PEOPLE OF MI V DARRYLL JONES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 15, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 289727
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 08-013661-FH
DARRYLL JONES,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: WHITBECK, P.J., and METER and FORT HOOD, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The prosecutor appeals as of right from an order of dismissal entered by the trial court.
Defendant had been charged with delivery of less than 50 grams of heroin, MCL
333.7401(2)(a)(iv); maintaining a drug house, MCL 333.7405(1)(d); felon in possession of a
firearm, MCL 750.224f; and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL
750.227b. The prosecutor had also filed a fourth-offense habitual offender notice under MCL
769.12. The heroin was discovered in defendant’s home after the police obtained a search
warrant for the home. The search warrant was based on a controlled buy conducted by a
confidential source of information (SOI), who purchased cocaine from an individual in the home.
The trial court concluded that the police officer who signed the affidavit supporting the search
warrant misled the magistrate regarding the SOI’s credibility. Accordingly, the court suppressed
the evidence found in the home and dismissed the case. We reverse this decision and reinstate
the case. We also order that the case be assigned to a different judge on remand.
After the prosecutor charged him, defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence
found in his home, stating that the person who signed the affidavit in support of the search
warrant, Officer Joseph Castro of the Detroit Police Department, falsely or with a reckless
disregard for the truth stated that he “saw the SOI go directly to the target location and then
return to the affiant turning over suspected cocaine.” Defendant argued that “no person came to
the location of the execution of the search warrant and purchased cocaine” and “drugs are
commonly sold on the entire street of the location.”1
1
Evidently defendant was suggesting that the SOI had actually purchased cocaine at a home
other than defendant’s.
-1-
At the motion hearing, Castro testified that he searched the SOI before the SOI went into
the house in question and found no drugs on him. Castro stated that he saw the SOI approach the
front door of the home, enter the building, “exit the location,” and come back to Castro’s vehicle.
The SOI returned to the vehicle with “[a] sum of suspected cocaine,”2 and the SOI also did not
have the money that Castro had provided him beforehand for the controlled buy. Castro stated
that he had “used” this SOI over 50 times previously and that the information provided by the
SOI had resulted in convictions. Castro admitted that he did not see anyone come to the door of
the house to greet the SOI. However, he stated that the SOI described the person who greeted
him as “a black male, 5’10[”], 165 pounds . . . with [s]hort, curly black hair, slim build, dark
complexion.” Castro admitted that the description does not match defendant.
A search warrant was obtained for the residence the same day; the police found no
cocaine in the house, but they did find heroin and drug paraphernalia.
Berchara Jones, defendant’s wife, testified that she lives at house, along with her three
children, her mother, and defendant. She denied that anyone who matches the description
provided by the SOI lives in or has access to the house. She also denied that anyone besides her
mother and defendant and her children came into the residence on the day in question.
Defense counsel argued that “there’s nothing to corroborate the information that’s given
the affiant by the SOI . . . .” He argued that maybe no SOI went into the house, or maybe the
SOI planted cocaine in the house beforehand.
Before making its ruling, the trial court opined that the definition of “reliable” varies
from person-to-person and from situation-to-situation. It then stated:
But we have to get back. I think in this case, where all of this is going to,
there is no standard except the abuse of discretion standard or somebody
neglecting and intentionally doing something; and the focus is on the affiant and
not on the SOI, and Mr. Castro doesn’t have to go into the house, doesn’t have to
confirm anything. You know, what he confirmed is pretty much the standard.
You don’t have the money when you come back. You have some drugs when you
come back . . . . The fact that it might have been different drugs, might go to the
veracity, and I would question whether 2117 should ever be used again.
But as it relates to a prior recitation, in the four corners of the search
warrant, there were those indications that the judge had as to his reliability.
Castro got to determine what was reliable. The judge concurred. There was
nothing to show that he was deceptive. I mean, he put some numbers in there.
Whether they’re true or not, that not what’s being attacked. So based on the four
corners, I can’t find that there was an abuse of discretion by the magistrate to
issue a finding that . . . the evidence, based on the search, should be suppressed.
2
The substance was later analyzed and was indeed found to be cocaine.
-2-
The court signed an order denying the motion to suppress.
Later, the court sua sponte ordered the prosecutor to produce the search-warrant records
for the cases in which Castro had used the SOI. The prosecutor complied and provided the court
with the records in those 22 cases, but the court then requested the search-warrant records for
any cases at all in which the SOI had been used. The prosecutor refused to comply with this
order, arguing that it imposed an undue burden on her office.
Despite defense counsel’s not having raised the issue, the court subsequently, at a motion
hearing, revisited its earlier decision to deny defendant’s motion to suppress. The court analyzed
the 22 available records and stated that there were 10 instances in which the SOI participated in a
controlled buy for a particular substance and that same substance was later found at the pertinent
location. The court stated that on the first date Castro used the SOI and on the last date Castro
used the SOI, he used the same words in his affidavit: “SOI has been used by the crew members
of the Detroit Police Department Narcotic Division on over ten occasions resulting in seven
arrests for violation of controlled substance acts and other offenses.” The court noted that as of
the last date, there were at least 22 additional instances in which the SOI had been used. The
court stated:
It doesn’t have in there that the last 22 times that Mr. Castro used them
that, you know, he was only credible half or less than half the time, or at least he
was only successful half the time. You can’t pull out what you would like to, to
show somebody that they were right or that they’re reliable. You can’t tweak,
omit, exaggerate statistics to try to prove a point that you want to point [sic].
There’s no way in this world, if Mr. Castro was being honest – which is
required by being the affiant in a search warrant – to attest to numbers – that you
can exclude 22 numbers. The numbers are identical for the first search warrant
that he requested using 2117 that was supplied to the court and the last one that
was used for Mr. Jones. Identical. He omitted 22 from the magistrate’s
consideration. You can’t hide results from the magistrate and rely on old numbers
to try to attest to reliability. . . .
I think and I rule that by doing what Mr. Castro did, that he intentionally
skewed the numbers, intentionally omitted known [failures] – not unknown,
because these are where he was responsible, where he was the affiant. He
intentionally omitted known failures of . . . SOI 2117 and didn’t supply them in
the affidavit so that the judge would be allowed – the magistrate would be
allowed to make the decision about the SOI’s credibility, and that’s not what the
law requires.
He didn’t follow the law. He intentionally did not follow the law, and as a
result of that, by revisiting the motion from the defense, I’m going to grant the
motion to suppress what was found as a result of the search warrant . . . . It’s not
that the SOI has to establish their credibility, but the police have to demonstrate
an honesty that Mr. Castro failed to do to allow the examining magistrate to make
-3-
the decision about whether the numbers convince him, and those numbers have to
be honest, have to reflect the truth, which these don’t.
The court ordered the evidence suppressed and dismissed the charges against defendant, stating
that it no longer needed the additional records involving the SOI.
On appeal, the prosecutor argues that the trial court erred in reversing its earlier ruling
regarding the motion to dismiss. She contends that this case must be remanded for trial. We
agree.
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence for clear error, but we
review its conclusions of law de novo. People v Sobczak-Obetts, 463 Mich 687, 694; 625 NW2d
764 (2001).
To be valid, a search must typically be conducted pursuant to a warrant based on
probable cause. People v Kazmierczak, 461 Mich 411, 417; 605 NW2d 667 (2000). “Probable
cause exists where there is a substantial basis for inferring a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” People v Hellstrom, 264 Mich App 187,
192; 690 NW2d 293 (2004) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
We pay great deference to a magistrate’s determination of probable cause in support of a
search warrant. People v Russo, 439 Mich 584, 604; 487 NW2d 698 (1992). Our review of a
magistrate’s determination regarding whether probable cause exists to support a search warrant
involves neither de novo review nor application of an abuse of discretion
standard. Rather, the preference for warrants . . . requires the reviewing court to
ask only whether a reasonably cautious person could have concluded that there
was a “substantial basis” for the finding of probable cause. [Id. at 603 (citations
omitted).]
The task of the magistrate considering whether to issue a search warrant
is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and
basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place. [People v Keller, 479 Mich 467, 475; 739 NW2d 505 (2007) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).]
If it is determined that an affiant has knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth
inserted false material into an affidavit and that the false material was necessary for a finding of
probable cause, the search warrant must be quashed and the fruits of the search excluded at trial.
People v Melotik, 221 Mich App 190, 200; 561 NW2d 453 (1997). A defendant may “challenge
the truthfulness of factual statements made in an affidavit supporting a warrant,” even though
there is a presumption that the affidavit is valid. People v Turner, 155 Mich App 222, 226; 399
NW2d 477 (1986).
-4-
“To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger’s attack must be more than
conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross examine.
There must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the
truth, and those allegations must be accompanied by an offer of proof. They
should point out specifically the portion of the warrant affidavit that is claimed to
be false; and they should be accompanied by a statement of supporting reasons.”
[Id. at 226-227, quoting Franks v Delaware, 438 US 154, 171; 98 S Ct 2674; 57 L
Ed 2d 667 (1978).]
The prosecutor argues that a suppression hearing should have never even been held under
Turner, 155 Mich App at 226-227, because defendant made an insufficient offer of proof. We
conclude, however, that even assuming that a hearing was warranted, the trial court erred in
reversing its initial decision to deny defendant’s motion to suppress. As noted by the trial court
during the first motion hearing, there was nothing within the four corners of the search warrant to
show that the affiant had been deceptive, and the evidence later produced also failed to show that
the affiant had been deceptive. The trial court took issue with the fact that in only 10 of 22 cases,
the SOI participated in a controlled buy for a particular substance and that same substance was
later found at the pertinent location. However, the prosecutor at one of the hearings noted that
there were only five instances where nothing (i.e., no drug paraphernalia or drugs of any kind)
was found. Moreover, that an observed, controlled buy occurs for a particular drug and that
later, no drugs are found or a different drug is found at the location in question does not prove
that the confidential informant is unreliable or deceptive. There are numerous reasons – running
out of supplies, disposal of the drugs – why such a result might occur. The simple fact is that if a
proper controlled buy occurs – the police search the SOI, provide him with money, and observe
him entering a house, and the police then observe the SOI leaving the house and returning with
drugs and without the money – there is credible information regarding drugs being located in that
house. The number of prior cases here in which the SOI was “not credible” (to use the trial
court’s terminology) does not change this result. There was simply no evidence that the SOI lied
to the police in this case.
Moreover, the statement criticized by the trial court in this case – “SOI has been used by
the crew members of the Detroit Police Department Narcotic Division on over ten occasions
resulting in seven arrests for violation of controlled substance acts and other offenses” – was not
materially false or materially misleading. Accordingly, the trial court’s basis for granting the
motion to suppress was invalid. We emphasize that the trial court did not find, as initially argued
by defendant, that Officer Castro lied or acted with reckless disregard for the truth in stating that
he observed the controlled buy. The court’s ruling was based solely on the 22 records provided
by the prosecutor and Castro’s inclusion in the affidavit of the statement quoted above. We
reverse that ruling. Because the dismissal of the case was based solely on the grant of the motion
to suppress, we also reverse the order of dismissal and remand this case for trial.
The prosecutor argues that the trial court erred in ordering her office to produce all
search-warrant records involving the SOI. The prosecutor’s argument makes clear that she is not
challenging the request for the 22 records concerning Officer Castro but is instead challenging
the later order involving all the SOI’s search-warrant records. This issue is moot, because the
trial court later found that it did not “need that information now” and essentially voided the
subpoena. At any rate, we do find that the order constituted an abuse of discretion, see MCR
-5-
6.201(J), because there was simply no reasonable basis for the court to make the burdensome
request that the prosecutor produce all search-warrant records related to the SOI.3
The prosecutor lastly argues that this case should be assigned to a different judge on
remand.4
The general concern when deciding whether to remand to a different trial
judge is whether the appearance of justice will be better served if another judge
presides over the case. We may remand to a different judge if the original judge
would have difficulty in putting aside previously expressed views or findings, if
reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice, and if
reassignment will not entail excessive waste or duplication . . . .
Repeated rulings against a party, no matter how erroneous, or vigorously
or consistently expressed, are not disqualifying.
Rather, plaintiff must
demonstrate that the judge would be unable to rule fairly on remand given his past
comments or expressed views. [Bayati v Bayati, 264 Mich App 595; 691 NW2d
812 (2004) (citations omitted).]
We have reviewed the transcripts and conclude that an irreconcilable conflict has developed
between the trial judge and the prosecutor in this case. After the judge, with no prompting from
defendant, ordered the search-warrant records, repeated arguments took place between the judge
and the prosecutor, with the judge essentially becoming an advocate for defendant. Under these
circumstances, we conclude that remand to a different judge is necessary.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
3
The court seemed to acknowledge that these records were not pertinent when he stated at the
last hearing that Castro “intentionally skewed the numbers, intentionally omitted known
[failures] – not unknown, because these are where he was responsible, where he was the affiant”
(emphasis added).
4
The prosecutor did file a motion for recusal below, but the court did not rule on this motion
because instead it unexpectedly dismissed the case.
-6-
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