PEOPLE OF MI V ADONIS ALEXANDER FRYE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 15, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 288444
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 07-002249-FC
ADONIS ALEXANDER FRYE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: DAVIS, P.J., and DONOFRIO and STEPHENS, JJ.
DAVIS, P.J. (concurring)
I concur with the majority in all respects other than their determination that the trial court
abused its discretion by admitting into evidence the certified record of defendant’s prior felony
conviction for delivery of marijuana.
Defendant’s defense was that he acted in self-defense, due to the victim’s purported
propensity for violence. Although motive is not ordinarily part of the prosecutor’s case, intent is
highly relevant to whether defendant actually did act in self-defense. Because defendant raised
the issue, the prosecutor was required to affirmatively disprove defendant’s claim of selfdefense. The existence of a retaliatory or vengeful motive for the shooting—in other words,
offensive rather than defensive—is a “fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action,” and therefore any evidence making such a motive more or less likely would be relevant.
MRE 401.
The evidence indicated that, among other things, defendant sold marijuana as a
significant part of his means of livelihood. The victim apparently had some influence on
defendant’s acquisition of that marijuana for resale, and because of a dispute between the two of
them, the victim had threatened defendant that he would “never make no more money on the
street.” There was some evidence indicating that defendant was angry with the victim, possibly
aggravated by this threat to cut off defendant’s livelihood. The fact that defendant was
previously convicted for delivery of marijuana supports the prosecutor’s theory that defendant
shot the victim for reasons unrelated to self-defense. The specific nature of defendant’s prior
conviction therefore had probative value independent of the bare fact that defendant was
ineligible to possess a firearm.
I agree with the majority’s observation that in an ordinary case, a defendant’s offer to
stipulate to being ineligible to possess a firearm due to a prior conviction will establish that
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element of the relevant offense. Therefore, in an ordinary case, if a defendant so stipulates, the
record of that prior conviction would be irrelevant. However, in this case, defendant’s prior
conviction was relevant to more than just whether he was ineligible to possess the firearm, but
also to his assertion of self-defense. His prior offense was not one that is typically regarded as
particularly atrocious or likely to inflame the jury’s passion, particularly in a jurisdiction where
possession of small amounts of marijuana has been decriminalized by ordinance, and certainly
delivery of marijuana is less heinous than the murder for which defendant was charged. It is
difficult to see how admission thereof posed much risk of unfair prejudice, particularly enough
prejudice to outweigh the probative value of the evidence.
For these reasons, I conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting
the certified record of defendant’s prior delivery of marijuana conviction. I do note, that had the
trial court made any sort of record in support of its ruling this discussion would likely have been
unnecessary and a per curiam opinion would have issued in this case.
/s/ Alton T. Davis
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