAYNE ROBERT HUTTER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 22, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 291140
Grand Traverse Circuit Court
LC No. 08-010656-FH
WAYNE ROBERT HUTTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: SAAD, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and MURRAY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree home invasion, MCL
750.110a(2), carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, assault with a dangerous weapon,
MCL 750.82, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b, and
malicious use of a telecommunications service, MCL 750.540e. The trial court sentenced
defendant to concurrent sentences of 5 to 20 years for the home invasion conviction, 2 to 5 years
for the carrying a concealed weapon conviction, and 2 to 4 years for the felonious assault
conviction, to be served consecutively to a two-year sentence for the felony firearm conviction.1
Defendant appeals as of right. Because we conclude that defendant was not denied effective
assistance of counsel, his statement was not obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights,
and the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on intentionally pointing a firearm at
another without malice, we affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS
Defendant’s convictions arise from him entering the home of Christine Blackledge and
pointing a firearm at her to force her to talk to him about her relationship with Dan Lahner.
Blackledge and defendant had known each for 18 years, and they had periodically dated.
According to Blackledge, during the summer of 2005, they were just “very, very good friends”;
they were not engaged in a sexual relationship. On Labor Day weekend, Blackledge and
1
Defendant’s sentence for malicious use of a telecommunications service was limited to time
served.
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defendant sailed from Traverse City to Boyne City to visit Lahner. Early in the morning on
September 1, 2008, defendant discovered Blackledge in the same bed as Lahner.2
On the afternoon of September 7, 2008, Blackledge returned to her Traverse City home
after running errands. She called Lahner, and while speaking with him, she saw defendant
standing in her kitchen doorway. Blackledge testified that she had not given defendant
permission to enter her home, and she denied that she and defendant had a general practice of
walking into each other’s homes without knocking.
Defendant told Blackledge to get off the telephone. When she complied, defendant
pulled out a gun and pointed it at her right between her eyes. Defendant told her that the gun
was loaded and that they were going to talk. He backed Blackledge into her sunroom, where she
sat on a couch and defendant straddled a chair. Defendant continued to point the gun at
Blackledge’s head; his finger remained on the trigger. Defendant screamed and yelled at
Blackledge about Lahner. Blackledge thought she was going to die. Eventually, the telephone
rang, and defendant calmed down and soon left. Blackledge immediately locked the front door
and called Lahner and some friends who were coming over for supper. She then called 911.
Officer Kurt Bazner responded to Blackledge’s home, while Sergeant James Bussell
drove out to defendant’s house. Bazner described Blackledge as “upset, visibly shaken,” but she
was able to methodically tell him what had happened. Bazner then spoke with Bussell, telling
Bussell that it was “a good felonious assault.” Bussell, accompanied by Deputy Ryan Salisbury,
approached defendant’s home to speak with defendant. He wanted to hear defendant’s side of
the story. Defendant, after being asked what happened in town, stated that he only pointed “it” at
Blackledge for a second; he was only trying to scare her.
II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel
failed to investigate, interview, and call witnesses that could substantiate defendant’s testimony
that he and Blackledge entered each other’s homes without knocking and when counsel failed to
object to opinion testimony from two officers that defendant was guilty. Because defendant did
not move for a Ginther3 hearing or a new trial below, our review is limited to mistakes apparent
on the record. People v Brown, 279 Mich App 116, 140; 755 NW2d 664 (2008). And although
defendant attached four affidavits in support of his ineffective assistance claim to his appellate
brief, the affidavits are not a part of the lower court record and, therefore, cannot be considered.
People v Seals, 285 Mich App 1, 20-21; 776 NW2d 314 (2009).
To establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that trial
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for
counsel’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the
proceedings would have been different. People v Payne, 285 Mich App 181, 188-189; 774
2
Blackledge testified that she and Lahner were only talking.
3
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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NW2d 714 (2009). Counsel is presumed to have provided effective assistance, and the defendant
bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise. Seals, 285 Mich App at 17.
A. FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE AND CALL WITNESSES
Defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and interview
potential witnesses that could substantiate defendant’s testimony that he and Blackledge always
entered the other’s house without knocking. Counsel has a duty to make a reasonable
investigation. People v Grant, 470 Mich 477, 485; 684 NW2d 686 (2004). A defendant is
entitled to have his counsel prepare, investigate, and present all substantial defenses. In re Ayres,
239 Mich App 8, 22; 608 NW2d 132 (1999). It is not apparent from the record that trial counsel
failed to investigate and interview potential witnesses that could support defendant’s testimony
that he and Blackledge entered each other’s houses without knocking. The record contains no
description of what trial counsel did, or did not do, before trial. In addition, even if we were to
consider the affidavits submitted with defendant’s brief, we note that the four affidavits do not
provide any factual support for defendant’s claim that trial counsel failed to conduct a reasonable
investigation. None of the affiants averred that trial counsel did not interview them before trial.
Accordingly, defendant has failed to establish the factual predicate of his claim that trial counsel
failed to conduct a reasonable investigation. People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57
(1999).
Defendant also claims that trial counsel failed to call witnesses at trial to support his
testimony that he and Blackledge entered each other’s homes without knocking. Decisions
regarding whether to call witnesses involve matters of trial strategy. Seals, 285 Mich App at 21.
We will not second-guess counsel on matters of trial strategy, nor will we assess counsel’s
performance with the benefit of hindsight. People v Horn, 279 Mich App 31, 39; 755 NW2d 212
(2008). Although “strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable
precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on
investigation,” Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 690-691; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674
(1984), as we have already stated, it is not apparent from the record that trial counsel failed to
conduct less than a complete investigation. Accordingly, defendant has failed to overcome the
presumption that counsel’s decision not to call additional witnesses was sound trial strategy.
B. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO TESTIMONY
Defendant claims that trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to object to the
introduction of inadmissible and highly prejudicial evidence. In particular, defendant maintains
that trial counsel should have objected to the opinion testimony of Bazner and Bussell that
defendant committed the charged crimes and that trial counsel compounded the problem when he
elicited similar testimony from Bazner in cross-examination. We disagree.
It is improper for a witness to comment or to provide an opinion on the credibility of
another witness. People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 71; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). Credibility
determinations are for the jury. Id.
Defendant maintains that the following exchange between the prosecutor and Bazner
resulted in the admission of inadmissible opinion testimony:
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Q. Did you ask her [Blackledge] to tell you step by step what had happened?
A. Yes.
Q. Why did you do that?
A. To investigate the crime to see if it’s actually what we like to term if it’s a
legitimate crime or not. Handling numerous domestics, some aren’t a
legitimate domestic, they seem to hit and miss on key issues or leave things
out. She was methodical in what she told me happened.
Contrary to defendant’s argument, a careful reading of this exchange reveals that Bazner
did not provide an opinion on the credibility of Blackledge. Although Bazner testified that
Blackledge was “methodical” in recounting what had occurred, he never stated that he found
Blackledge to be credible. Any objection to Bazner’s testimony would have been meritless.
Counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a futile objection. People v Fike, 228 Mich App
178, 182; 577 NW2d 903 (1998).
Defendant also complains that in the following exchange the prosecutor elicited
inadmissible opinion testimony from Bussell:
Q. This came out, Officer Bazner’s called you on the phone, it was a good
felonious assault?
A. Yeah, he may have used those words. You know, we get a lot of reports on
things sometimes that may or may not be true, this appeared from what he told
me on the phone this was a legitimate crime and there had actually been a
felonious assault with a pistol, a firearm.
Although Bussell used the phrase “this was a legitimate crime,” it is clear from the
context of Bussell’s testimony that Bussell was not providing the jury with an opinion of
Blackledge’s credibility. And, he subsequently testified that, even upon hearing that it was “a
good felonious assault,” he still needed to investigate. He needed to speak with defendant
because there are “always two sides to every story.” Consequently, any objection to Bussell’s
testimony would have been futile. Again, counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a futile
objection. Id.
In addition, defendant maintains that trial counsel elicited opinion testimony from Bazner
during cross-examination with the following questions:
Q. Officer, did you advise the sergeant that it was a good felonious assault at
some point?
A. Yes, sir, I did.
Q. In your mind what does that mean to you?
A. That it was an actual crime that took place.
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Q. That he should arrest him at that point?
A. I advised him that it was a good domestic, I did not advise him to arrest him.
This issue, whether trial counsel was ineffective for eliciting opinion testimony, was not
raised in defendant’s statement of questions presented and, therefore, it is not properly before us.
People v Anderson, 284 Mich App 11, 16; 772 NW2d 792 (2009). Nevertheless, we note that
decisions regarding how to cross-examine a witness involve matters of trial strategy. In re
Ayres, 239 Mich App at 23. We will not second-guess counsel on matters of trial strategy, nor
will we use the benefit of hindsight to assess counsel’s competence. Horn, 279 Mich App at 39.
Defendant has not overcome the presumption that counsel’s cross-examination of Bazner was
sound trial strategy.4
III. SUPPRESSION OF DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in not suppressing his statement, given to
Bussell outside of his home, that he “pointed it at her for a few seconds” to scare her.
Specifically, relying on his version of the events, defendant asserts that his statement was
obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights because he was in police custody when
Bussell questioned him. We disagree.
We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress. People v Akins, 259
Mich App 545, 563; 675 NW2d 863 (2003). However, we will not disturb a trial court’s factual
findings made at a Walker5 hearing unless the findings are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is
clearly erroneous if we are left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a
mistake. People v Manning, 243 Mich App 615, 620; 624 NW2d 746 (2000). We give
deference to the trial court’s assessment of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses. People v Tierney, 266 Mich App 687, 708; 703 NW2d 204 (2005).
The statement of an accused made during a custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless
the accused voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment rights.
People v Harris, 261 Mich App 44, 55; 680 NW2d 17 (2004). Custodial interrogation is
“questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” People v Zahn, 234 Mich
App 438, 449; 594 NW2d 120 (1999) (quotation omitted). The totality of the circumstances
must be examined, and the key question is whether the accused reasonably could have believed
that he was not free to leave. Id. Miranda6 warnings are not required if there is no custodial
interrogation. People v Peerenboom, 224 Mich App 195, 198; 568 NW2d 153 (1997).
4
It may be, as suggested by plaintiff on appeal, that trial counsel was trying to develop a further
record on which to challenge the admissibility of defendant’s statement to Bussell.
5
People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).
6
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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A police officer may temporarily detain a person for the purpose of investigating criminal
behavior even if there is no probable cause to support an arrest. People v Jenkins, 472 Mich 26,
32; 691 NW2d 759 (2005). The police officer must have a reasonably articulable suspicion that
the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. United States v Hensley,
469 US 221, 227; 105 S Ct 675; 83 L Ed 2d 604 (1985). Articulable suspicion may be based on
information obtained from another. People v Chambers, 195 Mich App 118, 122; 489 NW2d
168 (1992). In the course of an investigatory stop, a police officer, where he has reason to
believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous person, may conduct a reasonable search
for weapons. People v Taylor, 214 Mich App 167, 169; 542 NW2d 322 (1995). A person
temporarily detained for an investigatory stop is not in “custody” for purposes of Miranda. See
Berkemer v McCarty, 468 US 420, 440; 104 S Ct 3138; 82 L Ed 2d 317 (1984).
At the Walker hearing, Bussell testified that, after Blackledge’s 911 call was received, he
drove to defendant’s house. He “staged” the house for approximately 35 to 40 minutes with
Salisbury before he received a call from Bazner. Bazner informed him that defendant had held a
pistol at Blackledge’s face for 20 to 30 minutes. He also learned that defendant was intoxicated.
Bussell and Salisbury then approached defendant’s door. Bussell stated that he intended to
“continue to investigate the crime”; he wanted to learn defendant’s side of the story. At
defendant’s door, Bussell drew his weapon. But he holstered it when defendant approached the
door, and he was able to see that defendant was not carrying a gun. When Bussell asked
defendant to speak with him and Salisbury, defendant “leaned backwards” into the house. To
prevent defendant from grabbing a gun, Bussell grabbed defendant’s arm and pulled him outside.
Bussell and Salisbury, each holding defendant by an arm, escorted defendant
approximately 20 feet, “if even that,” to a detached garage. Bussell ordered defendant to place
his hands on the garage. Defendant complied, and Bussell patted him down for weapons. No
weapons were found, and defendant turned around. Bussell, standing approximately six feet
from defendant, asked him what happened in town. Defendant replied that he “pointed it at her
for a few seconds” and that he was only trying to scare her. Bussell then asked defendant the
location of the gun. Defendant stated that it was in the center console of his car. With
defendant’s permission, Bussell retrieved the gun. After he asked defendant questions about
other guns defendant owned, Bussell arrested defendant. Defendant was handcuffed and taken to
jail. Several hours later, defendant was read his Miranda rights. According to Bussell,
defendant, while at the garage, acted as if what had happened was not a big deal.
Defendant testified that Bussell handcuffed him after he was patted down. Only then did
Bussell turn him around and ask him questions. Bussell did not ask defendant to tell him what
happened; rather, Bussell screamed at defendant to tell him why he pointed a gun in
Blackledge’s face.
At the end of the Walker hearing, the trial court addressed the conflicting testimony of
Bussell and defendant regarding whether, immediately after the pat down search, defendant was
handcuffed, placed under arrest, and questioned in an accusatory manner. It found that Bussell
testified “truthful[ly]” in the way the investigation was conducted. Its finding was based on “the
way [Bussell] testified” and that Bussell, as a sergeant of many years, “would be more neutral in
his approach to a situation which he had not yet heard the other side of the story.” Having
reviewed the testimony of Bussell and defendant, we find no basis upon which to conclude that
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the trial court clearly erred in finding that the questioning of defendant occurred as testified to by
Bussell. Tierney, 266 Mich App at 708; Manning, 243 Mich App at 620.
Further, on de novo review, we conclude that defendant’s statement to Bussell that he
pointed the gun at Blackledge for a few seconds to scare her was given during a lawful
investigatory stop and, therefore, not subject to the constitutional restrictions asserted by
defendant. Bussell testified that he detained defendant to investigate criminal behavior. Based
on the information he received from Bazner, Bussell had a reasonably articulable suspicion that
defendant engaged in criminal behavior. In addition, the pat down search of defendant was
reasonable. Bussell, because Bazner informed him that defendant had pointed a gun at
Blackledge’s face for 20 to 30 minutes, had a reasonable basis to believe that defendant may be
armed and dangerous. Further, we find that Bussell’s question to defendant to explain what had
happened in town was a reasonable question to ask in furtherance of investigating the incident,
did not accuse defendant of any criminal behavior, and was consistent with conducting an
investigatory stop. Because defendant made the statement during an investigatory stop, he was
not in “custody” and, therefore, the statement was not obtained in violation of his Fifth
Amendment rights. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress.
IV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on
intentionally pointing a firearm at another without malice, MCL 750.233, as a lesser offense of
felonious assault. We disagree.
We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a request for a jury instruction on a lesser
offense. People v Walls, 265 Mich App 642, 644; 697 NW2d 535 (2005).
A trial court may instruct a jury on a necessarily included lesser offense, but not on a
cognate offense. People v Brown, 267 Mich App 141, 146; 703 NW2d 230 (2005). The
elements of a necessarily included lesser offense are contained within the greater offense; “it is
impossible to commit the greater without first having committed the lesser.” People v Bearss,
463 Mich 623, 627; 625 NW2d 10 (2001) (quotation omitted). An instruction on a necessarily
included lesser offense is proper “if the charged greater offense requires the jury to find a
disputed factual element that is not part of the lesser included offense and a rational view of the
evidence would support it.” People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335, 357; 646 NW2d 127 (2002).
The misdemeanor offense of intentionally pointing a firearm at another without malice
cannot be committed without the use of a firearm. MCL 750.233(1) provides:
A person who intentionally but without malice points or aims a firearm at
or toward another person is guilty of a misdemeanor by imprisonment for not
more than 93 days or a fine of not more than $500.00, or both.
However, one can commit felonious assault without the use of a firearm. “The elements of
felonious assault are (1) an assault, (2) with a dangerous weapon, and (3) with the intent to injure
or place the victim in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery.” People v Avant, 235
Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). Dangerous weapons, for purposes of felonious
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assault, include guns, revolvers, pistols, knives, iron bars, clubs, and brass knuckles. See MCL
750.82.
Because felonious assault can be committed without the use of a firearm, it is possible to
commit felonious assault without committing the offense of intentionally pointing a firearm at
another without malice. Accordingly, intentionally pointing a firearm at another without malice
is not a necessarily included lesser offense of felonious assault. The trial court did not err in
refusing to instruct the jury on intentionally pointing a firearm at another without malice.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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