PEOPLE OF MI V JEFFREY FREDRICK HOLCOMB
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 15, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 291540
Midland Circuit Court
LC No. 08-003930-FH
JEFFREY FREDRICK HOLCOMB,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: DAVIS, P.J., and DONOFRIO and STEPHENS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of third-degree criminal sexual
conduct, MCL 750.520d(1)(a) (victim over 13 years of age and under 16 years of age).
Defendant was sentenced, as a second habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to 12 to 22 ½ years’
imprisonment. We affirm.
Defendant first contends that he was denied a fair trial as the result of several acts of
prosecutorial misconduct. We disagree. In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, this
Court analyzes the context of the prosecutor’s comments to ascertain whether the defendant was
denied a fair and impartial trial. People v Truong, 218 Mich App 325, 336; 553 NW2d 692
(1996).
Defendant alleges that the prosecutor denied him a fair trial by improperly attempting to
elicit hearsay testimony from Detective Robert Brzak. The prosecutor asked Brzak several
questions relating to conversations that he had with the victim and Amanda Coldwell during his
investigation. Defense counsel objected to three separate questions, alleging that each question
would result in the introduction of hearsay. Each objection was placed prior to the witness
providing an answer. Therefore, even if defendant can establish that the prosecutor was
improperly attempting to elicit hearsay, he cannot establish that the prosecutor’s conduct denied
him a fair trial because defense counsel successfully prevented the jury from being exposed to
the evidence. To the extent that defendant implies that the questions themselves exposed the jury
to improper evidence, the trial court instructed the jury that the questions of the attorney’s could
not be considered as evidence. A jury is presumed to follow its instructions and instructions are
presumed to cure most errors. People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 279; 662 NW2d 836
(2003). Furthermore, even if the witness had been permitted to answer the questions at issue, his
responses would not have qualified as hearsay. The prosecution’s line of questioning was
intended to merely explain the investigation process that resulted in the arrest and prosecution of
-1-
defendant. Therefore, the statements would not have been offered for the truth of the matter
asserted. “[A] statement offered to show why police officers acted as they did is not hearsay.”
People v Chambers, 277 Mich App. 1, 11; 742 NW2d 610 (2007). Consequently, defendant is
not entitled to relief as a result of the questions posed to Brzak.
Defendant next asserts that the prosecutor, during closing arguments, made improper
reference to defendant's previous conviction for criminal sexual conduct. Specifically, the
prosecutor stated:
He prior [sic] had been in trouble for having sex with a 15 year old girl.
You have that there. You know he’s been in trouble for it. And at that time, that
was eight years ago. It was in the year 2000.
He’s now eight years older, eight years wiser, and yet he’s still hanging
around with 14 and 15 year old kids.
Defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s argument. When not properly preserved, this Court
reviews claims of alleged prosecutorial misconduct for plain error affecting the substantial rights
of the defendant. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
In general, a prosecutor is granted great latitude in his closing argument. People v
Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). He “is free to argue the evidence and all
reasonable inferences from the evidence as it relates to his theory of the case.” People v
Gonzalez, 178 Mich App 526, 535, 444 NW2d 228 (1989). As explained below, the evidence of
defendant's previous conviction was properly admitted at trial pursuant to MCL 768.27a.
Consequently, the prosecution was free to reference that evidence during its closing argument.
The prosecution’s argument was not inaccurate or inconsistent with the properly admitted
evidence. Furthermore, even if the prosecutor’s closing argument was devoid of reference to the
prior conviction, the jury was already informed of the circumstances surrounding that crime.
Therefore, defendant cannot show that the prosecutor’s closing argument denied him a fair trial
where that argument merely reiterated the evidence with which the jury was already familiar.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of a previous
sexual encounter with a 15-year-old female pursuant to MCL 768.27a. Defendant contends that
the evidence should not have been admitted because MCL 768.27a is unconstitutional and
because the evidence is otherwise inadmissible pursuant to the Michigan Rules of Evidence. We
disagree. This Court conducts a de novo review when addressing a challenge to a statute’s
constitutionality. People v Hrlic, 277 Mich App. 260, 262; 744 NW2d 221 (2007).
Furthermore, the trial court’s decision to admit the evidence of defendant's prior offense is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Washington, 468 Mich 667, 670-671; 664 NW2d
203 (2003). The abuse of discretion standard recognizes that in certain circumstances there are
multiple reasonable and principled outcomes and, so long as the trial court selects one of these
outcomes, its ruling will not be disturbed. People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d
231 (2003).
MCL 768.27a provides: “in a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of
committing a listed offense against a minor [as provided under MCL 28.722], evidence that the
defendant committed another listed offense against a minor is admissible and may be considered
-2-
for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.”1 Defendant argues that MRE 404(b)
controls the introduction of a defendant's prior unlawful conduct and that the legislature does not
have the authority to modify that analytical scheme. This Court has already addressed that issue
in a published opinion. In People v Watkins, 277 Mich App 358; 745 NW2d 149 (2007), the
defendant was charged with third-degree criminal sexual conduct. It was alleged that the
defendant had sexual intercourse several times with they 12-year-old girl who babysat his
children. Id. at 360. The prosecution, pursuant to MCL 768.27a, sought to introduce evidence
that defendant had previously had sexual intercourse with a 15-year old girl who babysat the
defendant's children. Id. at 361. The prosecution argued that MCL 768.27a controlled, despite
conflicting with MRE 404(b). Id. at 362. This Court agreed and explained, “to the extent that
the statute, as applied, addresses an issue of substantive law, the statute prevails. This Court
recently held that ‘MCL 768.27a is a substantive rule of evidence because it does not principally
regulate the operation or administration of the courts.’” Id. at 364 (quoting People v Pattison,
276 Mich App. 613, 619; 741 NW2d 558 (2007)). Therefore, because the statute in question
does not represent an attempt by the legislature to regulate the operation of the courts, it follows
that the legislature was operating within its constitutionally granted powers. We note that
defendant's reliance on Justice Cavanagh’s dissent in People v Watkins, 482 Mich 1114; 758
NW2d 267 (2008), is misplaced as it is well-established that a dissenting opinion is not binding
authority. Rohde v Ann Arbor Pub Schools, 265 Mich App 702, 707; 698 NW2d 402 (2005).
Because the evidence of defendant’s prior conduct was admissible pursuant to MCL
768.27a, the trial court was correct to not analyze the admissibility of that evidence under MRE
404(b). However, the court incorrectly concluded that MRE 403 was also inapplicable to a
proper analysis. Despite the prosecution’s assertions to the contrary, this Court has established
that when evidence is submitted pursuant to MCL 768.27a, it is still subject to the relevancy
requirements of MRE 403. Pattison, 276 Mich App at 621. We find that the prosecution failed
to demonstrate that the evidence of defendant's prior conduct was relevant to the charged
offense. The evidence merely established that defendant, as an 18-year-old, had consensual
sexual intercourse with a 15-year-old girl. The evidence did not demonstrate that defendant ever
denied his conduct. In the present case, defendant was charged with having sexual intercourse
with a 15-year old girl when he was 26 years of age. Defendant denied that any sexual
penetration ever occurred in the present case. The prosecution failed to establish that defendant's
prior offense bore any value when determining his guilt of the charged offense. The evidence of
defendant's prior offense was never contextualized for the jury. Consequently, that evidence was
of little value to the proceedings. However, as explained below, defendant is not entitled to
relief where the trial court’s error was not outcome determinative.
When determining whether an error was outcome determinative, the error’s effect “is
evaluated by assessing it in the context of the untainted evidence to determine whether it is more
probable than not that a different outcome would have resulted without the error.” People v
Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). Had the evidence of defendant's prior
offense been omitted pursuant to MRE 403, it is still highly probable that defendant would have
been convicted. The prosecution presented substantial evidence in support of the charged
1
Defendant does not contend that his prior offense was not a listed offense.
-3-
offense, including the testimony of the victim, along with the testimony of Coldwell, Jessica
Dean and Aron Strait. Even if the jury had questioned the victim’s credibility, several other
witnesses corroborated her account of her relationship with defendant. Particularly persuasive
was Dean’s testimony, which established that she was in the bedroom while defendant and the
victim first had sexual intercourse. Defendant cannot establish that the evidence of his previous
conduct was a significant factor in his conviction.
Affirmed.
/s/ Alton T. Davis
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.