PEOPLE OF MI V CHARLES TERRELL JONES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 20, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 286092
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 03-013861-FC
CHARLES TERRELL JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MARKEY, P.J., and ZAHRA and GLEICHER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In 2004, defendant was convicted of two counts of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, firstdegree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2), and possession of a firearm during the commission of
a felony, MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of 10 to
15 years for each robbery conviction and 12 to 20 years for the home invasion conviction, to be
served consecutively to a two-year prison term for the felony-firearm conviction. In a prior
appeal, this Court affirmed defendant’s convictions, but remanded for resentencing with regard
to the home invasion conviction. People v Jones, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of
Appeals, issued October 25, 2005 (Docket No. 256613). On remand, the trial court again
sentenced defendant to a term of 12 to 20 years’ imprisonment for the home invasion conviction.
Defendant appeals that sentence by delayed leave granted. We vacate defendant’s sentence for
home invasion and remand for resentencing before a different judge. This appeal has been
decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Initially, we reject defendant’s argument that resentencing is required because the trial
court considered facts not found by a jury to determine his sentence contrary to Blakely v
Washington, 542 US 296; 124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004). In Blakely, the United States
Supreme Court struck down as violative of the Sixth Amendment the State of Washington’s
determinate sentencing scheme in which the sentencing judge was allowed to increase the
defendant’s maximum sentence on the basis of facts that were not reflected in the jury’s verdict
or admitted by the defendant. Our Supreme Court has determined that Blakely does not apply to
Michigan’s indeterminate sentencing scheme, in which a defendant’s maximum sentence is
determined by the fact-finder’s verdict and the statute violated; the sentencing guidelines affect
only the minimum sentence. People v Drohan, 475 Mich 140, 164; 715 NW2d 778 (2006).
We also reject defendant’s argument that the trial court was required to score and
consider the sentencing guidelines for the home invasion conviction. In defendant’s prior
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appeal, this Court held that because the trial court scored the guidelines for armed robbery, the
sentencing offense in the highest crime class, it “did not err when it failed to calculate a
sentencing guidelines range for defendant’s first-degree home invasion conviction.” Jones,
unpub op at 2-3. This Court’s holding on this point is the law of the case. “Under the law of the
case doctrine, an appellate court’s determination of law will not be differently decided on a
subsequent appeal in the same case if the facts remain materially the same.” People v Kozyra,
219 Mich App 422, 433; 556 NW2d 512 (1996).
Nonetheless, we agree with defendant that the trial court’s reasons for imposing a 12-year
minimum sentence for home invasion, which was two years longer than the sentences it imposed
for the higher class armed robbery convictions, were legally and factually flawed.
The trial court stated that it did not like home invasions because anything can happen on
the street but one ought to be safe in his home. Thus, the court “imposed the greater sentence on
the home invasion because [it] has a great sustain [sic] for home invasion.” The principle of
proportionality requires that a sentence imposed by a trial court be “proportionate to the
seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.” People v Milbourn,
435 Mich 630, 635; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). The principle of proportionality that guides judicial
sentencing discretion is based on the recognition that the Legislature has “clearly expressed its
value judgments concerning the relative seriousness and severity of individual criminal offenses”
by “establishing differing sentence ranges for different offenses across the spectrum of criminal
behavior.” Id. In the statutory sentencing guidelines, the Legislature’s intention to differentiate
criminal behavior based on its judgment of the seriousness of an offense is manifested in the
creation of different classes of crimes. The trial court’s personal evaluation of the seriousness of
home invasions in general should not take precedence over the Legislature’s judgment. See id.
at 645, 652-653 n 19, citing People v Coles, 417 Mich 523, 546, 339 NW2d 440 (1983). In
formulating an appropriate and proportionate sentence for a given offense, the trial court must
consider “the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender,”
Milbourn, 435 Mich at 635, but its personal abhorrence of a given crime in general is not an
appropriate consideration for determining an appropriate sentence for a particular offender.
Although the trial judge did examine the facts of this particular case, it misstated them in
some respects. The court stated:
In addition, I recalled in this case you followed this individual home and
then you forced your way into her home. And when you got there she had a
disabled brother that she was caring for who was in the home, and you went
through the entire house and terrorized the disabled brother. I believe there was
another child in the home at the same time. So this Court finds that the home
invasion was quite repugnant, quite frankly. That it was—resulted not only in the
taking of the personal property, but in the terrorizing of children and a disabled
child to boot.
There was no evidence that defendant “terrorized the disabled brother.” At trial, Javonna
Croom testified that her brother was lying in the dark on the living room floor, when defendant
entered the house. He appeared to be sleeping, but apparently he heard her come in. She told
him, “Don’t say nothing, don’t move.” At defendant’s original sentencing proceeding, Croom
described how the incident affected her, but did not mention that it affected her disabled brother.
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The court also inaccurately referred to Croom’s brother as a “disabled child.” Croom’s brother
was 32 years old at the time of defendant’s preliminary examination. The trial court was correct
in stating that there was another child in the home, but the evidence at trial indicated that the
child left the area after defendant entered the house, and the facts do not support the trial court’s
statement that defendant engaged in conduct that involved the “terrorizing” of that child. The
trial court also inaccurately stated that defendant “went through the entire house.” The evidence
indicated that he went into the living room and then upstairs to Croom’s bedroom before leaving
the house.
In sum, because the trial court’s reasons for imposing the 12-year minimum sentence are
both legally and factually flawed, we vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for resentencing.1
See People v Havens, 268 Mich App 15, 18-19; 706 NW2d 210 (2005).
Defendant also requests that a different judge resentence him. In deciding whether
resentencing should take place before a different judge, we consider the following factors:
(1) whether the original judge would reasonably be expected on remand to
have substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind previously-expressed
views or findings determined to be erroneous or based on evidence that must be
rejected, (2) whether reassignment is advisable for the appearance of justice, and
(3) whether reassignment would entail waste and duplication out of proportion to
any gain in preserving the appearance of fairness. [People v Hill, 221 Mich App
391, 398; 561 NW2d 862 (1997) (citations and quotation marks omitted).]
The sentencing judge’s statements explaining her decision to impose a higher sentence
for home invasion than the sentences she imposed for the higher class armed robbery
convictions, her personal dislike and disdain for home invasions generally, and her statement that
she thought defendant’s 12-year minimum sentence was a “gift,” suggest that she would have
difficulty putting aside her previously expressed beliefs. Although, reassignment will entail
some duplication of judicial time, it is apparent that the trial court’s understanding of the facts
from the 2004 trial were flawed when defendant was resentenced in 2007. So, even if the same
judge were to resentence defendant, she would still need to reacquaint herself with the record.
We also note that there was inordinate delay after this Court remanded the case for resentencing
before the resentencing occurred. Although the Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on April
28, 2006, defendant’s resentencing was not held until more than a year later, in June 2007.
Appointment of appellate counsel caused further delay. In light of this history, resentencing by a
different judge would further the appearance of justice. The balance of these considerations
weighs in favor of granting defendant’s request that a different judge resentence him.
Accordingly, on remand, the case shall be reassigned to a different judge for resentencing.
1
We note that in People v Mack, 265 Mich App 122, 129; 695 NW2d 342 (2005), this Court
questioned, but did not directly decide, whether a sentence for a conviction of a lesser class
felony that is not scored under the guidelines could permissibly exceed the sentence imposed for
a higher crime class felony and remain proportional. Because we are remanding for
resentencing, we likewise do not decide that question in this case.
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We remand with instructions that a different judge resentence defendant for first-degree
home invasion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
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