IN RE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 401E OF 2007 PA 164
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In re Implementation of Section 401e of 2007 PA 165.
COUNTY OF GRAND TRAVERSE, COUNTY
OF MONTCALM, COUNTY OF DELTA,
COUNTY OF HILLSDALE, COUNTY OF
HOUGHTON, COUNTY OF DICKINSON,
COUNTY OF CASS, COUNTY OF CHIPPEWA,
COUNTY OF MENOMINEE, COUNTY OF
TUSCOLA, COUNTY OF CHEBOYGAN,
COUNTY OF EMMET, COUNTY OF CHARLEVIOX, COUNTY OF SAGINAW, COUNTY OF
NEWAYGO, COUNTY OF IONIA, COUNTY
OF GOGEBIC, COUNTY OF OGEMAW,
COUNTY OF MACKINAC, COUNTY OF
ALCONA, COUNTY OF ALPENA, COUNTY
OF HURON,
UNPUBLISHED
April 20, 2010
Appellants,
V
No. 285896
Public Service Commission
Case No. 00-015489
MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
and TELECOMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION
OF MICHIGAN,
Appellees.
In re Implementation of Section 401e of 2007 PA 165.
COUNTY OF VAN BUREN,
Appellant,
V
No. 285964
Public Service Commission
Case No. 00-015489
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MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
and TELECOMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION
OF MICHIGAN,
Appellees.
In re Implementation of Section 401e of 2007 PA 165.
COUNTY OF SAINT CLAIR,
Appellant,
V
No. 286244
Public Service Commission
Case No. 00-015489
MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
and TELECOMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION
OF MICHIGAN,
Appellees.
Before: METER, P.J., MURPHY, C.J., and ZAHRA, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated cases concerning the funding of emergency telephone services
under the Emergency 9-1-1 Service Enabling Act, MCL 484.1101 et seq., appellants, twentyfour Michigan counties, appeal as of right from orders of the Public Service Commission (PSC)
adjusting downward their respective requested surcharges for those services. We affirm in part,
vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.
I. FACTS
Traditionally, counties funded their 9-1-1 centers through statutory mechanisms not
involving the PSC. See MCL 484.1401. However, 2007 PA 164 amended various parts of the
9-1-1 Service Enabling Act to broaden the base from which 9-1-1 services may be supported by
extending it beyond traditional landline telephone usage to usage of all communication service
devices that may call 9-1-1; the statute also introduced a role for the PSC in the matter.
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At the relevant time,1 MCL 484.1401b provided, in pertinent part:
(1) [A]fter June 30, 2008 a county board of commissioners may assess a
county 9-1-1 charge to service users located within that county . . . .
(2) The charge assessed under this section and section 401e shall not
exceed the amount necessary and reasonable to implement, maintain, and operate
the 9-1-1 system in the county.
A “communication service” is
a service capable of accessing, connecting with, or interfacing with a 9-1-1 system
. . . by dialing, initializing, or otherwise activating the 9-1-1 system through the
numerals 9-1-1 by means of a local telephone device, cellular telephone device,
wireless communication device, interconnected voice over the internet device, or
any other means. [MCL 484.1102(g).]
MCL 484.1401e provides:
(1) No later than February 15, 2008, each county that decides to assess a
surcharge under section 401b shall with the assistance of the state 9-1-1 office
submit to the commission all of the following:
(a) The initial county 9-1-1 surcharge for each 9-1-1 service district to be
effective July 1, 2008.
(b) The estimated amount of revenue to be generated in each 9-1-1 service
district for 2007.
(c) Based on the surcharge established under this subsection, the estimated
amount of revenue to be generated for 2008.
(2) If the amount to be generated in 2008 exceeds the amount received in
2007 plus an amount not to exceed 2.7% of the 2007 revenues, the commission, in
consultation with the committee, shall review and approve or disapprove the
county 9-1-1 surcharge adopted under section 401b. If the commission does not
act by March 17, 2008, the county 9-1-1 surcharge shall be deemed approved. If
the surcharge is rejected, it shall be adjusted to ensure that the revenues generated
do not exceed the amounts allowed under this subsection. In reviewing the
surcharge under this subsection, the commission shall consider the allowable and
disallowable costs as approved by the committee on June 21, 2005.
1
Subsection (2) is now designated as subsection (3), but the text has not been changed.
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The “committee” for this purpose is a subset of the state police, commonly called the Emergency
Telephone Service Committee (ETSC), and is authorized to “develop statewide standards and
model system considerations and make other recommendations for emergency telephone
services.” MCL 484.1712.
Before 2007 PA 164, counties assessed 9-1-1 charges on only traditional landline service
users, the number of which in a given county could readily be determined. However, the number
of all communication service users cannot be ascertained with like precision. The ETSC
analyzed available information on communication service devices in this state, and arrived at an
estimate of .93 such devices per person statewide.
On January 2, 2008, the PSC ordered each county assessing a 9-1-1 surcharge to provide
information on the level of the proposed surcharge the county intended to begin collecting on
July 1, 2008; its estimated revenues for 2007 collected under the existing surcharge; and its
estimated 9-1-1 revenues for 2008. The counties complied, and sent additional information to
the ETSC, which recommended approval for several of appellants’ proposed rates. The PSC,
however, ultimately rejected the application of any detailed analysis to the requests. Instead, the
PSC applied the estimate of .93 communication service devices per person across the board. It
then proceeded to approve surcharges as requested in connection with several counties who
requested surcharges based on estimated revenues for 2008 not in excess of their estimated 2007
revenues plus 2.7 percent. It also adjusted all surcharges estimated to bring revenues exceeding
2007 levels plus 2.7 percent downward to that level, treating that formula as the statutory ceiling.
The PSC explained that
because of the uncertainty related to the number of communication services
devices in each county, the most prudent action is for the Commission to adjust
the requested surcharges for these counties so that estimated county 2008
surcharge revenue is not greater than the county’s 2007 surcharge revenues plus
2.7%. The surcharge is re-calculated by applying the .93 factor to the county
population number identified by the 2000 U.S. Census.
Several counties, including appellants Grand Traverse County and Huron County,
petitioned the PSC for rehearing. In response, the PSC credited Grand Traverse County’s
assertion that it had initially understated its local landline surcharge revenue for 2007, and
approved an adjustment based on the corrected figure. The PSC rejected Huron County’s
assertion that the PSC had acted arbitrarily in modifying its surcharge to recover 2007 revenues
plus 2.7 percent, on the ground that that county “did not submit sufficient support for approving
a surcharge that would likely generate revenues nearly 27% above the 2007 level,” which the
PSC characterized as “ten times the statutorily permissible 2.7%.” This left those appellants and
several others still aggrieved at having their proposals adjusted downward to where they were
expected to generate 2007 revenues plus 2.7 percent.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“The standard of review for PSC orders is narrow and well defined.” In re Consumers
Energy Co, 279 Mich App 180, 188; 756 NW2d 253 (2008). A party aggrieved by an order of
the PSC has the burden of proving by “clear and satisfactory evidence” that the order is unlawful
or unreasonable. MCL 462.26(8). To establish that a PSC order is unlawful, the appellant must
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show that the PSC failed to follow a statutory requirement or abused its discretion in the exercise
of its judgment. In re MCI Telecommunications Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 427; 596 NW2d 164
(1999). “[A]n order is unreasonable if it is not supported by the evidence.” In re Consumers
Energy Co, supra, 279 Mich App at 188.
A final order of the PSC must be authorized by law and be supported by competent,
material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. Const 1963, art 6, § 28; In re Consumers
Energy Co, supra, 279 Mich App at 188. A reviewing court gives due deference to the PSC’s
administrative expertise and should not substitute its judgment for that of the PSC. Attorney
General v Public Service Comm No 2, 237 Mich App 82, 88; 602 NW2d 225 (1999). However,
issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. In re Complaint of Rovas, 482 Mich 90,
102; 754 NW2d 259 (2008). A reviewing court should give an administrative agency’s
interpretation of statutes it is obliged to execute respectful consideration, but not deference. Id.
at 108.
III. COMMUNICATION SERVICE DEVICES
Several appellants take issue with the PSC’s decision to employ the ETSC’s estimate for
the statewide average number of communication service devices per person of .93, arguing that
counties that are mostly rural in character, or that have significant prison populations, should
have a lower average usage rate.
The affected appellants emphasize Ionia County, asserting that nine percent of its
residents are incarcerated in prisons, and insisting that this is an obvious situation where the
device usage rate must be below average, thus presumably below .93. We disagree. Any
attempt to estimate usage rates might as well include considering the possibility that persons
working for correctional institutions, or persons living near them, might elect to keep personal
communications devices for themselves in higher numbers than the public at large, as an extra
measure of security for themselves. If so, that would mitigate the distortion resulting from a
significant prison population in the county. Further, appellants’ arguments and exhibits do not
suggest that they examined the demography of Ionia or any other county with sufficient intensity
as to have accounted for all possible facets that might balance the presumably reduced usage
rates in penal populations. Finally, that nine percent of a county’s population may reasonably be
presumed to be entirely without personal communication devices implicates not so great a
fraction of the total population as to discredit use of the statewide average usage factor, even
though such average presumably presupposes lower rates of incarceration. Given that precise
actual figures are not available, we regard nine percent as simply not enough, in light of possible
mitigating circumstances, to render use of the statewide average unreasonable.
The affected appellants further argue that counties that are mostly rural in character are
more apt than urban-dominated ones to have areas where cell phone service is not available, and
argue that the residents of Michigan’s many such counties are thus less likely to have cellular
telephones, such that the statewide average is overly high. Appellees retort that this is mere
speculation, and offer their own theory that cellular telephone usage may be more intensive in
rural areas because of the greater distances between traditional landline telephones. Because
appellants’ theory is indeed mere conjecture, subject to being balanced or rebuffed by other
conjecture, it does not merit appellate relief.
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The affected appellants additionally point out that the .93 figure is an estimated average,
and as such cannot be perfect in every application, thus necessarily causing some counties to end
up with surcharges that fail to generate the revenues expected. However, to the extent that
appellants suggest that the actual statewide average is something different from .93, they provide
no concrete evidence in support. To the extent that they complain because the .93 factor is a
mere estimate, the obvious retort is that resort to an estimate cannot be avoided, including by
those wishing for a different factor. The PSC’s decision to apply a statewide estimate put
forward by the ETSC instead of rival estimates by various counties was reasonable, given that no
county has shown that it has bested mere averages by precisely identifying its rate of actual
device usage. In the battle of the estimates, the one covering the whole state as developed by the
ETSC carries a presumption of validity or reasonableness superior to proposals by interested
counties who offer more supposition than data in support of their positions.
For these reasons, appellants have failed to show that the PSC’s decision to apply the
average .93 factor in all cases was unlawful or unreasonable.2
IV. RETAINED SURCHARGES
At the relevant time,3 MCL 484.1401b(9) provided, “The service supplier may retain 2%
of the approved county 9-1-1 charge to cover the supplier's costs for billings and collections
under this section.” Appellants argue that this 2 percent must be considered when calculating
surcharge levels for purposes of identifying which ones exceed 2007 revenues plus 2.7 percent.
These appellants suggest that that 2 percent fee must be worked into that formula, such that they
be deemed entitled to at least 2007 revenues plus 4.7 percent.
Appellees suggest that this 2 percent provision takes the place of an earlier such
collection mechanism, but fail to identify that asserted mechanism with particularity. Grand
Traverse County, et al., argue in their reply brief that the “argument that the 2% might have been
previously buried in the technical charge that the industry had previously collected is wholly
irrelevant.” Appellant St. Clair County in turn advises, “Prior to the 2007 amendment to ETSA,
. . . service suppliers were compensated pursuant to a technical charge authorized by ETSA,” but
that “the amendments to ETSA do not affect a service supplier[’]s entitlement to the technical
charge.”
We need not inquire into whether the 2 percent provision at issue takes the place of an
earlier funding mechanism, or is complementary, or even duplicative, of one still in existence,
2
At oral argument, there was specific discussion concerning whether, in the event of a remand,
the PSC should be invited, or even directed, to take into account such actual data concerning
device usage rates as have come to light during the pendency of this appeal. We decline,
however, to allow the appellate process to convert a statutory scheme calling for estimates in
anticipation of future events into one whereby such estimates are later supplanted by review of
past developments. Our affirmance of the PSC’s decision to use the .93 factor universally leaves
that decision as law of the case, applicable through any further proceedings.
3
This subsection is now designated as subsection (10), but the text has not been changed.
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because a straightforward reading of the relevant statutory provisions indicates that any such
inquiry is inapt. “The Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning it plainly
expressed.” Trumble’s Rent-L-Center, Inc v Employment Security Comm, 197 Mich App 229,
233; 495 NW2d 180 (1992). Further, the Legislature is presumed to have considered the effect
of new legislation on all other legislation. See Walen v Dep’t of Corrections, 443 Mich 240,
248; 505 NW2d 519 (1993). These strictures inveigh against presuming that the Legislature
established the presumptively proper funding levels for 2008 as 2007 revenues plus 2.7 percent
with no awareness of, or concern for, the provision allowing service providers to retain 2
percent.4 According each pertinent statutory provision its plain meaning means calculating, as
the PSC did, 2007 revenues plus 2.7 percent without regard for the service providers’ prerogative
to retain 2 percent of surcharge revenues.
For these reasons, we reject this claim of error.
V. STATUTORY LIMITATION ON 2008 REVENUES
Appellants argue that the PSC erred in treating the formula of 2007 revenues plus 2.7
percent as a ceiling when adjusting surcharges. We agree.
Again, at the relevant time, MCL 484.1401b(2) authorized assessment of a county 9-1-1
charge not to exceed “the amount necessary and reasonable to implement, maintain, and operate
the 9-1-1 system in the county.” Again, MCL 484.1401e(2) states:
If the amount to be generated in 2008 exceeds the amount received in
2007 plus an amount not to exceed 2.7% of the 2007 revenues, the commission, in
consultation with the committee, shall review and approve or disapprove the
county 9-1-1 surcharge adopted under section 401b. If the commission does not
act by March 17, 2008, the county 9-1-1 surcharge shall be deemed approved. If
the surcharge is rejected, it shall be adjusted to ensure that the revenues generated
do not exceed the amounts allowed under this subsection. In reviewing the
surcharge under this subsection, the commission shall consider the allowable and
disallowable costs as approved by the committee on June 21, 2005.
The PSC interpreted the latter to mean that “[i]f the proposed surcharge is rejected, the
Commission is to adjust it so that the revenues will not exceed the 2.7% over the previous years’
surcharge revenues.” Appellants argue that, rather than fix all adjustments at 2007 revenues plus
2.7 percent, the PSC was obliged to determine what surcharges were necessary and reasonable
for each affected county, and base its adjustments accordingly. Appellants’ position has merit.
Section 401e(2) does not speak of 2007 revenues plus 2.7 percent as a limitation on the
PSC’s discretion once exercised; instead, it merely presents that formulation as the trigger for the
4
Or, conversely, they weigh against presuming that the Legislature provided for service
providers’ retention of 2 percent of surcharge revenues without regard for the specification of
2007 revenues plus 2.7 percent as the benchmark beyond which PSC review comes into play.
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PSC’s involvement. On its face, it establishes a level of cost recovery up to which there is a
presumption of necessity and reasonableness. Once a county’s proposal exceeds that level, thus
inviting PSC overview, the PSC is to adjust surcharges so that they do not exceed “the amounts
allowed under this subsection.” Appellees point out that that subsection spells out no formula
other than 2007 revenues plus 2.7 percent, and suggest that, for that reason, it must be treated as
the cap as well as the trigger.
However, that subsection incorporates by reference “section 401b,” and thus the latter’s
authorization under then-subsection (2) of a charge that does not exceed the “amount necessary
and reasonable to implement, maintain, and operate the 9-1-1 system in the county.” Further,
even aside from that incorporation by reference, MCL 484.1401e(2) expressly allows a surcharge
generating revenues above 2007 levels plus 2.7 percent, albeit conditioned upon PSC approval.
Section 401e(2) must be examined as a whole, including its incorporation by reference of
§ 401b. Thus, § 401e(2) must be read to include the provision of § 401b’s then-subsection (2)
establishing as the upward limit on revenues those “necessary and reasonable” for operation of 91-1 systems. The PSC thus erred in holding each county seeking revenues beyond 2007 levels
plus 2.7 percent to that precise formulation.
Further, § 401e(2)’s statement that the PSC is to “consider . . . allowable and
disallowable costs” suggests that the PSC was expected to examine each case with some
particularity. This underscores that the PSC’s statutory duty was to adjust those proposed
surcharges that were subject to adjustment to levels necessary and reasonable as discretely
determined, not arbitrarily to 2007 revenues plus 2.7 percent.
For these reasons, we conclude that the PSC erred in treating 2007 revenues plus 2.7
percent as a cap it was obliged to observe whenever disapproving of a specific proposal that
exceeded that level of funding, and in thus deeming itself relieved of the obligation to consider
with greater particularity what each affected county’s necessary and reasonable costs for its 9-11 system might be.
We therefore vacate the PSC’s orders in connection with each county for which the PSC
adjusted a proposal downward to 2007 levels plus 2.7 percent, and remand this case to the PSC
with instructions to decide anew each adjustment with individualized attention to what each
affected county’s necessary and reasonable 9-1-1 funding levels for 2008 were.5
5
Most appellants additionally argue that, because the PSC failed properly to adjust surcharges to
levels reasonably necessary to maintain their respective 9-1-1 systems, each should be deemed
approved, citing MCL 484.1401e(2), which deems a plan approved where the PSC “does not act
by March 17, 2008.” However, that default provision is invoked by total inaction, not imperfect
action. The PSC’s March 11, 2008, order reflected a good deal of action in connection with each
appellant, even if it proceeded incorrectly in important respects. Accordingly, appellants’
invocation of the default provision of MCL 484.1401e(2) is inapt. Remand thus remains
necessary for the required determinations of necessity and reasonableness.
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VI. CONCLUSION
We affirm the decisions below insofar as the PSC uniformly applied the average
communication device usage factor of .93 in calculating estimated 9-1-1 surcharge revenues for
2008, and made those calculations with no special regard for the service providers’ statutory
prerogative to retain 2 percent of those surcharges. We vacate the decisions, however, insofar as
the PSC treated the formulation of 2007 revenues plus 2.7 percent as the upward limit on its
discretion when adjusting proposed surcharges, and remand this case to the PSC with
instructions to consider those adjustments anew while applying particularized analysis and
discretion in each instance to determine necessary and reasonable 2008 funding levels.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ William B. Murphy
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