IN RE STEWART MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of SHERRY ROSE STEWART and
ANTHONY JOSEPH STEWART, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
April 20, 2010
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 293495
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 07-469930
DENISE RENE STEWART,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
MILFORD MICHAEL STEWART, ROGER
SASSON, and JAMES MILLER
Respondents.
Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and TALBOT and WILDER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent Denise Rene Stewart appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating
her parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j).1 Because we
conclude that there were no errors warranting relief, we affirm. This appeal has been decided
without oral argument under MCR 7.214(E).
Respondent first argues that the trial court erred when it found that petitioner had
demonstrated grounds for termination of respondent’s parental rights by clear and convincing
1
An older sibling, Milford Stewart, was also involved in the proceedings. However, due to
Milford’s age and at his request, the trial court did not terminate respondent’s parental right to
him. The parental rights of respondent-fathers were also terminated, but they are not parties to
this appeal. Although the termination order also cites MCL 712a.19b(3)(a)(ii), the parties agree
that this ground for termination does not apply to respondent mother.
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evidence. Respondent also argues that the trial court erred when it determined that termination
of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests.
Petitioner has the burden of proving a statutory ground for termination by clear and
convincing evidence. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 350; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). We review the
trial court’s findings of fact for clear error. MCR 3.977(J). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous
when this court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In re
Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Once a statutory ground for termination has
been proven, the trial court shall order termination of parental rights if it finds “that termination
of parental rights is in the child’s best interests[.]” MCL 712A.19b(5). We review the trial
court’s best interests finding for clear error. In re Trejo, 462 Mich at 356-357.
Under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), a court may terminate a parent’s parental rights if it
determines that, “[t]he conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no
reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering
the child’s age.” A court may terminate a parent’s parental rights if it determines that, “[t]he
parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is
no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a
reasonable time considering the child’s age.” MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). Finally, under MCL
712A.19b(3)(j) a court may terminate a parent’s parental rights if it determines that, “[t]here is a
reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the child will
be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.”
The trial court did not clearly err when it found that respondent would not be able to
provide proper care and custody for the children within a reasonable time. Although respondent
made some effort at the last minute to comply with her parent-agency agreement, her virtually
total non-compliance for two years prior to that supports the trial court’s finding. In addition,
though respondent had apparently begun parenting classes and drug treatment classes, she had
not yet completed them. Nor had she addressed her other difficulties, including finding suitable
housing and employment, and dealing with her mental health issues. A parent’s failure to
comply with the parent-agency agreement is evidence of a parent’s failure to provide proper care
and custody for the child. In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 214; 661 NW2d 216 (2003); In re Trejo, 462
Mich at 360-363. Given respondent’s very late start, it was also reasonable for the court to
conclude that respondent would be unable to properly care for the children within a reasonable
time.
Nor did the trial court err when it determined that the conditions that led to the
adjudication continued to exist and there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions would
be rectified within a reasonable time. The children were taken into care due to respondent’s lack
of parenting skills, her failure to obtain education for the children, the “deplorable” housing
conditions in which she and the children lived, and possible drug use. As of the date of the
bench trial, the children were attending school. However, this was not due to any effort on
respondent’s part, and she had not yet completed the parenting classes, which presumably would
aid her in maintaining the conditions necessary to foster the children’s education. In addition,
she was still living in temporary housing and had failed to submit to a number of the random
drug screens. Thus, the conditions that led to the adjudication continued to exist. Given the
amount of time already spent trying to rectify the conditions at issue, the trial court did not
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clearly err in finding that the conditions that led to the adjudication would not be rectified within
a reasonable time.
The evidence also supported the trial court’s finding that there was a reasonable
likelihood that the children would be harmed if returned to respondent’s care. Even apart from
the situation that led to the children’s placement in care, respondent’s continued failure to
establish a stable, self-sufficient lifestyle showed a reasonable likelihood of a future risk of
exposure to dangerous home conditions. Respondent focuses on the lack of physical danger to
the children, and the fact that she did not physically abuse them. While this is true, the history of
neglect, and the apparently still unresolved underlying mental health issues that appears to have
led to that neglect, supports a finding that the children would likely be again neglected if
returned to respondent’s care. This constitutes the likelihood of future harm. See MCL
722.622(j).
We also conclude that the trial court’s best interests finding was not clearly erroneous.
Details of the children’s educational deficits are documented in the file, along with the indication
that they will continue to need individual developmental support. Respondent is not in a position
to provide that support. In addition, two of petitioner’s caseworkers testified that they believed
that termination was in the children’s best interests due to their needs, the length of time in care,
the fact they were happy and thriving in their foster care placement, and the fact that they needed
permanence.
There were no errors warranting relief.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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