PEOPLE OF MI V SCOTT CHRISTOPHER JONES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 22, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 288671
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 07-007920-FH
SCOTT CHRISTOPHER JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: JANSEN, P.J., AND CAVANAGH AND K. F. KELLY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of possession of a firearm during
the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), third offense, MCL 750.227b, felon in possession
of a firearm (felon in possession), MCL 750.224f, and carrying a concealed weapon (CCW),
MCL 750.227. Defendant was sentenced to two terms of 18 months to 5 years’ imprisonment
for his felon in possession and CCW convictions and to a consecutive term of ten years’
imprisonment for his felony-firearm conviction. We affirm his convictions, but remand to the
trial court for resentencing.
I. BASIC FACTS
In April 2007, police were dispatched to a Detroit home after a citizen called the police.
The two officers who arrived on the scene observed defendant, who appeared to be intoxicated,
sitting on the steps of the home’s porch. According to the officers, when they exited the vehicle
and announced themselves as police officers, defendant pulled a gun from his waistband and
threw it into the bushes in front of the porch. One of the officers searched the bushes and found
a gun matching the one defendant had thrown. Defendant was arrested.
At trial, the testimony created a credibility contest for the jury to resolve. The officers
testified that they saw defendant throw a gun into the bushes, while defendant testified that,
while he had been on the porch, he did not throw a gun into the bushes. The gun was admitted
into evidence. Subsequently, defendant was convicted.
II. MISTRIAL
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial
because the prosecutor made improper remarks during closing argument that deprived him of a
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fair trial. We disagree. Although defendant presents his argument as an error regarding his
motion for a mistrial, his claim is more properly characterized as a claim of prosecutorial
misconduct. Defendant, however, did not object when the prosecutor made the remarks below,
albeit defense counsel did move for a mistrial based on those same remarks. We review
unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct for plain error affecting substantial rights.
People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 448; 669 NW2d 818 (2003). To avoid forfeiture under
the plain error rule, a defendant must establish that: (1) an error occurred, (2) the error was
plain, and (3) the plain error affected the defendant’s substantial rights, i.e., it affected the
outcome of the lower court proceedings. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 762-763; 597 NW2d
130 (1999). Further, we decide issues of prosecutorial misconduct on a case-by-case basis. In
doing so, we examine the pertinent portion of the record and evaluate the prosecutor’s remarks in
context. People v Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 660; 608 NW2d 123 (1999). “The test is whether
[the] defendant was denied a fair trial.” Id.
The conduct defendant complains of includes remarks the prosecutor made during
closing and rebuttal closing argument. Specifically, the prosecutor stated that police were
dispatched to the home in question “because [defendant] was doing something on that porch that
terrified that young lady. . . . Maybe he had a gun. . . . [T]he officers came there, because there
was a call about him with a gun.” Before trial, defendant moved to preclude testimony that
police had been called to the scene because defendant was on the home’s porch with a gun on the
basis that such testimony would be inadmissible hearsay. The trial court ruled that the officers
could give testimony “of the fact that they were given a dispatch to be at a particular location.”
However, the court ruled that “we’re going to have to wait and see how the testimony comes out,
as to any degree of specificity . . . .” At trial, no testimony was elicited concerning the substance
of the police call or why the officers were called to the scene. Thus, as the prosecution concedes
on appeal, the prosecutor improperly remarked upon the substance of the call during closing and
rebuttal argument because he was arguing facts not in evidence. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich
643, 686; 521 NW2d 557 (1994) (stating that it is improper for a prosecutor to assert a fact not in
evidence).
Defendant, however, has not demonstrated that the prosecutor’s conduct prejudiced the
defense. At trial, two police officers provided eyewitness testimony that they each had observed
defendant sitting on a porch and that defendant, upon hearing the police announce themselves,
had pulled a gun from his waistband and threw it into the bushes in front of the porch. One of
the officers testified that she searched the bushes and found a gun resting in the bushes’
branches. The officers’ testimonies, combined with the stipulation that defendant was ineligible
to possess a firearm at the time of the offenses, was sufficient to prove that defendant committed
the offenses of felon in possession, felony-firearm (predicated on the felon in possession
conviction), and CCW.1 Given this overwhelming evidence, it is not reasonably likely that, but
1
The elements of felon in possession include a previous felony conviction and possession of a
firearm. See People v Perkins, 473 Mich 626, 629-631; 703 NW2d 448 (2005). The elements of
felony-firearm are: (1) the possession of a firearm (2) during the commission of, or the attempt
to commit, a felony. People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). The
elements of CCW include proof that defendant carried a weapon and that the weapon was
concealed on or about his person. See People v Hernandez-Garcia, 477 Mich 1039, 1040; 728
(continued…)
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for the challenged prosecutorial statements, a different outcome would have been reached.
Moreover, the trial court specifically instructed the jury that the attorney’s arguments were not
evidence. Thus, although the prosecution acted improperly, defendant has not shown that the
conduct prejudiced him and the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for a new
trial.
III. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant next asserts that his counsel’s failure to request a missing witness instruction
with regard to two witnesses who were endorsed by the prosecution, but never produced for trial,
denied him effective assistance of counsel. We disagree. Because defendant did not move for a
Ginther2 hearing or otherwise raise the issue below, our review is limited to mistakes apparent on
the record. People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 48; 687 NW2d 342 (2004). To establish
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that: (1) counsel’s performance was
below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, (2) there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302; 613 NW2d 694 (2000).
If the prosecution fails to call a listed witness3 and has failed to delete that witness from
the witness list, it may be appropriate for the trial court to read the missing witness instruction.
People v Cook (On Remand), 266 Mich App 290, 293 n 4; 702 NW2d 613 (2005). The missing
witness instruction, CJI2d 5.12, allows the jury to infer that the missing witness’s testimony
would have been unfavorable to the prosecution. Id. at 293 n 3. The propriety of reading the
missing witness instruction “depend[s] on the specific facts of that case.” People v Perez, 469
Mich 415, 420-421; 670 NW2d 655 (2003). Instances that would justify the instruction include
those where an endorsed witness has not been properly excused or where the prosecution has not
provided the defense reasonable assistance securing a witness that would have been unfavorable
to the prosecution. Id.
After our review of the record, we are not of the opinion that counsel was ineffective for
failing to request the missing witness instruction. Nothing in the record indicates that counsel
would have been justified in seeking such an instruction or that the court would have granted
such a request. First, the record indicates that the police made good faith attempts to serve
subpoenas on both Vania Harmon, the individual who called the police, and Reginald Shultz, a
neighbor at the scene. Personal service on Harmon was unsuccessful as was service by certified
mail. With regard to Shultz, police personally served him with a subpoena but he failed to
appear at court. Nothing in the record indicates that the police knew Shultz would not appear.
(…continued)
NW2d 406 (2007).
2
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
3
The prosecution is required by statute to provide defendant with “a list of the witnesses the
prosecuting attorney intends to produce at trial.” MCL 767.40a(3). Further, “[t]he prosecuting
attorney may add or delete from the list of witnesses he or she intends to call at trial at any time
upon leave of the court and for good cause shown or by stipulation of the parties.” MCL
767.40a(4).
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Second, defendant makes no showing that the witnesses would have provided testimony
favorable to him. Harmon in particular would likely have provided unfavorable testimony
because Harmon made the call to the police regarding defendant’s presence on her front porch.
Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to request an instruction that would not have been
justified. See People v Mack, 265 Mich App 122, 130; 695 NW2d 342 (2005). Thus, we are not
persuaded that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
on account of his failure to request a missing witness instruction. Further, defendant has not
established that counsel’s alleged mistake prejudiced him. Given the officers’ testimonies and
the discovery of the gun in the bushes, it is not reasonably likely that, but for counsel’s alleged
error, a different outcome would have been reached. Accordingly, defendant’s claim of
ineffective assistance fails.
IV. SENTENCING
Lastly, defendant contends that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court did
not impose an intermediate sanction pursuant to MCL 769.34(4)(a) or otherwise provide
substantial and compelling reasons for departure when it sentenced defendant to 18 months to 5
years’ imprisonment for his felon in possession conviction to run consecutively with his felonyfirearm conviction. The prosecution concedes this issue and we agree. We review de novo
questions of the proper interpretation and application of the legislative sentencing guidelines.
People v Cannon, 481 Mich 152, 156; 749 NW2d 257 (2008).
Ordinarily, a trial court must impose a minimum sentence within the sentencing
guidelines range. MCL 769.34(2) and (3). Here, the recommended minimum sentence range for
defendant’s conviction of felon in possession, fourth habitual offender, was 0 to 18 months. If
the upper limit of the recommended range is 18 months or less, as is the case here, then
the court shall impose an intermediate sanction unless the court states on the
record a substantial and compelling reason to sentence the individual to the
jurisdiction of the department of corrections. An intermediate sanction may
include a jail term that does not exceed the upper limit of the recommended
minimum sentence range or 12 months, whichever is less. [MCL 769.34(4)(a).]
Thus, the trial court here was required to impose an intermediate sanction or otherwise state
substantial and compelling reasons for departure on the record. The trial court, however,
departed from the guidelines and sentenced defendant to 18 months to 5 years’ imprisonment
without articulating substantial and compelling reasons for the departure. This was error that
requires resentencing. See People v Smith, 482 Mich 292, 319; 754 NW2d 284 (2008). Thus,
we vacate defendant’s sentence for his felony in possession conviction and remand to the trial
court for resentencing. On remand, the trial court must impose an intermediate sanction for the
felon in possession conviction in compliance with MCL 769.34(4)(a), or articulate substantial
and compelling reasons for departure on the record.
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We affirm defendant’s convictions, remand to the trial court for resentencing on the felon
in possession conviction consistent with this opinion, and affirm defendant’s remaining
sentences. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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